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PREFACE 
The current state of the law relating to exemption clauses 
has been described, fittingly, as "unmanageably complex „1  . These 
complexities, in part, have stemmed from the past failure of the 
courts to recognise that examption clauses are an integral part of a 
contract and should not be ignored in assessing the rights and 
duties of the parties to the agreement. 
This thesis has two functions. One is to examine the role 
and function of exemption clauses in contracts and the choice of 
controls which can be imposed upon such clauses. The second 
function is to assess the desirability of reform of the terms implied, 
chiefly by the Sale of Goods Acts and the Trade Practices Act, in 
contracts. Since exemption clauses often exclude, restrict or 
modify implied terms discussion of these terms has been drawn into 
the body of the thesis. 
A postscript has been added to include changes 
foreshadowed by the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1985 (Clth.) 
which are relevant to the main parts of the thesis. The law as 
stated is that applying on January 1, 1986. 
I would like to thank my supervisors Mr Frank Bates, and 
Mr Donald Chalmers, respectively Reader and Senior Lecturer in 
Law in the Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania. Their 
suggestions, chiefly concerning organization of the material, were 
detailed and very helpful. I would also like to thank Mr Justice 
Kirby for his interest in the initial research and his encouragement. 
I am also grateful to members of the Tasmanian Law Reform 
Commission, particularly Mr Bruce Piggott, its Chairman and Mr Bill 
1. 	D. Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet and Maxwell 
2nd edition (1982), at p.264. 
Goudie, its former Executive Director for their comments upon 
earlier drafts and their dedication to reform of the law generally. I 
would also wish to record thanks to Associate Professor Derek 
Roebuck, University of Papua New Guinea, who, when Professor of 
Law at the University of Tasmania, commenced a research interest 
in 1978 by offering my name to undertake a reference on the thesis 
topic for the Tasmanian Law Reform Commission. Lastly, but no 
means least, I wish to record my warm appreciation to Mrs Karen 
Hanlon and Mrs Kayleen Cooper who produced a clear manuscript 
from a multiplicity of amendments. 
John Livermore 
Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
University of Tasmania 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EXEMPTION CLAUSES: THE BACKGROUND 
Introduction  
The term "exemption clause" is generally used as meaning a clause in a 
contract or a term in a notice which appears to exclude or restrict a liability 
which would otherwise arise. 1 The term "exclusion clause", however, refers 
to a clause that sets out to exclude liability. Therefore, at the beginning, it 
must be made clear that throughout this discussion the wider term "exemption 
clause" has been used in preference to that of "exclusion clause". The reason 
for this is as follows: if the term exclusion clause were solely used then 
there could be no discussion of terms in contracts which restrict liability as 
opposed to excluding it. In relation to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (as 
amended) s68 refers to "Any term of a contract ... that purports to exclude, 
restrict or modify" (or has that effect). For that reason the term "exemption 
clause" is used throughout the ensuing text. The discussion of "indemnity 
clauses" is similarly justified in that such clauses have the effect of 
excluding, restricting, and modifying, in terms of s68. It should be noted 
that the Second Report on Exemption Clauses stated that an indemnity clause 
effectively operated as a provision restricting a right or remedy and should 
1. 	See P.K.J. Thompson Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Butterworths, 
(1978) at p.7. See also Second Report on Exemption Clauses, the Law  
Commission (Law Corn. No69) and Scottish Law Commission (Scot. Law Corn. 
No.39) (1975) at paras.161-162. See especially B. Coote Exception Clauses, 
Sweet and Maxwell, (1964) at p.7 and his classification of exemption clauses 
in Chapter 1; see also Appendix pp.145 et seq. See Law Commission No.95, 
Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods (1979) following Law 
Commission Working Paper No.71 (1977). For comment on this report see 
N.E. Palmer (1980) 43 M.L.R. 193. 
1 
be treated as an exemption clause. 
One further introductory point needs to be made: an exemption clause 
may by a contractual provision limit or exclude or modify liability not only in 
contract but in tort. For example, liability for death or injury to property 
or persons arising from negligence may be governed by such a clause. 
Therefore the desirability of extending control of exemption (and indemnity) 
clauses in contract that have this effect in tort is later considered. 
The preliminary analysis of the topic of this discussion proceeds in the 
following sequence. Firstly, the definition of exemption clauses (including 
indemnity clauses) is dealt with; secondly, the control of exemption clauses 
under the common law is reviewed, with particular reference to the historical 
background and to the origins and development of fundamental breach. 
Thirdly, the principal common law rules of construction used by the courts in 
relation to exemption clauses are examined. 
Definition of Exemption Clauses  
It is common for parties to written contracts to insert clauses that 
apparently remove, limit or qualify legal rights, duties, liabilities or remedies 
which would otherwise apply. Such clauses may be termed "exemption", 
" exclusion" or H ex ce pt ion " clauses or take the form of specific exclusions of 
warranties or conditions under the general heading of a "guarantee" or 
"warranty". Terminology used may also include such phrases as "sold as is" 
or "with all faults". In other cases such clauses appear to limit or exclude 
the right to reject, to limit the amount of damages claimable, or place a time 
limit on claims or their reception. These clauses may additionally attempt to 
acknowledge that facts which amount to a breach of contract have not 
occurred. 
In the analysis that follows, an exemption clause is generally defined 
as any term in a contract excluding, restricting or modifying a remedy or 
2. 	See Chapter Eight. 
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liability arising out of a breach of a contractual obligation.
3 
Indemnity Clauses  
Indemnity clauses effectively operate as provisions restricting a right 
or a remedy. Therefore they fall within the general definition of an 
exemption clause used throughout this discussion. 
A contracting party, A, may attempt to avoid the consequences of 
liability by making the person with whom he contracts, B, bear the loss 
resulting from his, A's, own breach of duty. For example, a car ferry 
operator may contract with a car owner on terms that the latter will indemnify 
the operator against third party claims arising from damage caused to other 
cars or their occupants on the ferry by the negligent positioning of the car 
by the operator's employees. A clause may, exceptionally, require A to 
indemnify B against liability B incurs to A, so that if A sues B, A has to 
pay back to B what he recovers from B. 
Such a situation arose in Smith and Anor v. South Wales Switchgear  
Co Ltd. '  Chrysler (Scotland) Ltd contracted with the defendants on the 
basis of Chrysler's standard form general conditions of contract. Part of this 
included the following clause: 
"In the event of the order involving the carrying out of work 
by the supplier and its subcontractors on land and/or premises 
of the purchaser, the supplier will keep the purchaser 
indemnified against; (a) All losses and costs incurred by 
reason of the supplier's breach of any statute, by-law or 
regulation; (b) Any liability, loss, claim or proceedings 
whatsoever under statute or common law (i) in respect of 
personal injury to, or death of any person whomsoever, (II) in 
respect of any injury or damage whatsoever to any property, 
real or personal, arising out of this or in the course of or 
caused by the execution of this order. The supplier will 
insure against and cause all subcontractors to insure against 
their liability hereunder". 
3. D. Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts, Sweet and Maxwell, 2nd 
edition (1982), at p.1. See also Second Report on Exemption Clauses, n.1 at 
para.161. 
4. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 165. 
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In carrying out the work at Chrysler's premises an employee of South Wales 
Switchgear suffered injury due to an accident caused by negligence and 
breach of statutory duty by Chrysler. Chrysler claimed to be indemnified in 
respect of the liability by virtue of the indemnity clause quoted above. In 
allowing that appeal by the supplier, the House of Lords held that the clause, 
on its true construction, was to be determined on the basis of tests laid down 
in Canada Steamship Co Ltd v. The King 5 that applied equally to exemption 
and indemnity clauses. On this basis the clause did not provide indemnity 
against Chrysler's own negligence. This was so, firstly, because no such 
express provision was made for such an indemnity. Secondly, the words "any 
liability ... whatsoever • •• under common law ... in respect of personal 
injury" although wide enough to cover Chrysler's own negligence, did so only 
in respect of its liability for the acts and omissions of South Wales 
Switchgear's employees and not for Chrysler's liability for their own 
employees. Thirdly, the head of damages under common law liability for 
personal injury might be based on a ground other than Chrysler's own 
negligence. 
Control of Exemption Clauses under Common Law  
Historical background : the Origins of Fundamental Breach 
It is a generally accepted proposition that in every contract there are 
certain obligations, which are fundamental, the breach of which amounts to a 
non-performance of the contract. Such a breach constitutes a breach of a 
"fundamental term". As Lord Abinger noted in Chanter v. Hopkins: 
5. 	[1952] A.C. 192; these tests were unsuccessfully applied to an 
indemnity clause in a contract in Greenwell v. Matthew Hall Pty Ltd, A.W. 
Boulderstone Pty Ltd and Cyclone Double Grip Scaffolding Pty Ltd District 
Court of NSW (5/411982) (unreported) where the proferens had not expressly 
exempted for its own negligence; Smith v. South Wales Switchgear Co Ltd  
applied. 
4 
"If a man offers to buy peas off another, and he sends him 
beans, he does not perform his contract .. the contract is to 
sell peas, and if he sends tem anything else in their stead, it 
is a non-performance of it." 
It was also early established by the courts that where a seller of 
goods did not deliver goods under a contract no reliance could be placed by 
him on an exclusion clause in the contract which benefitted him. 7 
By contrast, in the case of "fundamental breach", the court is 
concerned with the consequences of a particularly serious breach of condition 
which is adjudged to have deprived the party not in default of the whole 
benefit which it was intended that he should obtain from the contract. In the 
words of Lord Dilhorne in Suisse At!antique Societe D'Armement Maritime S.A. 
v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale:- 
"In relation to a fundamental breach, one has to have regard 
to the whole contract so that, if it is not complied with the 
performance becomes somethinga totally different from that 
which the contract contemplates" 
The doctrine of fundamental breach 9 , prior to the Suisse At!antique 
case was a substantive rule of law which held that there were categories of 
breach and types of contractual term so fundamental that no exception clause, 
however drafted, could exclude them. The doctrine so defined is attributed 
in origin to three judgements by Devlin J., (dealt with subsequently) in 
Chandris v. Isbrandtsep - Moller Co. Inc. 10 , Alexander v. Railway  
Executive" , and Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd v. Sassoon S. Getty, San &  
Co. 12 
6. (1838) 4 M.& W. 399 at p.404. 
7. Nicol v. Godts (1854) 10 Excl. 191, Wieler v. Schilizzi (1859) 17 C.B. 
619. 
8. [1966] 2 All E.R. 61 at p.68. 
9. For a detailed treatment of the origins of fundamental breach see B. 
Coote "The Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach" (1967) 40 A.L.J 336. See 
also B. Coote Exception Clauses (195'4) particularly Chapters Five, Six and 
Eight. 	 f(9 
10. [1951] 1 K.B. 240. 
11. [1951] 2 K.B. 882. 
12. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1468. 
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The concept of deviation in maritime law, however, has been a major 
contributor to the evolution of the doctrine of fundamental breach. 
(a) 	Deviation  
For example, under common law, in a contract of carriage by sea, a 
condition is implied that the carrier will not deviate from the usual, 
customary or prescribed route.
14 
Where a vessel deviates from her 
proper course, the shipowner is not only liable for the delay, but is 
additionally liable for any loss or damage that occurs to the goods. In 
Thorley v. Orchis S.S. Co 15 locust beans were shipped from Limassol 
in Cyprus to London. The vessel had deviated to two ports in Asia 
Minor en route. On arrival in London the beans were damaged 
through the negligence of the stevedores. The court held that the 
shipowners were liable as the deviation had displaced the contract and 
they could not rely on the provision for exemption of negligence in the 
contract. In that case it was noted by Fletcher Moulton L.J.: 
"A deviation is such a serious matter, and changes the 
character of the voyage so essentially, that a shipowner who 
has been guilty of a deviation cannot be considered as having 
performed his part of the bill of lading contract, but 
something fundamentally different and therefore he cannot 
claim the benygt of stipulations in his favour contained in the 
bill of lading" 
14. See Davis v. Garrett (1830) 6 Bing. 716. On deviation see 
Carver, Carriage of Goods by Sea,  Sweet and Maxwell, (1982) paras 
1161-1208. 
15. [1907] 1 K.B. 660. 
16. Ibid. at p.699. 	Coote explains the phenomena associated with 
deviation as lying in the nature of a bailment relationship. Such protection 
as this gives the bailee lasts only so long as the bailee holds the bailed goods 
within any limits the bailor has• placed on his right to possession. 	If he 
steps outside these limits he holds, not as a bailee, but as a mere detainor, 
and as such becomes absolutely liable for loss or damage to the goods so 
detained. See B. Coote "The Second Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach" 
(1981) 55 A.L.J. 788 at p.789. See also Lord Wright in A/S Rendall v. Arcos 
Ltd (1937) 43 Com. Cas. 6, at p.15. 
6 
In Stag Line v. Foscolo Mango Lord Atkin laid down the test of 
reasonable deviation": 
"A true test seems to be what departure from the contract 
voyage might a prudent person controlling the voyage at the 
time make and maintain having in mind all the relevant 
circumstances existing at the time, including the terms of the 
contract and the interests of the parties concerned, but 
without oblipation to consider the interests of any one as 
conclusive" 
However, until settled by the House of Lords in Hain S.S. Co. Ltd v. 
Tate & Lyle18 , the exact effect of a breach of obligation under a 
contract of sea carriage to proceed without deviation was in doubt. In 
Hain's case it was settled that the obligation not to deviate is a 
condition of the contract, breach of which entitles the owner of the 
goods, if he so wishes, to treat the contract as repudiated. Deviation 
therefore, does not of itself automatically end the contract. 19 The 
House of Lords in Ham's case were agreed that it is open to the party 
not in default to either treat the contract as at an end, or waive the 
20 
breach and treat it as subsisting. 	As Lord Atkin noted:- 
".. the true view is that the departure from the voyage 
contracted to be made is a breach by the shipowner of his 
contract, but a breach of such a serious character that 
however slight the deviation the other party is entitled to 
treat it as going to the root of the contract, and declare 
himself no longer bound by any of its terms. I am satisfied 
that by a long series of decisions adopting in fact commercial 
usage in this respect any deviation constitutes a breach of 
contract of this serious nature .. the breach by deviation does 
not automatically cancel the express contract, otherwise the 
shipowner by his own wrong can get rid of his own contract. 
Nor does it affect merely the exceptions clauses. This would 
make those clauses alone subject to a condition of no deviation, 
17. 1932 2 A.C. 328, at p.343. 
18. (19361 2 All E.R. 597. 
19. Shipowners have attempted to extend their rights to call at ports and 
to deviate by the insertion of a clause or clauses in their agreements which 
gives the ship express liberty to deviate. Such 'liberty clauses' are usually 
drafted so as to include every possible deviation. 
20. See Asquith J. in Woolf v. Collis Removal Service [1948] K.B. 11 
(C.A.). 
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a construction for which I can find no justification. 	It is 
quite inconsistent with the cases which have treated deviation 
as precluding enforcement of demurrage provisions. The event 
falls within the ordinary law of contract. The party who is 
affected by the breach has the right to say, I am not now 
bound by the contract, whether it expressed in a 
charterparty, bill of lading or otherwise.' 
The charterer in Hain's case had acted in a manner which suggested 
an affirmation of the contract and a waiver of the shipowner's breach. 
In these circumstances, the House of Lords held that the shipowner's 
deviation had not automatically ended the contract, since this would 
have permitted a party in default the right to determine his own 
contract and so possibly profit from his wrongdoing. The deviation 
was treated by their Lordships as any other breach. The deviation 
constituted a form of repudiation which the charterer could opt to 
accept and end the contract, or ignore and so waive the right to 
repudiate, affirm the contract, but at the same time reserve the right 
to damages. The charterer chose the latter cause. 
(b) 	The Unification of the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach  
In the course of their judgements in Hain's case Lords Atkin and 
Wright respectively made the following statements: 
"One of the terms [of the contract] is the performance of an 
agreed voyage, a deviation from which is a fundamental 
breach." 
"An unjustified deNiation is a fundamental breach of a contract 
of affreightment. "- 
These statements were built on by Devlin J. in Chandris v. Isbrandsen - 
21. [1936] 2 All E.R. 597, at 601; explained in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co 
Ltd v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1961] 2 All E.R. 257. See Photo 
Productions Ltd v. Securicor [1980] 1 All E.R. 556, at pp.567,568, where 
Lord Diplock refers to fundamental breach in the context of maritime deviation 
and also apportionment of risk under the Hague Rules in bills of lading. 
22. [1936] 2 All E.R 597, at pp.603,607. 
8 
Moller Co. Inc.
2 3 The case involved a claim for demurrage where a 
charterer had loaded a dangerous cargo in breach of contract, with the result 
that unloading was delayed. In his judgement Devlin J. cited the passages 
from Hain's case quoted above in support of the concept, of a breach of 
•• • some fundamental or basic condition of the contract, such as involved, 
for example, in a deviation from the contract voyage." 24 In Alexander v. 
Railway Executive
25 
this proportion was given greater precision. 	In 
Alexander's case A went with a friend, C, to deposit luggage at a railway 
station. C ten days later persuaded one of the railway's clerks to let him 
open the cases without producing the ticket and remove some of their 
contents. Over a few weeks C persuaded the clerk to let him take all the 
cases. C had no authority from A and was later convicted of larceny. The 
railway authority was found liable to A by the court; it was unable to rely on 
the exemption clause in the contract relieving them from liability since 
allowing an authorized third party to have access to goods deposited in the 
cloakroom meant that the defendants had broken a fundamental term of the 
agreement. Devlin J. said : 
"I think that that must be said to be a fundamental breach of 
the contract .. The ordinary law of contract .. involves that, 
where there has been a breach of a fundamental term of a 
contract giving the other party the right to rescind it, then 
unless and until, with full knowledge of all the facts, he elects 
to affirm the contract and not rescind it, the special terms of 
the conlgact go and cannot be relied upon by the defaulting 
party." 
The development of a substantive doctrine of fundamental breach was 
taken further by Devlin J. in Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd. v. Sasson I. 
23. (19511 1 K.B. 240. - For commentary on this and the two subsequent 
decisions of/Devlin J. noted see B. Coote Exception Clauses, Sweet and 
Maxwell (19'4), pp.104 et seq. 
24. !bid at p.248. 
25. [1951] 2 K.B. 882. 
26. [1951] 2 K.B. 882, at pp.889-890. 	In The Albion [1953] 1 W.L.R. 
1026 the Court of Appeal confirmed that the expressions 'fundamental term' 
and 'fundamental breach' had no special significant outside deviation. 
9 
Setty, Son & Co.
27  In this case there had been a sale by description of 
round mahogany logs of given specifications. The timber did not comply with 
the specifications but the buyer failed to take action within a contractual 
fourteen-day time-limit on claims. Devlin J. held that the limitation clause 
did apply as, although there was a failure to comply with the specifications, 
the logs delivered were in fact round mahogany logs. Devlin J. attempted to 
lay down a new and general principle in the following terms: 
"It is no doubt a principle of construction that exceptions are 
to be construed as not being applicable for the protection of 
those for whose benefit they are inserted if the beneficiary 
has committed a breach of a fundamental term of the contract 
... If, for example, instead of delivering mahogany logs the 
sellers delivered pine logs and the buyers inadvertently 
omitted to have them examined for fourteen days, it Aight be 
well that the sellers could not rely on the time clause"' 
Devlin J.'s "principle of construction" which he had applied as a rule 
of law in the Smeaton Hanscomb's case was subsequently restated as a 
substantive rule of law by Denning L.J. in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. 
Wallis
29 as follows: 
"Notwithstanding earlier cases which might suggest the 
contrary it is now settled that exempting clauses of this kind, 
no matter how widely they are expressed, only avail the party 
when he is carrying out the contract in its essential respects. 
He is not allowed to use them as cover for misconduct or 
indifference or to enable him to turn a blind eye to his 
obligations. They do not avail him when he is guilty of a 
breach which goes to the root of the contract. It is necessary 
to look at the contract apart from the exempting clauses to see 
what are the terms express or implied which impose an 
obligation on the party. If he has been guilty of a breach of 
these obligations in a respect which goes to the very root of 
the contract he cannot rely on the exempting clauses. ... 
The principle is sometimes said to be that a party cannot rely 
on an exempting clause when he delivers something 'different 
in kind' from that contracted for, or has broken a 
'fundamental term' or a 'fundamental contractual obligation'. 
However, I think they are all comprehended by the general 
27. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1468. 
28. Ibid. at p.1470. 
29. [1936] 1 W.L.R. 936. 
10 
principle that a breach which goes to the root of the contrAft 
disentitles the party from relying on the exempting clause." 
This new concept of fundamental breach, as enunciated above by Denning 
L.J. (as he then was), was removed from the narrow area of bailment and 
extended to the wider field of commercial transactions. 
In Lord Denning's terms it was not the condition or fundamental term 
which was excluded from the contract. It was the liability for its breach 
which was excused, the exemption clause operating, when the •contract was 
adjudicated, as a defence to accrued rights of action. The criticism of this 
view, notably advanced by Professor Coote, advances the counter-argument 
that exemption clauses qualify the promises to which they relate, and so take 
effect at the formation of the contract rather than acting as mere defences at 
the point of adjudication.
31 
The importance of this critique in respect of 
fundamental breach and exemption clauses is not only that exemption clauses 
are regarded as taking effect when the contract is formed but that there is 
no need, on its premise, for the concept of fundamental breach itself. This 
is so because, once the exemption clauses have taken effect at the formation 
of the contract, every subsequent breach of the remaining content of the 
contract will be actionable. 32  
The essential weaknesses of the substantive doctrine of fundamental 
30. Ibid. at p.940. 
31. B. Coote Exception Clauses Chapter One; 'The Second Rise and Fall 
of Fundamental Breach' (1981) 55 A.L.J. 788, at p.792. See also B. Coote 
'The Rise and Fall of Fundamental -ErFeach' (1967) 40 A.L.J. 336 at pp. 
337-341; 'The Effect of Discharge by Breach on Exception Clauses' [1970] 
C.L.J. 221. 
TE--- B. Coote (1981) 55 A.L.J. 788 at p.792. See the judicial application of 
this analysis by Diplock L.J in Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural  
and Poultry Producers Association 1966] 1 W.L.R. 287, at pp.341-343, 
C.Czarnikow Ltd v. Koufos [1966] 2 Q.B. 695, at pp. 730-731, Moschi v. LEP 
Air Services Ltd 1973 A.C. 331 at p.350; Photo Productions Ltd v. Securicor  
Transport Ltd [1980] 1 All E.R. 556, at pp.565-567. 
11 
breach have been identified 33  as firstly, it lacked any previous authority as a 
rule of law and, secondly, it was laid down as a unified principle, despite the 
fact that the threads of the underlying authority on which it was based were 
quite distinct. These defects in its 'basis and structure did not prevent the 
doctrine of fundamental breach from occupying a position of significance in 
the law of contract and in relation to exemption clauses in particular both up 
to, and subsequent to, the House of Lords decision in the Suisse Atlantique 34 
case. 
The Suisse Atlantique Case. 
35 
The House of Lords in the Suisse Atlantique 	decided that a 
demurrage clause in a charterparty was not an exemption clause, but 
considered obiter what was meant by the term fundamental breach. Their 
unanimous,opinion was that it was not a substantive rule of law. 36 It was a 
question of construction of the contract in each case as whether or not an 
exemption clause was wide enough to cover the breach at issue. Their 
Lordships applied the following statement of Pearson L.J. in U.G.S Finance 
Ltd v. National Mortgage Bank of Greece and National Bank of Greece S.A.: 
"As to the question of 'fundamental breach', I think there is a 
rule of construction that normally an exception or exclusion 
clause or similar provision in a contract should be construed 
as not applying to a situation created by a fundamental breach 
of contract. This is not an independent rule of law imposed 
by the court on the parties willy-nilly in disregard of their 
contractual intention. 	On the contrary it is a rule of 
construction based on the presumed intention of the 
contracting parties. It involves the implication of a term to 
give to the contract that business efficacy which the parties 
33. See B. Coote 'The Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach' (1967) 40 
A.L.J. 336, at pp.337-341. 
34. Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime S.A. 	v. N.V.  
Rottercfamsche Kolen Centrale [19661 2 All E.R 61. 
35. Ibid. 
36. TrIM 2 All E.R. 61, at p.67 per Viscount Dilhorne; at pp.71-72 per 
Lord Reid; at pp. 78-79 per Lord Hodson; at pp.88-89 per Lord Upjohn and 
at pp.93-94 per Lord Wilberforce. 
12 
as reasonable men must have intended it to have. This rule of 
construction is not new in principle but it has become 
prominent in recent years in consequence of the tendency to 
have standard forms of contract containing exceptions clauses 
drawn in extravagantly wide te99s, which would produce 
absurd results if applied literally." 
However, their Lordships left it open for the doctrine of fundamental breach 
to revive. Firstly, none of the earlier cases was expressly overruled; these 
were said to be explained on the basis of construction. This left open the 
likelihood of a continuing "rule of construction" as enunciated by Devlin J. 
and applied by Denning L.J. in Karsales (Harrow) Ltd v. Wallis38 . 
Secondly, the incidents of fundamental breach and fundamental terms were 
described by their Lordships in words traditionally reserved for discharge for 
breach and conditions. The retention of the terminology of fundamental 
breach suggested that the special concepts were still relevant to exemption 
clauses. Thirdly, their Lordships confused and ran together fundamental 
breach, discharge for breach and deviation. 39 
Rejection of the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach in Australia  
The High Court of Australia anticipated the rejection of the doctrine of 
fundamental breach prior in Suisse Atlantique. In Sydney City Council v. 
37. [1964] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 446 at p.453. 
38. [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936; see above. See also Mendelssohn v. Normand  
[1969] 2 All E.R. 1215, at p.1218, where Lord Denning placed the deviation 
cases as the source of the doctrine of fundamental breach; 'If a man promises 
to keep a thing in a named place; but instead keeps it in another place, he 
cannot rely on the exemption clause ... That doctrine has been extended to 
cases where a man promises to perform his contract in a certain way and 
instead performs it in an entirely different way. He too cannot rely on an 
exemption clause : because it is considered as applying only when he is 
carrying out his contract in the stipulated way and not breaking it in a 
fundamental respect.' 
39. See B. Coote 'The Second Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach' (1981) 
55 A.L.J. 788, at p.793, holding that this third factor was to lead to the 
decision in Harbutt "Plasticine" Ltd v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. [19701 
1 Q.B. 447. 
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West40  the plaintiff parked his car in a car park that was owned and operated 
by the Sydney City Council. He was presented with a ticket on entry which 
contained the following condition: "The Council does not accept any 
responsibility for the loss or damage to any vehicle or for loss or damage to 
any article or thing in or upon any vehicle or for any injury to any person 
however such loss, damage or injury may arise or be caused." Beneath the 
conditions on the ticket was a notice which read "Important : The ticket must 
be presented for time stamping and payment before taking delivery of the 
vehicle". An unauthorized person took the plaintiff's car from the car park 
who gave the attendant at the exit a duplicate parking ticket for another car 
which he had obtained by falsely representing that he had lost his original 
ticket. The attendant was under a duty to allow cars out of the car park 
only when the driver surrendered an appropriate ticket. The High Court 
n. held by a majoty 41  that, on construction of the exemption clause it did not 
cover the action of the Council's employee which was not within the terms of 
the contract of bailment. All the members of the High Court treated the 
question as one of construction. In their joint judgement Barwick C.J. and 
Taylor J. expressed the following view: 
"There is no doubt, of course, that in the case where a 
contract of bailment contains an exempting clause such as we 
have to consider the protection afforded by the clause will be 
lost if the goods the subject of the bailment are stored in a 
place or in a manner other than that authorised by the 
contract or if the bailee consumes or destroys them instead of 
storing them or if he sells them. But we would deny the 
application of such a clause in those circumstances simply upon 
the interpretation of the clause itself. Such a clause 
contemplates that loss or damage may occur by reason of 
negligence on the part of the warehouseman or his servants in 
carrying out the obligations created by the contract. But in 
our view it has no application to negligence in relation to 
40. (1965) 114 C.L.R. 481; see H.H. Glass 'Exception Clauses and 
Fundamental Breach' (1972) 46 A.L.J. 339; 	Hon. Mr Justice McGarvie 
'Exemption Clauses and Fundamental Breach' (1981) Leo Cussens Institute; 
H.K. Lucke 'Exclusion Clauses and Freedom of Contract : Judicial and 
Legislative Reactions', (1977) 51 A.L.J. 532. 
41. Kitto and Menzies JJ. dissenting from the view of Barwick C.J. and 
Taylor J.; Windeyer J. found in favour of the respondent on the ground that 
the Council was in breach of the express term of the contract requiring 
presentation of the ticket for time-stamping; (1965) 114 C.L.R. 481, at p.504. 
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acts done with respect to a bailor's goods which are neither 
authorised nor permitted by the contract. For instance, if, in 
the present case, one of the attendants at the parking station 
had been allowed by the management to use the respondent's 
car for his own purposes and, in the course or driving it, had 
caused damage to it by his negligent driving, the clause would 
afford no protection. Negligence in these c45cumstances would 
be right outside the purview of the clause.
, 
 
In Thomas National Transport (Melbourne) Pty. Ltd. v. May & Baker  
(Australia) Pty Ltd. 143 the High Court of Australia considered an exemption 
clause in a contract of carriage. The appellant, an interstate transport 
company, regularly employed a driver to pick up goods in Melbourne and take 
them to its central depot in the city for interstate transmission. On a 
number of occasions previously, because the driver was late in getting to the 
depot which closed at 5.30 p.m. he was directed by two-way radio to take the 
goods he had collected to his residence. The respondent's goods were 
collected and because of delays the driver was too late to reach the depot 
and, on failing to make contact with the depot, took the loaded truck home 
and put it in his garage, which was not secured by a door and contained no 
fire extinguisher. One of the terms of the contract of carried goods stated: 
u... the consignor must accept responsibility for any damage to 
or loss of any goods whilst in the carrier's custody during 
storage or transit by road, ... due to civil commotions, act of 
God, ... fire or water and that the carrier may and is hereby 
expressly authorized by the consignor to carry all goods or to 
have them carried by any method as he in his absolute 
discretion thinks fit and notwithstanding any instruction verbal 
or otherwise of the consignor that the goods are to be carried 
by another method". 
44 
It was held by a majority of the High Court that TNT were in breach of an 
implied term of the contract that the respondent's goods would be taken to 
the depot which would be open to receive them when the driver had completed 
his round. The term of the contract quoted above containing the words "any 
42. (1965) 114 C.L.R. 481, at p.488. 
43. (1966) 115 C.L.R. 353. 
44. Windeyer J. dissenting./ 
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method" would be construed as meaning "any method of carriage" and did not 
include storage of the goods in the driver's garage. 
In a dissenting judgement Windeyer J. considered the decision of the 
House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique which he regarded as confirming his view 
that the effect of an exemption could only be resolved by construing the 
language that the parties used, read in its context and with any necessary 
implication based on their presumed intention. 45 Windeyer J. stated: 
"The first question in all such cases is therefore what did the 
party who relies upon the exemption clause contract do. That 
being ascertained, the next question is was there such a 
radical breach by him of his obligations under the contract 
that, upon the true construction of the contract as a whole 
including the exweption clause, he cannot rely upon the 
exemption clause." 
The High Court has since, in H. and E. Van der Sterren v. 
'Cibernetics (Holding) Pty Ltd 117 construed an exemption clause to relieve a 
party from liability for what would otherwise be fundamental breach. In this 
case, a manufacturer of plastic coating sold the product to the plaintiff under 
a sale agreement which included the following terms: "The company shall not 
be liable ... in any way whatsoever in relation to the product unless such 
claim is notified to the company within fourteen days of delivery of the 
product". It was agreed between the parties that the coating would lose none 
of its distinctive property when correctly mixed and applied if it was stored 
at room temperature and away from sources of heat and light before being 
used. When, in complying with these measures, the material failed to harden, 
the plaintiffs failed to notify the manufacturers of their claim and 
subsequently sued them for breach of contract. The High Court unanimously 
held that the manufacturers were not liable, as on construction of the 
exemption clause, failure to notify the claim left the clause, which was 
definite and clear, intact. As Walsh J. put it: 
45. (1966) 115 C.L.R. 353, at p.375. 
46. Ibid. at p.379. 
47. (197-0) 44 A.L.J.R. 157. 
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"In the circumstances of the case I do not think that there is 
sufficient reason to conclude that the parties ought not to be 
taken to have intended to include in the contract a limitation 
of the defendant's liability in such stringent terms as are 
contained in c1.7. The defendant was the Australian 
manufacturer of an American product. Its properties and its 
expected performance were described in "literature" made 
available to the defendant and through it to the plaintiff. He 
had himself acquired some practical knowledge of it. Both 
parties, no doubt, expected that its use would give 
satisfactory results. But these could be affected by many 
factors. I do not think it can be regarded as absurd or as 
incredible that the defendant should wish to define and to limit 
its liability in a stringent way in order to protect itself from 
the uncertainties which could arise, by reason of the 
statements in the literature and of the difficulties of 
ascertaining the causes of any failure that occurred in the 
performance • of the product, or that the plaintiff should be 
content to accept such a stipulation, in a bargain by which he 
obtained a commercial benefit of the exclusive use of the 
product in the Australian Capital Territory. ... The terms of 
exception clauses must sometimes be read down if they cannot 
be applied literally without creating an absurdity or defeating 
the main object of the contract ... But such a modification by 
implication of the language which the parties have used in an 
exception clause is not to be made unless it is necessary to 
give effect p to what the parties must be understood to have 
intended." " 
Consistent with the above pronouncement, in Metrotex Pty Ltd v. 
Freight Investments Pty Ltd 49 the Victorian Supreme Court was prepared to 
extend the shelter of an exemption for total loss of goods carried. The 
defendant agreed to carry three parcels of goods of the plaintiffs from 
Sydney to Melbourne. The goods were delivered to the defendant in Sydney 
but did not arrive in Melbourne and could not be subsequently found and 
their disappearance was unexplained. The contract of carriage included the 
following clause :- 
"The carrier accepts no responsibility for any damage, 
including injury, delay, or loss of any nature, arising out of 
or incidental to the carriage or any , services ancillary thereto 
or which may occur at any time after the goods have been 
delivered to the carrier and before the goods have been 
delivered to the consignee whether due or alleged to be due to 
misconduct or negligence on the part of the carrier or not and 
whether the cause of the damage is known or unknown to the 
carrier." 
48. Ibid. at p.158, with whom Barwick C.J. and Kitto J. agreed. 
49. [1969] V.R. 9 (Supreme Court (Full Court)). 
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In an action against the defendant the Court held that, on the•
evidence, the only reasonable explanation open was that the exemption clause 
exempted the defendant for damages for the loss. This would have been so 
even if the loss had been due to theft by the carriers' servants (unless such 
action could be treated as that of the carrier itself). The wording of the 
exemption clause was regarded by the court as of pre-eminent importance: 
"It is now established doctrine that the language of such an 
exempting clause is to be construed strictly and its ambiguities 
resolved against the party seeking its protection. It is also to 
be read, if its language so requires and its language so 
permits, as subject to an implied limitation which would not 
allow that party to disregard performance of the main 
obligation of the contract ... The proper approach ... appears 
to be to endeavour to ascertain the intention of the parties by 
applying the language used as understood in its ordinary 
sense to the subject-matter and preferring a n4brower 
operation to a wider operation where both are open ..."' 
The Australian courts were clearly willing to extend exemptions in 
contracts to quite severe or aggravated forms of breach. 	In Hall v. 
Queensland Truck Centre Pty. Ltd. It was judicially observed: 	"The 
principle of fundamental breach ... must now be regarded as substantially 
demolished . "51  In such an environment fundamental breach had (and has) 
little part to play as an effective rule of law. 52 
The Securicor Case  
As outlined earlier, it was open to the courts after the Suisse  
Atlantique case to apply the doctrine of fundamental breach to exemption 
clauses as a substantive rule of law. In Harbutts "Plasticine" Ltd v. Wayne  
Pump and Tank Co. Ltd53 the English Court of Appeal held that, even when 
50. Ibid. per Winneke C.J. and Gourans J. at pp.12-13. 
51. 11970] Qd. R.231 at p.235 per Hoare J. The case involved a supply of 
goods totally different from the contract description. It was held, applying 
Andrews Bros (Bournemouth) Ltd  v. Singer & Co Ltd [1934] 1 K.B. 17, that 
the defendants clauses did not on their construction apply to such an event. 
52. See N.E. Palmer, Bailment Law Book Co., (1979) at pp.943-944. 
53. [1970] 1 Q.B. 447. 
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the words did, on a proper construction, cover the event which had 
occurred, a limitation clause could not protect the proferens once the contract 
•had been discharged for breach. Lord Denning held that the position would 
be the same where the defendant was guilty of such a fundamental breach 
that the contract was automatically at an end without the innocent party 
5 
having an election.
4  This ignored Lord Wilberforce's argument in the Suisse 
Atlantique case that an act which might be a breach sufficiently serious to•
justify refusal of further performance might be reduced in effect, or not made 
a breach at all, by the terms of the exemption clause. 55 The decision in the 
Harbutts "Plasticine" case also confused termination with recission. An 
election to terminate operates prospectively without prejudice to rights 
accrued and obligations incurred prior to termination. It is only in so far as 
a contract is executory that a contract is discharged by the innocent party's 
election. The primary obligations of the parties come to an end and are 
replaced by secondary obligations, the extent of which must, as a matter of 
construction, be determined by the contract including any exemption clause. 56 
The application of Harbutt's "Plasticine" in the following decade became 
increasingly, extreme. In Wathes (Western) Ltd v. Austin (Menswear) Ltd
57 
the Court of Appeal held that the principle applied, not only where the 
contract had been discharged for breach, but also where it had been affirmed 
by the injured party. 
54. For criticism of Harbutts "Plasticine" Ltd see B. Coote 'The Effect of 
Discharge by Breach on Exemption Clauses' [1970] C.L.J. 189; J.H.Baker 
(1970) 33 M.L.R. 441; P.N. Leigh-Jones and M. Pickering. 	'Harbutts  
"Plasticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.': 'Fundamental Breach 
and Exemption Clauses, Damages and Interest' (1970) 87 L.Q.R 515; J.F. 
Wilson 'Fundamental Breach : The Plot Thickens' (1971) 4 N.Z.U.L.R 254; 
A.M. Shea 'Discharge from Performance of Contracts by Failure of Condition' 
(1979) 42 M.L.R. 623. 
55. [1966] 	E.R. 61, at p. 92. 
56. See S.W. Cavanagh and C.S. Phegan, Product Liability in Australia, 
Butterworths, (1983) paras 302 and 313. 
57. [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 14, the Court purporting to follow Charterhouse  
Co. Ltd v. Tolly [1963] 2 Q.B. 683 on the basis that it had not been 
overruled in the Suisse Atlantique case. 
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It is now clearly established by the landmark House of Lords decision, 
Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd 58 that there is no rule of 
law by which exemption clauses can be eliminated, or deprived of their effect, 
whatever their terms may . be . This decision firmly rejected the argument, 
advanced primarily by Lord Denning in previous cases that the doctrine of 
fundamental breach is a rule of law. The House of Lords in the Securicor  
case overturned the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal and expressly 
overruled Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd 59 and 
Wathes (Western) Ltd v. Austin (Menswear) Ltd. 60  In doing so, their 
Lordships approached the question of whether a fundamental breach prevented 
the proferens from relying on an exemption clause as turning on the 
construction of the whole contract. 
The facts of the Securicor case were that Photo Production Ltd owned 
a factory and contracted with Securicor to provide security at the factory, 
including patrols at night. While carrying out a night patrol at the factory, 
a Securicor patrolman deliberately lit a fire which got out of control and 
completely destroyed the factory and the stock which was valued at Z615,000. 
Securicor were sued for damages by the plaintiffs on the ground that they 
were liable for the act of their employee. Securicor pleaded, amongst other 
defences, that an exemption clause in the contract absolved them from any 
liability for any injurious act or default by any employee unless such act or 
default could have been foreseen or avoided by due care on the part of 
Securicor. Securicor, under this clause, disclaimed liability for any loss 
suffered by the plaintiffs through fire and any other cause except where this 
58. [1980] 1 All E.R. 556; noted L.S. Sealey (1980) 39 C.L.J 252; 
D.Plunkett (1980) 4 Auckland L. Rev 114; N.C. Seddon (1980)-5 1$ —A.L.J. 
289; L.W. Melville (1980) 130 New Law Journal 646; see B. Coote "The "S-Falid 
Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach" (1981) 55 A.L.J. 788. 
59. [19701 1 All E.R. 225. 
60. [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 14. 
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was attributable to negligence of Securicor's employees acting in the course of 
their employment. 
Securicor were held not to have failed to exercise care or diligence in 
employing the patrolman and the trial judge held that Securicor could rely on 
the exemption clause. On appeal by the factory owners, the Court of Appeal 
reversed the lower court's decision, holding that Securicor were in 
fundamental breach of the contract which, thereby, prevented them from 
relying on the exemption clause. The factory owners, then, appealed to the 
House of Lords. 
The House of Lords held that there was no rule of law by which an 
exemption clause could be disregarded in considering the parties' position 
when there was a breach of contract (whether fundamental or not) or by 
which an exemption clause could be deprived of effect regardless of the 
contract's terms. This was the case because the parties were free to choose 
to exclude or modify their contractual obligations. Whether an exemption 
clause applied when there was a fundamental breach, breach of a fundamental 
term or any other breach, turned on the construction of the whole contract, 
Including any exemption clause. Although Securicor were in breach of their 
implied obligation to operate their service with due and proper regard to the 
safety and security of the plaintiffs factory and premises, Securicor were 
protected from liability by a clear and unambiguous exemption clause. 
The House of Lords expressed the view that in commercial matters 
generally, when parties were not of unequal bargaining power and risks were 
normally covered by insurance, the parties should be left to apportion risks 
as they saw. fit. In Lord Diplock's words: 
"In commercial contracts negotiated between businessmen 
capable of looking after their own interests and deciding how 
risks inherent in the performance of various kinds of 
contract can be most economically borne (generally by 
insurance) it is, in my view, wrong to place a strained 
construction on words in an exclusion clause which are clear 
21 
and fairly susceptible of one meaning only even after due 
allowance has been made for the presumptigp in favour of the 
implied primary and secondary obligations". 
Lord Diplock, in the Securicor case, provided an analysis of the 
situation arising on a breach of what• he termed a "primary" contractual 
obligation compared with a resultant and consequent " secondary" obligation 
then owed by the party in default. A primary contractual obligation, for 
example, would be that property in, and possession of goods, are 
transferred. A secondary contractual obligation would be the liability for 
payment of damages in the event of a breach of the primary contractual 
obligation. Both parties' primary obligations remain unchanged, so far as 
they have not yet been fully carried out, unless the innocent party is 
entitled to, and elects to, treat themself as discharged from his obligations 
because of the guilty party's breach. This will also occur where the event 
resulting from the failure of one party to perform a primary obligation has 
the effect of depriving the other party of substantially the whole benefit 
which it intended by the parties he should obtain from the contract. Another 
instance is where the contracting parties have agreed, expressly or by 
implication of law, that any failure by one party to perform a particular 
primary obligation, irrespective of the gravity of the event that has in fact 
resulted from the breach, entitles the other party to elect to put an end to 
all primary obligations remaining unperformed. 
If a party makes such a lawful election, a secondary obligation to pay 
monetary compensation to the innocent party for the loss sustained in 
consequence of the future non-performance of the primary obligations of the 
Innocent party is discharged. Reference to a contract being terminated, 
rescinded, repudiated, discharged or brought to an end by the innocent 
party's election should be understood in the sense of ending primary 
61. 	[1980] 1 All E.R. 556, at p.568. 
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obligation only. 62 
The limitation clause was held to be valid by the House of Lords 
essentially as a reasonable way of apportioning risks as between insurers on 
either side. In the words of Lord Wilberforce: 
"Securicor undertook to provide a service of periodical visits 
for a very modest charge which works out at 26p per visit. It 
did not agree to provide equipment. It would have no 
knowledge of the value of the plaintiffs' factory: that, and 
efficacy of their fire precautions, would be known to the 
respondents. In these circumstances nobody would consider it 
unreasonable, that as between these two equal parties the risk 
assumed by Securicor should be a modest one, and that the 
respondents elould carry the substantial risk of damage or 
destruction". 
Lord Diplock gave similar emphasis: 
"For the reasons given by Lord Wilberforce it seems to me that 
this apportionment of the risk of the factory being damaged or 
destroyed by the injurious act of an employee of Securicor 
while carrying out a visit to the factory is one which 
reasonable businessmen in the position of Securicor and the 
factory owners might well think was most economical. An 
analogous apportionment of risk is provided for by the Hague 
Rules in the case of goods carried by sea under bills of 
lading".
b4 
The Securicor case was followed in AiIse Craig Fishing Co Ltd v. 
Malvern Fishing Co Ltd and Securicor (Scotland Ltd.  )65  In this case, the 
House of Lords on appeal from Scotland had to consider the following facts. 
The Aberdeen Fishing Vessel Owner's Association Ltd (termed the 
62. Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal decision Geo. Mitchell v. Finne y  
Lock Seeds Ltd [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036 expressed the hope that the analysis o f  
contractual obligations into 'primary', 'secondary', 'general secondary' and 
'anticipatory secondary' obligations would not have to be considered often by 
the courts: 'No doubt it is logical enough but it is too esoteric all together. 
It is fit only for the rarified atmosphere of the House of Lords. Not at all 
for the chambers of the practitioner. 	Let alone for the student at the 
university' (at p.1046). Clearly a parting shot. By contrast Oliver L.J. 
observed that, with deference to Lord Denning he found the analysis adopted 
by Lord Diplock helpful '... so long as it is borne in mind that the purpose 
of a contract is performance and not the grant of an option to pay damages'. 
(at p.1049). 
63. Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 1 All E.R. 556 
at p.564. 
64. Ibid. at pp.564, 568. pp.564, 568. 
65. 1982 S.L.T. 377 H.L. (Sc.). 
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Association) contracted on behalf of its members with Securicor (Scotland) Ltd 
to supervise vessels •in Aberdeen harbour. 
During the evening of 31 December (a date not without significance in 
Scottish ritual) 1971, two vessels were berthed side by side in the harbour. 
As the tide rose the bow of one slid under the deck of the quay at which she 
was berthed and became caught (or "snubbed"). There was a special risk of 
this occurrence due to the open structure of the quay. As the tide rose 
further, she took an increasing list to starboard and then fouled the 
adjoining vessel. Both vessels subsequently sank and became total losses. 
Securicor did not provide, as contracted, continuous security cover for the 
vessels since the designated patrolman left to take part in New Year's Eve 
celebrations. The ship's owners were members of the Association. The 
contract between the Association and Securicor excluded the latter's liability 
in certain circumstances and a clause limited liability for any loss or damage 
arising out of the services provided to 1 ,000. After the owners of each 
vessel had brought actions against each other in negligence and against 
Securicor in negligence and for breach of contract, Securicor was then 
brought in by one owner as third parties. Securicor pleaded, inter alia, that 
if they were liable in damages their liability was contractually limited to 
1,000 for any claim in any event, and to X10,000 in respect of all and any 
incidents arising within any consecutive period of twelve months. Securicor 
further argued that their liability was entirely excluded by the contract. 
In the Court of Session their Lordships
66 
found that the condition 
purporting to exclude liability was not effective but that the clause limiting 
liability to,e1,000 was clear and free from ambiguity and had the effect of 
limiting Securicor's liability to that sum. 
66. 	1981 S. L. T. 130 ( First Division) , Lord President Emslie, Lords 
Cameron and Dunpark. 
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In dismissing the appeal the House of Lords affirmed the decision of 
the Court of Session. It held that, although the limitation clause fell to be 
construed contra proferentem, its terms were clear and unambiguous and that 
the limitation clause was undoubtedly wide enough to cover relevant liability 
including the negligence of Securicor itself. Lord Fraser made a distinction 
between the application of the strict principles of construction applicable when 
considering the effect of clauses of exclusion or indemnty 67 and when 
considering the effect of clauses merely limiting liability. In his view 
although the latter clauses would be read contra proferentem there was no 
reason why they should be judged by the specially exacting standards applied 
to exclusion and indemnity clauses. Such standards were applied to exclusion 
and indemnity clauses for the reason of the inherent improbability that the 
other party to a contract including such a clause intended to release the 
party seeking to impose it (proferens) from a liability which would otherwise 
fall on him. However, he would be more likely to agree to a limitation of the 
liability of the proferens especially, as under provision in the contract with 
Securicor, the potential losses which might be caused by Securicor's 
negligence (or that of its servants) were so great in proportion to the sums 
that could be reasonably charged for the services contracted for. 68 
Both Securicor cases were considered in George Mitchell (Chesterhall)  
Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. 69 The facts of this case were essentially as 
follows. Farmers had agreed to buy cabbage seed from merchants with whom 
67. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v. The King [1952] A.C. 192 applied by 
the Scottish House of Lords in Smith v. UMB Chrysler (Scotland) Ltd [1978] 
1 All E.R. 18. See Chapter Four. 
68. 1982 S.L.T. 377 H.L. (Sc.), at p.382. It should be noted that the 
shipowners of the vessels sunk were covered in respect of hull insurance. 
See Lord Denning's comparison of the insurance cover in both the Securicor 
and Ailsa cases in George Mitchell (Chesthall) Ltd v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd 
• [19821 3 W.L.R. 1016, at p.1045. 
69. [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 476. See note [1981] J.B.L. 412. 
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they had dealt with for some years. The sale was subject to the merchants' 
standard terms and conditions. One of these stated: "In the event of any 
seeds sold by us not complying with the express terms of the contract of sale 
or any seeds proving defective in varietal purity we will refund all payments 
made to us by the buyer in respect of the seeds and this shall be the limit of 
our obligation. We hereby exclude all liability for any loss or damage arising 
out of such use or of any defects in any seeds supplied by us or from any 
other loss or damage whatsoever, save for refund as aforesaid." Both parties 
knew that the seeds sold were for winter white cabbage and the merchants•
knew the farmers normally sowed the cabbage in seed beds in March and 
transplanted in June and July. The merchants also knew that the cabbage 
was for human consumption. The farmers planted about sixty acres and the 
seeds germinated. In September it was noticed that the cabbages were of 
lush growth with loose fluffy hearts. The merchants agreed, after 
discussions with the farmers, that what had been grown was not suitable for 
either human or animal consumption and that they, the merchants, had sold 
seed wholly different in kind by description and commercially. In response to 
a claim by the farmers for damages the merchants held that they were 
protected by the exemption clause and liable only for 192, which was the 
cost of the seeds. The farmers claimed for damages, total failure to perform, 
breach and fundamental breach of contract. They also claimed that the 
defendants' reliance on the conditions of sale were void and unenforceable as 
those had not been negotiated and, thus it would not be fair and reasonable 
to rely on the conditions. 70 
70. 	By virtue of s55(4) and para.11 of Schedule 1 of the Sale of Goods•
Act 1979 (UK). As the contract had been concluded before February 1, 1978 
The- Unfair Contract Terms Act  1977 (UK) Schedule 2, containing the 
reasonable test, was inapplicable. This test is dealt with in detail in Chapter 
Four. 
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In the lower court, the judge, relying essentially on fundamental 
breach, held that, on the facts the seed supplied was in no sense vegetable 
• seed and the clause could not be construed to cover that situation.
71 
Delivery was of something wholly •different in kind from that which was 
ordered and which the merchant had agreed to supply. It was making 
commercial nonsense of the contract to suggest that either party could have 
intended that the clause was to operate in the circumstances of the case. In 
looking at a commercial contract, the terms had to be construed in a 
commercial sense. What was delivered was not vegetable seed at all and the 
merchants could not rely on the conditions which they had imposed. 
In the Court of Appeal one judge, Oliver L.J. followed Parker J. in 
the lower court by relying on fundamental breach as the basis for dismissing 
the appeal. Oliver L.J. said: 
"What was delivered to the farmers was not a fulfilment 
of the contract, even a defective fulfilment, any more 
than a delivery of a motor bicycle whuld be a fulfilment 
of a contract for the sale of a car". 
The two other judges, Lord Denning M.R. and Kerr L.J., did not rely on 
fundamental breach but held that the clause under review was 
unreasonable. 73 It is important to note that although all of the judges 
dismissed the appeal they did so on distinctly different arguments. This new 
emphasis on the reasonable test is discussed in detail later.
74 
It should 
finally be noted that the distinction made in the A11sa 75 case regarding 
exemption clauses which provide for limitation, as opposed to total exclusion, 
of liability, was categorised by Kerr L.J. as "... no more than a guide to 
construction 
76
. He did adopt it on the basis that limitation clauses 
71. [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476, Parker J., at p.480. 
72. George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1982] 3 
W.L.R. 1036, at p.1050. See note C.M. Schmitthoff [1982] J.B.L. 447-448. 
73. See note 69 supra. 
74. See note 70 supra; see also Chapter Four. 
75. See note 65 supra. 
76. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036, at p.1055. 
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A warranty, on the other hand has been defined by the same Act as 
Il an agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of 
sale, but collateral to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which 
gives rise to a claim for damages but not a right to reject the goods and 
treat the contract as repudiated" 
80  In practice, however, it may be difficult 
to distinguish between a condition and a warranty in all save the simplest 
contracts. The problem of categorisation is made more difficult by parties 
using the word "condition" in circumstances in which the courts would not 
necessarily treat it as such in law. Essentially, conditions are major, and 
warranties minor, terms of a contract and the court will look to the intention 
of the parties in giving due weight to particular terms. 81 
The distinction between conditions and warranties was once believed to 
be the main criterion for determining the effects of breach of contract in 
general. This supposition, however, was rejected by the Court of Appeal in 
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha. 82 In this case 
80. Respectively s.16 and s.5; ACT : Sale of Goods Ordinance 1954 
ss16(2),(3); 5(1); Victoria : Goods Act 1958 ss 3(1), 16(2); Queensland : 
Sale of Goods Act 1896 ss 3(1), 14(2); South Australia : Sale of Goods Act  
1895-1972 ss 11(2), 60; Tasmania Sale of Goods Act 1896 ss 3(1), 16(2). 
81. See Schuler AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1973] All E.R. 
683. See Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract, Butterworths (11th  Australian 
edition, 1981) at paras 420-430; Chitty on Contracts Sweet & Maxwell 25th 
edition, 1983 paras 746, 1625; Benjamin Sale of Goods, Sweet and Maxwell, 
2nd edition, 1982 paras 744-760; Ansons Law of Contract, Sweet and Maxwell, 
Oxford University Press, 25th edition 1979 pp.129-137; G.H. Treitel The Law  
of Contract 5th edition, Stevens, 1979, at pp.608-610. See also Jackson v. 
Rotax Motor and Cycle Co [1910] 2 K.B. 937; Arcos v. Ronaire-n—[1-933] 
A.C.470; Re Moore and Landauer and Co.  [1921] 7 K.B.519; Associated  
Newspapers Ltd v. Banks (1951) C.L.R. 322; Decro-Wall International S.A. v. 
Practitioners in Marketing Ltd  [1971] 2 All E.R. 215, at p.227; The Mihalis  
Angelos [1971] 1 Q.B. 164; see the comments of Upjohn L.J. in Hong Kong  
Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 1 All E.R. 474, at p. 
484 and Lord Denning M.R. in Cehave N.V. Bremer [1975] 3 All E.R.739, at 
pp.746-747, See Lord Devlin 'The Treatment of Breach of Contract' [1966] 
C.L.J. 192 D.W. Greig 'Condition - or Warranty' (1973) 89 L.Q.R. 93 
Taii—riment on Mihalis Angelos); Hon. Mr Justice McGarvie 'Contractual Concept 
of the Credit Bills' (1979) 53 A.L.J. 687, at pp.690-693. 
82. [1962] 1 All E.R. 474. 
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It was held that a stipulation as to seaworthiness in a charterparty was 
neither a condition nor a warranty but an intermediate or innominate term. 
The court held that as such a term could be broken in many different ways, 
from the trivial to the most serious, the innocent party's right to treat the 
contract as at an end depended on the nature and effect of the breach in 
question. This right to treat the contract as at an end depended on whether 
he had been deprived "of substantially the whole benefit which it was 
intended he should obtain from the contract."
83 
The House of Lords in 
Bunge Corporation v. Tradax S.A.
84 
 made it clear that the statutory 
classification of terms in the Sale of Goods Act as conditions and warranties is 
not to be treated as an indication that the law knows no terms other than 
conditions and warranties.
85 Whether a term is a condition or a warranty 
or an innominate term depends on the intention of the parties, as ascertained 
from the construction of the contract.
86 
In applying the rule of strict construction to an exemption clause the 
courts will construe ambiguities against the party inserting the term. This 
approach was illustrated in Alex Kay Pty Ltd v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation & Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
87  The plaintiffs, a car hire firm, 
entered into a contract of insurance with the second defendants on a car 
acquired for use in the business. The insurance policy contained a clause 
exempting the insurers from " any breach of contract, agreement or 
obligation". Over eighteen months after the contract with the insurance 
company was made the car was hired to a client who disappeared with it, both 
83. Ibid., per Diplock L.J., at p.489. 
84. (1-9171] 2 All E.R. 513. 
85. Ibid., per Lord Scarman at p.543. See also Cehave v. Bremer [1975] 3 
All E.127-719. 
86. The Law Commissions' in their recent Working Paper (No. 85 Law Com; 
Consultative Memorandum No. 58, Sale and Supply of Goods. Scot. Law Corn. 
1983) concluded that in both English and Scottish Law '... the classification 
of the statutory implied terms as conditions or warranties is inappropriate and 
liable to produce unreasonable results', para 2.37. It should be noted that 
Scots law makes no distinction between conditions and warranties. The 
Working Paper is discussed, in the context of the statutory implied terms, 
subsequently in Chapters Three and Five. 
87. [1963] V.R. 548. 
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being untraceable. The words quoted above were held to be capable of three 
separate meanings; (a) any breach by the plaintiff of a contract with a hirer; 
(b) any breach of a contract by the hirer; (c) any breach of contract. The 
least favourable interpretation to the insurance company, (a) was adopted by 
the court. 
It has been held that unless liability in tort, such as negligence, is 
clearly and expressly excluded, such liability may arise from a transaction 
which otherwise contains limiting and exempting terms. In White v. John 
Warwick & Co Ltd88 the plaintiff hired a tradesman's cycle to deliver 
newspapers on terms that provided . . nothing in this agreement shall 
render the owners liable for any personal injuries to the riders of the 
machine hired". The defendants on their part contracted "to maintain the•
machine in working order". A rider was injured due to defects in the cycle's 
maintenance. The court held that the clause would protect the defendants 
from breach of contractual obligation to maintain the cycle, but would not 
exclude liability in tort if negligence could be established. 
Requirement of Notice (Signed Documents)  
The general rule relating to the construction of contracts is that notice 
of the conditions must be available at the time of making the contract. 
However, it is important to make a distinction between signed and unsigned 
documents. Where a document is used as a contractual document, a person 
signing it will be bound even though he has not read its contents, in the 
absence of fraud, and/or misrepresentation and the question of notice is 
irrelevant. The court will look into the circumstances of the case to 
determine whether a signed document is to be treated as a contractual 
document as opposed to a receipt. In D.H. Hill & Co Pty Ltd v. Walter H.  
Wright Pty Ltd89 a carrying company, made a contract by "phone to carry 
88. [19531,1 W.L.R. 1285. 
89. [1971] V.R. 749. 
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Wright's machinery from their Doncaster plant to one at Clayton. Owing to 
the appellant's negligence this machinery was damaged. At the Clayton plant 
an employee of the carrying company presented a carriage document for 
signature by an employee of Wrights, who signed it. The document on its 
face was addressed to the carrying company requesting carriage of the 
machinery "subject to the terms and conditions endorsed on the back 
• thereof". One of the conditions on the back provided that "All goods are 
handled, lifted and/or carried entirely at the owner's risk. The carrier shall 
not be liable for any loss or damage of whatsoever kind, howsoever 
occasioned at any time and whether caused by any acts, default or negligence 
of the carrier or otherwise howsoever". The carriers relied on this clause to 
exclude their liability in a claim for damages. There was evidence to show 
that this document had been used regularly in similar transactions between 
the two parties. The Victorian Supreme Court held, on appeal by the 
carriers, that, although the respondents knew of the form's existence, they 
had no knowledge of the content of the terms and conditions on the reverse 
and regarded it as an acknowledgement of receipt of goods delivered. There 
was no evidence, in the court's view, "... of any course of prior dealing in 
which the parties mutually regarded the terms and conditions on the back of 
the form as part of the contract between them" 
90. The situation in the D. H. 
Hill case was distinguished from that which arose in the landmark case of 
Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association 91  . 
In Hardwick Game Farm A sold to B an extraction to be used in compound 
feedstuffs which were then sold by B to C. Owing to the toxic nature of the 
extract, game birds died when the compound was fed to them. Over three 
years A and B had entered into similar contracts at the rate of three or four 
a month; the contracts were oral but a contract note containing conditions 
was sent on or after the time of sale. These notes included, on their reverse 
90. Ibid., at p.753. 
91. TI96-61 1 All E.R. 309. 
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side, one condition which read: "The buyer under this contract takes the 
responsibility of any latent defects". The House of Lords held that the 
exempting clause was incorporated in the contract. It could be assumed, on 
the basis of dealings between A and B, that when B placed his order, he did 
so on the basis and with the knowledge that A's acceptance of the order and 
their agreement to sell would be on the terms and conditions set out in the 
contract notes. 
It should be noted that, in Hill's case, the Victorian Supreme Court 
was strongly influenced by the arguments put forward in McCutcheon v. 
David MacBrayne Ltd. 92 In McCutcheon's there was an oral contract for the 
carriage of a car on a sea ferry which was lost when the ferry sank while 
being negligently navigated. There had been a course of dealing between the 
parties, but the transaction on the occasion of the vehicle's loss differed 
from these in that a risk note (which included a clause excluding liability for 
negligence) was not signed. The House of Lords found for the plaintiff on 
the basis that the excluding term was not part of the contract and could not 
be incorporated by a previous course of dealings as there was no proof by 
them of knowledge of the actual terms and agreement to those terms. 
The question of previous dealings between the parties and their 
relative bargaining positions were considered by the English Court of Appeal 
in British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd. v. Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd. 93 In this 
case a crane was urgently needed by the defendants to do some work on a 
marshy site. The defendants site-manager telephoned the plaintiffs and an 
agreement was reached on delivery and rental charges, but nothing was said 
about other conditions of hire. The crane arrived with a driver employed by 
the plaintiffs and who was to operate the crane during the period of hire. 
On the first day the driver drove the crane over the ground without first 
92. [1964] 1 All E.R. 430. 
93. [1974] 	1 All E.R. 1059; for a commentary on this case see N.E. 
Palmer [1974] 25(3) N.I.L.Q 338. 
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laying timber baulks (navimats) and as a result the crane sank in the mud. 
The plaintiffs expended considerable cost (which they bore) in recovering the 
machine. The next day, after the navimats had been put in place the driver 
attempted to move the machine sideways and it sank again, almost completely, 
with resultant expense incurred to pull it out. The plaintiffs claimed the 
defendants should bear this expense. They relied on their normal conditions 
of hire and, in particular, a clause which stated "The Hirer shall be 
responsible for an indemnify the owner against ... All ... expenses in 
connection with and hiring out of the use of the plant." An additional clause 
required the hirer to take all reasonable precautions to keep the plant safe 
while on site, to make the ground safe and, if necessary, to lay suitable 
material for it to travel on; and to "be responsible for the recovery of the 
crane from soft ground". These conditions were not seen by the defendants 
until after the oral contract had been made, but were sent to them soon after 
the crane arrived. The second sinking occurred before the conditions were 
signed and returned. Thus the defendants argued that, since the conditions 
were not drawn to their attention at the time of contracting, they should not 
be bound by them. 
The Court of Appeal unanimously decided that the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn was that the defendants should be taken to have 
agreed to abide by the conditions of hire with which they were substantially 
familiar and which, it was admitted, were the sort of conditions they would 
expect to be sent after the making of the oral contract. On two previous 
occasions, approximately sixteen and eight months earlier, the defendants had 
engaged in similar transactions with the plaintiffs, in which the same printed 
form of conditions had been signed and returned. Lord Denning was not 
prepared to accept that this justified (as the plaintiffs had claimed) imputing 
knowledge of these conditions to the defendants by virtue of a course of 
dealing. The two earlier occasions were not known to the current site 
manager, and, in any case, they were too few and the intervening periods 
34 
too great, to bring a course of dealing into operat ion. 94 Instead he 
preferred to base his decision on the "common understanding" of the parties, 
as reflected in their general business relationship, familiarity with trade 
practice and equal bargaining position. 
Requirement of Notice (Unsigned Documents)  
In the case of unsigned documents containing exemption clauses, the 
courts will determine whether or not reasonable notice of them has been given 
to the party sought to be bound by their terms. The cases illustrating this 
basic principle are numerous: the principle of notice also raises the issue as 
to whether the document in question was a contractual one. The problems 
raised in applying both the first and second canons of construction are aptly 
illustrated by the case of Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Co Ltd 95 where the 
leading English cases were reviewed. In Thornton's case the plaintiff drove 
his car into an automatic carpark in London for the first time. A notice 
outside stated that all cars were parked at owner's risk. The ticket which 
the plaintiff took, but did not read, was produced from an automatic machine. 
The ticket •contained a notice to the effect that it was issued subject to the 
conditions of issue displayed on the premises. On a pillar opposite the ticket 
machine were a set of detailed conditions which included one which, in effect, 
94. [1974] 1 All E.R., at p.1061. Sir Eric Sachs was of a similar opinion, 
ibid at p.1065. Lord Denning distinguished Hollier v. Rambler Motors (AMC)  
rt-a- [1972] All E.R., 399 on the ground that 	plaintiff in that case was 
not of equal bargaining power with the garage company. 
95. [1971] 2 W.L.R. 585. For a recent Australian decision on notice of 
exempting provisions in which the "ticket cases" were reviewed see Watt v. 
Transview Pty Ltd Supreme Court of NSW (15/6/1983) - (unreported). In 
this case the Supreme Court held that a notice displayed at a ticket box 
which was not seen by the purchaser of the ticket or referred to on the 
ticket itself was not effective to impose a term exempting for loss, damage or 
injury in a contract or carriage, in this case a ride in a cable car at the 
Royal Agricultural Grounds, Sydney. The plaintiff was injured whilst a 
passenger in the cable car and was subsequently awarded damages by the 
Supreme Court, reversing the decision of first instance. 
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sought to exclude the carpark proprietors from liability not only for damage 
to the car, but also for injury to the customer, howsoever caused. The 
plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant's employee while 
bringing the car to him. The Court of Appeal held that the ticket was not a 
contractual document but a receipt, so that none of its terms were part of the 
• contract and that the notice displayed in the carpark itself was not brought 
to the attention of the plaintiff so that its terms were not part of the 
contract. Therefore the defendants were liable in negligence to the plaintiff 
for his personal injuries. 96 
96. 	Under present English law such a clause would be void, see Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 s2(1)(U.K.); See also D. Yates Exclusion Clauses in 
Contracts Sweet and Maxwell, Second edition (1982), at p.59. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EXEMPTION CLAUSES: THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
Control of Exemption Clauses by Statute: A Perspective 
Over the last one hundred years the standard form contract 
has been increasingly used, often containing the types of clauses 
noted above. In the words of one authority: 
"The idea of an agreement freely negotiated between the 
parties has given way to the necessity for a uniform set 
of printed conditions which can be used time and time 
again, and for a large number of persons". 
Periodically, Parliament has intervened, chiefly in the interests of 
consumers, to control exemption clauses by a variety of methods: 
(a) By providing that certain terms are valid only if 
drawn to the attention of the party 
disadvantaged in particular ways, eg. Hire 
Purchase Act 1959 (Tasmania) s9(2)c, 
Secondhand Vehicle Dealers Act 1971 (South 
Australia) s21 (2) . 
(b) By prohibiting certain exclusions outright, eg. 
Trade Practices Act 1974 s68,•Unfair Contract 
Terms 	Act 	1977 	(UK) 	s2(1), 	s6(2)(a); 
Commercial Transactions (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1974 (New South Wales) s7; 
• Consumer Transactions Act 1972-1973 (South 
• Australia) s10. 
(c) 	By giving jurisdiction to the courts to control 
unreasonable exclusion clauses, •eg. Common  
Carriers Act 1874 (Tasmania) s13; 
1. 	• Anson's Law of Contract Oxford University Press (1975) 24th 
edition at p.151. 
See the ,definition and classification of standard form contracts by the 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission Exemption Clauses 
Second Report (1975) para 152. For a statutory definition of 
standard form contracts see the West German law on Standard  
Contract Terms 1976, para 1. The matter of standard form contracts 
is discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Eight. 
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Misrepresentation Act 1971-1972 (South Australia) 
s7(3); Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK) 
Schedule 2. 
Exceptionally, exemption clauses will be imposed in contracts 
by statute. In such cases the statute usually prohibits any further 
limitations of liability over and above the statutory provisions. The 
Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 1959 (CwIth.) incorporates the 
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol which, inter 
alia, limits damages payable in the event of death or injury to an 
airline passenger on a scheduled flight or where luggage has been 
lost or damaged.
2 The Sea Carriage of Goods Act  1924 (CwIth.) 
incorporates the Hague Rules which provide maximum limits for the 
shipowner's liability for damage to or loss of the goods shipped. 3 
The carrier may increase (but not decrease) his liability by agreeing 
to a higher maximum with the shipper. 4 
Legislative intervention has not proceeded on any clear 
pattern, although in recent years exemption clauses have been 
controlled by statute in the interests of the consumer (e.g. the Trade  
Practices Act 1974 (CwIth.), s68; the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
(U. K.), s4 and Schedule 2). The range and development of 
legislative control, on one hand, can be illustrated by the early 
Carriers Acts (both in England and Australia) and, on the other, the 
2. Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act  1959 (CwIth.) Part IV 
as amended by Hague Protocol (1955), Arts.10 and 11 respectively. 
See N.E. Palmer Bailment Law Book Co. (1979) Chapter 17, at pp. 
642-643, 666-667. 
3. Sea Carriage of Goods Act 1924 (CwIth.), Sched. art. IX. 
4. Sea Carriage of Goods Act 1924, Sched. art. IV, r.5. On the 
issue of statutorily imposed exclusion clauses see D. Yates Exclusion  
Clauses in Contracts at pp. 113-116. See Trade Practices Act 1974 
(CwIth.) S68a; see Chapter Four. See also Carriage of Goods by Sea  
Act 1971 (U.K.) Sched. art.II1(8). Carriage by Air Act 1961, (U.K.) 
SZfied.1, arts.22, 23(1) and 32; Carriage of Goods by Road Act  1965 
(U.K.) Sched., arts. 23,41; Carriage by Railway Act 1972 (U.K.), 
Sched. arts. 6(2), 7 and 10; Carriage of Passengers by Road Act  
1974 (U.K.), Sched. arts. 13, 16 and 23(1). 
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carriage, (c) to be strictly answerable for all loss and damage that 
occurs during the course of the carriage. 
The strict liability imposed on the common carrier by the 
common law was not balanced by any right of the carrier to check 
packets presented for carriage or obtain information as to their 
contents; nor did the common law distinguish between different kinds 
of goods. The Carrier's Act of 1830 was passed partly to remedy the 
anomalous position of carriers who would be strictly liable for goods 
stolen in transit yet had no means of discovering their value. 
Generally the Act relieved the carrier of liability for particular goods 
of an especially valuable or fragile nature, worth more than .110, 
unless the consignor made a special declaration of value. The other 
reason for the passing of the Carrier's Act was that the courts had 
come to presume generally that notices excluding or limiting the 
carrier's liability, provided they were conspicuously placed in the 
carrier's receiving office where the consignor had an opportunity of 
reading them, had a binding effect on the consignor. The Act thus 
gave a remedy to the carrier in relation to liability for valuables and 
dealt with the public dissatisfaction with unilateral notices.
7 
(b) 	The Railways and Canal Traffic Act 1854 
Rail transport was in its infancy when the Carrier's Act 1830 
was passed and railways per se only came within the ambit of that 
statute by use of the terms "other public conveyances by land for 
7. 	0. Kahn-Freund op.cit. at p.220. 
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hire" and "other common carriers". Within a short space of time, 
however, the railways acquired a monopoly position in inland 
transport and began to insist on making special contracts with 
consignors to limit their own responsibilities as common carriers, 
notice of which terms (as a set of printed conditions) were normally 
contained in a note or ticket given to the consignor. The courts 
tended to take the line that the consignor had notice of these 
conditions when these were placed in his hand. As a result of the 
general public reacting to what no doubt in modern judicial terms 
would be expressed as a gross inequality of bargaining power, the 
Railways and Canal Traffic Act 1854 was passed. This Act imposed 
upon railway carriers the duty to carry any goods which they were 
able to carry for anyone who wished them to do so. 8 However, the 
Act did not debar the railway companies from contracting out from 
their liability as common carriers. Even so, the railway carrier was 
made statutorily liable for the loss of or damage to any goods they 
carried due to the negligence or default by their servants or 
themselves.
9 Any special contracts made with the consignors 
purporting to limit such liability with regard to receipt, forwarding 
and delivery of goods to be valid had to be just and reasonable. " 
The powers of the railway (and canal) carriers were constrained in 
the making of contracts limiting their liability for the negligence or 
default of their servants (i.e. committed within the scope of the 
8. Now repealed: Transport Act 1962, Schedule XII, Pt. 1. 
9. Railway and Canal Traffic Act s.7. 
10. Ibid. 
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servant's authority). Although in circumstances outside the above 
the Act left railway and canal carriers free to reduce their common 
carrier's liability to that of a bailee. in any form they chose and under 
conditions not necessarily just or reasonable,
11 
once an act occurred 
due to the negligence of the carrier or his servants, then any 
limitation on liability for such loss had to conform to the statutory 
provision if the carrier were to be relieved of his liability. 
In Peek v. North Staffordshire Railway,
12 
the House of Lords 
laid down bases for assessing the reasonableness of a contract of 
carriage under the 1854 Act. Following the provision that a carrier 
had to carry for a reasonable remuneration 13 their Lordships noted 
that in offering to carry at "owner's risk" a railway carrier could 
alternatively offer to carry on terms that excluded or limited his 
liability. Such an alternative was neither just nor reasonable unless 
the carrier offered a reduction in price below what would have been 
reasonable remuneration if the goods had been carried at "owners' 
risk" or the carrier in question offered any other advantage he was 
not bound to give. Thus once the court was satisfied that the 
railway carrier had offered what came to be known as a "fair 
alternative" it was presumed that the arrangement was just and 
reasonable, the onus of demonstrating that the conditions were so 
being borne by the carrier.
14 
The doctrine of the fair alternative laid down in Peek's case 
11. Shaw v. Great Western Railway [1894] 1 Q.B. 373; see, in 
particui —Wright J. at pp.382, 383. 
12. (1863) 10 H.L. 473. 
13 	Ibid., s.2. 
14. 	Brown v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway 
(1883) 8 App. Cas. 703, at 716. 
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was elaborated in later decisions 15 and set a limit to the freedom of 
carriers by rail to restrict their own liability. As a result the 
railway companies developed alternative consignment rates governing 
carriage at owner's and carrier's risk. The owner's risk conditions 
were those by which the rail carriers restricted their liability and had 
to be part of a contract signed by the consignor or his agent to be 
valid. These "owner's risk" conditions were not usually relied on by•
the railway companies to absolve themselves totally from liability for 
the safety of goods carried. In practice the companies accepted, 
even at owner's risk, liability for the wilful misconduct of themselves 
and their servants since the courts were reluctant to hold conditions 
of carriage as reasonable if they excluded such liability. Thus an 
attempt by companies to contract out of this liability ran the risk that 
the courts would not uphold the conditions. 16 
Contracts of Carriage by Rail and Reasonableness: A New South 
Wales Example 
The question of reasonableness in a contract of carriage by 
rail has been extensively explored in the Australian High Court 
decision in Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Quinn.
17 
It has 
been suggested in English courts that as a matter of common law a 
	
• 15. 	See principally; Glenister v. G.W. Railway (1873) 29 L.T. 423; 
Lewis v. G.W. Railway (1877) 3 Q.B.D. 195; Dickson v. G.N. 
TOTTa (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 197; G.W. Railway v. •McCarth (1887)-77 
App. Cas. 218; Williams v. Midland Railway [1908] 1 K.B. 252; and 
see Gregory v. Commonwealth Railways Commissioner (1941) 66 
C.L.R. 50. • 
16. See Brown v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway .  
(1883) 8 App ---"Cis. 703 and Smith (H.C.) v. S.W. Railway [1922] 1 
A.C. 178; W. Young and Son (Wholesale Fish 'Merchants) v. British  
Transport Commission [1955] 2 Q.B. 177, at p.193 per McNair J. 
17. (1946) •72 C.L.R. 345. 
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judge might delete a wholly unreasonable term from a contract " 
although there is no authority directly in point and the weight of 
judicial opinion is against such a contention. 19 In Quinn's case power 
to delete an unreasonable clause from a contract of carriage was 
expressly given by statute to the judiciary, and duly exercised. A 
contract between the appellant and the respondent, Mrs. Quinn, for 
the carriage of her goods from Coolah Railway station to St. 
Leonard's station was made subject to the Government Railways Act 
1912 as amended, and the provisions of by-laws, regulations and 
conditions published under the Act and to the terms and consignment 
note signed by Mrs. Quinn. A by-law incorporated contained (inter 
alia) two conditions: (1) that a claim for loss •or damage to goods 
tendered for conveyance by rail would not be allowed unless lodged in 
writing with the Commissioner within fourteen days after the date 
when delivery was or should have been given; (2) that the 
Commissioner did not guarantee the arrival or delivery of any goods 
at any particular time and that he did not undertake to advise the 
consignor of the arrival of the goods or that delivery had not been 
taken. The goods were consigned at "Commissioner's risk" rates, 
were lost and Mrs. Quinn failed to lodge her claim in writing within 
fourteen days. 
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales the 
High Court held that the by-law containing the condition requiring 
claims for loss or damage to be lodged within fourteen days was not 
invalidated through the failure of the Commissioner to exhibit it on 
18. See the views of Bramwell L.J. in Parker V. South Eastern  
Railway Co. (1887) 2 C.P.D. 416, at p.428; John Lee & Son  
(Grantham) Ltd. v. Railway Executive, [1949] 2 All E.R. 581, at 584; 
Lord Denning's observations in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union [1954] Ch. 
479 at p.485; on deletion of unreasonable terms from a contract see 
generally, Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract (4th Australian ed. 
Butterworths 1981), pp.124-125. 
19. See in particular the observations of Lord Haldane V.C. in the 
Privy Council •case of Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. 
Robinson [1915] A.C. 740, at pp.747-748. 
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railway stations and other places in accordance with ss66 and 67 of 
the Government Railways Act. It was further held that the condition 
was not just and reasonable and therefore contrary to the provisions 
of s9(a) of the Common Carrier's Act 1902 (New South Wales) and 
thus invalid.
20 Additionally, the court ruled that despite the fact 
that the goods were tendered to the owner's agent the Commissioner, 
in the circumstances of the case, remained a common carrier in 
respect of the goods of which delivery had not been taken and was 
not a bailee for their safekeeping.
21 The judgment of Dixon J. is of 
particular interest and his arguments are worth reproducing fully. 
In the learned judge's view the considerations which told against the 
justice and reasonableness of the limitation were as follows: 
"1. 	It requires the claim to be in writing and treats 
an oral claim as useless, even though it had been 
entertained and investigated by the Commissioner. 
Many consignees, expecting the arrival of articles 
despatched by railway, would be likely to make 
inquiries and then complain at the railway station, but 
it would not occur to them to reduce a claim to writing 
until the station staff had rejected it. 
2. 	There was no definite time from which the period 
of fourteen days limited in the case of loss in transit 
begins to run. The long distances over which goods 
may be conveyed and the variable Conditions affecting 
railway transportation in Australia make it very difficult 
for a consignee to make• up his mind when he should 
treat failure of the goods to arrive as a reason for 
inferring their loss. The consignors may not advise 
the consignees promptly or at all of the despatch of 
goods. Much of the the goods traffic carried is for 
consignors and consignees outside the course of routine 
and organized business. The difficulty of being sure 
either of the meaning or the application of the 
expression "fourteen days after that date when delivery 
should have been given" led the respondent to contend 
that the provision was void for uncertainty, at all 
events if considered as a by-law. That it is an 
extreme contention, but the difficulty has a real 
bearing on the reasonableness and justice of the clause 
in the conditions prevailing in Australia. 
20. Barton J. in Hirsh v. Zinc Corporation Ltd. (1917), 24 C.L.R. 
34, at p.52. 
21. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) v. Quinn (1946) 72 
C.L.R. 345, per Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ., Williams J. 
dissenting. 
45 
3. The necessity of giving notice is a thing of 
which many consignees would be unaware. 	The 
voluminous pamphlet in which it is contained would be 
in the hands of relatively few and of these not many 
could be expected to discover the clause. 
Non-fulfilment of the condition is fatal, and the 
ordinary man would not give notice in writing 
instinctively unless he knew that he was required to do 
so. 
4. The condition forms part of the Commissioner's 
risk contract. 	It is not part of the protection for 
which the Commissioner bargains in consideration of 
giving a reduced rate. There is no alternative offered. 
The consignor paying the higher rate in order to 
secure the greatest protection he can for the goods can 
obtain no better contract and finds that the 
Commissioner escapes liability unless notice in writing is 
given within fourteen days of a hypothetically 
ascertained date. The fact that the clause forms part 
of the Commissioner's risk Tilditions is perhaps the 
most important consideration." 
These arguments serve, it is submitted, as an admirable basis of 
assessing contracts where the parties are not of equal bargaining 
power; it is to the railway carriage cases dealing with a common 
carrier's liability to his customers that one can profitably look for the 
source of an evolving doctrine of contractual equality and for early 
examples of legislative intervention to control exemption clauses. 
Exemption Clauses in Insurance Contracts 
Insurance contracts provide particularly notable examples of 
the use of wide ranging exemption clauses embodied in standard form 
contracts. As a general rule all contracts of insurance are construed 
2 
as contracts of indemnity.
3 
 Most policies contain a long list of 
22. Ibid., at pp.376-377. 
23. Except life insurance, insurance against accident or sickness 
of the insured himself, and certain contingency policies such as those 
against rain. See Castellain v. Preston (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 380; 
Theobald v. Railwax Passengers Assurance Co. (1854) 10 Exch. 45. 
See also S.J. Borne and D.W. Greig Commercial Law Butterworths 
2nd edition 1978, at pp.381-382. See also R.B. Vermeesch and K.E. 
Lindgren Business Law of Australia  Butterworths 4th edition 1983, 
Chapter Twenty Four at pp. 775-776. 
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exceptions, that ,is a list of circumstances in which the insurer will 
not be liable. Common examples include loss or damage caused by 
war, riots, civil commotion or radioactivity. Any ambiguity in such 
clauses is construed against the insurer.
24 
The insurer employs a variety of devices in the form of terms 
and conditions to protect himself against alteration of the risk insured 
during the period it is covered. These terms and conditions include 
temporal exclusions and continuing or promissory warranties. 
In the case of temporal exclusions cover is limited by 
excluding liability for loss caused when the risk incurred is increased 
in a way unacceptable to the insurer. In the context of motor vehicle 
insurance a typical exclusion reads: 
"loss, damage, liability and/or compensation for damage 
and or injury caused whilst the Motor Vehicle is being 
driven by or is in charge of any person 
(1) under the influence of any drug or of 
intoxicating liquor or 
(2) in whose blood the percentage of alcohol is .1 or 
more grams per 100 millilitres of blood as 
indicated by analysis of the person's breath or 
blood". 
With regard to continuing or promissory warranties these 
operate on the basis that statements made by the insured in the 
proposal form are incorporated as warranties into the policy. The 
most common example is a clause in the policy that: 
"The answers in the proposal form shall form the basis 
of this contract and be deemed to be incorporated 
herein". 
Such a clause has the effect of making the answers warranties. A 
continuing or promissory warranty involves a promise by the insured 
that a certain state of affairs will prevail during the currency of the 
policy. Such a warranty in a motor vehicle policy reads: 
"I warrant ... that ... the motor vehicle has not been 
24. 	See Alex Kay Pty Ltd v. General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation & Hartford Insurance Co. [1963] V.R. 548, at Chapter 
One. 
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and will not be specially modified from maker's original 
specifications". 
Normally the insured is required to comply with a condition in 
the policy; for example that a motor vehicle will be maintained 
in a safe and roadworthy condition. In yet another form a 
term may be expressed as a proviso in the policy. For 
example: 
"This policy shall be voided and of no effect if, after 
the date of the inception of the policy the insured 
vehicle be in any way corrected or modified in a manner 
that increases its designed maximum speed and 
performance". 
The Australian Law Reform Commission in its Discussion Paper 
on insurance contracts 25 recommended that all the provisions noted 
above should be reduced to the status of terms of the contract, thus 
abolishing the differences in legal result stemming from the varying 
forms of express ion. 26 
The insurer's ability to rely on the terms illustrated has been 
modified by statute. The New South Wales Insurance Act 1902 by s18 
empowers a court to relieve the insured from consequences which 
otherwise would follow from certain conduct under the terms of a 
policy. Section 18 covers continuing warranties and conditions, but 
does not apply to exclusions or simple provisos. The tentative 
conclusion (so expressed in the Discussion Paper) reached by the 
Commission was that an insured party should not be denied recovery 
under a policy under a contract of insurance for conduct which Is 
unrelated to the loss in question. This is the case where a vehicle 
has been allowed to become unsafe but the accident in respect of 
25. Insurance Contracts, Discussion Paper No.7  Law Reform 
Commission (1979). I am grateful to Mr. Justice Kirby, former 
Chairman of the Law Reform Commission and to Mr. W.J. Tearle, a 
member of that Commission, for drawing my attention to the need to 
Include a reference to insurance contracts in the context of exemption 
clauses. The Discussion Paper has been drawn upon, particularly 
paras.40-46. 
26. Discussion Paper No.7, para.43. 
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which the claim is made is not the result of the vehicle's condition; it 
has occurred, for arguments sake, because another vehicle has run 
into the back of the insured's vehicle. The view of the Commission 
was that the insurer in these circumstances should be entitled to 
cancel the cover due to breach of the policy but that the insured 
should be indemnified for loss suffered by the insured before 
cancellation of the policy. This, it was argued, should apply in 
respect of all conduct of the insured during the period of cover, 
without regard to the form of control in a particular policy. Such an 
approach has been given statutory shape in New Zealand in the 
Insurance Law Reform Act 1977. All distinctions between exclusions, 
warranties, conditions, and provisos are swept away. By virtue of 
s11 : 
"Where - 
(a) By the provisions of a contract of insurance the 
circumstances in which the insurer is bound to 
indemnify the insured against loss are so defined 
as to exclude or limit the liability of the insurer 
to indemnify the insured on the happening of 
certain events or on the existence of certain 
circumstances; and 
(b) In the view of the Court or arbitrator 
determining the claim of the insured the liability 
of the insurer , has been so defined because the 
happening of such events or the existence of 
such circumstances was in the view of the 
insurer likely to increase the risk of such loss 
occurring; 
the insured shall not be disentitled to be indemnified by 
the insurer by reason only of such provisions of the 
contract of insurance if the insured proves on the 
balance of probability that the loss in respect of which 
the insured seeks to be indemnified was not caused or 
contributed to by the happening of such events or the 
existence of such circumstances". 
The Law Reform Commission recommended the adoption of this 
provision in Australia subject to one important modification. This was 
that the basis of recovery should be stated separately, rather than 
be linked with court proceedings. 27 
27. 	Discussion Paper No.7, at para.46. 
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The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (CwIth.), which has not yet 
been proclaimed, has followed the Australian Law Reform Commission's 
recommendations that statements, by an insured, regarding a state of 
affairs should cease to operate as warranties. 
The Insurance Contracts Act 198428 is a detailed enactment 
which sets out, according to its preamble: 
".. to reform and modernise the law relating to certain 
contracts of insurance so that a fair balance is struck 
between the interests of insurers, insureds and other 
members of the public, and so that the provisons 
Included in such contracts, and the practices of 
insurers in relation to such contracts, operate fairly." 
The Act, by s24, declares a warranty of existing fact made in or in 
connection with a contract of insurance to be a mere representation. 
A statement made by or attributable to the insured as to the 
existence of a state of affairs (which will exclude a continuing 
warranty) is to have effect, not as a warranty, but as though it were 
a statement made during negotiations before the contract of insurance 
was entered into. Even if the statement is incorporated in the 
contract, it is not to be treated as a term of it but as a mere 
representation and there is consequently no remedy for breach of 
contract. Therefore the insurer cannot avoid the operation of ss28-30 
of the Act dealing with remedies for misrepresentation by making the 
representation a term of the contract. 
Under s15, The Act provides a code of relief in respect of 
harsh, unconscionable or unfair contracts. 	Relief includes the 
variation, avoidance or termination of the contract. 	Any other 
legislation providing for relief from the legal consequences of 
28. 	Repealing the Life Assurance Act 1774 (Imp.), the Fires 
Prevention (Metropolis) Fires Act 1774 (Imp.) and the Marine 
Insurance Act 1778 (Imp.) by virtue of s3 of the Act. The Act ToTi 
not apply to contracts made prior to the commencement of the Act 
(s4(1)), nor to contracts of re-insurance, health, marine, workers 
compensation, motor vehicle third party, or State insurance (s9). 
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misrepresentation does not apply to contracts of insurance within the 
•ambit of the Act. Legislation such as the New South Wales Contracts  
Review Act 1980 and the South Australian Misrepresentation Act  
1971-72 will not apply, although any common law principles of relief 
from unconscionable contracts will continue to apply (s7). 
Part IV of the Act makes major changes in the common law 
concerning the duty of disclosure and misrepresentation. A duty is 
laid upon the insured, under s21(1) to disclose, before the contract 
•is entered into, every matter known to the insured which either (a) 
he knows is relevant to the decision of the insurer whether to accept 
the risk and if so on what terms; or (b) a reasonable person in the 
circumstances could be expected to know to be so relevant. 
The court is given an overriding power by s31 to disregard 
avoidance of a contract of insurance for fraudulent misrepresentation 
or non-disclosure in certain circumstances. If the insured brings 
proceedings in respect of a loss • suffered, the court has a discretion 
to disregard the avoidance and allow the insured to recover the 
whole, or such part as the court thinks is just and equitable in the 
circumstances, of the amount otherwise payable under the contract of 
insurance. However, the court can only disregard the avoidance if 
(a) it would be harsh and unfair not to do so, and (b) in the court's 
opinion, the insurer has not been prejudiced by the insured's breach 
or, if so, such prejudice is insignificant or minimal (s31(2)). The 
court, additionally, must have regard to the need to deter fraudulent 
conduct in relation to insurance and must weigh the culpability of the 
insured against the loss he would suffer if the avoidance were to 
•stand. The court may take into account other relevant matters in 
deciding whether or not to exercise its overriding power (s31(3)). If 
such power is exercised, it operates only to preserve the claim in 
respect •of the loss and does not otherwise operate to restate the 
contract (s31(4)). 
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Trade Practices Act 1974  
(i) 	Control of Exemption Clauses 
(a) 	Supply of goods  
(1) 	The Trade Practices Act 1974 (as amended) has made 
important changes in the control of exemption clauses and the effect 
of such clauses upon implied terms in contracts. 
Essentially the Act (in Division V) restores the terms implied 
in a contract for supply by a corporation to a consumer for which, 
respecting the sale of goods, the Sale of Goods Act 1896 allowed 
contracting out.
29 
The Trade Practices Act provides: 
"s68(1) Any term of a contract for the supply of goods 
or services to a consumer (including a term that 
is not set out in the contract but is incorporated 
in the contract by another term of the contract) 
that purports to exclude, restrict or modify or 
has the effect of excluding, restricting or 
modifying - 
a) the application in relation to that contract of 
all or any of the provisions of this Division; 
the exercise of a right conferred by such a 
provision; or 
any liability of the corporation for breach of 
a condition or warranty implied by such a 
provision, is void. 
(2) A term of a contract shall not be taken to 
exclude, restrict or modify the application of a 
provision of this Division unless the term does 
so expressly or is inconsistent with this 
provision". 
The effect of s68 of the Trade Practices Act is to invalidate 
exemption clauses (or terms having that effect) that exclude, restrict 
29. 	Section 57 (New South Wales); s54 (South Australia), 
(Western Australia); s56 (Queensland), s61 (Victoria), s59 
(Tasmania); s56 (New Zealand); s55 United Kingdom. The section 
allows the exclusion of implied terms and conditions by express 
agreement between the parties, or by course of dealing, or by usage. 
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or modify the implied terms of fitness and quality in consumer 
contracts of supply. Section 68 does not make the use of such 
clauses (or terms) illegal. However, s58(g) of the Act prohibits false 
or misleading statements concerning the existence, exclusion or effect 
of any condition, warranty, guarantee, right or remedy that a 
consumer may have. The Trade Practices Commission has expressly 
stated that attempts to exclude liability, as in warranty or guarantees 
(unless permitted by the Act), lay corporations open to prosecution 
under s53(g). 30 
Section 68 clearly makes void the use of such standard clauses 
as: 
"This warranty (or guarantee) is expressly in lieu of all 
other warranties (or guarantees) express or implied and 
all other obligations and liabilities on our part". 
However, the use of such exemption clauses (for this is what they 
are, in fact) is not illegal under s68, even though their use is struck 
down by s53(g). There is sufficient evidence that such clauses are 
still being used in standard form documents even if on a reduced 
scale since the passing of the 1974 Act. 31 The Trade Practices 
Commission has recommended that express warranties and guarantees 
be made accurate and positive and not be phrased in a manner likely 
to mislead or deceive. Accordingly, the preliminary wording to such 
documents should read: 
"The benefits conferred by this guarantee are in 
addition to all other rights and remedies in respect of 
the product (or service) which the consumer has under 
the Trade Practices Act and other State and Territory 
laws". 
30. Information Circular No.26 (5/1/1979) replacing Information  
Circular Nos.5 and 6 (23/411975). 
31. The reports of Consumer Protection Councils and Bureaux in 
most States over the past five years verify this. See Appendix A 
'Used Car Warranty'. 
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The present situation is not satisfactory. Some car dealers are still 
not beyond the stage of describing vehicles in terms of "as is, where 
is", ignoring the fact that the Trade Practices Act has invalidated the 
legal effect of this and similar terminology. 
More positive steps should be taken to ensure prosecution for 
the use of warranties and guarantees that infringe s53(g). It was 
found necessary for the Director-General of Fair Trading under s22 
of the Fair Trading Act 1973 (UK) to make regulations to ban the use 
of such clauses. This followed on a report by the Consumer 
Protection Advisory Committee dealing with practices which attempted 
to exclude inalienable rights in consumer contracts. 32 The Consumer  
(Restrictions on Statements) Order
33 
accordingly 
following acts by persons acting in the course of a 
the display of certain notices which are void 
where consumer transactions are carried out; 
(2) the publication of any advertisement carrying 
statements similarly void, intended to induce 
consumers to enter consumer transactions; 
(3) supplying to a consumer goods bearing on the 
container a void term, or which would be if it 
were a term; 
(4) furnishing 	to 	any 	consumer 	party, 	or 
prospective party, to a consumer transaction of 
a document containing a void term (or which 
would be if it were a term); 
(5) supplying goods, containers and furnishing 
documents to a consumer which contain a 
statement detailing certain rights or obligations 
Of a consumer. Goods, containers or documents 
must not contain a statement relating to the 
right or obligations of the consumer where the 
goods are defective, not fit for a particular 
32. 'Rights of Consumers: A Report on Practices Relating to the 
Purported Exclusion of Inalienable Rights of Consumers and Failure to 
Explain their Existence'. H.M.S.O. (1974); presented to Parliament 
under s83 of the Fair Trading Act 1973. 






purpose or do not correspond with their 
description unless there is a clear conspicuous 
statement in close proximity to the other which 
informs the consumer that his statutory rights 
are not affected; 
(6) 	the suppNing by the retailer, anticipating a • 
subsequent consumer transaction, of any goods, 
container bearing, or furnishing a document 
containing, a statement limiting the liability of 
the supplier to the retailer. This can only be 
done if there is a clear conspicuous statement as 
In (5)." 
Under s172 of the Trade Practices Act the Commission has power to 
make similar regulations. 
(ii) 	Implied Terms  
The effect of s68 is that it is no longer possible for 
corporations to exclude implied conditions and warranties under the 
guise of warranty or guarantee. Therefore all goods supplied to 
consumers are sold with the following implied: 
"(a) 	a condition that the seller had title to sell the 
goods and that the buyer will enjoy "quiet 
possession" free of any encumbrance (s69); 
(b) a condition that in a supply by description the 
goods correspond with that description (s70); 
(c) a condition that goods supplied to a consumer 
in the course of a business are of merchantable 
quality unless specific defects are drawn to the 
consumer's attention or he examines the goods 
and he could have seen the defects for himself 
(s71 (1) ) ; 
(d) a condition that in a supply by sample: 
(i) the bulk corresponds to the sample in 
quality; 
(ii) the 	consumer 	has 	a 	reasonable 
opportunity of comparing bulk with 
sample; 
(iii) that the goods are free from defects 
rendering them unmerchantable that 
would not be apparent on a reasonable 
examination of the sample (s72)." 
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felt by most authorities to have nullified the •effect of Thornett and  
Fehr v. Beers and Son
36 in which it was held that a cursory check 
of the outsides of glue barrels, the contents of which were not of 
merchantable quality, was, in effect, sufficient to bar a claim for 
breach of condition. 
Section 70 implies, in contracts for the supply of goods by 
description, a condition that the goods will correspond with the 
description and such a condition will apply even if the goods for sale 
or hire are selected by the consumer. The wording of s70 (as with 
ss68-72) is based on similar terms in the Supply of Goods (Implied  
Terms) Act 1973 (in this case, s4). 37 A sale in a self-service store, 
therefore, falls within the category of a sale by description under 
s70. 
Section 71(2) provides that where a corporation supplies goods 
to a consumer in the course of business, and the consumer expressly 
or impliedly makes known to the corporation or another supplier any 
particular purpose for which the goods are required, there is an 
implied condition that the goods are reasonably fit for that purpose, 
whether the purpose is a common one or not for the use of the goods 
in question. When goods are purchased or supplied under s71 (2) the 
condition will apply even though the customer does not make his 
specific purpose known, as reliance is usually inferred where a 
customer purchases goods from a retailer or manufacturer. 38 
36. (1919) 1 K.B. 486. See Benjamin Sale of Goods Sweet & 
Maxwell (2nd edition 1981), at para.815.; P.S.Atiyah Sale of Goods  
Pitman (5th edition 1975) at p.83. 
37. The wording of the English Act was based on a specific 
recommendation of the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission in their First Report (Exemption Clauses In Contracts)  
Law Corn. No.24, Scot. Law Corn. No.12 at para.24. 
38. Per Lord Wright in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd•
[1936] A.C. 85, 99; see alia—TTnjamin pp.817, 825, Sutton Sale of 
Goods law Rook Co. (1974), at pp.142-153. 
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It should be noted that ss68-72 do not apply to private and 
auction sales. 
(b) 	Supply of services 
There is an important distinction between contracts of sale and 
contracts for services (also referred to as contracts for skill and 
labour). In Robinson v. Graves 42 it was held that a contract to 
paint a portrait was a contract for skill and labour and not a contract 
for the sale of goods, despite the fact that it was the object of the 
contract to transfer property in the completed portrait to the 
defendant. The distinction (termed the "main purpose" test) would 
appear to be that if the substance of the contract is the production 
of something to be sold, and the exercise of the skill is primarily for 
the purpose of producing the goods, then the contract is one for the 
sale of goods. But if the contract is one for skill and labour to be 
exercised, and the resulting article is the product of that skill, the 
contract is for work done and materials supplied. 43 
The application of this test has brought varying results. It 
has been held that the making of dentures " is a sale of goods as is 
the making of a mink coat or a suit of clothes to measure, 45 but not 
the drafting of a legal document or the supply of plans by an 
architect. 46 It is not easy to see the validity of these distinctions 
42. [1935] 1 K.B. 579. 
43. See K.C.T. Sutton Sale of Goods (1974) at p.40. In Deta 
Nominees Pty Ltd. v. Viscount Plastic Products Pty. Ltd. [197-9] . 
V.R. 167 it was held that a contract for the manufacture and supply 
to a furniture manufacturer of an industrial tool suitable for the 
production of plastic drawers for furniture was for the sale of goods 
even though the manufacturer of the tool modified the furniture 
manufacturer's specification to make the tool more practical. 
44. Samuels v. Davis [1943] K.B. 526. 
45. Marcel (Furriers) Ltd. v. Tapper [1953] 1 W.L.R. 49. 
46. Vautier v. Fear [1916] G.L.R. 524. 
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and the "main purpose" test has itself been categorized as so erratic 
as to be no guide at al1. 147 
The distinction is also important in terms of liability attaching 
to the supplier. In a contract of sale of goods the seller's obligations 
extend to latent defects and do not depend on proof of negligence. 
But in a contract for services the person providing the service is 
usually held to undertake to exercise due skill and care and is not 
liable in the absence of negligence. This distinction may be 
illustrated by the American case of Perlmutter v. Beth David  
Hospital48 . In this case the plaintiff was given a blood transfusion in 
the defendants' hospital. The blood was contaminated with jaundice 
viruses which, according to the expert evidence, were not detectable 
by any scientific tests, and the plaintiff suffered injury as a result. 
The plaintiff, who was a paying patient at the hospital, paid an 
account charging him separately for the blood supplied. The plaintiff 
claimed that the blood had been "sold" to him and that the defendants 
were therefore liable for "defects" in the blood on the basis of breach 
of the implied warranties in the sale of goods. The New York Court 
of Appeals held by a majority that the transaction was one of services 
only and that the supply of the blood was merely incidental to those 
services. 49 
The Trade Practices Act by s74(1), in respect of services 
supplied by a corporation to a consumer, provides that there is an 
47. G.W. Bartholomew 'Contracts for the Sale of Goods and 
Contracts for Work and Labour' (1961) 35 A.L.J. 65. 
48. 123 N.E. 2d. 792 (1955). 
49. Contrast Dodd v. Wilson [1946] 2 All E.R. 691. In this case 
the plaintiff contracted %Trilh--a. veterinary surgeon to inoculate his 
cattle with a serum which the latter had purchased for suppliers of 
vaccine. 	It was held that there was no contract of sale but 
nevertheless the surgeon impliedly warranted the vaccine to be fit for 
the purpose for which it was supplied. He was therefore liable 
although not guilty of negligence. See for comment on this case see 
P.S. Atiyah Sale of Goods Pitman (5th edition) at p.15. 
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Implied warranty that the services supplied will be rendered with due 
care and skill and that any materials supplied in connection with 
those services will be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they 
are supplied. In respect of the requirement that services supplied 
are rendered with due care and skill s74(1) would appear to do no 
more than restate the common law position outlined above. If the 
consumer, either in so many words or by implication, indicates to the 
supplier a particular purpose for which the services are required or 
what he wants them to achieve, there is an implied warranty that the 
services and materials supplied will be reasonably fit for that purpose 
or might be reasonably expected to achieve that result. 50 There is a 
proviso that this will not apply where the circumstances show that the 
consumer did not rely on the skill and judgement of the corporation 
or that it would be unreasonable in the circumstances for him to do 
so (s74(2)). 
(i) 	Definition 
"Services" are restricted by definition 51  to 
"(a) 	the construction, maintenance, repair, treatment, processing, 
cleaning or alteration of goods or of fixtures on land; 
(b) the alteration of the physical state of land; or 
(c) the transportation of goods otherwise than for the purposes of 
a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on or 
engaged in by the person for whom the goods are transported" 
(s74(3))." 
This 	would 	include 	services 	such 	as dry-cleaning, 
transportation and removal (but not storage) of goods, building 
50. Warranties are also implied that materials used are of good 
quality and free from latent defects and that they are reasonably fit 
for their intended purpose : Helicopter Sales (Australia) Pty. Ltd.  v. 
Rotor Work Pty. Ltd. (1974-5) 132 C.L.R. 1 and cases there cited. 
51. For a general definition of services see s4(1) of the Act as 
amended. 	See now Trade Practices Amendment Bill c1.36 which 
repeals s73. See Postscript. 
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contracts, car repair work, and repair work in general. It would not 
include most professional services (except those of civil engineers and 
architects) nor important bailment contracts such as those 9overnin9 
car parking facilities. Nor does the section apply to services carried 
out by sub-contractors, where there is no direct contract between the 
sub-contractor and the consumer. The definition excludes the 
majority of professional services and bailment contracts (save 
transportation), such as those applying to car parking facilities. The 
section does not apply to services carried out by a subcontractor, 
where there is no direct contract between the subcontractor and the 
consumer. 
Services are also defined in s4; these include property rights, 
other benefits or facilities provided by way of trade or commerce, 
contracts for performance of work (including that of a professional 
nature). The definition also includes contracts for the provision of 
amusement, instruction, entertainment or recreation, insurance, 
banking and moneylending. 
The narrowness of the definition of the types of services 
under s74(3) to which the implied warranties apply can be strongly 
criticised. Why should dry-cleaners, removalists and builders be 
covered but not solicitors, auditors, bankers or insurance brokers? 
Car parks can still absolve themselves from contractual and tortious 
liability to their clients by the use of suitably worded exemption 
clauses in notices prominently displayed at point of contracting, while 
dry-cleaners who damage clothing entrusted to their care cannot do 
so. These anomalies should not exist. Therefore s74(3) should be 
amended so that s74(1),(2) (subject to the changes already 
suggested) apply to all services. A consumer may suffer as much, if 
not more, from negligent advice as from defective, unfit goods. His 
remedy should not depend on bringing an action within a relatively 
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uncertain area of negligence in the form of a Hedley Byrne
52 
tort or 
making a contract that falls within the current restrictive definition of 
services. If it were felt proper, on grounds of policy, to exempt 
certain services from the proposed remodelled s74(3) this could be 
done on the basis of the Fair Trading Act 1973 (UK). 53 
(ii) 	"Mixed" Contracts  
Certain problems arise with regards to "mixed" contracts for 
the supply of goods and services. The difficulties of distinguishing a 
contract for the supply of services for a contract for the supply of 
goods have been outlined earlier. A typical "mixed" contract would be 
one for the brick cladding of a house. There is no legislative 
guidance as to whether such a contract is to be governed by ss69-73 
(supply of goods) or s74 (supply of services with related materials). 
The definition of supply of goods is not an exhaustive one and it is 
not made clear in the Act as to whether a contract for the supply of 
goods is, by that fact, excluded from the ambit of s74. In practice, 
contracts for the supply of goods and services cannot be precisely 
delineated. The definition of services under s74(3) does not provide 
guidance in a given set of facts as to which type of contract is under 
consideration. A court might decide a contract was primarily one for 
the supply of goods in order to give the consumer maximum 
protection. It has been suggested above that the courts, faced with 
this problem would employ a "main purpose' test to assist them. In 
52. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] A.G. 
465; MLC Assurance Co Ltd v. Evatt [1971] A.C. 793; Scott Group  
Ltd v. McFarlane [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553; but see now Shaddock &  
Associates v. Paramatta City Council [19811 36 A.L.R. 385 (HC). 
53. See Schedules 4 and 5 of that Act. Services excluded under 
the Schedules are, inter alia legal, medical, dental, opthalmic, 
veterinary, nursing liF7iFei—a-n d services of architects, those of 
accounting and auditing, surveyors, professional engineers and 
technologists, the provision of primary, secondary, further and 
tertiary education. 	The supply of gas for domestic purposes, 
electricity, the carriage of passengers by road and the carriage of 
passengers and goods by rail and letter post services are also 
excluded. 
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such a case, the greater part of contracts for work and materials 
would be dealt with under s74. It can be argued that the consumer, 
in such contracts, should have the same protection as is given under 
ss69-72 in the case of supply of goods. 
The problem is illustrated by a recent case in the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales involving the supply of a computer system, 
Toby Construction Products Pty Ltd v. Computer Bar Sales Ltd 54 . 
The plaintiff alleged that it entered into a deed with Ward Computer 
Co Pty Ltd for the acquisition of a computer system. 
The deed described three items of "hardware" and two items of 
"software" and referred to them collectively as "the equipment". It 
nominated a total price of $14,390 and allocated $12,230 for the 
hardware and $2,160 for the software. Delivery was to be effected 
within 30 days of the agreement and the vendor was to install all the 
equipment at its expense and train the plaintiff's staff in its use. 
The plaintiff sued in respect of losses alleged to have been caused by 
deficiency in the equipment supplied. 
The court only dealt with the issue as to whether the contract 
sued upon constituted an agreement for the sale of "goods" within the 
meaning of the New South Wales Sales of Goods Act 1923 and the 
Trade Practices Act 1974. The balance of the action, due to the 
quantum of the claim, was remitted to the District Court. 
It was held by Rogers J. that : 
(i) The sale of the computer system, comprising both 
hardward and software, constituted a sale of goods 
within the meaning of both the New South Wales Sale of 
Goods Act 1923 and the Trade Practices Act 1974. 55 
54. (1983) 50 A.L.R. 684 
55. [bid, at p.690 
The substance of the contract was the sale of a total system to 
be supplied to the plaintiff. The system, software included, whilst 
representing the fruits of much research and work, was, in current 
jargon, off the shelf, in a sense, mass produced. 
The fact that it was necessary for the effective working of the 
system that it should comprise software did not disqualify the 
aggregate operative system from the application or description of 
"goods". There was a sale of tangible chattels, a transfer of 
identifiable physical property. 
(ii) 	It is a debatable question whether or not the sale of 
computer software by itself is sufficient to constitute a 
sale of goods within the meaning of the legislation 
under consideration. 56 
Admittedly, the issue in this case was whether the supply of 
computer hardware and software came within sale of goods for the 
purposes of the New South Wales Sale of Goods Act 1923. Rogers J. 
applied an American decision Triangle Underwriters Inc v. Honeywell  
57 Inc 	where the supply of computer equipment and services was held 
to be a sale of goods. 
The problem in Toby'S case could be dealt with by amending 
the Trade Practices Act 'so that any materials supplied in connection 
with services be deemed to be a supply of goods within the meaning 
of the Act. 58 
56. 	Ibid. 
57. 475 F. Supp 765; 604 F (2d) 737 (C.A.) 
58. This is the solution provided in the proposed draft Tasmanian 
Supply of Goods and Services Bill (c. 1(4)), see Tasmanian Law 
Reform Commission Report No. 33, Report and Recommendations 
relating to Exclusion Clauses and Implied Obligations in Contracts for 
the supply of Goods and Services (1983) Government Printer, Hobart; 
subsequently referred to as Tasmanian Law Reform Commission Report 
No. 33 (see Appendix B). 
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There are additional problems in the relationship between 
s74(1) and s74(2). Section 74(2) makes a distinction between the 
purpose for which materials are supplied and the results that they 
are required to achieve. Under s74(1), where the consumer does not 
rely on the supplier's skill and judgement, the supplier has no relief. 
Therefore, if a consumer insisted on a particular product being used 
under a contract for work and materials and he could bring himself 
under s74(1) he could recover damages, despite the fact that he may 
have designated materials that the supplier had indicated to the 
consumer were unsuitable. It would seem that a supplier in such a 
situation might refuse to perform the work at the outset. The 
anomaly that exists between the two subsections should be resolved. 59 
Constitutional Limitations of the Provisions of the Trade Practices Act 
The provisions of the Trade Practices Act considered are 
constitutionally limited in their application. They have no effect upon 
contracts made between a consumer and a non-corporate , body, such 
as a sole trader, unless the contract involves interstate or overseas 
trade. Because of these constitutional limitations and also due to the 
differing approaches to the substantive law by the jurisdictions of 
each State, conditions and warranties implied by law into contracts 
are not uniform. 
The Trade Practices Act is founded on a number of legislative 
powers that the Federal Parliament can use under the Constitution. 
That chiefly relied on is the corporation's power (s51(xx)), but 
others are also invoked, such as the powers in relation to trade and 
commerce (s51(i)), external affairs (s51(xxix)), postal and 
telecommunication services ( s51 ( v) ) , banking ( s51 (xiii) ) , insurance 
59. 	The resolution of the anomalies discussed and the suggested 
solution is drawn from N.E. Palmer and F.D. Rose 'Implied Terms in 
Consumer Transactions: The Australian Approach' (1977) 26 
I.C.L.Q. 169, at pp.174-175. 
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(s51(xiv)), Territories (s122) and dealings with the Commonwealth 
and its agencies (s51(1) and incidental powers). Although the 
prohibitive sections of Part V of the Trade Practices Act refer chiefly 
to corporations the Act generally is so drafted to cover all whose 
activities fall within the constitional powers on which the Act is 
based. This is provided expressly by s6 of the Act. In Australian  
Industrial Court, Ex parte CLM Holdings Pty Ltd it was held that 
s6(2): 
extends the application of the principal provisions 
of the Act to persons not being corporations, as well as 
to corporations, whilst they are engaged in interstate 
or overseas trade or commerce, trade or commerce 
between territories or with a territory or in the supply 
of goods or services to the Commonwealth To an 
authority or instrumentality of the Commonwealth". 
The position is that, in general, the provisions of the Act 
(including those already discussed) embrace restrictive agreements 
and conduct of corporations in the course of inter-state, intra-state 
and overseas trade. In addition, these provisions cover the 
agreements and conduct of all legal and natural persons arising from 
the operation of trade between Territories, a Territory and a state, 
interstate and overseas and from dealings with Federal 
instrumentalities. Additionally, by s6(3) of the Act, the unfair 
practices provisions of Part V Division 1 govern conduct so caught 
when radio, television, postal, telephonic or telegraphic facilities are 
used by a person.
61 
60. [1977] 13 A.L.R. 273, at p.279. 
61. The constitutional ambit of the Act is also constrained by 
limitations on the corporations power. See Strickland v. Rocla 
Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 C.L.R. 468, R v. Trade Practices  
Tribunal and Commissioner of Trade Practices; Ex parte St George  
County Council (1974) 130 C.L.R. 533. See R v. Judges of the 
Federal Court and Adamson; Ex parte Western Australian Football  
League (1979) 23 A.L.R. 439 where a football league and club were 
held to be trading corporations and Commonwealth v. State of 
Tasmania (1983) 46 A.L.R. 625, where the Hydro Electric Commission 
of Tasmaniawas held by a majority of the High Court to be a trading 
corporation within the meaning of the corporations power (s51 (xx) of 
the Constitution). 
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The Trade Practices Act provides expressly that Commonwealth 
and State laws should operate concurrently by reason of s75 which 
states that:, 
"(1) 	Except as provided by sub-section (2), this Part 
is not intended to exclude or limit the 
concurrent operation of any law of a State or 
Territory. 
(2) Where an act or omission of a person is both an 
offence against section 79 and an offence under 
the law of a State or Territory and that person 
is convicted of either of those offences, he is 
not liable to be convicted of the other of those 
offences. 
(3) Except as expressly provided by this Part, 
nothing in this Part shall be taken to limit, 
restrict or otherwise affect any right or remedy 
a person would have had if this Part had not 
been enacted". 
This section was considered in General Motors Acceptance Corporation  
v. Credit Tribunal. 62 It was stated by the High Court that, though 
s75 did not rectify an inconsistency where it occurred, it did show an 
intention by Federal Parliament that it was not intended to cover the 
field. In the case at issue, GMAC had been summoned before the 
South Australian Credit Tribunal to explain its failure to meet the 
requirements of s40 of the South Australian Consumer Credit Act  
1972-1973 by which the company was under a duty to serve certain 
notices to consumers who had obtained credit from it. GMAC argued 
that the notice required to be served under the Thirteenth Schedule 
of Regulations made under the Consumer Credit Act was misleading 
and if served would infringe s52(1) of the Trade Practices Act. The 
Schedule in question required a credit provider to summarize the 
protection available to consumers under the Consumer Credit Act  
relating to implied terms as to title, quality and fitness (which could 
not be excluded) and to state that the benefit of these terms was 
62. 	(1977) 14 A.L.R. 252. 
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available to borrowers. It was argued on GMAC's behalf that as the 
Schedule required a statement only of the rights available under the 
State Act, it was misleading as these rights had been superseded by 
the non-excludable rights given under ss68-72 of the Trade Practices  
Act. The High Court found that though there were similarities in the 
ambit and effect of the terms in each Act, there were also important 
differences. Both the terms and the situations in which they would 
be implied in contracts were distinguishable. There was, therefore, 
no inconsistency between the State and Federal Acts. The Federal 
Parliament had indicated in s75 that it did not intend to cover the 
field. It can be stated with a degree of certainty then, that unless 
the rights given to a consumer under Federal and State legislation are 
exactly the same, the issue of inconsistency does not arise. Where 
there is inconsistency s75 effectively indicates an intention by the 
Federal Parliament not to cover the field and there may then be room 
left for the State Act to operate, leaving the consumer with rights 
under both State and Federal Acts. The GMAC case shows that the 
High Court is likely to interpret each Act to give it concurrent and 
separate areas of operation. 
State-Federal Relationships and Part V of the Trade Practices Act 
In dealing with the question of State-Federal relationships in 
applying the consumer protection provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act the Report of the Trade Practices Act Review Committee, 
subsequently referred to as the Swanson Report, expressed the 
desire that State agencies and courts be more involved in the 
administration of those provisions. 63 The Committee was asked by 
Its terms of reference to give attention to any particular problems 
arising from the inter-relationship of the consumer protection 
63. 	Swanson Report at para.9.35. 
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provisions with State laws. The Committee considered that the causes 
of the uncertainty and confusion arising from different State and 
Federal laws attempting to deal with similar matters in marginally 
differing ways stemmed in turn from the possible interaction of s75 
and 5109 64  of the Constitution, and in the difference in terms and 
substance of the laws themselves. In relation to implied conditions 
and warranties in consumer transactions under the Trade Practices  
Act neither s75 of the Act nor administrative action coordinated 
between State and Federal agencies, in the Committee's view, 
overcame the problem of the multiplicity of laws. Due to the 
constitutional limitations already noted, and differences of legislative 
approach by the States (particularly in the definition of "consumer") 
numerous technical distinctions, which were basically irrelevant to 
both commercial behaviour and consumers' interests, determined 
questions of both the conditions and warranties implied by law into 
contracts and to which contracts they applied. In the interests of 
uniformity it was essential that these conditions and warranties be 
uniform throughout Australia, the present situation being 
unsatisfactory to all those affected by the law. 65 
The Committee concluded, in respect of conditions and 
warranties to be implied into transactions, that the field should be 
covered by Federal legislation to rid the relationship of Federal and 
State laws in this area of existing confusion. The one exception to 
this conclusion was the particular legislation of States, such as the 
New South Wales Motor Dealers Act 1974, dealing with specific 
conditions or warranties especially relevant to goods or services. As 
64. By s109 of the Constitution it is provided that where a State 
Act is inconsistent with a Federal Act the Federal Act shall prevail to 
the extent of the inconsistency. 
65. (Swanson Report, at paras. 9.8-9.13). 
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legislation of this type gave, in the Committee's view, an important 
source of consumer rights in given industries Federal law should not 
override it. 
	
The 	Committee, 	in 	the 	context 	already 	considered, 
recommended that the Federal government seek to persuade the States 
to adopt enactments to cover the non-corporate bodies which were 
outside the ambit of the Trade Practices Act and to frame such State 
laws in terms similar to those of the Trade Practices Act. The 
Committee's recommendation that a Standing Committee of 
Commonwealth and State Ministers responsible for consumer affairs be 
set up to co-ordinate reform of consumer law was consequently taken 
66 
up. 
Trade Practices Act 1974: Problems of Consumer Definition  
The present definition of a consumer in the Trade Practices  
Act was introduced by the Trade Practices Amendment Act 1977. 
Clearly the manner in which a consumer is defined determines the 
application under the Act of the implied terms and the invalidation of 
exemption clauses which attempt to remove the protection of those 
terms in consumer contracts, as well as indicating the ambit of 
protection considered desirable on the grounds of public policy.
67 
For the purposes of the Act (as amended), unless a contrary 
intention appears, it is provided by 4B that: 
"(1) 	(a) 	a person shall be taken to have acquired particular 
goods as a consumer if, and only if - 
(i) 	the price paid or payable by the person for the 
goods did not exceed the prescribed amount; or 
66. The practical results of this development can be seen in the 
Goods (Sales and Leases) Act  1981 (Victoria), Chattels Securities Act  
1981 (Victoria) and the Credit Act 1984 (Victoria); see also Credit  
Act 1984 (New South Wales). 
67. See G.Q. Taperell, R.B. Vermeesch and D.J. Harland Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection  Butterworths (3rd edition) 1983 at 
p.577. 
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(ii) 	where that price exceeded the prescribed amount 
- the goods were of a kind ordinarily acquired 
for personal, domestic or household use or 
consumption, and the person did not acquire the 
goods, or hold himself out as acquiring the 
goods, for the purpose of re-supply or for the 
purpose of using them up or transforming them, 
in trade or commerce, in the course of a process 
of production or manufacture or of repairing or 
treating other goods or fixtures on land; and 
(b) 	a person shall be taken to have acquired particular 
services as a consumer if, and only if - 
(I) 	the price paid or payable by the person for the 
services did not exceed the prescribed amount; 
or 
(ii) 	where that price exceeded the prescribed amount 
- the services were of a kind ordinarily acquired 
for personal, domestic or household use or 
consumption. 
(2) 	For the purposes of sub-section (1) - 
(a) •the prescribed amount is $15,000 or, if a greater 
amount is prescribed for the purposes of this 
paragraph, that greater amount; 
(b) if a person acquired goods together with other property 
or with services, or with both other property and 
services, and a specified price was not allocated to the 
goods in the contract under which they were acquired, 
the price paid or payable by the person for the goods 
shall be taken to have been the market value of the 
goods at the time when that contract was entered into; 
and 
(c) if a person acquired services together with property or 
with other services, or with both property and other 
services, and a specified price was not allocated to the 
first-mentioned services in the contract under which 
they were acquired the price paid or payable by the 
person for the first-mentioned services shall be taken 
to have been the market value of those services at the 
time when that contract was entered into. 
(3) 	Where it is alleged in any proceeding under this Act or in any 
other• proceeding in respect of a matter arising under this Act 
that a person was a consumer in relation to particular goods or 
services, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is 
established, that the person was a consumer in relation to 
those goods or services." 
One effect of this section is to bring, under the definition of 
consumer, a firm which is supplied with goods or services of up to 
$15,000 (a figure which can be changed by regulation) in value. The 
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amendment arises from specific recommendations made by the Swanson  
Report. 68 Under the unamended Act, a person was treated as a 
consumer if the goods or services were of a kind ordinarily acquired 
for private use or consumption. Any acquisition for re-supply was 
thereby excluded from being supply to a consumer. A person would 
not be so regarded, in the case of services, if they acquired them 
for the purposes of, or in the course of, a profession, business, 
trade or occupation or for a public purpose.
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The above definition has been subjected to a number of 
criticisms. What if large quantities of a commodity such as sugar, 
are ordered, does this then make them goods of a kind not ordinarily 
acquired for private use or consumption? In relation to the type of 
goods purchased, is the buying of a reconditioned engine for a car 
which the purchaser is installing on a private do-it-yourself basis a 
consumer purchase, or not? If two friends wish to paint the roofs 
and frames of their weatherboard properties and agree that one shall 
purchase for both of them in order to save by bulk buying, is the 
sale a consumer purchase, even though an ordinary consumer would 
purchase half the quantity of paint? A salesman in a large building 
supplies outlet would only know essentially for what purposes the 
paint was required. Sales of paint in larger quantities than given in 
the example might be conducted at a separate part of the retailer's 
establishment set aside for "trade sales". However, modern methods 
of retailing increasingly make bulk buying a system of purchase that 
68. See discussion of consumer definition, paras.8.38-9.45. 
69. Section 4(3)(a) ,(b) of the unamended Trade Practices Act; see 
also the definition from which the above section derives, of s55(7) of 
the English Sale of Goods Act (see now s6 of the Unfair Contract  
Terms Act 1977 (UK)). See s68A of the Trade Practices Act. 
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the private consumer, as distinct from the trade buyer, is encouraged 
to use. It has been suggested by Professor Greig that some of the 
uncertainty of this part of the definition could be removed by adding 
a clause to the effect that a purchase of goods not ordinarily for 
private use would still count as a consumer sale if the seller was 
aware that the goods were in fact for private use. 70 The authors of 
Benjamin on Sale of Goods argue that if the word "type" is taken to 
refer strictly to the nature of the actual goods, then bulk sales of 
goods normally sold for consumer purposes in small quantities will be 
designated as consumer sales. Sales outside this heading will be 
those of goods ordinarily purchased for commercial use only (they 
include commercial weedkiller and furniture vans). However, they 
doubt, if under "type of goods" their packaging is included, or 
whether a box containing 144 toilet rolls are "goods of a type 
ordinarily bought for private use or consumption". 71  This illustration 
crystallizes the problems in determining the nature of goods, 
commercial or consumer, inherent in the increasing trend to sell in 
bulk direct to the general public. 
Where a person acquires, in the course of business, goods, of 
a kind ordinarily acquired for private use or consumption, provided 
these goods are not for re-supply, the person will fall within the 
category of a consumer. Therefore, under the unamended s4(3) (a) 
an insurance company purchasing a suite of chairs for its visitors' 
lounge would acquire as a consumer. The section does not require 
that goods be used for private use or consumption, only that the 
goods be of a kind ordinarily acquired for private use or 
consumption. The factor of acquiring such goods in the course of a 
70. See D W Greig, Sale of Goods Butterworths (1974), at p.229. 
71. Benjamin, Sale of Goods, Sweet & Maxwell (1981), at 
para.1011. 
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business does not then affect the status of the buyer. 72 However, in 
respect of services the status of the person acquiring these is of 
importance. Therefore, if a doctor purchased a typewriter for his 
receptionist this would come under s4(3)(a) as a consumer 
acquisition. On the other hand, if he hired or leased the machine 
from an office equipment firm this could be taken as an acquisition 
for the purposes of the doctor's profession and not to be counted as 
a consumer acquisition. If one adopted Professor Atiyah's criticism of 
ss55(7)(a), (b) of the English Sale of Goods Act, it could be argued 
that acquisition of services by a business should fall within the 
consumer category if the services are to be used by the business in 
the same way as by consumers. If this is so, the doctor in the 
example does not acquire the typewriter in the course of a business 
for the purposes of s4(3)(b). 73 
Criticism of the Consumer Definition by the Swanson Report 
The Swanson Report held that the test of a consumer as it 
then stood had been correctly criticised on the following grounds: 
"(a) 	that it was insufficiently sensitive to the 
inequalities that occurred in commercial 
transactions that did not involve "consumer 
goods" in the narrow sense, 
(b) that it had inherent uncertainties, and 
(c) that it made an ilygical distinction between 
goods and services." 
72. See the criticisms of the differently •worded s55(7) in the 
English Sales of Goods Act, (1893) (now 1979) s6 Unfair Contract  
Terms Act 1977, P.S. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods Pitman (5th ed.), at 
p.134; Benjamin, Sale of Goods at para.1011; D.W. Grieg, Sales of 
Goods (1974) Sweet & Maxwell, at pp.227-228. 
73. See P.S. Atiyah op cit p.5. In his example he argues that to 
demonstrate that a sale was not a consumer sale it would have to be 
shown that the buyer made a business of buying goods of a relevant 
type. A firm of solicitors buying carpet for their offices would 
purchase as consumers, on this basis. 
74. Swanson Report, at para.9.42. 
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Both (b) and (c) have already been discussed, although it has not 
been there suggested that the uncertainties of the definition were 
insurmountable or presented great practical difficulties. In respect of 
(a), discussion is left for the moment as to the need to extend the 
definition of consumer to include certain business transactions. 75 
Since the Committee was charged in their terms of reference, 
amongst other matters, to consider and report on whether the Trade  
Practices Act was sufficiently certain in its language to enable 
persons affected by it to understand its operation, they had to 
consider the certainty of the then current definition of consumer. It 
concluded that the "best approach" should be by reference to the 
price paid by the consumer for the goods or services. 76 This 
solution was noted as having been used in legislation such as the Hire 
Purchase Act, 1960 (New South Wales). 77 This method of framing a 
consumer definition was specifically rejected by the English and 
Scottish Law Commissions, both in an early Working Paper and 
confirmed by their First Report on Exemption Clauses. 78 Contracting 
out in sales exceeding a particular price on the precedent of hire 
purchase legislation was not favoured on the basis that any maximum 
price which would be adequate for sales to private purchasers would 
cover many more "business sales" than it did in the case of hire 
purchase transactions. Additionally, even if sales to corporate bodies 
were excluded (which is not the case with the current Trade 
Practices Act), there would be anomolous distinctions between small 
businesses which were incorporated and others which are not. 
75. See Chapter Four. 
76. Report, at para.9.43. 
77. Sub-section 1 (6) as amended by the New South Wales 
Commercial Transactions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1974. 
78. Working Paper No.18, Scottish Law Commission Memorandum 
No.7, para.54; First Report (1969), at para.73. 
76 
The $15,000 limit which represents the definition of a consumer 
does not then produce the certainty sought by the Swanson 
Committee. A price limit is an arbitrary device and is made even less 
certain in its application by the proviso that the services or the 
goods will still be acquired by a person as a consumer if they are 
above $15,000 if they are "of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, 
domestic or household use or consumption". 79 Despite the fact that 
the Committee regarded the ambit of this latter qualification as 
uncertain (even if only, in their view, in a limited number of cases) 
the overall conclusion is that a marginally uncertain definition has 
now been replaced by a wholly arbitrary and considerably more 
uncertain one. 
As a result, it would be advantageous to revert to the original 
definition of consumer in the Trade Practices Act, subject to the 
removal of the anomoly existing between supply of goods and supply 
of services. The addition of Professor Greig's rider to that definition 
suitably expressed would also assist in making it more certain so 
that, a purchaser will acquire goods or services which are not 
ordinarily for private use if the supplier was aware at the time of 
supply that the goods or services, in fact, were for private use. 
Although total certainty in a workable definition of a consumer 
is likely to be illusory if not, indeed, unattainable, the merits of the 
definition advocated above would appear to exceed those currently 
found in the Trade Practices Act. 
79. 	Section 4B(1)(b)(ii). In a Green Paper, The Trade Practices 
Act: Proposals for Change (1983) Canberra, the Attorney General, 
the Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment and the Minister 
for Employment and industrial Relations propose changes in the 
current definition of consumer. An exposure draft bill, included in 
the Green Paper, the Trade Practices Amendment Bill by c1.4 would 
raise the $15,000 limit to $200,000 and extend the definition of 
consumer, to include those engaged in a forming business (defined by 
c1.4(4)). 
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Clearly, if the original definition of "consumer" is preferred, 
- that is, a person who acquires goods or services of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for private use or consumption, to the exclusion 
of certain commercial transactions, - then the conclusions of the 
Swanson Report must be rejected on this issue. It follows that the 
Report's argument that the definition should be broad enough to 
provide protection to a range of business transactions, particularly 
by small businesses, is unacceptable. The examples given to justify 
the extension of "consumer" to business are not particularly apt. It 
was argued that an insurance company purchasing a lounge chair for 
its reception area or a small pie manufacturer buying an office 
typewriter were in no better bargaining position or had any greater 
ability to evaluate goods or services than an ordinary consumer. " 
However, those examples, it is submitted, would put the purchaser 
within the category of a "consumer" in the original definition since 
neither business would be dealing specifically in those goods.
81 
In 
respect of the bargaining power of the businesses, it appears to be a 
misplaced concern to regard an insurance company, which typifies an 
industry 'positively revelling in the use of exemption clauses, as being 
in a disadvantaged position as a purchaser. Both the insurance 
company and the pie manufacturer have an advantage which 
distinguishes them from the ordinary consumer: they can both insure 
against risks which are part of their business. Even if they were 
not so protected in the earlier examples given, as "consumers", it 
does not seem that either company would be financially unable to bear 
a premium covering them against the risks of goods or services which 
prove defective, or could cause loss, injury or damage (for instance, 
	
80. 	Swanson Report, at para.9.40. 
11. 	See Professor Atiyah's argument above, Sale of Goods, Pitman 
Vitt ■ ociition) 
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as in the case of a small computer malfunctioning and electrocuting an 
employee). The proper role of consumer protection legislation is to 
protect the consumer. It should not be designed to replace the use 
of insurance in commercial transactions where, even if the purchaser 
and supplier are not on an equal footing, it is possible to meet the 
eventuality of loss or damage by payment of a premium which would, 
in turn, constitute a legitimate business expense. This view is 
expanded later. 82 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.) and Control of Exemption  
Clauses  
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.) now provides that 
where parties contract with each other, one as a consumer or on the 
other's written standard terms of business the latter cannot exclude 
or restrict his liability for breach of contract, when in breach, or 
claim to be entitled to render either a substantially different 
contractual performance or to render no performance at all in relation 
to part or all of the contract (s3). This provision is subject to the 
contract term satisfying a test of reasonableness (laid down in 
Schedule 2 of the Act). 
Dealing as a consumer is defined by s12: 
"(1) 	A party to a contract "deals as a consumer" in 
relation to another party if - 
(a) he neither makes the contract in the 
course of business nor holds himself out 
as doing so; and 
(b) the other party does make the contract In 
the course of a business; and 
(c) in the case of a contract governed by the 
law of sale of goods or hire-purchase, or 
by section 7 of this Act, the goods 
82. 	See Chapter Four, infra. 
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passing under or in pursuance of the 
contract are of a type ordinarily supplied 
for private use or consumption. 
(2) But on a sale by auction or by competitive 
tender the buyer is not in any circumstances to 
be regarded as dealing as a consumer. 
(3) Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party 
does not deal as. consumer to show that he does not". 
(a) 	Control of Varieties of Exemption Clauses  
The Unfair Contract Terms Act by reason of s13(1), extends 
control over exemption clauses by making certain categories of clause 
ineffective where exclusion or restriction of liability is also prevented 
by the Act. The provisions which are to be treated similarly to 
exemption clauses are provisions which (a) restrict the means of 
enforcing liability, or (b) restrict or exclude the remedy stemming 
from it or (c) restrict or exclude the rules of evidence or procedure. 
Provisions of type (a), "making the liability or its enforcement 
subject to restrictive or onerous conditions", are rendered 
ineffective. 83 Provisions falling within this category are those which 
stipulate that complaints must be made within a certain time as a 
condition of the defendant accepting liability,
84 
or require several 
copies of a claim or that certain persons attest to it. It is suggested 
that a clause providing a shorter limit than allowed under the 
Limitation Act 1939 is prima facie restrictive. 85 "Onerous" is not 
defined, but may be regarded as meaning unfairly burdensome or 
simply unfair. 
83. Section 13(1)(a). For criticism of s13 see D. Yates Exclusion 
Clauses in Contracts Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edition (1982), at 
pp.75-81; N.E. Palmer and D. Yates 'The Future of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977' [1981] C.L.J. 108-134, at pp.126-130. See 
Chapter Eight. 
84. See Commissioner , of Railways for New South Wales v. Quinn  
(1946) 72 C.L.R. 307. 
85. P.K.J. Thompson, Unfair Contract Terms Act Butterworths 
(1977) p.8. 
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Provisions of type (b) are those which restrict or exclude any 
right or , remedy in relation to the liability concerned or subject a 
person to any prejudice as a result of his pursuing any such right or 
remedy'. For instance, a clause stated - 
11 ... the buyers shall be bound to accept and pay for 
(the goods) unless the sellers shall within 14 days after 
arrival of the goods at their destination receive from•
the buyers notice of any matter or thing whereof they 
may allege that the goods are not in accordance with 
the contract". 
It was held in Szymonowski & Co v. Beck & Co
86 
that this clause did 
not end the seller's liability after 14 days, but only restricted the 
buyer's right to reject the goods. Damages were available as a 
remedy if it could be proved that the goods did not accord to the 
terms of the contract. In a consumer contract the clause quoted 
would be rendered ineffective (subject to the reasonableness test) as 
if it were an exemption clause. 87 
Provisions of type (c) are those that restrict or exclude rules 
of evidence or procedure. A common example of this provision is 
that, in a sale of goods or contract of hire, which states that the 
buyer (or hirer) acknowledges, that before signing the agreement, he 
has carefully examined the goods and is satisfied that they are of 
merchantable quality and fit for the purpose for which they are 
required and that he has read all exemption clauses and accepts them 
as fair and reasonable. Provisions of this kind, prior to the 1977 
Act, had been held to be without legal effect at common law. 88 The 
Act controls such provisions in that they cannot now be used to 
exclude evidence that the hirer or buyer did not satisfy himself as to 
the quality of the goods or the fairness of the agreement. 89 
86. [1923] 1 K.B. 457. 
87. Section 13(1)(b). 
88. See Lowe v. Lombank Ltd [1960] 1 W.L.R. 196. 
89. Sections 13(1)(c), 25(3)(c). 
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Section 13(1) also provides that to the extent that exclusion or 
restriction of any liability is prevented by ss2 or 5-7 of the Act,
90 
these sections also prevent exclusion or restriction of liability by 
reference to terms and notices which exclude the "relevant obligation 
or duty". This provision covers a notice which, instead of excluding 
liability for negligence, states, (in effect), that no duty of care is 
accepted. Such a notice will be treated as operating as an exemption 
clause. 
An agreement in writing to submit present or future 
differences to arbitration is not to be treated under the Act as 
excluding or restricting any liability.
91 
(b) 	Control of Indemnity Clauses  
A clause such as that one in the South Wales Switchgear case 
has been termed a "boomerang" clause.
92 Under the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 (UK) a similar clause, because of its commercial 
context, would still fall to be governed by the common law rules. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act, however, controls the use of 
exemption clauses that are unreasonable under the Act (s4). Where a 
person deals as a consumer, no term of a contract will be effective to 
compel him to indemnify another person (irrespective of whether that 
person is a party to the contract, or not) in respect of liability 
incurred by the other for negligence or breach of contract. It will 
be permissible to rely on such a contract term where it satisfies a 
test of reasonableness (laid down in Schedule 2 of the Act). Section 
4 is further qualified by s4(2): 
"(2) 	This section applies whether the liability in 
question - 
90. These sections are considered at Chapters Five and Six. 
91. Section 13(2). 
92. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 165; see P.K.J. Thompson Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 Butterworths (1978), at p.11. 
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(a) is directly that of the person to be 
indemnified or is incurred by him 
vicariously; 
(b) is to the person dealing as consumer or 
to someone else". 
The potential operation of s4(2) has already been illustrated in the 
example given in Chapter One of a car firm operator's employees 
causing injury or damage in respect of which the car owner 
undertakes to indemnify the operator against claims. 
Control of Indemnity and Exemption Clauses: Australian Applications  
The extension of control to exemption clauses governing areas 
such as negligence that are within the ambit of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act will be considered later in the Australian context. 93 The 
issue to be considered now is the desirability of amending the Trade 
Practices Act to cover both exemption and indemnity clauses and to 
ensure that all clauses which operate as exemption clauses are subject 
in consumer transactions to the same controls. 
Indemnity clauses are not specifically dealt with in the Trade 
Practices Act. Section 68 refers only to terms which have the effect 
of excluding, restricting or modifying. That indemnity clauses are 
impliedly within this section seems self-evident, however, the section 
could be amended advantageously to include indemnity clauses 
expressly. Similarly, provisions which are dealt with under s13 of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act as having effects similar to those of 
exemption clauses are within the ambit of s68 of the Trade Practices  
Act. However, additional guidance may be usefully given by using 
the categories outlined above under s13 of the Unfair Contract Terms  
Act. That is to say, s68 could be amended within the terms of s13 to 
93. 	See Chapter Eight. 
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the effect that the section applies to provisions that (a) restrict the 
means of enforcing liability, (b) restrict or exclude the remedy in 
relation to the liability incurred, (c) restrict or exclude the rules of 
evidence or procedure. It should be noted that although the Supply  
of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 (which provided the model for s68 
of the Trade Practices Act) originally provided for the invalidation of 
exemption clauses in consumer contracts for the sale of goods it has 
been necessary to specify the type of clause to which the extended 
provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 apply. 94 If, as is 
later suggested, the Trade Practices Act were to be amended to cover 
clauses that limit or exclude liability for death or injury arising from 
negligence, it would be consequentially necessary to introduce the 
amendment modelled on s13 of the 1977 Act. 95 
94. The Supply of Goods (Implied Terms Act 1973 (U.K.) s4. 
95. See Chapter Seven. For a discussion of the reasonableness 
test see Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE SALE OF GOODS ACTS 
The passing of the Trade Practices Act in 1974 served to 
accentuate the deficiencies of the Sale of Goods Acts in various states 
including Tasmania.
1 These shortcomings arose from the 
inappropriateness of the earlier legislation to consumer transactions of 
the mid-twentieth century. As Professor Atiyah has put it: 
11 ... the Sale of Goods Act has not proved one of the 
more successful pieces of codification undertaken by 
Parliament towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
The principal reason for this may well be that there has 
been a change in the type of sale of goods cases coming 
before the courts. The •nineteenth century cases on 
which the Act was based were, in the main, sales 
between builTiessmen or organizations, i.e. sales by 
manufacturers and suppliers. Since the Act was 
passed, however, a large proportion of tfie— cases 
coming before the courts appear to have been sales by 
retailers to the consuming public. In view of the very 
different social and economic nature of these 
transactions, both of which are in law sales of goods, it 
• is not surprising that an Act devised principally for the 
one has not always worked satisfactorily for the other. 
It is now noticeable that one of the principal trends of 
modern legislative change is to discrimylate between 
consumer and non-consumer transactions". 
The protection of the implied terms given under the Trade 
Practices Act to consumers (ss68-72) applies essentially only to those 
goods supplied to a consumer by a corporation. This leaves it open 
1. Unless otherwise stated all further references in this chapter 
to the Sale of Goods Act are to the Tasmanian Act. 
2. The Sale of Goods Pitman, 5th edition (1975), at p.2. 
Reference is to the United Kingdom Act. 
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to a partnership or sole trader or other non-corporate body to 
exclude or vary the implied terms in a contract under the Sale of 
Goods Act. The Sale of Goods Act permits the two parties to a 
contract for sale to exclude any requirements of the Act by either 
express agreement or in the course of dealings between them.
3 
In transactions between commercial buyers and sellers, the 
Sale of Goods Act provides a generally suitable code. In order to 
provide suitable remedies for consumers, it has been judged 
appropriate in some States to amend the Act by inserting a new 
section to deal specifically with consumer sales. This is an approach 
which has been taken in New South Wales by the Commercial  
Transactions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1974 inserting Part VIII in 
the Sale of Goods Act 1923 and more recently canvassed by the 
Victorian Goods (Sales and Leases) Act 1981.
4 
The Goods (Sales and Leases Act) 1981 (Victoria)  
The Goods (Sales and Leases) Act was introduced in the 
Victorian Parliament in 1978 as a result of deliberations of the 
Standing Committee of the Attorneys' General concerning uniform 
consumer legislation. The Bill was withdrawn then reintroduced and 
passed in 1981. 5 
The Act by s2(1), inserts a new Part IV in the Victorian 
Goods Act 1958 making provision for non-excludable terms to be 
3. Section 57 (New South Wales); see note 29, supra, Chapter 
Two. 
4. See also Consumers Transactions Act 1972 (South Australia) 
and the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 (UK). The latter 
provided the precedent for subsequent Commonwealth and State 
legislation. 
5. The other Bills, also intended to create a uniformity in 
important areas of consumer law amongst the States, are now enacted 
as the Credit Act 1984 and the Chattel Securities Act 1981. See also 
Credit Act 1984 (New South Wales). For comment and criticism of the 
Goods (Safes and Leases) Act 1981 see A.J. Duggan and S.W. Begg, 
'The New Implied Terms' (1983) 11 A.B.L.R. 284, et seq, 367 et seq. 
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implied in all sales and services (as defined in the Goods (Sales and  
Leases) Act). Such terms are also implied in certain leases of goods 
where the cash price of the goods or services or rent under the lease 
does not exceed $15,000. Where the cash price does exceed this 
figure the terms will apply where the goods or services are for 
personal, domestic or household use or consumption. By s85(1) a 
reference to a sale does not include - 
	
"(c) 	a contract or agreement made before the date of 
commencement of the Act 
(d) 	a contract of sale of, or an agreement to sell, 
goods where a buyer buys, or holds himself out 
as buying, the goods for the purpose of 
re-supply or, where the goods are raw materials 
or goods that are ordinarily acquired for the 
purposes of repairing or treating other goods or 
fixtures on land or being incorporated in other 
goods, for the purpose of - 
(i) transforming them; or 
(ii) incorporating them in other goods - 
in trade or commerce, in the course of a process 
of production or manufacture or of repairing or 
treating other goods or fixtures on land; or 
(e) 	a contract of sale of, or an agreement to sell, 
services where the buyer of those services has 
contracted to provide those services, or goods 
and services including those services to a third 
person." 
Division 2 which governs sales repeats the wording of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (as amended) save that "sale" is substituted 
• for the word "supply". The implied terms and conditions under the 
Trade Practices Act are therefore transferred under the Goods (Sales  
and Leases) Act to apply those implied terms and conditions to sales, 
including those by non-corporate bodies, to a consumer (ss.86-90). 
Sale of services are dealt with under ss91-94. Notably, the 
terms implied under these sections are designated conditions rather 
than warranties as distinct from the latter approach under the Trade 
Practices Act (s74). Section 92 generally follows the provisions of 
s74(1) and (2) of the Trade Practices Act, but with some important 
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differences. 
Section 91 implies, in effect, that the services are of 
merchantable quality. Under s91 services will be provided with an 
implied condition that these will be rendered with due care and skill. 
In the case of a sale of services by a person who sells these in the 
course of a business there is an implied condition that the services 
are as fit for their purposes for which services of that kind are 
commonly bought as is reasonable to expect having regard to their 
price, the terms of the sale and all other relevant circumstances. 
Section 92 implies into a sale of services in the course of a business a 
condition (not found in the corresponding provision in s74(2) of the 
Trade Practices Act) of fitness for purpose or result where the buyer 
makes known to the seller. (or in the course of antecedent negotiation 
to a dealer or person acting on the seller's behalf6 ) the particular 
purpose for which the services are required or the result he desires 
the services to achieve. This implied condition will not apply where 
the circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or that it is 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill or judgement of the seller, 
dealer or other person. In contrast to 574 of the Trade Practices Act 
there is no requirement to the quality or fitness of materials supplied 
in connection with services
7 
 . 
Section 93 provides for a sale of services by demonstration as 
follows: 
"In a sale of services - 
(a) 	where the seller shows to the buyer a 
demonstration of, or a result achieved by, 
services and the buyer is induced by the 
demonstration or by the showing of the result to 
buy services of that kind; or 
6. 'Antecedent negotiations and 'dealer' are defined 
in s84(1) and (6) respectively. 
7. But see s94, infra. 
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(b) in which there is a term express or implied to 
the effect that the sale is a sale of services of 
the kind that are shown to the buyer in a 
demonstration, or that achieved a particular 
result shown to the buyer - 
there is - 
(c) an implied condition that the services will 
correspond in nature and quality with the 
services shown in the demonstration or will 
correspond in quality with the services that 
achieved that result; and 
(d) an implied condition that the services will be 
free from any defect rendering them unfit for 
the purposes for which services of that kind are 
commonly bought that would not be apparent on 
reasonable examination of the services shown in 
the demonstration or the result achieved by 
services of that kind and of which the buyer is 
not aware when the sale is made". 
There is no counterpart to s93 in the Trade Practices Act. 
Part IV applies to sale of goods which include services and sale of 
services which include goods by virtue of s94(1). Sections 94(1) and 
94(2) provide that - 
"(1) 
	
Where, in a sale of goods and services, there is 
a term that - 
(a) would be a condition of the sale if it were 
a sale only of the goods; or 
(b) would be a condition of the sale if it were 
a sale only of the services - 
the term shall not be treated for the purposes of 
this Part as a condition of the sale of the goods 
and services unless having regard to the sale as 
a whole, it is shown that the term ought to be 
regarded as a condition of the sale. 
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a statement 
in a sale to the effect that a term is not a 
condition does not of itself establish that the 
term should not be treated as a condition. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
sub-section (1) a reference to the sale of goods 
includes a reference to the supply of materials in 
connexion with a sale of service". 
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A provision in a contract of sale (including a term that is not 
set out in the sale but incorporated by another term of the sale) that 
excludes, restricts or modifies a condition or warranty implied by 
Division 2 of the Act, or purports to have a similar effect, is void 
(s95(1)). Additionally, a seller, by s96, who includes, or permits to 
be included, an exclusionary, restricting or modifying provision in a 
sale affecting such a condition or warranty, is guilty of an offence. 
Section 97
8 
deals with limitation and indemnity clauses as 
follows: 
"97(1) Subject to sub-section (3), a contract or 
provision in or that relates to a sale [is void 
and constitutes an offence] 
(a) that excludes, restricts or modifies or 
purports to have the effect of excluding, 
restricting or modifying 	liability 	for 
damages or limits or purports to have the 
effect of limiting the amount of damages 
that may be recovered by a buyer in 
respect of a breach by a seller of a 
condition or warranty implied by this Part 
in a sale; 
(b) requires a buyer to indemnify a seller in 
respect of damages payable for breach of 
a condition or warranty implied by this 
Part in a sale; or 
(c) that provides that a buyer is not entitled 
to damages, or is entitled only to a 
limited amount of damages, in respect of a 
breach by a seller of a condition or 
warranty implied by this Part in a sale 
unless he takes such steps or follows 
such procedures as, 	but for the 
provision, a buyer would not reasonably 
be expected to take or follow. 	The 
penalty for breach of ss96 and 97 is 10 
penalty points". 
It could be argued that s68 of the Trade Practices Act covers 
the subject matter of s97(1). However, the latter section serves to 
clearly identify offending clauses. Importantly, ss96 and 95 improve 
upon s68 of the Trade Practices Act. Section 96 not only 
8. 	Section rephrased by transposing 'is void' above (a) and 
adding 'and constitutes an offence' (s98(2)) to assist clarity. 
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makes void a provision in a contract of sale that excludes, restricts 
or modifies a condition or warranty implied by Division 2 of the Goods  
(Sales and Leases) Act but makes it an offence for the seller to 
include, or permit to be included, such a provision. In addition s95 
prohibits such a provision contained in contracts separate from, but 
related to, the principal contract. 
Section 97(3) provides for limitation of liability for breach of 
condition or warranty in respect of goods and services not of kind 
commonly purchased for personal, domestic or household use or 
consumption. A term will not be void which limits the liability of the 
seller for breach of a condition or warranty (apart from a transaction 
to the value of $15,000 under s86) in the circumstances listed below: 
"(a) 	in the case of goods, any one or more of the 
following:- 
(i) the replacement of the goods or the 
supply of equivalent goods; 
(ii) the repair of the goods; 
(iii) the payment of the cost of replacing the 
goods or of buying equivalent goods; 
(iv) the payment of the cost of having the 
goods repaired; or 
(b) 	in the case of services - 
(i) the supply of the services again, or 
(ii) the payment of the cost of having the 
services supplied again". 
Section 97(3) will not apply in relation to a term in a contract 
of sale if the buyer establishes that it is not fair or reasonable for 
the seller to rely upon it; the court in deciding this (following the 
wording of s4B of the Trade Practices Act) 9  shall have regard to all 
the circumstances of the case and in particular to the following 
matters: 
"(a) 	The strength of the bargaining positions of the 
seller and the buyer relative to each other, 
taking into account, among other things, the 
9. 	As amended by the Trade Practices Amendment Act (No. 2) 
1977 s3. 
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availability of equivalent goods and services and 
suitable alternative sources of supply; 
(b) Whether the buyer received an inducement to agree to 
the term or, in agreeing to the term had an opportunity 
of buying the goods and services or equivalent goods 
and services from any source of supply under a sale 
that did not include that term; 
(c) Whether the buyer knew or ought reasonably to have 
known of the existence and extent of the term (having 
regard, among other things, to any custom of the trade 
or any previous course of dealing between the parties); 
and 
(d) In the case of a sale of goods, whether the 
goods were manufactured, processed or adapted 
to the special order of the buyer." 
In a contract for a sale of goods, whether the seller is in 
breach of the implied conditions of title, freedom from charge or 
encumbrance (ss86(1)(a),(b)), or in breach of such conditions in the 
case of a limited title or modified freedom from charge or encumbrance 
given by a seller or a third party (ss86(3)(c),(d),(e)) the buyer 
cannot discharge the sale under s98 on grounds of breach unless: 
"(a) 	he has given notice to the seller to the effect 
that he will discharge the sale unless the seller 
within a reasonable time provides good title to 
the goods or removes the charge or encumbrance 
on the goods, as the case may be; and 
	
(b) 	the seller has not, within a reasonable time after 
the notice was given, provided good title or 
removed the charge or encumbrance, as the case 
may be." 
By s99(2) a buyer is not deemed to have accepted goods by 
reason only that he has retained or used them or if he has not 
informed the seller of rejection of the goods or returned the goods to 
him unless a reasonable period of time has expired after the defective 
nature of the goods became apparent. This applies to a sale of goods 
where: 
• "(a) 	the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer 
are defective in breach of a condition implied by 
this Part in the sale; 
(b) 	the fact that they are so defective is apparent at 
that time or becomes • apparent within a 
reasonable period after that time; and 
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	• (c) 	the 	buyer has not done any act or thing by 
reason of which the goods cannot be returned to 
the seller in substantially the same state as they 
were in when they were delivered to the buyer". 
By s99(3) a buyer is not deemed to have accepted goods as 
specified by s42 of the Goods Act 1958 (Victoria) where, by 
agreement with the seller, the buyer, before acceptance, delivers the 
goods to the seller or to one nominated by him for repair or 
replacement. Acceptance by the buyer, in these circumstances, will 
not be effective until the buyer accepts the goods after such repair 
or replacement. Section 99 does not limit the time within which 
buyer may return the goods •and treat the sale as repudiated by 
reason of a breach of condition under s98 (s99(4)). No right is 
given under s99 to a buyer to discharge a sale of goods where the 
goods are rendered unmerchantable after delivery to the buyer or are 
damaged by abnormal use after delivery to the buyer (s99(5)). 
Section 100 represents a vital reform by granting recission to 
a buyer in the case of innocent misrepresentation:
10 
"100. (1) 	Where a buyer enters into .a' sale of goods 
after a misrepresentation that is not 
fraudulent is made to him and, if the 
misrepresentation had been fraudulent the 
buyer would have been entitled to rescind 
the 	sale 	by 	reason 	of 	the 
misrepresentation, the buyer may rescind 
the sale by notice given to the seller 
before, or within a reasonable period 
after, acceptance of the goods. 
(2) 	Sub-section (1) applies whether or not 
the misrepresentation has become a term 
of the sale". 
Section 101 governs the situation where a buyer discharges a 
sale of goods by repudiation or on breach of condition by the seller 
or rescinds for innocent misrepresentation: 
"101. Where a buyer - 
10. 	See Misrepresentation Act 1971-1972 (South Australia) s6, 
s7(1); Misrepresentation Act 1967 (UK ) ss1,2(1). 
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(a) 	discharges a sale of goods by reason of 
repudiation or breach of a condition by 
the seller; or 
(b) 	in accordance with 	section 101 	(1) 
rescinds a sale after a misrepresentation 
that is not fraudulent is made - 
the following provisions apply - 
(c) 	where the goods have been delivered to 
the buyer , and have not been returned to 
the seller, the buyer shall return the 
goods to the seller or permit the seller to 
take possession of the goods; 
(d) 	the buyer is liable to the seller for loss 
or damage caused to the goods - 
(i) by the buyer wilfully or by his 
negligence while the goods are in his 
possession during a• period of 21 
days after discharging or rescinding•
the sale; and 
(ii) by the buyer wilfully while the 
goods are in his possession after the 
expiration of a period of 21 days 
after discharging or rescinding the 
sale; 
(e) 	where the property in the goods passed 
to the buyer before the discharge or 
rescission, the property re-vests in the 
seller; 
(f) 	the seller is liable to the buyer for money 
paid and for the value of any other 
consideration paid or provided under the 
sale by the buyer to the seller; and 
(g) 	where - 
(i) the buyer used the goods before the 
discharge or recission; and 
(ii) the 	seller 	acted 	honestly 	and 
reasonably in selling the goods - 
the court by which or arbitrator before 
whom the matter falls to be considered 
may if it or he considers it just to do so 
having regard to all the circumstances of 
the case allow the seller to recover from 
the buyer an amount equal to the whole 
or any part of the fair value to the buyer 
of this use of the goods". 
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Division 3 of the Goods (Sales and Leases) Act repeats the 
provisions of Division 2 in respect of leases. 
The Goods (Sales and Leases) Act makes certain improvements 
to the existing law governing terms implied in consumer transactions. 
For example, it provides that the use of exempting provisions in 
contracts are not only void, but illegal (s96) and prohibits such 
provisions contained in contracts separate from, but related to, the 
principal contract. Similarly, s91 adds to the protection of the 
consumer by implying that, effectively, services sold are fit for their 
purpose. Section 93 is also an innovation in that it implies a 
condition that services sold will correspond with services 
demonstrated respecting nature and quality. 
However, there are serious deficiencies in the Goods (Sales  
and Leases) Act11  . First, the Act does not mirror the corresponding 
sections of the Trade Practices Act (ss68-74). For example there is 
no requirement in ss91-93 of the Goods (Sales and Leases) Act  
relating to the quality or fitness of materials supplied in connection 
with services. Where the Good (Sales and Leases) Act increases as, 
for example, protection of the consumer under the provision of ss91, 
93, 95-97 noted above, this puts the Victorian Act• more out of line 
with the Federal Act. Since no attempt has been made to 
consequentially amend the Trade Practices Act there now exists two 
pieces of legislation, which are applicable to the same transactions, 
and which effect different reforms although sometimes the same 
reforms in different ways. The Goods (Sales and Leases) Act, by its 
very title, covers a narrower ground than that of the Trade Practices  
Act; so that where the former applies to sales and leases, the latter 
applies to contracts for the supply of goods and services, and, 
11. 	See A.J. Duggan and S.W. Begg 'The New Implied Terms' 
(1983) 11 A.B.L.R. 367, at pp. 394-395. 
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additionally, has the merit of implying a single set of terms into such 
contracts. 
Secondly, although the intention preceding the passage of the 
Goods (Sales and Leases) Act was to rationalize the different State 
laws implying terms into consumer transactions, such an intention has 
failed. The Goods (Sales and Leases) Act cannot be said to provide 
a workable model for such a rationalization. 12 
Thirdly, the Goods (Sales and Leases) Act is not entirely 
consistent in its treatment of transactions which are substantially 
similar. For example, a person who purchases goods for re-supply 
will not obtain the benefit of the implied terms under the Act, 
whereas if he had leased them, he probably would so benefit. With 
the passage and coming into force of the Victorian Credit Act 1984 
this discrepancy is exacerbated with the result that, where goods are 
acquired by way of hire purchase for the purpose of re-supply that, 
where goods are acquired by way of hire purchase for the purpose of 
re-supply, the hirer may, if incorporated, obtain the benefit of the 
implied terms mentioned above, but not if he is unincorporated. 
An alternative, and arguably, better approach to uniformity of 
implied terms in consumer contracts is outlined subsequently. 13 
Implied Conditions in Hire Purchase Transactions  
Under the uniform hire purchase legislation,' terms of quiet 
possession, title, freedom from charge or encumbrance, of 
12. See the examples cited by A.W. Duggan and S.W. Begg (see 
note 11 supra); inconsistencies exist between Part IV of the Victorian 
Goods Act, the Victorian Hire Purchase Act, s5 and the common law 
in their concurrent application to hire purchase agreements. 
13. See below; see Tasmanian Law Reform Commission Report No.  
33 1983 (Government Printer) Hobart. 
T4. 	Hire Purchase Act 1960 (New South Wales) (now repealed see 
note 18), Hire Purchase Act 1959 (Victoria), Hire Purchase Act 1959 
(Queensland), Hire Purchase Act 1959 (Western Australia), Hire 
Purchase Act 1959 (Tasmania), Hire Purchase Ordinance 1961 (ACT).— 
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merchantability and of fitness of purpose similar to those implied 
under the Sale of Goods Acts are written into hire purchase 
contracts. In respect of consumer transactions, legislation has been 
enacted in South Australia and, more recently, in Victoria and New 
15 
South Wales. 
The implied conditions of merchantability and fitness of 
purpose under the Hire Purchase Acts do not apply where the 
agreement itself contains a statement (acknowledged by the hirer in 
writing that it has been brought to his notice) that the goods are 
second-hand and all conditions as to quality (in relation to 
merchantability) or fitness and suitability (in relation to fitness of 
purpose) are expressly negatived.
16 
The provisions will only apply 
where the owner is a non-corporate body and the transaction is not 
one of an interstate or overseas nature. For the bulk of consumer 
transactions the Trade Practices Act will apply because the owner of 
hired goods will, in the majority of cases, be a corporation.
17 
Transactions over $15,000, unless relating to goods for household, 
personal or domestic use, continue to be governed by the Hire 
Purchase Acts, except in New South Wales and South Australia. Such 
commercial contracts remain unaffected by the recent credit legislation 
in Victoria and New South Wales.
18 
15. Consumer Credit Act 1972 (South Australia), Consumer 
Transactions Act 1972 (South Australia), Credit Act 1984 (New South 
Wales) Credit Act 1984 (Victoria). 
16. Hire Purchase Act 1959 (Tasmania) Part III Division 1, 
s9(2),(3). 
17. See Trade Practices Act 1974 ss68-72. 
18. In New South Wales the Hire Purchase Act 1960 has been 
repealed by the Hire Purchase Repeal Act 1983. In Victoria, 
however, the Hire Purchase Act 1959 will continue to apply to all hire 
purchase agreements outside the regulated area (ie. commercial 
contracts). In South Australia the Consumer Transactions Act 1972 
has repealed both the Hire Purchase Agreements Act 1960 and the 
Moneylenders Act 1946 and in abolishing hire purchase replaced it and 
the repealed legislation by a rational legal framework for credit 
including a chattels mortgage. See In relation to bills of sale the 
Chattels Securities Act  1981 (Victoria). 
97 
The Credit Act 1984 (Victoria) and the Credit Act 1984 (New 
South Wales) regulate credit sales, loan, continuing credit contracts 
and property mortgages .
19 The supplier and credit provider are 
both made liable to the consumer if the credit provider is linked to 
the supplier. This liability is joint and several and covers liability 
for misrepresentation, breach of contract or failure of consideration in 
respect of the sale of goods and services.
20 
A "linked credit 
provider" is defined widely to include credit providers who have a 
continuing relationship with the supplier and to whom consumers are 
referred or who are promoted by sellers by agreement or 
arrangement.
21 Both the New South Wales and Victorian Acts make it 
an offence punishable by a penalty of $500 for a credit provider (or a 
mortgagee) to attempt to exclude the provisions of the Act.
22 
Further Reform 
Clearly the Goods (Sales and Leases) Act 1981 (Victoria) goes 
a considerable way towards reforming the Goods Act 1958 (Victoria) 
but does not bring it into line with the Trade Practices Act. 22 An 
alternative approach to that of the Victorian and New South Wales 
19. Credit Act 1984 (Victoria), Credit Act 1984 (New South Wales) 
1981 ss5 and 29. 
20. Credit Act 1984 (New South Wales), Credit Act 1984 (Victoria) 
s24, see Consumer Transactions Act 1972 (South Australia) s13. 
21. Credit Act 1984 (New South Wales), Credit Act 1984 (Victoria) s5, 
Consumer Transactions Act 1972 (South Australia) s5, Trade Practices  
Act 1974 s73. 
22. Section 160 in both Acts; see also Consumer Transactions Act  
1972 (South Australia) s47. For a general discussion of the Victorian 
and New South Wales credit legislation see P.Latimer Australian'  
Business Law C.C.H., 1984 edition, Chapter Fourteen. 
23. Criticism of the definition of 'services', 'consumer', and the 
'reasonableness' test used in the Victorian Act applies equally to the 
Trade Practices Act. See Chapters Two and-Tour. 
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legislation has been taken by the draft Tasmanian Supply of Goods 
24 
and Services Bill 1983. 	The draft legislation, accords with the 
recommendation of the Swanson Report that States adopt legislation to 
cover non-corporate bodies outside the Trade Practices Act, In terms 
similar to the latter Act. 25 It goes further than the Victorian and 
New South Wales Acts in that it also repeals and amends the Sale of 
Goods Act.
26 Thus, the whole of the present principal Act is recast 
to cover all contracts of supply of goods and services. The result is 
that reference can be made to one single Act that deals with contracts 
of supply (including sale) and the implied terms apply to all 
transactions save where these are suitably excluded by agreement in 
the case of inter-business dealings. It can be noted that the Irish 
legislature had moved part way to the position taken by the draft 
Tasmanian Bill in its Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 
1980.
27 
The Irish Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980  
The Irish Sale of Goods and Services Act 1980 in respect of 
the implied conditions as to title, correspondence with description, 
merchantable quality and reasonable fitness for , purpose, follows 
24. See Appendix B, reproducing the draft legislation contained in 
Tasmanian Law Reform Commission Report No 33 Report and  
Recommendations Relation to Exclusion Clauses and Implied Obligations  
in Contracts for the Supply of Goods and Services (1983). 
25. See supra note 8; other differences between the Supply of 
Goods anderc---ViEes Bill and the Trade Practices Act are discussed in 
context, see infra concerning definition of durability. 
26. (1896) (Tasmania), amending s1 of that Act and the 
corresponding long title and amending the Hire Purchase Act 1959 
(Tasmania) ss9 and 10. 
27. No.16 of 1980. 	The Act includes, by Part III, provisions 
concerning implied terms in hire purchase agreements (construing the 
Irish Hire Purchase Acts 1946 and 1960 and Part III as one). I am 
grateful to Mr William Binchy, Research Counsellor with the Irish Law 
Reform Commission in Dublin, for a copy of the Act. For comment on 
the Act see note by M.H. Whincup [1981] J.B.L. 478. 
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broadly the wording of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 
(UK) but with some significant additions. Sale by description is 
changed by amending s13 of the principal Act in the following terms: 
"A reference to goods on a label or other descriptive 
matter accompanying goods exposed for sa)g may 
constitute or form part of a description" (s.10). 
Arguably, the new definition makes it easier to reject goods which do 
not fulfil reasonable expectations raised by presentation or marketing 
of the goods. It may also make breaches of promises of after-sales 
service and guarantees actionable. 
Goods are of merchantable quality under the Act: 
"... if they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for 
which goods of that kind are commonly bought and as 
durable as it is reasonable to expect having regard to 
any description applied to them, the price (if relevant) 
and all the other relevant circumstances, and any 
reference in this Act to unmwhantable goods shall be • 
construed accordingly" (s10). 
By specifying durability as an ingredient of merchantable quality the 
Irish Act provides a useful innovation in contrast to the existing gap 
in the principal Act.
30 
The Act further provides an implied warranty for spare parts 
and servicing. By s12 the Act lays down an implied warranty that 
spare parts and an adequate after sales service will be available from 
the seller for any advertised time or, where this is not done, for a 
reasonable time. The Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism is 
empowered to make orders defining what is a reasonable time. Any 
attempt to exclude the warranty is vold. 31 
In contracts of sale of motor vehicles,
32 
s13 implies a condition 
28. Inserting a new s13(3) in the principal Act. 
29. Inserting a new s14(3) in the principal Act. 
30. See infra. 
31. See Trade Practices Act 1974 s74F, noted in Chapter Five infra 
together with the issue of the provision of spare parts and servicing. 
32. Including mopeds and electrically driven vehicles. 
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that at the time of delivery the vehicle is free from defects 
endangering the public or anyone in the vehicle. Section 13 does not 
apply in the case of car trade buyers nor when buyer and seller 
agree that the vehicle is not intended for use in the state in which It 
is delivered and a document is signed to that effect by both parties 
and given to the buyer on or before delivery. An agreement is only 
effective if it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Unless the 
dealer excludes the implied condition of roadworthiness in the above 
manner the dealer must give the buyer a certificate in the prescribed 
form stating that the vehicle is free from dangerous defects when 
delivered. In an action for breach of the implied condition, where no 
certificate has been given, it will be presumed that the defect in 
question existed at the time of delivery. 33 Section 13 also entitles 
anyone using the motor vehicle with the consent of the owner to sue 
the seller for breach of the implied condition of roadworthiness "as if 
he were the buyer" (s13(7)); this innovation marks a move away from 
the narrow confines of the doctrine of privity. 34 
Manufacturers' guarantees35 are dealt with in ss15-19. 
Guarantees are defined as documents, notices or other statements 
supplied by a manufacturer or supplier other than the retailer which 
indicate that the manufacturer or supplier will service, repair or 
otherwise deal with the goods after purchase (s15). A guarantee is 
required to be clearly legible, to define the goods supplied, to state 
the name and address of the person offering the undertaking, its 
duration, precise terms, cost to the buyer, and the procedure for 
33. For Australian legislation see Chapter Five. The English 
courts have held that a used car dealer gives an implied warranty 
that the vehicle can be safely and lawfully used on the road unless, 
it appears, the vehicle is sold 'as is' or for scrap; Lee v York Coach  
[1977] R.T.R. 35. 
34. See Chapter Six. 
35. See Chapter Five. 
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claiming under it. It is an offence to supply a guarantee which does 
not conform to these requirements (s16). A seller who delivers a 
manufacturer's guarantee to a buyer is liable for the observance of 
its terms as if the seller were himself the guarantor, unless he 
informs the buyer he is not so liable, or gives his own guarantee 
(s17). Importantly, the buyer may maintain an action against a 
manufacturer or other supplier who fails to observe any of the terms 
of the guarantee as *if that manufacturer or supplier had sold the 
goods to the buyer and had committeed a breach of warranty. The 
court is empowered to order the manufacturer or supplier to take 
such action as may be necessary to observe the terms of the 
guarantee or pay damages to the buyer. A buyer includes all 
persons who acquire title to the goods within the duration of the 
guarantee (s19). This provision may be compared with those under 
Division 2A of the Trade Practices Act, discussed subsequently.
36 
Part III of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 
deals with title and fitness of goods in hire purchase transactions 
(ss25-38). Duties imposed on creditors are similar to those imposed 
elsewhere on sellers in the Sale of Goods and Supply. of Services Act 
(see ss10-12). However, s32 declares the dealer a party , to the 
contract and makes him and the owner jointly and severally liable for 
any breach of the hire purchase agreement. This contrasts with the 
usual position of the dealer as an intermediary who links the 
consumer and the finance company and bears no liability for breach of 
any , implied term of the contract, except upon an express promise 
which he, as a dealer, makes. 37 
36. See Chapter Five. 
37. See Andrews v. Hopkinson [1957] 1 Q.B. 289; but now see 
Credit Act 1984 (Victoria), Credit Act 1984 (NSW) s24(1); Consumer 
TFariialFns  Act 1972 (SA) s13(1); in respect of the liability of the 
seller and a person conducting antecedent negotiations see Goods 
(Sales and Leases) Act 1981 (Victoria) s102(1). 
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Part IV deals with supply of services. 	The implied 
undertakings as to quality of service are worded in similar terms to 
the Trade Practices Act, s74; 38 
"(a) 	that the supplier has the necessary skill to 
render the service; 
(b) • that he will supply the service with due skill, 
care and diligence; and 
(c) that, where materials are used, they will be 
sound and reasonably fit for the purpose for 
which they are required; and 
(d) that, where goods are supplied under the 
contract, they will be of merchantable quality". 
(s39) 
These terms may be excluded, or varied by agreement or usage. 
Where the supply is to a consumer it must be shown that any express 
exclusion of the implied terms is fair and reasonable and has been 
specifically brought to the consumer's attention. 
The United Kingdom legislature has enacted its own Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982. This Act contrasts with both the Irish 
legislation and the proposed Tasmanian draft legislation. 
The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982  
The Supply of Goods and Services Act  1982, which was passed 
on 13 July 1982, makes changes in the law concerning implied terms 
in contracts for the transfer of property in goods, for the hire of 
goods and for the supply of services. The Act stems from the 
recommendations of the Law Commission report Implied Terms in  
Contracts for the Supply of Goods" and the National Consumer 
Council's report Service Please. The Supply of Goods and Services  
Act 1982 deals with "Supply of Goods" in Part I (which came into 
effect together with s17 and related parts of ss18 and 19 on January 
38. See Chapter Two. 
39. Law Corn. No. 95 (1979). 
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4 1983) and with the "Supply of Services" in Part II (which with 
related parts of ss18 and 19 came into effect on July 4 1983). Part 
III deals with supplementary matters. 
The Act has two aims. The first, under Part I implements the 
Law Commission's recommendations, and reforms the law in respect of 
the terms to be implied in certain contracts for the supply of goods 
and to bring these implied terms generally into line with those terms 
implied by ss12-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The second, in 
Part II which is based on the National Consumer Council's report 
(noted above), is to provide statutory protection to the consumer in 
the case of contracts of service, and this is mainly done by codifying 
the common law relating to contracts for service. 
Supply, of Goods  
A contract for the transfer of goods for the purposes of the 
Act means a contract under which one person agrees to transfer 
property in goods to another, other than an expected contract. An 
excepted contract (ie. one the Act does not cover means a contract - 
(a) for a sale of goods; 
(b) for a hire purchase agreement; 
(c) under which the property in goods is (or is to 
be) transferred in exchange for trading stamps 
or their redemption; 
(d) for a transfer on agreement to transfer which is 
made by deed and for which there is no other 
consideration 	other 	than 	the 	presumed 
consideration imported by the deed; 
(e) intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge, 
charge or other security (s(1(2)). 
Under the Act a contract is regarded as a contract for the 
transfer of goods whether or not services are provided (or to be 
provided) under the contract and whatever the nature of the 
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consideration for the transfer or the agreement to do so (subject to 
s1(2)). The latter provision will therefore cover such items as goods 
supplied in return for product labels or tear off coupons on 
packets.
40 
Part I deals with implied terms in the supply of goods. These 
implied terms are, with one important difference, similar to those in 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 ss12-15 concerning title (s2), 
correspondence with description (s3), merchantable quality and 
fitness of purpose (s4) and sale by sample (s5). 
Where the transferor transfers the property in goods in the 
course of a business and the transferee either expressly or impliedly 
makes known any particular purpose for which the goods are being 
acquired to the transferor and to a credit broker (where the 
consideration (or part) for transfer is a sum payable by instalments 
and the goods were previously sold by a credit broker to the 
transferor) there is an implied condition that the goods supplied 
under the contract are reasonably fit for that purpose, whether or 
not that is a purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied 
(s4(4),(5)). The background to this provision is to be found in 
cases such as Spencer Trading Co 41 and Ashington Piggeries. 42 
These provisions will not apply when the circumstances show that the 
transferee does not rely or that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on 
the skill or judgement of the transferor or credit broker (s4(6)). A 
credit broker is defined by the Act as a person acting in the course 
of a business of credit brokerage carried on by him (s18). The 
above provisions also apply to a transfer by a person who in the 
course of business is acting as agent for another. They also apply 
to a transfer by a principal in the course of a business, except 
40. Chappell & Co Ltd v. Nestle's Co Ltd [1959] 2 All E.R. 701; 
Esso Petroleum Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [19761 1 
All E.R. 117. 
41. [19471 1 All E.R.284. 
42. [19711 1 All E.R. 847. See Chapter Two supra. 
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where the other person is not transferring in the course of a 
business and either the transferee knew this or reasonable steps are 
taken to bring it to the transferee's notice before the contract 
concerned is made (s 14(8)). 
An implied condition or warranty about quality or fitness for a 
particular purposes may be annexed by usage to a contract for the 
transfer of goods (s4(7)). 
Hire of Goods  
A contract for the hire of goods is defined as a contract under 
which one persons bails or agrees to bail goods to another by way of 
hire. It does not include a hire purchase agreement or a contract 
under which goods are (or are to be) bailed in exchange for trading 
stamps on their redemption (s6(1),(2)). A contract is a contract for 
hire whether or not services are also provided or to be provided 
under the contract whatever the nature of the consideration for the 
bailment, or agreement to bail by way of hire (s6(3)). 
A bailor is defined, in relation to a contract for the hire of 
goods, as a person who bails the goods under the contract or a 
person who agrees to do so, or a person to whom the duties under 
the contract of either of those persons have passed. A bailee is 
described in similar terms as a person to whom goods are bailed 
under the contract. In each case the definition will be dependent on 
the context (s18(1)). Essentially, a bailment occurs where one 
person (the bailor) gives over possession of goods to another (the 
bailee). 
Implied terms concerning hire by description (s8), quality and 
fitness (s9) and hire by sample (s10) are similar to those governing 
supply of goods (ss3-5). Additionally, in a contract for the hire of 
goods, there is an implied condition on the part of the bailor that in 
the case of a bailment he has the right to transfer possession of the 
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goods by way of hire for the period of the bailment and in the case 
of an agreement to bail he will have such a right at the time of 
bailment. There is also an implied warranty that the bailee will enjoy 
quiet possession of the goods for the period of bailment except so far 
as the possession may be disturbed by the owner of other person 
entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance disclosed or 
known to the bailee before the contract is made (s7(1),(2)). These 
provisions do not affect the right of the bailor to repossess the goods 
under an express or implied term of the contract (s7(3)). 
In the case of a contract for the transfer of goods or a 
contract for the hire of goods a right, duty or liability which would 
otherwise arise under such a contract may be negatived or varied by 
express agreement, by a course of dealing between the parties, or by 
such usage as binds both parties to the contract (s11). This is 
subject to the provisions of concerning consumer supply under the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 43 and the provision that an express 
condition or warranty does not negative a condition or warranty 
implied by preceding provisions of the Supply of Goods and Services  
Act unless inconsistent with it. Nothing in those preceding 
provisions prejudices the operation of any other enactment or rule of 
law whereby any condition and warranty (apart from one relating to 
quality and fitness) is to be implied in a contract for the transfer of 
goods or for the hire of goods (s11). 
Supply of Services  
A contract for the supply of services is defined as a contract 
under which the supplier agrees to carry out a service (s12). A 
contract of service or apprenticeship is expressly excluded from the 
43. 	The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 by s18 amends the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 in that liability for breach of s7 of 
the 1982 Act (implied condition as to title, etc) cannot be excluded or 
restrictedriee s7(3A) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
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definition of a contract for the supply of services. A contract is one 
for the supply of services under the Act whether or not goods are 
also transferred or to be transferred, or bailed or to be bailed by 
way of hire under the contract, and whatever is the nature of the 
consideration for which the service is to be carried out (s12(1)-(3)). 
In a contract for the supply of service, where the supplier is acting 
in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the 
supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill 
(s13) Where the contract does not fix the time for the service to be 
carried out, or it is left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the 
contract or to be determined by the course of dealing between the 
parties, there is an implied term that the supplier will carry out the 
service within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a 
question of fact (s14). There is an implied term in similar 
circumstances to s14 that the party contracting with the supplier will 
pay a reasonable charge (again, a question of fact) as consideration 
for the supply of a service (s15). 
The Secretary of State may provide by order (the power 
exercisable by statutory instrument) either of ss13-15 shall not apply 
to services of a description specified in the order which may make 
different provision for different circumstances (s12(4),(5)). 
Exclusion of the implied terms is governed by s16 which is identical 
to s11. Nothing in this part of the Act may be taken to prejudice 
any rule of law which imposes on the supplier of services a duty 
stricter - than under s13 or s14 or one whereby any term is implied not 
inconsistent with this part of the Act. This part of the Act has 
effect subject to any other enactment which defines or restricts the 
rights, duties or liabilities arising in connection with a service of any .  
description (s16). The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 enacts 
the recommendations of Law Commission Report Implied Terms in  
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Contracts for the Supply of Goods (1979). 	In that Report the 
Commission stated that the reforms recommended would involve the 
enactment of further legislation in the supply of goods. One way of 
reducing the number of statutes in this area, might be, in the 
Commission's view, to consolidate the then existing legislation on 
implied terms in contracts of sale, hire purchase and for the 
redemption of trading stamps with the legislation proposed in the 
Report.
44 
This course has not in fact been followed in the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982. Even if that course had been followed 
it would still have been necessary to refer to five major statutes to 
find all the sale of goods legislation.
45 
The Commission regarded the 
better way of reducing the number of statutes in the field of supply 
of goods would be to consolidate the legislation relating to contracts 
for the sale of goods. This was subsequently done in the form of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979. 46 
Australian jurisdictions are not faced with the confusing array 
of statutes concerned with supply of goods and services to be found 
in the United Kingdom. Arguably, by comparison, the draft 
Tasmanian Supply of Goods and Services Bill provides a modern and 
rational framework. 
Durability  
The question has been canvassed of how far it is a part of the 
concept of merchantability that goods supplied should last for a 
44. Law Corn. No 95 para.15. 
45. Sale of Goods Act 1893; Misrepresentation Act 1967; Supply of 
Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973; Consumer Credit Act 1974; Unfair  
ticrirFact Terms Act 1977. See M.James 'The Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982' (1983) J.B.L. 10. 
46. Repealing and re-enacting the 1893 Act and partly doing the 
same for Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. 
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particular period of time. 47 The position is unclear, there being few 
authorities on the point; such reported cases deal with perishable 
goods and with the issue whether the seller impliedly warrants that 
the goods will reach their destination in a merchantable condition. 48 
The durability of goods is of prime importance to a consumer and it is 
a defect in the existing law that this aspect should be left in limbo. 49 
The principle that is followed is the general one that goods 
must be of merchantable quality at the time they were sold and that 
the criterion of merchantability in the legislation is determined partly 
by reference to the period of time for which it is reasonable to expect 
them to last in a sound condition.
50 
For example, where a washing 
machine is sold with an expected durability of five years (not 
guaranteed expressly to the consumer) and breaks down persistently 
after one year's use it will not meet the implied conditions of fitness 
of purpose or of merchantable quality. The alternative approach, and 
one consistent with the authorities, is that goods should be 
merchantable and fit for their purpose at the time of sale, and there 
is no breach unless it can be shown that the defect existed at that 
time. As Lord Denning M.R. stated in Crowther v. Shannon Motors 
"If the car does not go for a reasonable time but the engine breaks 
47. See Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Consumer  
Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods  (1972) at pp.37-38, 
referred to subsequently as the Ontario Report; Law Commission, 
Working Paper No.71 (1977) at p.43 paras.71-75; New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission Working Paper on the Sale of Goods, 
pp.148-151. 
48. See a review of the earlier cases in Marsh & Murrell Ltd v. 
Joseph I. Emmanuel Ltd [1961] 1 All E.R. 77. 
49. See on the issue of durability Law Commission No.95, Implied  
Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods  (1979) paras.100-114. 
The provisions of Part II of the Supply of Goods and Services Act  
1982 (UK) are currently being examined by the Law Commission. The 
Law Commission is also examining the need for further implied terms 
as to durability and the availability of spare parts and servicing. 
50. This is the principle laid down in Working Paper No.71 in 
para.72, see note 51 infra. 
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particular period of time. 47 The position is unclear, there being few 
authorities on the point; such reported cases deal with perishable 
goods and with the issue whether the seller impliedly warrants that 
the goods will reach their destination in a merchantable condition.
48 
The durability of goods is of prime importance to a consumer and it is 
a defect in the existing law that this aspect should be left in limbo:19 
The principle that is followed is the general one that goods 
must be of merchantable quality at the time they were sold and that 
the criterion of merchantability in the legislation is determined partly 
by reference to the period of time for which it is reasonable to expect 
them to last in a sound condition. 5° For example, where a washing 
machine is sold with an expected durability of five years (not 
guaranteed expressly to the consumer) and breaks down persistently 
after one year's use it will not meet the implied conditions of fitness 
of purpose or of merchantable quality. The alternative approach, and 
one consistent with the authorities, is that goods should be 
merchantable and fit for their purpose at the time of sale, and there 
is no breach unless it can be shown that the defect existed at that 
time. As Lord Denning M.R. stated in Crowther v. Shannon Motors  
"If the car does not go for a reasonable time but the engine breaks 
47• 	See Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Consumer  
Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods (1972) at pp.37-38, 
referred to subsequently as the Ontario Report; Law Commission, 
Working Paper No.71 (1977) at p.43 paras.71-75; New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission Working Paper on the Sale of Goods, 
pp.148-151. 
48. See a review of the earlier cases in Marsh & Murrell Ltd v. 
Joseph I. Emmanuel Ltd [1961] 1 All E.R. 77. 
49. See on the issue of durability Law Commission No.95, Implied  
Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods  (1979) paras.100-114. 
The provisions of Part II of the Supply of Goods and Services Act  
1982 (UK) are currently being examined by the Law Commission. The 
Law Commission is also examining the need for further implied terms 
as to durability and the availability of spare parts and servicing. 
50. This is the principle laid down in Working Paper No.71 in 
para.72, see note 51 infra. 
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up within a short time, that is evidence which goes to show it was 
not reasonably fit for the purpose at the time it was sold". 51 
The crucial question then arises, what constitutes a reasonable period 
of time? Although it may be useful to provide specific express 
warranties in respect of fitness for purpose and merchantability for 
special classes of goods - e.g. second hand cars - there is also merit 
in the proposal that the condition of merchantability be enlarged to 
include a requirement of durability, for a reasonable period of time. 
The provisional view of the English Law Commission was that 
this change was not necessary as a court would, unless evidence 
showed otherwise, find that (in their example) a refrigerator that 
broke down after one year was not of merchantable quality or fit for 
the purpose at the time of sale. 52 
The Law Commission had earlier left open the question as to 
whether the law was satisfactory or whether some new statutory 
provision was necessary to introduce the concept of durability. 53 
They have now concluded that a provision for reasonable durability 
should become part of the implied obligations of a seller as to quality 
and fitness. The Commission noted in their report Implied Terms in  
Contracts for the Supply of Goods that some Canadian Provinces had 
51. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 30, at p.33. 
52. Law Commission Working Paper No.71, at para.75; see also the 
application of fundamental breach to the frequent breakdown of a 
motor cycle supplied under a hire purchase agreement; the 
breakdowns were referred to by Lord Denning M.R. termed as 
" congeries of defects", Farnworth Facilities v. Attryde [1970] W.L.R. 
1053. Although the case was not concerned with the implied term of 
reasonable fitness but a fundamental term of compliance with 
description the case factually illustrates a not uncommon course of 
experience on the part of a consumer supplied with defective goods. 
See also Benjamin Sale of Goods Sweet & Maxwell (1981), at para.995 
and the cases there cited, including Yeomen Credit Ltd v. Apps 
[1962] 2 Q.B. 508. 




 On the basis of evidence received on 
consultation the Commission was convinced that a provision to this 
effect would help simplify and clarify the existing law. Therefore in 
all contracts for the supply of goods the suppliers' obligations in 
respect of the fitness and quality of the goods should include an 
obligation to the effect that the goods will remain reasonably fit for 
their purpose for a reasonable period of time. This should be so, in 
the Commission's view, whether the purpose is general or particular 
and is made known to the seller. Thus, goods purchased six months 
earlier should be as fit for their purpose as six-month old goods of 
their kind can reasonably be expected to be. The Commission 
regarded the simple concept of reasonable durability as being 
inadequate. Apart from the common case where goods did not last as 
long as the purchaser expected them to, there was also the case to 
be considered where goods were expected to change or develop in a 
particular way after the supplier had supplied them. As an example, 
the purchase of seeds for sowing at a later date was instanced. The 
same principles, it was felt should apply and that goods should be fit 
at the time of purchase to fulfil that purpose and remain reasonably 
fit for a reasonable time after that. The Commission did not include 
their recommendations as to durability in their draft Bill to amend the 
Sale of Goods Act as they were proposing to investigate undertakings 
as to quality and fitness of goods under a new reference.
55 
54. See the Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act R.S.N.S. 1967 
c.53 as amended by R.S.N.S. 1975 c.19 s20c(3)(j); the Saskatchewan 
Consumer Products Warranties Act 1977, s11(7) and see note 48 
supra. 
55. Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods Law Corn. 
No.95 (1979) para.113. See note 32 of the 1979 Report for the Law 
Commission's new terms of reference. 	The draft Bill was 
subsequently incorporated into the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which 
repealed and re-enacted the 1893 Act (as amended). See now 
Working Paper No 85 (The Law Commission), Consultative Memorandum 
No. 58 (The Scottish Law Commission) Sale and Supply of Goods 
(1983) discussed infra. 
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However, legislation in particular Canadian provinces had, for 
some time, contained provisions governing this aspect of a seller's 
obligations. 56 The Report was opposed to limitation by a seller of his 
obligation to supply goods that remain fit for their purpose by 
imposing a time period. The Report, therefore, recommended that the 
statutory test of reasonable durability should remain the paramount 
test and that a buyer should not be prevented from challenging the 
adequacy of an express warranty of durability. The original Goods 
(Sales and Leases) Bill (Victoria) excluded the application of the 
conditions of correspondence of goods, or sample, with description, 
merchantable quality and fitness of purpose in the case of a contract 
for the sale or agreement to sell a second-hand car to which Part VI 
of the Motor Car Traders Act 1973 (Victoria) applies. The present 
Goods (Sales and Leases) Act 1981 does not contain such an 
exclusion. 
It is noteworthy that there have been legislative proposals 
made in the United Kingdom to amend the definition of merchantable 
quality and of fitness. A Bill, the Supply of Goods Amendment Bill, 
introduced in the autumn of 1978 in the House of Commons by the Rt 
Hon Donald Stewart MP, was subsequently withdrawn. 58 This Bill 
sought to amend s62(1) of the Sale of Goods Act and s7(2) of the 
Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. By s1 the Bill added in 
place of s7(2) of the 1973 Act; the following : 
56. See Farm Implement Act 1970 (Alberta), 	Agricultural  
Implements Act 1968 (Saskatchewan), Farm Machinery and Equipment 
Act 1971 (Manitoba), Farm Implement Act 1968 (Prince Edward 
"iJand); see also Table 10 at pp.98-99 of the Ontario Report. 
57. In the Tasmanian context see comparable provisions of the 
lapsed Secondhand Vehicle Dealers Bill 1978 (Tasmania). 
58. I am grateful to Mr Stewart M.P. for a copy of his Bill and of 
the reply by then Secretary of State for Prices and Consumer 
Affairs, the Rt Hon John Fraser, to Mr Stewart's question as to plans 
for reviewing the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (31/1/1979). 
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"(2) 	After section 62(1) of the principal Act there 
shall be inserted the following subsection: 
(1A) Goods of any kind are of merchantable 
quality within the meaning of this Act if 
• the goods tendered in performance of the 
• contract are of such type and quality and 
in such condition that having regard to 
all the circumstances, including the price 
and description under which the goods 
are sold, a buyer with full knowledge of 
the quality and characteristics of the 
goods, 	including knowledge of any 
defects, would, acting reasonably, accept 
the goods in performance of the contract." 
The Bill was later withdrawn with the approval of the Consumers' 
Association and the then Minister of Prices and Consumer Affairs 
arranged for the matter to be referred to the Law Commission. In a 
reply to a tabled question in Parliament, the Secretary of State for 
Prices and Consumer Affairs stated that the government recognised 
the need, which the Bill had highlighted, for a thorough-going 
examination of the rights of buyers where goods were defective. 59  
The Law Commissions' Provisional Proposals  
In 1979 the Law Commissions in both England and Scotland 
were asked by the Lord Chancellor to consider, amongst other 
matters, whether the undertakings as to quality and fitness of goods 
implied under the law relating to the sale of goods, hire purchase and 
other contracts for the supply of goods required amendment " . 
59. See note 58, supra. 
60. Under the Law Commission Act 1965, s.3(1)(c). The reference 
also included for consideration: (b) the circumstances in which a 
person to whom goods are supplied under a contract of the kind 
specified above, where there has been a breach by the supplier of 
the term implied by statute is entitled to 	reject the goods and 
treat the contract as repudiated; (ii) claim against the supplier a 
diminution or extinction of the price; (iii) claim damages against the 
supplier; (c) the circumstances in which by reason of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1893 a buyer loses the right to reject the goods and to 
make recommendations. This part of the reference will not be 
discussed. 
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In October 1983 the Law Commissions published a Working 
Paper entitled Sale and Supply. of Goods61 . Amongst other matters 
the Law Commissions assessed the implied terms of quality and fitness 
in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, in contracts for the hire purchase of 
goods under the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 and in 
other contracts for the supply of goods by virtue of the Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982. 62 . 
Merchantable Quality  
The Law Commissions noted that two main approaches had 
developed in reaction to the question of what was meant by 
merchantable quality. The first, termed the "acceptability test" by 
the Law Commission, derived from the statement of Dixon J. in 
Australian Knitting Mills v. Grant 63 : 
"(the goods) should be in such an actual state that a 
buyer fully acquainted with the facts and, therefore, 
knowing that hidden defects existed and not being 
limited to their apparent condition would buy them 
without abatement of the price obtainable for such 
goods if in reasonably sound order and condition and 
without special terms." 
The second, termed the "usability test" was set out by Lord 
Reid in Kendall and Sons v. Lillico and Sons Ltd. as follows" : 
"What subsection (2) 65 now means by merchantable 
'quality' is that the goods in the form in which they 
were tendered were of no use for any purpose for 
which goods which complied with the description under 
which these goods were sold would normally be used, 
and hence were not saleable under that description." 
61. Working Paper No. 85 (The Law Commission), Consultative 
Memorandum No. 58 (The Scottish Law Commission). 
62. Under ss.10 and 15 of that Act. The Act does not apply to 
Scotland. 
63. (1933) 50 C.L.R. 387, at p.418 (H.C.)(reversed on the facts 
by the Privy Council) adapting the earlier test of Farwell L.J. in 
Bristol Tramways v. Fiat Motors [1910] 2 K.B. 831, at p.841. 
64. [19691 2 A.G. 31, at pp.77-78. 
65. Now s.14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
115 
The distinction between the acceptability test and the usability test, 
however, was not clear cut, as both tests being referred to with 
approval in several judgments.
66
. In cases concerning goods 
purchased for business purposes, the usability test has tended to be 
applied. In at least one case goods were held to be of merchantable 
quality on the basis that they were saleable or usable for some 
purpose, even if not for the primary purpose for which they were 
bought. Thus in Brown v. Craiks
67 
 cloth unfit for dress material 
was nevertheless held to be merchantable as it was usable for 
industrial purposes. 68 
In 1968, the Law Commissions in their consultative document 69 
on amendments to the Sale of Goods Act proposed, for comment, an 
improved and expanded version of the acceptability test as follows: 
"Merchantable quality' means that goods tendered in 
performance of the contract shall be of such type and 
quality and in such condition that, having regard to 
the circumstances, including the price and description 
under which the goods are sold, a buyer with full 
knowledge of the quality and characteristics of the 
goods, including knowledge of any defects, would, 
acting reasonably, accept the goods in performance of 
the contract." 
The test attracted criticisms, accepted by the Law Commissions 
subsequently in their report, Exemption Clauses in Contracts, First 
Report: Amendments to the Sale of Goods Act,
70 
 that whether a fully 
informed buyer would accept the goods would depend on whether the 
66. See Kendall v. Lillico [1969] 2 A.C.31 per Lord Guest 107, 108 
(favouring the acceptability test as it referred to price); Cehave 
N.V. v. Bremer [1975] 3 All E.R. 739 (C.A.), per Roskill L.J. 
758-760, Ormrod L.J. 763-764. In Bartlett v. Sydney Marcus [1965] 
2 All E.R. 743, 756 Salmon L.J. was of 	opinion that there was 
nothing between the two tests other than semantics. 
67. [1970] 1 W.L.R. 752. 
68. See also Kendall v. Lillico, above, where groundmeat extracts 
were found unfit for poultry but usable as cattle food. 
69. Working Paper No. 18. Consultative Memorandum No. 7. 
70. Law. Co. No. 24, Scot. Law corn. No. 12(1969). 
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goods did comply with the contract; the definition thus circuitously 
concluded by saying that goods would comply with the contract if 
they complied with the contract. The Commission bowed to these 
criticisms
71 
and dropped the proposed test and recommended that test 
now enshrined in the Sales of Goods Act 1979. 72 
The Law Commissions in their 1983 consultative document dealt 
3 with two criticisms of the implied term as to merchantable quality. 7  
First, that the criterion of merchantability itself is out of date and 
inappropriate in the context of modern consumer transactions. 
Secondly, that the term concentrated too exclusively on fitness for 
purpose and did not make sufficiently clear that other aspects of 
quality were of importance, such as appearance and freedom from 
minor defects, durability and safety. 
"Merchantable" 
The Law Commissions regarded the word "merchantable" as 
having a meaning inappropriate in the context of consumer 
transactions; the expression "merchantable quality" according to 
„74 Benjamin 11 ... [is] and always has been a commercial man's notion. 
The basic objection, given the commercial bias in the definition itself 
which assumed that goods unsatisfactory for one purpose may 
generally be sold or used for another, was that "from the consumer's 
point of view ... the very starting point is wrong and needs to be 
considered." 75 The term " merchantable quality" had also been 
71. 'bid, para 43. For comment, see infra at pp. 121-122. 
72. Section 14(6) which requires goods of merchantable to be as fit 
for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are 
commonly bought as is reasonable to expect having regard to any 
description applied to them, the price (if relevant) and all other 
relevant circumstances. 
73. Working paper No. 85, paras. 2.5-2.13. 
74. Benjamin Sale of Goods 2nd edition, (1981), at para. 808. 
75. Working Paper No. 85, para. 2.6. 
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criticised in the context of commercial transactions in Cehave N.V. v. 
Bremer76 . The Court of Appeal held that a consignment of citrus 
pulp pellets was merchantable, even though part of it was damaged 
and could only be used mixed in cattle food in smaller amounts than if 
the product had been undamaged. There were, however special 
factors in the case. One was the existence of an express term 
entitling the buyer to an allowance off the price if the condition of 
the pellets was defective. The other was the fact that the buyer, 
having rejected the goods, repurchased them at a lower price, owing 
to a fall in the market and then used them for their originally 
Intended purpose. The court may, thus, have intended to avoid a 
situation where the buyer made a profit. In considering the term 
"merchantability" Ormrod L.J., in Cehave, pointed out difficulties 
which had surrounded it since the inception of the Sale of Goods Act 
1893: 
"In the intervening period the word [merchantability] 
has fallen out of general use and largely lost its 
meaning except to merchants and traders •in some 
branches of commerce. Hence the difficulty today of 
finding a satisfactory formulation for a test •of 
merchantability. No doubt people who are experienced 
in a particular trade can still look at a parcel of goods 
and say 'those are merchantable but only at a lower 
price' distinguishing them from 'job lots' or 'seconds'. 
But in the absence of expert evidence of this kind it 
will often be very difficult for .a judgf.7 or jury to make 
the decision except in obvious cases." 
The Law Commissions were of the view that even where experts in the 
trades referred to by Ormrod L.J. in the above case could 
meaningfully reach a conclusion, it doubted how far the term 
" merchantable" could be used other than it was used in the Sale of 
Goods Act. Accordingly, the Law Commissions regarded 
merchantable" as essentially obsolete for all ordinary purposes and 
76. [1975] 3 All E.R. 739. 
77. Ibid. p.80. In this case the finding of commercial arbitrators 
as to merchantable quality of the goods was held to be wrong in law. 
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recommended that it be replaced. 78 
Minor Defects 
The Law Commissions also considered the position concerning 
minor defects in goods. In its view , the law was not clear before the 
79 introduction of the statutory definition of merchantable quality 	and 
had remained unclear subsequently. Criticism of this definition has 
been based on the view that minor defects (for example, scratches 
and dents in new articles for consumer use, cars and electrical 
household goods) may cause inconvenience for a buyer who may 
justifiably claim that these goods are clearly not in the condition in 
which they should be when delivered. Two arguments were cited by 
the Law Commissions: 80 first, the definition is claimed to concentrate 
exclusively on the fitness of the goods for the purpose or purposes 
for which they are commonly purchased. The usability test, thus, 
concerns itself only with defects which interfere with the main use or 
uses of the article and not with less important defects which do not 
prevent such use or uses. Secondly, defining goods as being of 
merchantable quality if they are fit for the purpose or purpose, "as it 
is reasonable to expect", possibly may result in the definition lowering 
the appropriate standard of merchantable quality in cases where a 
seller is able to establish that goods of a particular type, such as a 
• new car, can reasonably be expected to have a• number of minor•
defects on delivery. Thus, as defects increase in number and 
frequency they are less likely to be regarded as being a breach of 
contract. Lowering of manufacturing standards, including quality 
control would be accompanied by a corresponding decline in the 
78. Working Paper No. 85, pare 2.7. 
pp.121-122. 
79. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.14(6), originally 
Supply of Goods (Implied 'Terms) Act 1973, s.27(2). 
80. Working Paper No. 85, 
Merchantable Quality - what does  
(1979), at p.32. 
See comment infra at 
enacted in the 
paras. 	2.10-2.11, referring to 
it mean?, Consumers' Association 
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statutory standard of merchantable quality. 
The Law Commissions, as an illustrative example of the validity 
of the above arguments, referred to a Scottish decision, Miliars of 
Falkirk Ltd. v. Turpie81 . In that case, a new car was found, on 
delivery, to have an oil leak in the power-assisted steering column. 
The dealers took the car back on the same day and effected repairs 
but nevertheless on the next day the leak recurred. The buyer then 
refused to pay the balance of the price on the car and rejected it on 
the ground that it was not of merchantable quality. The court 
unanimously upheld the decision of the Sheriff that the car complied 
with the requirement of merchantable quality. Lord President Emslie 
held that the Sheriff was entitled to reach that conclusion; he stated: 
"I have in mind particularly that the relevant 
circumstances included these: (i) the defect was a 
• minor one which could readily and very easily be cured 
at very small cost; (ii) the pursuers were willing and 
• anxious to cure the defect; (iii) the defect was obvious 
and the risk of the car being driven long enough to 
create some danger if the steering unexpectedly ceased 
to be assisted was slight; (iv) many new cars have, on 
delivery to a purchases, some defects and it was not 
exceptional for a new car to be delivered in Oe 
condition in which the defender's car was delivered." 
The Lord President added that it appeared to have been common 
ground that the car had been sold with a manufacturer's repair 
warranty, although this had not been produced in evidence. Such a 
document, it may be assumed, would have been a further factor in 
considering 11 ... all other circumstances" under the statutory 
definition. 
The Law Commissions regarded Turpie's case as illustrative of 
the approach courts would be likely to take in similar cases where 
several, or, perhaps even numerous, minor defects are found to exist 
on delivery in goods such as cars which are of complex structure. 
Despite support for the view that the present statutory definition 
81. 1976 S.L.T. (Notes) 66; Inner House of the Court of Session. 
82. Ibid., at p.68. 
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covered freedom from minor or cosmetic defects 
83
, the Law 
Commissions considered it as highly undesirable that there should be 
8 
any uncertainty on the point.
4  Accordingly there should be a clear 
statutory provision that the requirement of quality included freedom 
from minor defects. 85 
Durability  
The Law Commission had recommended in its earlier report 
Implied Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods that an express 
provision on durability be incorporated in the Sale of Goods Act 86 . 
The Law Commissions now took the view that lack of an express 
reference to durability was a justifiable criticism of the present law 
and such a provision would make it easier for a consumer to establish 
a breach of contract.
87 
Safety  
The Law Commissions similarly noted the lack of a clear 
requirement that the implied term as to quality should include a 
requirement that goods should be reasonably safe. As in the case of 
durability the Law Commissions regarded safety as a specific 
ingredient in the definition of quality.
88 
Spare parts and servicing facilities 
The Law Commission reaffirmed the earlier conclusions, made in 
83. R. Goode, Commercial Law, Harmondsworth; Penguin Books 
(1982), at p.262. 
84. Citing Jackson v. Rotax Motors and Cycle Co. [1910] 2 K.B. 
937 (minor scratches and dents held to make motor horns•
unmerchantable); Winsley Bros v. Woodfield Importing Co. [1929] 
N.Z.L.R. 480 (machine costing 90 held to be unmerchantabie because 
of defects costing 1 to remedy. 
85. Working Paper, at para. 2.13; see specific proposals discussed 
infra. 
86. Law Corn. No. 95, (1979), at para.113. See also the 
recommendation of the Scottish Consumer Council, Review of the Law  
of Sale of Goods in Scotland (1981), at para. 8.5. 
87. Working Paper No. 85, at para. 2.15. 
88. Ibid., at para.2.16. 
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the Law Commission's report Implied Terms in Contracts for the 
Supply of Goods, that no legal obligation should be created where the 
seller or supplier is required to maintain stocks or provide servicing 
facilities. 89 This aspect may be contrasted with the Australian 
approach under the Trade Practices Act 1974 where such an obligation 
exists. 09  
Comment on the Law Commissions' Criticism of the Current Definition  
of Merchantable Quality  
At this point, it is useful to review the Law Commissions' 
criticisms of the term "merchantable quality". 
The first area of criticism centres on the imprecision of the 
term itself, both in its statutory form and as judicially interpreted. 
Against this can be set the cautionary words of Lord Reid in Brown  
v. Craiks: 
judicial observations can never be regarded as 
complete definitions, they must be read in the light of 
the facts and issues raised in the particular case. I do 
not think that it is possible to frame, except in the 
vaguest terms, a definition of imerciwitable quality' 
which can apply to every kind of case." 
This passage was cited with approval by Lord Denning in 
Cehave N.V. v. Bremer92 . Lord Denning in that case regarded the 
definition or merchantable quality 93 as "the best that has yet been 
devised". 94 His subsequent analysis, epitomises the recognition by 
many judges that, in their view, " merchantable quality" is a general 
term which is to be given a meaning according to the facts of each 
case: 
89. Law. Corn. No. 95 (1979), at para. 115. 
90. See Trade Practices Act 1974, Division 2A, .74F. This matter 
is discussed separately, infra. Chapter Five. 
91. [1970] 1 All E.R. 824, at p.825. 
92. [1975] 3 All E.R. 739, at p.7 118. 
93. At that time, s.27(2), Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973. 
94. [1975] 3 All E.R. 739, at p.748. 
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"... I should have thought a fair way of testing 
merchantability would be to ask a commercial man : was 
the breach such that the buyer should be able to reject 
the goods? In answering that question the commercial 
man would have regard to the various matters mentioned 
in the new statutory definition. He would, of course, 
have regard to the purpose for which goods of that 
kind are commonly bought." 
The statement of Lord Denning would appear to be a 
convenient summary of how merchantable quality or merchantibility, 
has been regarded by the courts. Lord Denning uses the phrase 
" commercial man" partly because the instant case involved an 
inter-business contract and particularly because the original Act was 
framed with commercial practice and rules as its basis. What the Law 
Commissions recommend in their Working Paper is the replacement of 
the current definition with more precise criteria (considered below) 
and the removal of the term 'merchantable" quality from the statute. 
The problem with this approach is that it presupposes that what will 
be beneficial in the case of contracts involving a consumer or 
consumers will be of equal benefit to commercial parties contracting 
between themselves. It can be argued that, 'apart from requirements 
that goods be durable and safe, the present definition needs to 
change on the grounds that it is a general definition which applies to 
both commercial and consumer contracts. 
In criticising the imprecision of the term "merchantable 
quality", the• Law Commissions may have ignored the flexibility which 
stems from this. This flexibility would be lost in the case of 
commercial contracts if the definition was made more precise, in that 
criteria other than those outlined by Lord Denning were statutorily 
written into the term merchantable quality. If the issue of minor 
defects is taken into account, as the Law Commissions suggest, then 
undue inflexibility would result in commercial contracts which could 
well run counter to the express terms accepted by the parties. One 
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can usefully contrast the Cehave
95 
and Turpie96  cases. 	In the 
Cehave case the contract contained a stipulation that the goods were 
"shipped in good condition." Lord Denning regarded this clause as 
comparable to a clause as to quality so that if a small proportion of 
the goods sold was a little below that standard it would be met by 
commercial parties by a reduction of price.
97 
Therefore the buyer 
would have no right to reject the whole of the goods unless the 
difference in quality was serious and substantial. In the case before 
him, his Lordship noted, the standard form provided for percentages 
of contamination, below which there was a price allowance, and above 
which there was a right of the buyer to reject. 98 . Similarly in the 
case of the clause "shipped in good condition," if a small proportion of 
the whole cargo was not in good condition and had arrived a little 
unsound, it should be met by a reduction in the price. The buyers, 
in Lord Denning's view, should not have the right to reject the whole 
cargo unless the defects in the cargo were serious and substantial. 
His Lordship cited the difficulty arising on a c.i.f. contract as to 
whether the damage was done before or after shipment. In the latter 
case the buyer would have no claim against the seller but would be 
left to claim against the insurers. Therefore, as a matter of good 
sense, the buyer should be bound to accept the goods and not reject 
them unless there was a serious and substantial breach, for which the 
seller was responsible. 
Buyers should not have a right to reject the whole cargo 
unless the difference in quality was serious and substantial. This 
contention Lord Denning regarded as being borne out by the 
difficulty often arising in c.i.f. contracts (as this was) as to whether 
95. Cehave N.V. V. Bremer 11975] 3 All E.R. 739. 
96. Supra, Millars of Falkirk Ltd. v. Turpie, 1976 S.L.T. (Notes) 
66. 
97. [1975] 3 All E.R. 739, at p.747. 
98. Form 100 Cattle Food Trade Association, c1.5. 
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the damage was done before shipment or afterwards.
99 
In the latter 
case the buyer would have no claim against the seller but would have 
to pursue his claim against the insurers. As a matter of common 
sense, his Lordship felt that the buyer was bound to accept the 
goods and not to reject them, save where there was a serious and 
substantial breach that could be fairly attributable to the seller. 1 
Further, he considered the term "shipped in a good condition" as 
neither a condition nor a warranty but an intermediate stipulation, an 
innominate term, which gave no right to reject the goods unless the 
breach went to the root of the contract. The condition of the goods, 
delivered by instalments, could not, in Lord Denning's view, be 
considered very bad as all of them were in fact used for their 
intended purpose. Accordingly the breach entitled the buyer to 
damages only, not the right to reject the goods. 2 
If one compares the Cehave case, which involved the sale of 
citrus pulp pellets under a standard commercial contract, with 
Turpie's case which concerned a consumer contract for a new car, the 
inappropriateness of writing in liability for minor defects to a general 
definition of merchantable quality becomes apparent. In Turpie's case 
the defect, an oil leak in the power-assisted steering column of the 
car, did not affect the main use of the car, nor did it render it 
unsafe. It was capable of being readily and easily cured at little cost 
and the suppliers were willing to effect the repairs; the sale under 
the manufacturer's repair warranty would have been an additional 
factor in concluding that the car was of merchantable quality. If 
one were to apply the standard of the fastidious and, as in the above 
case, arguably, unreasonable consumer to inter-business sales 
contracts not only will flexibility be lost but uncertainty will appear 
in transactions to a degree much greater than currently exists. 
99. 	11975] 3 All E.R. 739 at pp.747-748. 
1. Ibid. at p.748. 
2. T17751 3 All E.R. 739, at p.748. 
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Given that the Law Commissions subsequently rejected the argument 
that different standards of quality should apply to different types of 
transactions, goods or classes of buyer and seller, on practical 
grounds and regarded a newly formulated definition of "quality" should 
. embrace both consumer and non-consumer contracts, 3  • it Is, then, 
important to consider the effect of a reformulated statutory standard 
of quality which specifically included freedom from minor defects as a 
factor. 
Proposals for Reformulation of a New Standard of Quality  
The Law Commissions regarded the best method of 
reformulating a new standard of quality was to lay down a flexible 
standard linked with a clear statement of certain important elements 
included within the idea of quality - such as freedom from minor 
defects, durability and safety - and a list of the most important 
factors, such a description and price, which would normally be taken 
into consideration in determining the standard to be expected in any 
particular case. The method the Law Commissions proposed would not 
give priority to any particular element, all of which might not 
necessarily be relevant in particular cases q . Three options appeared 
open, (i) to formulate the standard by using some qualitative 
adjective such as "good"; (ii) basing the standard on a concept of 
"full acceptability"; (iii) basing the standard on a neutral adjective 
with few connotations, relying for its meaning on subsequently 
specified matters on the circumstances of the particular case. In all 
cases, the Law Commissions' envisaged that the formulation of the 
required standard of quality would be accompanied by a statement of 
certain important elements included within the concept of quality and 
by a list of factors to be taken into account in deciding whether the 
3. 	Working Paper No. 85, para 4.6. 
Li. 	Ibid., at para. 4.7. 
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required standard had been reached. 5  
(i) "Good" Quality 
The Law Commissions, as earlier noted 6 , regarded the word 
" merchantable" as having little meaning save "saleable". However, 
replacing it with "good" or "sound" was felt 7 to be appropriate for 
some transactions but not others. "Reasonable quality" was thought to 
indicate that goods were not expected to be of high quality. Doubt 
was expressed that a suitable qualitative adjective existed with 
sufficient flexibility and suggestions were sought as to what might be 
suitable. 8 
(ii) "Full Acceptability"  
The standard of "full acceptability" ought to convey in the Law 
Commissions' view, that the goods supplied should be of such quality 
as would in all the circumstances of the case be acceptable to a 
reasonable buyer who had full knowledge of their condition, quality 
and characteristics9 . This standard of "full acceptability" or 
"acceptability in all respects", was based on the concept of the 
" reasonable buyer" and his assumed knowledge of the condition, 
quality and characteristics of the goods. 10  The intention was for the 
standard to be, as far as possible, an objective one. For instance, a 
reasonable buyer would not consider the goods acceptable if they had 
minor defects; however, the test of a "reasonable buyer in all 
circumstances" should, as the Law Commissions recommended, prevent 
too high a standard being required where, as regards price for 
example, only a lower standard could reasonably be demanded. 
Despite the flexibility claimed for the standard of "full acceptability", 
5. Working Paper No. 85, at para. 4.6. 
6. Ibid., at para 2.7, supra p.117. 
7. Working Paper No.85, at para 4.9• 
8. Ibid. 
9. Working Paper No. 84, at para. 4.10. 
10. Ibid. 
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the test is open to objections. The concept of the hypothetical 
"reasonable buyer" might complicate the implied term and make it more 
difficult to apply. Such a buyer, on the one hand, would not be 
credited with intentions such as the use of the goods for one purpose 
rather than another but might operate as an objective bystander.
•However, on the other hand, he might also be credited with a 
knowledge of latent defects and deficiencies in the goods. This, 
therefore, might be regarded as making it more difficult to solve the 
problem of a satisfactory formula. Additionally, the "reasonable 
buyer" concept could be seen as an illusion as there is no actual, 
ascertainable standard of full acceptability to the reasonable buyer, 
even in ordinary transactions. Accordingly, the Law Commissions did 
not regard this approach as laying down a meaningful test as this, 
essentially, said that goods must be of such quality that a court 
would regard as being fully acceptable in all the relevant 
circumstances. 11 
(iii) 	"Proper Quality"  
The third possibility raised by the Law Commissions was to 
replace the word "merchantable" by a single neutral adjective such as 
"appropriate", "suitable" or "proper" followed by a list of principal 
factors relevant in deciding whether the standard had been met. 
This approach would require the standard to be judged by reference 
to the specified matters rather than vice versa. Hence, concentration 
could be directed at the essential question - whether the goods are of 
the appropriate quality having regard to the specified matters and all 
the circumstances. On the other hand, while the Law Commissions 
considered that the third option was free of some of the objections to 
the second, the form of words might be regarded as close to 
11. 	Working Paper No. 84, at para. 4.11. 
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meaningless. Such a position would be regarded as unsatisfactory, in 
that the legislation should provide a standard which would be 
virtually without content except to the extent that the court might 
take into account the •specified matters and all the circumstances of 
the case in deciding if the standard had been met.
12 
Elements to be Specified as Relevant to Quality  
The Law Commission selected four elements that might be 
specified as relevant to the standard of quality. These were : 
fitness for purpose, appearance, finish and freedom from minor 
defects, suitability for immediate use, durability and safety. A draft 
clause including these elements was also proposed for comment. 
The Law Commissions were of the view that, in a new 
definition of quality fitness for purpose or purposes for which goods 
of that kind are commonly bought should be included as one aspect of 
quality but not a predominant one. This "demotion" of the fitness 
test would prevent the re-emergence of the notion that quality was 
confined to usability .
13 
The new definition should also include a provision that made it 
clear that quality appearance, finish and freedom from minor defects. 
The Law Commissions were of the view that the provision should be•
directed primarily, but not exclusively, to consumer sales. The 
criticism of inclusion of this provision in a new definition has already 
been made above. There should also be a specific reference to the 
suitability of the goods for immediate use. As an example, a complex 
self-assembly kit was instanced, which although not suitable for 
immediate use because of its very nature, might not be so if it was 
sold without adequate instructions. 
12. Ibid., at para. 4.12. 
13. Woking Paper No. 85, at para.4.13. The state or condition of 
quality under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.61(1); this should 
continue to be included in the opinion of the Law Commissions 
(para.4.14). 
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As noted earlier, 14 the Law Commissions maintained that there 
should be a reference to durability which would be applied to •both 
consumer and commercial contracts. No express reference ought be 
made to relevant codes of practice on the basis that judicial discretion 
should decide the issue and particular reference might lead to 
manufacturers and trade associations objecting to the use of the 
codes.
15 
On the issue of safety, the argument was noted that no 
express reference to the matter was necessary, as its importance was 
sufficiently obvious. However, the Law Commissions were of the 
opinion that to leave out reference to such an important matter would 
seem odd given the nature of many modern consumer goods. The Law 
Commissions therefore provisionally proposed an express reference to 
safety in any definition. 16 
Factors Affecting the Required Standard of Safety  
The current definition of "merchantable quality" in the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 17  requires goods to be, 
"as fit for the purpose or purposes for which goods of 
that kind are commonly bought as it is reasonable to 
expect having regard to• any description applied to 
them, the price (if relevant) and all other relevant 
circumstances." 
The words "as is reasonable to expect" would be removed under 
the Law Commissions proposals, but the variables affecting the 
standard of quality, eg. description and 'price, would be• retained in 
the present wording. 
For the purposes of obtaining opinions on its proposals 
concerning a new term as to quality, the Law Commissions put 
forward the following clause for consideration and comment. 
1 1k. 	Working Paper No. 85, at paras.2.14-2.15. 
15. Ibid., at para.4.19. 
16. Working Paper No. 85, at para.4.21. 
17. Section 14(6). 
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"(1) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a 
business, there is an implied term that the goods 
supplied under the contract are of [proper 
quality][acceptable quality in all respects] except that 
there is no such term - 
(a) as regards defects specifically drawn to the 
buyer's attention before the contract is made; or 
(b) if the buyer examines the goods before the 
contract is made, as regards defects which that 
examination ought to reveal. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) above "quality' 
in relation to goods includes, where appropriate, the 
following matters: 
(a) fitness for the purpose or purposes for which 
goods of that kind are commonly bought; 
(b) appearance, finish, suitability for immediate use 
and freedom from minor defects; 
(c) safety; 
(d) durability; 
and in determining whether goods supplied under a 
contract are of [proper quality][acceptable quality in all 
respects] regard shall be had to any description applied 
to them, the price (if relevant) and all the other 
relevant circumstances." 
Comment on the Law Commissions' proposals for a new definition of 
quality  
The Law Commissions proposals put forward for comment in 
respect of the implied terms of quality and fitness discussed above 
would appear to have two main weaknesses. First, although the term 
"merchantable" may have little meaning outside commercial circules, 
and even within them be limited to a general concept of "saleable," no 
viable alternative is offered by the Law Commissions, on their own 
admission.
18 
 "Good", "sound" or "reasonable" quality were all rejected, 
the Law Commissions doubting, "whether any qualitative adjective 
exists which contains the necessary flexibility." The suggested 
standard of "full acceptability" was also discarded, on the basis that it 
would be left to the court to decide as to whether the goods were of 
such quality as to be fully acceptable in the circumstances. This 
attitude can be linked to the general issue of the "usability" and 
"acceptability" tests. The Law Commissions had previously, as noted, 
put forward an improved version of the acceptability test19 . Despite 
18. Working Paper No. 85, at paras.4.9,4.12. 
19. See Law Com. No. 24, Scot. Law Corn. No. 12 (1969). 
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the fact that this was subsequently dropped in favour of the test of 
"usability" now enshrined in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 20 , the 
acceptability test has a number of merits. Since the test is 
subjective, this gives it the merit of flexibility in that it is made 
dependent upon the circumstances of the transaction, be it of a 
commercial or a consumer nature. The objection that such a test has 
the appearance of circularity can be met by the argument that 
definition of merchantability is of lesser importance than the clear 
formulation of the elements included within the idea of quality and the 
listing of key factors to be taken into account in determining the 
standard of• merchantability. On this approach, retention of 
merchantability as a term and phrasing of its definitional standard can 
be seen as a semantic exercise21 . It can, therefore, be argued that 
the term merchantability should be retained, first, on the basis of 
continued usage as a general concept, and secondly, as no valid 
alternative has been advanced. Its alleged obsolescence and limited 
meaning becomes of minor importance given the greater precision that 
can be obtained from the formulation of particular elements, such as 
those of "durability" and safety. The commercial nature of the 
current definition is thus counter-balanced by specific requirements, 
such as that of "durability". 
The second weakness that can be noted in the Law 
Commissions proposals concerning minor defects has been examined 
earlier. It would appear to be inappropriate to list liability for minor 
defects as an element of merchantable quality, given the differing 
circumstances of consumer and commercial contracts. It should be 
reiterated that applying such a requirement to both commercial and 
20. Section 14(6), see note 72 supra. 
21. See Salmon L.J. in Bartlett v. Sidney Marcus [1965] 2 All 
E.R. 743, 756, and see Lord Reid's comments in Brown v. Craiks 
[1970] 1 All E.R. 824, 825. 
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consumer contracts could lead to a loss of both certainty and 
flexibility in commercial transactions. In some cases, where minor 
defects had been specifically provided for in a commercial contract, 
the result would be that the express intention of the parties would be 
defeated by statute. It is difficult to see why the Law Commissions 
were unable to accept, in this instance, different standards for 
commercial and consumer contracts. The Sale of Goods Act 1979 
distinguishes between such contracts in respect of not contracting out 
of the implied terms. 22 Since the issue of minor defects is one 
principally affecting consumer contracts it could be argued that it 
would be sufficient that a provision be inserted in the Act that goods 
supplied to a consumer would be required to be free of minor defects 
to meet the standard of merchantable quality. 
However, the balance of the Law Commissions proposals in the 
context of merchantable quality would appear to pursue a desirable 
strategy. Notably, the current implied term as to fitness of purpose 
(s.14(3)) is seen by the Law Commissions to require no change, 
despite its overlap with the implied term of merchantable quality. 23 
It is the latter which should provide the yardstick by which the 
quality of goods supplied are measured. The approach suggested by 
the Law Commissions, subject to the criticisms made above, would 
appear to provide more precise criteria by which the merchantable 
quality of goods can be judged. 
22. Sched. 1, paras. 11(3), 11(4). 
23. Working Paper No. 85, para.2.20. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STATUTORY CONTROL OF EXEMPTION CLAUSES IN 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: UNREASONABLENESS OR 
UNCONSCIONABILITY? 
• 	Statutory control of exemption clauses has already been 
discussed in outline. 1 	The specific issue of whether exemption 
clauses in commercial contracts should be subject to statutory tests 
will now be examined. 
As noted earlier
2  exemption clauses in contracts of carriage 
by rail had been required to pass a statutory test of reasonableness 
contained in the English Railways and Canals Traffic Act 1854 3 . The 
most recent statutory example of such a test is found in the United 
Kingdom Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 14 . By contrast with 
statutory tests of reasonableness the courts have developed 
principles, particularly in the last ten years, on which the terms of 
a contract may be reopened for examination on grounds of 
unconscionability. In the United States the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 2-302, has set guidelines for the courts to strike down or 
modify contracts that are wholly or partly unconscionable. More 
detailed legislative guidance has been provided in Australia by the 
New South Wales Contracts Review Act 1980, but essentially limited 
to consumer contracts. 
1. See Chapter Two. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Section 7. 
4. Section 14,  Schedule 2; see also Trade Practices Act 1974 
(CwIth.) s68A. 
134 
In order to evaluate and distinguish the different approaches 
under the tests of reasonableness and unconscionability the following 
order of analysis will be followed. 	Firstly, the issue of 
reasonableness will be discussed. 	This will include the issue of 
control of exemption clauses in commercial contracts with particular 
reference to the 1968 English Law Commission's Working Paper. 
Then the judicial interpretation of the reasonableness test laid down 
by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 will be dealt with through 
consequent decided cases. Next the legitimacy of the reasonableness 
test in s68A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 will be examined. In 
the second part, the issue of unconscionability will be discussed. 
As background, the origins and development of the concept of 
unconscionability will be charted. Then, the relationship of 
unconscionability and standard form contracts in the light of s2-302 
of Uniform Commercial Code will be dealt with. Next the background 
to the Contracts Review Act 1980 will be outlined, including the 
Peden Report. This will be followed by a description of the Act and 
resulting litigation. Finally, the Act will be criticized and 
contrasted with a lapsed South Australian bill, the Contract Review  
Bill and draft proposals in the Federal government's Green Paper, 
The Trade Practices Act : Proposals for Change. As a conclusion 
the tests of unconscionability and reasonableness will be compared 
and their respective suitability for control of exemption clauses in 
commercial contracts evaluated. 
(A) 	The Issue of Reasonableness  
Control of Exemption Clauses in Commercial Contracts  
The Working Party, which advised the Law Commissions in 
their First Report and produced their own Working Paper were, by a 




This opposition was based on •four main 
arguments: 
"(1) 	A distinVive factor noted by the Molony 
Committee was that traders elect to buy and 
sell as a matter of business and those who form 
the commercial links in the chain of distribution 
of consumer goods are fully capable of 
protecting themselves. The Committee regarded 
non-consumer sales as being outside their terms 
of reference and made no positive 
recommendations on this matter. Evidence 
before the Working Party supported these two 
points. 
(2) It is of the utmost importance in commercial 
contracts to establish with certainty where the 
risk lies in order to fix prices and insurance. 
It was often in the interests of both parties 
that the buyer should accept the risk. 
Certainty assisted confidence in the giving of 
legal advice and reduced litigation. 
(3) Even if there were some commercial buyers in 
need of protection they represented too small a 
minority to justify extension of control to the 
whole field of commercial contracts. 
(4) In some cases judicial rewriting of commercial 
contracts might produce inequity between the 
parties. 
(5) If UK sellers were subject to restrictions not 
borne by their foreign competitors, export sales 
might suffer as a result". 
The arguments favouring extension of control to commercial contracts 
were as follows: 
"(1) 	Although the bulk of complaints concerning the 
law as it stood (circa. 1968) came from private 
consumers there were indications that certain 
business consumers also needed protection. 
The National Farmers' Union had given evidence 
that harsh exemption clauses were used in the 
sale of agricultural machinery to farmers. 
5. Law Commission 
Commission Memorandum 
6. Molony Committee 
para.3. 
Published Working Paper 18, Scottish Law 
No.7, at para.60; see First Report, p.2. 
on Consumer Protection (1962); Cmnd. 1781, 
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(2) While the weight of commercial opinion as 
currently expressed was hostile to the extension 
of control to commercial transactions, the Motor 
Agent's Association regarded as inequitable any 
proposal forbidding exemption clauses in the 
retail sale of motor cars while allowing them on 
sales to retailers. 
(3) It remained practically impossible to frame a 
definition of consumer sale which would be free 
of 	anomoly. 	The 	Society 	of 	Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders had raised the issue 
as to why a purchaser of a commercial vehicle 
should not have the same rights as the 
purchaser of a private car. 
(4) Attempts by the courts to control exemption 
clauses in commercial sale by restrictive 
interpretation of terms and the application of 
the doctrine of fundamental breach indicates 
that a problem exists beyond the consumer 
level. 
(5) Forbidding contracting out of liability for 
misrepresentation under s3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act while allowing it in the 
case of statutory conditions and warranties 
would produce considerable anomol ies. A 
breach of s13 of the Sale of Goods Act would 
entail a misrepresentation as might generally be 
the case with s14(1) and occasionally s14".' 
The Working Party then went on to consider the various courses of 
action which had been raised in regard to contracting out of the 
statutory conditions and warranties in commercial sales. 
The Working Party suggested that a trader, professional 
businessman or farmer was in no better position when he purchased 
complex office equipment or a tractor. 8 The definition of a sale to a 
consumer should be drafted, it had been suggested, so as to include 
end-purchasers of goods for the purposes of a trade or business 
• 
who might need protection as much as the private purchaser. The 
objection that this might cover transactions where the purchaser 
7. For equivalent sections see ss 18, 19(1), of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1896 (Tasmania), (ACT), (New South Wales), ss17, 18(1), 
I-Victoria); 	(NT) 	ss13, 	14(1), 	(South 	Australia), 	(Western 
Australia); ss6, 17(1), (Queensland). 
8. Working Paper, at. para.64. See Chapter Two. 
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was clearly capable of looking after his own interests could be met, 
it was suggested, by setting a price limit beyond which contracting 
out would not be restricted. The Working Party noted that the 
provisional conclusion of the Law Commissions was that it would be 
difficult to formulate a workable definition of a consumer sale on 
those lines. 9 
Another 
contracting out 
ineffective in a 
upon it in the 
on a provision 
1967 which did 
proposal the Working Party discussed was that 
of the statutory conditions and warranties would be 
sale unless a court held that it would be fair to rely 
circumstances of a particular case. This was based 
in s3 of the United Kingdom Misrepresentation Act 
not involve a definition of a consumer sale and so 
gave the courts a flexible instrument of control. Such legislation 
might contain guidelines to the court by indicating particular matters 
it 'should take into account - for example, the abuse by a superior 
party where there was an inequality of bargaining power. The 
majority of the Working Party favoured the onus of proof being 
placed upon the person seeking to impose the limitation and also 
favoured making the date of contract the material date for judging 
the reasonableness of any contracting out provisions. 10 
Any uncertainty as to the enforceability of an exemption 
clause which could occur if such clauses were subject to a proposed 
reasonableness test, it was suggested, could be avoided by a 
procedure whereby the Restrictive Practices Court, or another 
similar body, might pronounce the contracting out provision void 
ahead of it adoption, if it were held, in all the circumstances of the 
case, to be unfair. Alternatively, an exemption clause could be 
initially considered as void unless it were approved by the 
9. Ibid. 
10. Wiling Paper, para.65, on the basis of s2- 302 of the US 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
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the Restrictive Practices Court. Both the Law Commissions and the 
Working Party considered both these suggestions to be 
impracticable; 11 however, it was further discussed by the Working 
Party as to whether the Registrar of Restrictive Trade Agreements 
might be given a power to refer clauses which he considered to be 
unfair to the Restrictive Practices Court. Such a power could 
Include a procedure which enabled manufacturers or other interested 
parties to bring standard form clauses before the Court for 
approval. The disadvantage of this procedure would be that, 
although suited to an overview of standard form contracts, it was 
not suitable for particular contracts, which might involve the Court 
in a great deal of work while if, in relation to the former, the 
parties were agreed on the fairness of the provisions, the court's 
functions would be essentially forma1. 12 
Standard form contracts might themselves be defined as a 
printed collection of proposed contract terms, formulated in advance 
for use in •a large number of similar transactions and presented to 
the other dealing party as a condition of doing business.
13 
This 
definition is used in discussing additional aspects of standard form 
contracts. 
11. Ibid., at para.67; the first suggestion was made on the basis 
of a procedure similar to the Israeli Standard Contracts Law, 1964, 
s5, for comment on the Israeli legislation see A.L. Diamond 'The 
Israeli Standard Contracts Law' (1965) 14 1.C.L.Q. 1410; K.F. Berg 
'The Israeli Standard Contracts Law 1964 : Judicial Control of 
Standard Form Contracts' (1979) 28 I.C.L.Q. 560. 
12. Working Paper, at para.69; on the issue of the courts 
striking down 'unconscionable' clauses see infra. 
13. See R.Dugan 'Standardized Forms - An Introduction' 24 Wayne  
L.R. 1307 (1978), at p.1316. See also the West German Law on 
Standard Contract Terms 1976 para.1 and the discussion by 
0.Sandrock 'The Standard Terms Act 1976 of West Germany' 26 Am. 
J Comp. Law 551 (1978) (a translation of the Act is provided at the
end of the article); W.P.Von Marshall 'The New German Law on 
Standard Contract Terms' (1979) L.M.C.L.Q. 278, E. Von Caemmerer
•'Standard Contract Provisions and Standard Form Contracts in 
German Law' (1976) 8 Vic. U. Well. L.R. 235. 
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The Insurance Factor  
The effect of the impact of insurance was considered on any 
proposal that effectively put risks on sellers against which they were 
previously able to protect themselves in contract. The views given 
to the Working Party by insurance experts on this aspect were as 
follows: 
"(1) 	In respect of accident insurance there would be 
no insuperable problem. Cover was currently 
available against personal injury or damage to 
property arising from accidents caused by 
defective products. The use of exemption 
clauses was rarely important in assessing an 
insurance premium as insurers realised that 
even though a clause might be legally 
watertight it might be made impossible or 
inexpedient to rely upon it because of business 
considerations. The general practice of 
insurers was to fix a maximum in respect of any 
single claim and/or a maximum in respect of 
claims by the same assured policyholder. 
Although the banning of exemption clauses in 
commercial contracts might increase current 
insurance rates, the prevailing rates were not 
high. If they were doubled the rate would still 
be so small in relation to turnover so as not 
cause any significant increase in the price of 
goods. 
(2) 	Special problems, however, were presented by 
both quality insurance and insurance to cover 
consequential risks such as loss of profits. 
Under existing practice the cost of replacing 
faulty or substandard goods or consequential 
loss of profits was not covered by insurance. 
It would be essential for the law to make clear 
where liability lay. Predicting the likely cost 
of this type of insurance cover was difficult 
due to lack of experience by insurance 
companies in this field. The assumption was 
that premiums would be fairly steep at the 
beginning but rates viquld adjust on the basis 
of experience gained". 
14. 	First Report, at para. 98; the views expressed relate to those 
of insurance companies operating in the UK. In respect of quality 
insurance and consequential risks these are now substantially 
affected by Division 2A, ss74B-K of the Trade Practices Act; see 
Chapter Five. 
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Evidence on Contracting Out in Commercial Sales 
The Working Party received evidence which indicated that the 
practice of contracting out was common in a wide range of business 
sales. For example, contracts for the sale of complex products 
(such as aircraft, computers and different types of machinery) often 
contained exemption clauses. In the case of certain types of goods 
sold to retailers or dealers for resale, exemption clauses were 
normally written into the contract by the supplying manufacturer. 
However, evidence from some organizations representing large retail 




The First Report, despite the fact that the majority of the 
Working Party were of the view that there was no justification for 
extending the control of exemption clauses to business sales, did not 
regard this evidence as conclusive. Accordingly, the First Report 
dealt with opinions they had sought on questions where the Working 
Party, they felt, gave no firm guide. 
These comments showed, again, a division of opinion as to 
whether there should be any control at all of exemption clauses in 
business sales. 
The retailers' organizations and those representing consumers 
were the strongest supporters of control, as were some local 
authority organizations. Trade associations for industrial interests 
were against control by a majority (including •the Association of 
British Chambers of Commerce), as were organizations representing 
the practicing legal profession, certain members of the higher 
15. 	First Report, at para. 98. 
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judiciary and some government departments.
16 
The latter, as 
buyers, wished to be free to negotiate terms under which the risk of 
defects was laid on them in circumstances where it was to their 
advantage to take out their own insurance against such defects. 
Some trade associations, representing particular commercial interests, 
favoured some form of control as did the British Insurance 
Association, the National Farmers
,17 Union, and the Bar Association 
for Commerce, Finance and Industry. Academic opinion was divided 
on the question. 18 
In relation to retailers, a representative organization of the 
insurance interest argued that without control of exemption clauses 
in business sales there would be a tendency for increased claims to 
be made upon retailers than upon manufacturers. However, it was 
felt that fairness required that the cost of replacing or repairing 
defective goods should be borne by those from whom the defect 
originated rather than by those who sold to the public. The 
retailers indicated an anxiety that retaining freedom of contract 
above the consumer level, apart from the danger of increasing 
insolvencies amongst retailers, would unfairly damage their legitimate 
interests.
19 
Opinion was equally divided on the form of control. The 
insurance interests, retailers, consumer organizations and the Bar 
Association for Commerce, Finance and Industry favoured a 
reasonableness test. The Association of British Chambers of 
16. First Report, at para. 101. 
17. Ibid., at para. 103. 
18. First Report, at para. 103. 	No indication is given in the 
First Report as to •what academic opinions had been given or how 
these were represented by individuals. 
19. First Report, at para. 102. 
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Commerce and other representative bodies of the commercial 
community, legal practitioners' organizations and indicative views of 
industrial opinion were against such test. " Once more, academics 
showed division on the issue. 21 The main reason for the opposition 
the First Report found: 
"It was feared that a general reasonableness test would 
create an intolerable degree of uncertainty in 
commercial affairs, lead to an increased amount of 
litigation, and make it difficult If legal advisers to 
satisfactorily advise their clients". 
The Law Commissions expressed themselves as divided on the 
issue as to whether exemption clauses in business sales should be 
controlled at all. They were agreed, however, that if there were to 
be a general control of business sales it should be in the form of a 
reasonableness test. 23 There then followed a rehearsal of the 
arguments for and against such general control, which covered in 
part the points raised in the Working Report. 
Those individuals in the Commissions who were opposed to the 
extension of controls argued that the evidence had not gone beyond 
showing that some commercial buyers needed better protection than 
was provided by the existing law. These commercial buyers, 
however, represented too small a minority to justify extending 
control to business buyers of consumer goods who did not deal in 
such goods by including these sales under the definition of a 
consumer sale. In the Federal Republic of Germany, where 
exemption clauses were subject to judicial review, was cited as an 
instance of where a test akin to the criterion of reasonableness had 
produced uncertainty and unnecessary litigation. Those supporting 
control argued that a strong trend towards mergers had led to a 
20. Ibid. 
21. See note 18 supra. 
22. First Report, at para.103. 
23. First Report, at para.107. 
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reduction in alternative sources of product supply to retailers and 
this had lessened their effective bargaining power. It was also 
debatable whether products liability insurance would be generally 
available, so that retailers would be able to bear any consequent 
risk. It was more convenient for this type of insurance to be 
carried by manufacturers who were accustomed to insuring against 
consumer claims. Section 3 of the United Kingdom Misrepresentation 
Act 1967 (U.K.) already contained a reasonableness test, so that no 
great innovation was involved. Section 2-302 of the US Uniform 
Commercial Code was cited as an example of where the courts, as an 
adjunct to the adverse construction of exemption clauses, have 
developed powers of striking down such clauses on the grounds of 
unconscionability.
24 
Those advocating the control of exemption clauses in business 
sales recommended amending the Sale of Goods Act 1893 by adding a 
provision that, in business sales and sales by auction, exemption 
clauses would be invalid to the extent that it was shown to the 
satisfaction of the court or arbitrator that it would not be fair or 
reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to allow reliance on 
the clause. Those opposed to control agreed to such a test being 
adopted if it was decided, as a matter of policy, to subject 
exemption clauses in business sales to legal controls.
25 
Subsequently, the Sale of Goods Act 1893 was amended by the 
Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973; 26 the reasonableness test 
is now outlined in ss6 and 11 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 
and guidelines for that test's application are contained in Schedule 2 
to that Act. 
24. First Report, at para.109. 
25. Ibid., at paras.110, 111. 
26. Section 4 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 
amending s55 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893; see now Sale of Goods 
Act 1979. 
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Judicial Interpretation of the Reasonableness Test 
So far, there are four reported cases where the 
reasonableness test as set down by the English legislation has been 
judicially considered. In the first, Rasbora Ltd v. J.C.L. Marine, 27 
Lawson J. considered, obiter, whether a sale, which he held was a 
consumer sale, contained an exemption clause which could not be 
relied on (if the sale were regarded as a non-consumer sale) because 
it was not fair and reasonable within the meaning of ss5(4) and (5) 
of the Sale of Goods Act.
28 
In the Rasbora case a motor yacht was built in a boat yard 
and sold for cash to J.C.L. Marine. On her maiden voyage the 
vessel caught fire and sank. The occupants escaped, but their 
personal possessions were lost. The fire, it was found, was due to 
defective electrical wiring in the yacht. It was undisputed that the 
seller was in the course of a business and that the yacht was goods 
11 ... of a type ordinarily bought for private use and consumption". 
The status of the buyer was the essence of the case: in other words 
were the goods sold to a person who did " ... not buy or hold 
himself out as buying in the course of business"? 
The purchaser, a Mr Atkinson, who had previously purchased 
a similar yacht from the defendants, decided, while the yacht in 
question was under construction, to purchase it through a company 
solely owned by himself which was incorporated in Jersey. The 
strategy behind this idea was to avoid a large amount of Value 
27. [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 645. 
28. Now see Schedule 2 and ss6 and 11 of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977. 
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Added Tax on the vessel. J.C.L. Marine had no objection to the 
method of payment. 
Lawson J. held that the contract was a consumer sale, even 
though the purchase was apparently made by the company, Rasbora 
Ltd.
29 
The original contract between the defendants and Mr 
Atkinson had been a consumer sale and the rights and duties passed 
to the plaintiff company by novation. Such rights and duties 
remained those of a consumer sale. It may be misleading to suggest 
that the original contractual rights and obligations were transferred 
by novation as this creates a new contract and the status of the 
buyer under the fresh contract requires re-examination. 30 Even if 
Rasbora Ltd. could be regarded as the purchaser, which Lawson J. 
held was not the case, the learned judge concluded that the sale 
would have been a consumer sale, nonetheless. This view was 
arrived at on the basis that the vessel was to be used by Mr 
Atkinson and not hired or let out for reward. The true issue, it 
can be respectfully suggested, was whether the company had bought 
or held itself, out as buying in the course of business, not any 
consideration of who was the ultimate user of the yacht. It was 
simply held that the sellers had not discharged the onus of 
demonstrating that the sale was not a consumer sale. It was also 
stated, obiter, that even if the sale were not a consumer sale, it 
would not, in all the circumstances, be fair or reasonable to permit 
the seller to rely on the exclusion clause since the vessel was totally 
29. For criticism of this case see Professor P.B. Fairest, 
"Consumer Protection for Whom?" (1978) 128 N.L.J 1127, the article 
Is drawn upon in the subsequent discussion. See alsonote in [1977) 
J.B.L. 349 where the reasons of Lawson J. are described as 
'disappointingly brief' (p.350). 
30. Professor Fairest, ibid., at p.1127. 
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destroyed. 31 This argument seems unconvincing: 	the clause 
allocated the risk between the parties which the buyer freely 
accepted, because the yacht was insured comprehensively. The 
insurer had paid out for a total loss and, by subrogation, was suing 
through the plaintiff. 
It is difficult to see any real merit in this case. Although 
remarks in the case concerning the application of the reasonableness 
test were obiter it seems that, on the facts the parties were at arms 
length and there was no inequality of bargaining power and 
insurance had covered 'a clearly allocated risk. 32 
What has been described as a more carefully argued 
application of the reasonableness test33 than that in the Rasbora  
case can be found in R.W. Green Ltd. v. Cade Bros. Farm. 34  In 
this case, the plaintiffs, who were seed potato merchants, regularly 
did business with the defendants on the basis of the standard 
conditions of the National Association of Seed Potato Merchants 
(NASPM). These conditions provided that "notification of rejection, 
claim of complaint must be made to the seller ... within three days 
... after the arrival of the seed at its destination", and that any 
claim for compensation should not amount to more than the contract 
price of the potatoes. In the case of one of three contracts for the 
sale of twenty tons of seed potatoes, eight months after delivery it 
31. [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 645, 651. 
32. On the issue of exemption clauses in inter-business contracts 
see D.Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet & Maxwell 2nd 
edition (1982), at pp.16-33. 	One main reason for the use of 
exemption clauses in commercial contracts appears to be the ' 
desire to avoid court proceedings should something go wrong', 
Yates, ibid at p.25. On business contractual practices in the UK 
see H.Beale and T.Dugdale 'Contracts between Businessmen : 
Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies' (1975) 2 British  
Journal of Law and Society 45. See also Chapter Seven. 
33. D.Yates ibid., at p.100. 
34. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602. See J.S.Zeigel note on R.W. 
Green Ltd in (1979) 57 Can. Bar. Rev. 105. 
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appeared that they were infected by a potato disease (virus Y) 
which could not be detected by inspection at the time of delivery. 
The plaintiffs sued for the price of the potatoes and the 
defendants counter-claimed for loss of profits. 
The court allowed the defendants' counter claim for 
damages on the basis of a breach of s.14 of the Sale of Goods  
Act. These, damages however, were limited to the price of the 
potatoes and were set off against the plaintiffs' claim for the 
price. Griffiths J. held that there were no grounds for holding 
the limitation clause which restricted claims to the level of the 
contract price to be unreasonable. He noted that, although it 
would have been difficult for the buyers to obtain seed potatoes 
otherwise than on the NASPM conditions, it was possible to obtain 
seed stock certified by the Ministry of Agriculture as virus free, 
at a much higher price. Further, the standard conditions had 
been used for over twenty years and had been •the subject of 
discussion between the Association and the National Farmers' 
Union. 35 The limitation of compensation to the contract price was 
regarded as reasonable. 36 However, it was a different matter in 
respect of the requirement that complaints be made within three 
days of delivery. The plaintiffs had attempted to justify this as 
being reasonable on the grounds that potatoes are a very 
perishable commodity and might deteriorate badly after delivery, 
particularly if they were badly stored. Therefore, they argued, 
it was quite reasonable that all risks be carried by the buyer 
35. Griffiths J. argued strongly that the contract, like any 
commercial contract, must be considered and construed against its 
trade background; [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602, at pp.606-607. 
36. The criteria (a) (b) and (c) of Schedule 2 of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act being satisfied. 
148 
within a short time of delivery. Griffiths J. regarded this as an 
acceptable argument in relation to defects which might be 
discoverable by reasonable examination, but not in respect of a 
defect such as a virus infection, which was not discoverable on 
inspection, within the time allowed by the contract. That part of 
the clause was held to be unreasonable and could not be relied 
on. 
The third case of George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v. 
Finney Lock Seeds Ltd 37 has already been noted in relation to 
fundamental breach. 38 In the lower court, relying essentially on 
fundamental breach, the learned judge held that seed supplied by 
the defendants which failed to produce winter cabbage suitable 
for either animal or human consumption was a supply of something 
entirely different from that which was ordered. This reasoning 
was adopted in the Court of Appeal by Oliver L.J. However, the 
other two judges, Lord Denning M.R. and Kerr L.J., did not 
rely on fundamental breach, but held that the clause under 
review was unreasonable under the test contained in the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977. 39 
Lord Denning held that the ultimate question in exemption 
clause cases is whether it would be fair and reasonable to allow 
the vendor to rely upon the clause. 40 In his view, the House of 
37. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036, affirmed by the House of Lords [1983] 
3 W. L. R . 163. 
38. See Chapter One. 
39. Since the contract was concluded before February 1, 1978; 
see now ss55(4) and (5) in Schedule 1 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. 	Section 55(5) is identical to the guidelines in the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977. See the criticism of the judgements of the
trial- judge and of Oliver L.J. on the common law issue by Lord 
Bridge of Harwich in the appeal to the House of Lords, [1983] 3 
W . L.R. 164. 	He states : 1 ... it seems to me, with all due• 
deference, that the judgements of the learned trial judge on the 
common law issue come dangerously near to re-Introducing by the 
back door the doctrine of "fundamental breach" which this House in 
Securicor .. had so forcibly ejected by the front'; at p.168. 
40. 1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036, 1046. 
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Lords in the Securicor case41 had replaced the doctrine of 
fundamental breach by the test of reasonableness. This was the test 
applied by the trial judge in the Securicor 42 case, MacKenna J., 
which Lord Denning quoted with approval in the Court of Appeal 
hearing of the case. 43 MacKenna J. said: 
"Condition 1, as I construe it, is, I think a reasonable 
provision ... Either the owner of the premises, or the 
person providing the service, must bear the• risk. 
Why should the parties not agree to its being borne by 
the owners of the premises? He is certain to be 
insured against fire and theft, and is better able to 
judge the cover needed than the party providing the 
service ... That is only another way of shifting the 
risk from the party who provides the service to the 
party who receives it. There is, as I have said, 
nothing unreasonable, nothing impolitic, in •such a 
contract". 
Approval of this judgement" by the House of Lords, in Lord 
Denning's view, was on the basis that the limitation clause was valid 
because it was a reasonable way of opportioning risks as between the 
insurers on either side. Lord Denning also regarded the speeches 
in the second Securicor case, Ailsa Craig, 45 as appearing to rely on 
the reasonableness of the limitation clause. Noting that the judges 
in the Ailsa Craig case said, obiter, that they would construe an 
exclusion clause much more strictly, he suggested the better reason 
was because it would not be fair or reasonable to allow the proferens  
to rely on them in the circumstances of the case. 46 
Turning to s55(4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 which says: 
"In the case of a contract of sale of goods, any term 
... shall ... not be enforceable to the extent that it is 
shown that it would not be fair or reasonable to allow 
reliance on the term". 
41. [19801 1 All E.R. 556. 
42. Ibid. 
43. 7081 1 W.L.R. 856, at p. 765. 
44. Citing Lords Wilberforce and Diplock [19801 
at pp. 564 and 568 respectively; the passages cited 
are given in Chapter One. 
45. 1982 S.L.T. 377, HL (Sc.); Lord Diplock, 
Fraser of Tullybelton at p.382. 
46. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036, 1047. 
1 All E.R. 556, 
by Lord Denning 
at p.380, Lord 
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Lord Denning held this provision to be exactly in accord with 
principle he had advocated. The ultimate question in the case was: 
to what  would it be fair and reasonable to allow the seed 
merchants to rely on the limitation clause? 
Dealing with R.W.Green Ltd, 47 where it was held fair and 
reasonable for seed potato merchants to rely on a limitation clause 
which limited their liability to the contract price of the potatoes, 
Lord Denning distinguished that case as being very different from 
the one before him. The contract terms in R.W.Green Ltd had been 
evolved over twenty years and the judge regarded the conditions as 
a set of trading terms on which both sides were content to do 
business, nor did either know, or could have been expected to 
know, that the potatoes were infected. 48 
By contrast, Lord Denning regarded the present case as 
borderline. On one hand, the price of the cabbage seed was small, 
/192, but the damages were claimed high,..e61,000. On the other 
hand, the clause was not negotiated between persons of equal 
bargaining power but inserted by the seed merchants in their 
invoices without any negotiation with the farmers. Additionally, the 
buyers had no opportunity of finding out if the seed was not 
cabbage seed while the sellers could and should have known this. 
Such a mistake could not have occurred without serious negligence 
by the seed merchants or their suppliers. As to risk, the buyers 
were not covered by insurance and, indeed, appropriate cover was 
not available. 
As to the position of the seed merchants Lord Denning cited 
with approval the judge at first instance: 
"I am entirely satisfied that it is possible for seedsmen 
to insure against this risk.., that the cost of doing so 
would not materially raise the price of seeds on the 
47. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602; see supra. 
48. Per Griffiths J., at pp.607, 608. 
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market ... that the protection of this clause for the 
purpose of protecting against the very rare case 
indeed, such as the present, is not reasonably 
required. If and in so far as it may be necessary to 
consider the matter, I am also satisfied that it is 
possible for seedsmen 49to test seeds• before putting 
effect of the clause in question. In his view it was settled law that, 
whatever the nature of the breach, an exemption clause could never 
"terminate" or cease to have effect, but remained to be construed in 
order to decide whether or not the parties intended that its terms 
should apply to the breach in question. " Nor, in Kerr L.J.'s 
opinion did the doctrine of fundamental breach survive as a rule of 
construction. Rules of construction were not rules of law but merely 
guidelines to the presumed intention of the parties in the light of 
the events which had occurred. Provided the words did not go so•
far as effectively to absolve one party from any contractual 
obligation, all provisions of a contract, including exemption clauses 
however wide, fell to be construed and applied if, on their true 
construction, it was clear that the parties intended them to apply to 
the situation in question. If, in a hypothetical contract for the sale 
of apples or cheese, the contract provided clearly and expressly that 
the seller was to be under no liability in damages if he delivered 
pears or chalk instead, then, in Kerr L.J.'s view, there was no rule 
of construction which disentitled the seller from relying on that 
exempting provision. He considered that, in such cases, the 
buyer's only remedy, where applicable, would be to invoke the 
statutory test of reasonableness, thus enabling the court to hold 
49. Per Parker J. [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476, 480, cited at [19821 
3 W.L.R. 1036, 1048. See the 'Wrong Variety of Seed Indemnity 
Insurance Scheme' set up by the United Kingdom Agricultural Supply 
Trade Association Ltd (UKASTA). 
50. [1982] 3 W.L.R., at pp. 1036, 1055. 
them onto the market". 
Kerr L.J., in his judgement dealt with the construction and 
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that such a provision or the seller's reliance upon it, would not be 
fair and reasonable. In the lower court the judge treated the 
exemption clause as being incapable of application to a breach which 
involved both the supply of the wrong kind of seed and seed that 
was unmerchantable. Against the background outlined above Kerr 
L.J. considered this approach to the terms of the exemption clause 
taken by the judge to be wrong in principle. 51 
However, in Kerr L.J.'s view, the balance was tipped against 
the merchants because, although all the breaches complained of could 
have arisen without negligence on their part, •there was nothing in 
the exemption clause that protected the merchants against the 
consequences of their own negligence. Accordingly, the merchants 
were not protected by the clause, as the plaintiffs would not have 
suffered total loss if there had not been negligence by the 
merchant's staff and the clause could not be construed to cover 
buyer's loss which was caused, in part, by seller's negligence. 52 
An alternative ground for finding in favour of the plaintiffs 
(were his argument above to be wrong), was proposed by Kerr L.J. 
on the basis that it would not be fair and reasonable to allow the 
defendants to rely on the clause, the balance of fairness and 
reasonableness, in his view, being overwhelmingly on the side of the 
plaintiffs. They had lost 61,000 and 60 acres had been wasted for 
over a year and nothing they could have done would have avoided 
this. As between them and the defendants all the fault admittedly 
lay on the side of the defendants. Further, farmers did not, and 
could not be expected to, insure against this type of loss; whereas 
suppliers could. 
51. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036, at pp.1056, 1057. 
52. Applying the tests in Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v. The 
King [1952] A.C. 192, 208, see Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in iJ  
Ailsa Craig case 1982 S.L.T. 377, 382. See Chapter One. 
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Noting a seed growers indemnity scheme, 53  his Lordship was not 
persuaded that liability for rare events of the kind litigated could 
not be adequately insured against, nor that the cost of such cover 
would add significantly to the cost of the seed. Further, the 
clause, although in existence for some time, was never negotiated, 
but was effectively imposed by the suppliers. Kerr L.J. stated: 
"To limit the supplier's liability to the price of the 
seed in all cases, as against the magnitude of the 
losses which farmers can incur in rare disasters of 
this kind, appears to me to be a grossly 
disproportionate grild unreasonable allocation of the 
respective risks". 
In his view, an overriding consideration, was that the statutory 
reasonableness test was designed for exempting provisions whose 
meaning was clear. One of the matters to be taken into account, in 
judging fairness and reasonableness was "... whether the buyer 
knew or ought reasonably to have known of the .. extent of the 
term". 55 In view of the fact that there had been long argument 
concerning the meaning and effect of the clause, Kerr L.J. regarded 
the legislation as not designed to meet such a situation, but framed 
for provisions the meaning of which was plain. But where these 
provisions were obscure, and until their meaning was determined by 
the courts, the courts should decide that enforcement of such 
provisions would be unfair and unreasonable.
56 
The George Mitchell case represents, in its treatment at the 
hands of Kerr L.J. and Lord Denning M.R., the first detailed 
application of the reasonableness test to an exemption clause. Of 
53. See note 49 supra. 
54. [1982] 3 W.L.R., at pp.1036, 1059. 
55. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s55, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
Sched.2. 
56. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036, 1059. 
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the two, Lord Denning, by holding that the ultimate question was 
whether it would be fair and reasonable to allow a vendor to rely on 
an exemption clause, comes close to substituting a doctrine of 
unfairness and unreasonableness to replace the doctrine of 
fundamental breach (which he helped build) that the House of Lords 
swept away in the Securicor case. 57 However, the basis for Lord 
Denning's new found doctrine is statutory (which he readily 
recognised) 58 and contains its own criteria for judging fairness and 
reasonableness. These criteria - negotiability of the term or terms, 
equality of bargaining power and availability of insurance to cover 
the allocated risk - were all applied by his Lordship in George 
Mitchell. Kerr L.J., by contrast, was primarily concerned with the 
construction and effect of the clause at issue, including the 
protection of the sellers against their own negligence. In finding 
for the farmers he gave, as an alternative ground, that the balance 
of fairness and reasonableness was on their side. This can be 
compared with Lord Denning's view that the present case, contrasted 
with the R.W.Green case, was borderline,, . 59  Although Kerr L.J. 
followed the statutory criteria he did make one addition which seems 
arguable. His contention that the legislation was framed to deal with 
provisions that were clear in their meaning and that reliance on 
obscure provisions would be unfair and unreasonable would appear to 
pre-empt the construction of such clauses. Provisions couched in 
vague and ambiguous terms would be, and are, read against the 
proferens and thereby given their most unfavourable and restrictive 
meaning. After the usual canons construction were applied, as 
exemplified in the Securicor case, then a court would apply the 
57. [1980] 1 All E.R. 556. 
58. [19821 3 W.L.R. 1036, 1047. 
59. Ibid., at p.1047. 
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statutory criteria of reasonableness and fairness. It is unfortunate 
that in two judgments, those of Kerr L.J. and Lord Denning, where 
such criteria are, in this writer's view, properly applied to the facts 
of the case, one judgment could be taken to elevate the statutory 
tests to a doctrine and the other judgement to place a gloss upon 
them that, if followed, would replace a vital canon of construction of 
exemption clauses. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in George Mitchell  
(Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. was confirmed on 
appeal to the House of Lords. " In delivering the judgment of the 
House of Lords, Lord Bridge of Harwich observed that the judgments 
of the learned trial judge and of Oliver L.J. in the Court of Appeal 
on the common law issue "... come dangerously near to reintroducing 
by the back door the doctrine of 'fundamental breach' which this 
House in Securicor 1 [1980] A.C. 827 had so forcibly evicted by the 
front.
1161 
Lord Bridge stated that Kerr L.J. in the Court of Appeal 
had omitted to notice the reference by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in 
Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd. v. Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd. and  
Securicor (Scotland) Ltd.
62 
that the very strict principles laid down 
in Canada Steamship Lines v. The King by Lord Morton of Heyton 63 
as applicable to exclusion and indemnity clauses 11 ... cannot be 




In dealing with the issue of what the court would view as 
"fair and reasonable" both under the modified s55(5) of the Sale of 
60. [19831 3 W.L.R. 163. 
61. Ibid., at p.168 Oliver L.J.'s judgment on this issue is dealt 
with fully atChapter One. 
62. 1982 S.L.T. 377 HL (Sc). 
63. [1952] A.C. 192, at p.208. 
64. 119831 3 W.L.R. 163, at p.189. 
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Goods Act 1979 (which sub-section would be of limited and 
diminishing importance) and the provisions of s11 of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 Lord Bridge stated what would be the 
appropriate approach of an appellate court to an original decision 
applying such provisions : 
"There will sometimes be room for a legitimate 
difference of judicial opinion as to what the answer 
should be, where it will be impossible to say that one 
view is demonstrably wrong and the other 
demonstrably right. It must follow, in my view, that, 
when asked to review such a decision on appeal, the 
appellate court should treat the original decision with 
the utmost respect and refrain from interference with 
it unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some 
erroneot6 principle or was plainly and obviously 
wrong." 
In the fourth and most recent reported case, Stag Line Ltd  
v. Tyne Shiprepair Group Ltd. and Others (The "Zinnia"), " the 
court held that a clause in a repair tender, on its proper 
construction, excluded liability for economic loss. 
The plaintiffs were owners of the vessel "Zinnia" which was 
due in February 1980 for drydocking including the four year survey 
of her tailshaft. The plaintiffs sent a repair specification for 
quotation to various shipyards, including Tyne Shiprepair Group 
(subsequently referred to as TSG). A wholly owned subsidiary of 
the defendants, Wallsend, submitted a tender for repair which was 
accepted by the plaintiffs. The vessel entered Wallsend's yard for 
repair on Feburary 24 1980. Among the work to be done was the 
relining of the stern tube for which the owners had specified a 
laminate called "Tufrol" which was made by Tufrol Ltd. Six and half 
sheets of this material were required but in fact only one and a half 
sheets of Tufrol and five sheets of at least one and possibly more 
than one other type of material was used. On March 15, 1980 the 
65. lipid; at p.171. 
66. TI9841 2 Lloyd's Rep 211 (Q.B. Commercial Court); reported 
as The 'Zinnia'. 
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vessel left the yard, the work having been completed. 
On June 12 1980, while the vessel was crossing Lake Erie 
with a grain cargo en route to Tilbury, she had a major breakdown 
in her engine room. It was found that the tailshaft and stern gland 
had overheated, although the ship's engineers succeeded in cooling 
them. After the vessel had discharged her cargo at Tilbury, she 
proceeded to a yard in Rotterdam for drydocking examination and 
repairs. 
The owners sought to recover the loss they had suffered as a 
result of the breakdown. The issues for decision, included inter 
alia, first, whether the breach or breaches of contract or duty 
caused the casualty at Lake Erie and thus the owners loss, second, 
whether the conditions printed on the back of Wallsend's tender 
excluded or limited the liability of TSG or VVallsend for all or part of 
the claims third, whether the conditions of contract or any of them 
were not available to TSG or Wallsend by reason of the Unfair  
Contract Terms Act 1977. 
In the Queen Bench Division (Commercial Court) Staughton J. 
found, on the evidence that the expansion of the non-specified 
material used by WalIsend to line the stern tube had not caused the 
overheating in question; it was more likely that it was caused by 
blockage of the lubricating system by silt from the muddy water in 
the United States port of Toledo. However, Wal!send was in breach 
of the contractual duty which a shiprepairer owed to exercise 
reasonable skill and care by himself or his employees or anyone else 
to whom he delegated the task, to ensure that proper materials were 
used. Wallsend were under a duty to inform the owners that part of 
the material used was not "Tufrol". 
The conditions of contract included, inter alia, the following 
terms which were considered to be relevant : 
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"8 (3) Subject to sub-clause (9), the Contractor does 
not exclude liability for direct physical damage to the 
tangible property of the Customer to the extent that it 
is caused by the negligence of the Contractor or its 
employees. 
8(9) Except as provided in sub-clause (2) in no event 
shall the Contractor be liable for the following loss or 
damage howsoever caused and even if forseeable by or 
in the contemplation of the Contractor. 1. Economic 
loss which shall include loss of profits business 
revenue goodwill and anticipated savings. 2. Damages 
in respect of special indirect or consequential loss or
• damage (other than direct physical damage to tangible 
property caused by the negligence of the Contractor 
or its employees). 3. Any claim made against the 
Customer by any other party." 
The owner's counsel accepted that c1.8(9)(1) excluded 
economic loss and also excluded the claims for loss or hire and 
related losses associated with the drydocking of the vessel in 
Rotterdam. Staughton J. held that the conditions, on their true 
construction did exclude liability for economic loss but did not 
otherwise exclude or limit Wallsend's liability. The defendants' 
counsel had contended that the owners had no remedy in respect of 
the remaining claims as they did not return the vessel to Wallsend's 
yard, or to a yard specified by Wallsend, for repair. Staughton J. 
accepted the argument of the plaintiff's counsel that whether or not 
that was so, the owners were not precluded in this case as their 
claim could be based upon negligence. 
This was dealt with in c1.8(3) and was subject only to the 
limit in c1.8(9) (see supra). Staughton J. made 67 the following 
observation concerning the issue of reasonableness under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act : 
"1 would have been tempted to hold that all the 
conditions are unfair and unreasonable for two 
reasons: first, they are in such small print that one 
can barely read them; secondly, the draftsmanship is 
so convoluted and prolix that one almost needs an 
LL.B. to understand them. However, neither of those 
arguments was advanced before me, so I say no more 
about them." 
67. 	119841 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211, at p. 222. 
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This statement is suprising for two reasons. 	First, the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act provides that the burden of proving that 
a contract term (or notice), satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness is upon the proferens.
68
. Second, if small print and 
convoluted draftsmanship alone raise the issue of unreasonableness, 
then many standard form inter-business contracts would be struck 
down on Staughton J.'s criteria. It might, it is suggested, have 
been appropriate if the learned judge had suitably qualified his 
remarks by reference to a prior course of dealings between the 
parties. 69 Although the observations quoted above were obiter, 
since neither argument was advanced by counsel, they demonstrate a 
disturbingly simplistic approach to commercial contracts. 
On the issue of the strength of relative bargaining positions•
of the parties Staughton J. found these to be, broadly, equal. The 
defendants occasionally relaxed their standard terms if requested by 
a particular customer, but this had only happened at the request of 
customers with more financial influence than the plaintiffs. Wallsend 
had never relaxed the exclusion in c1.8(9) of economic loss, nor 
modified c1.8 other than by extending the period of the guarantee. 
However, they had never been requested to do so. This did not 
surprise Staughton J. :- 
"Commercial men negotiating a contract for the future 
are not too concerned about the small print if they can 
secure a guarantee clause which seems to them 
satisfactory. It is only after a br.vch has occurred 
that they may take a different view"'" 
This comment, which appears to show an understanding of the 
realities of commercial bargaining, contrasts with the previous 
extract criticised earlier. Staughton J. went on to observe that 
68. Section 11(5). 
69. See Chapter One. 
70. [19741 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211, at p.223. 
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when the contract was made between Stag Line and Wallsend, the 
defendant company, were very busy and therefore would have been 
reluctant to make any concession, whereas when they were short of 
work they would have been much more ready to do so. However the 
judge was not prepared to take that factor into account in the 
circumstances of the case, or give it much weight. In Staughton 
J.'s words :- 
"It can scarcely have been the intention of Parliament 
that a clause in a shiprepairer's standard terms would 
be fair and reasonable one week - when the yard was 
willing to make concessions if asked - but unfair and 
unrea,crable the following week, when the yard was 
busy"  
Section 11(1) of the Unfair. Contract Terms Act  makes it clear 
that any judgement as to whether the term is fair and reasonable to 
be included in the contract is based on "... the circumstances which 
were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to. or in 
contemplation of the parties when the contract wasP made"  (emphasis•
added). It follows that if the circumstances of business change over 
time, so that a •firm has less work, and, in consetiuence r be more 
prepared, to relax the provisions of the contract, then it may be 
that, as result, clause or contract term could become 
unreasonable at the time when the relevant contract is made. 
Staughton J. may well have been correct in not taking the issue of 
the level of Wallsend s business commitments into account on the 
facts which were available to him. However, his observations, 
discussed earlier,, although obiter, cannot be taken as representing 
what is clearly expressed in s.11(1). 
As already noted, Staughton J. did not find the exclusion of 
economic loss unreasonable
72 
However, he would have taken a 
71. Ibid., at p.223. 
72. rang, with approval, Lord Wilberforce in Photo Production  
Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [19801 1 All E.R. 556, at p.561. 
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different view of the clause limiting liability for the replacement of 
defective work and materials, 73 if it had provided that the owner 
had no remedy unless he returned his vessel to the yard for repair 
or to such other places as the yard might direct. In that situation 
Staughton J. thought that the conditions did not exempt for 
negligent breach of contract then the remedy was not so limited. He 
did note that the clause in question did not have an alternative 
provision, found in many other similar contracts, that the yard 
would bear the cost to the owner of repair up to the amount which 
that repair would have cost the yard. Staughton J. found such a 
result "capricious", since the apportionment of risk was made to 
depend upon where a vessel incurred damage, and whether the 
owner happened to find it convenient and economic to return his 
vessel to the yard. If the clause had deprived the owners of all 
remedy because they did not return the vessel to Wallsend's 
yard, the judge said that he would have held that the clause was 
unfair and unreasonable.
74 
As the conditions on their true 
construction excluded liability for economic loss, but did not 
otherwise exclude or limit Wallsend's liability, it was not necessary 
for his honour to decide this point. 
•Two recent unreported cases have seen the application of the 
principles in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v. Finney Lock Seeds  
Ltd.
75  In the first, Rees Hough Ltd. v. Red land Reinforced Plastics  
Ltd.
76
, the plaintiffs, who were tunnelling and pipe-jacking 
contractors, ordered a quantity of pipes for Redland Ltd, who were 
manufacturers of concrete pre-cast jacking pipes. The pipes were 
delivered to the plaintiffs, who used them in the building of a 
73. Clause 8(4). 
74. [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211, at p.223. 
75. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036. 
•76. 	(1984) 134 N.L.J., 706; Queens Bench Division, Judge J. 
•Newey Q.C., •see note in [1984] J.B.L. 454, unreported. 
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tunnel. Some of the pipes cracked and the tunnel had to be 
completed by sub-contractors using a pipe-jacking method of their 
own. The plaintiffs brought an action against Redland Ltd claiming 
damages, on the ground that, first, they were in breach of an 
express term of the contract that the pipes should be capable of 
being jacked at about four hundred tonnes evenly distributed around 
the full profile of the pipe, in the shaft or at the inter-jack and 
with angles of up to one and a half degrees deflection between pipes 
in the _drive; and, second, they were in breach of the implied 
conditions as to fitness of purpose and merchantable quality under 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (5 14). 
Redland Ltd. denied liability relying, inter alia, on c1.10 of 
their standard terms and conditions which provided : 
"The Company warrants that the goods shall be of 
sound workmanship and materials and in the event of a 
defect in any goods being notified to the Company in 
writing immediately upon discovery thereof which is 
the result of unsound workmanship or materials, the 
Company will at its own cost at its option, either 
repair or replace the same provided always that the 
Company , shall be liable only in respect of defects 
notified within three months of delivery of the goods 
concerned. Save as aforesaid, the Company 
undertakes no liability, contractual or tortious, in 
respect of loss or damage suffered by the customer as 
a result of any defect in the goods ... and all terms 
of any nature, express or implied, statutory or 
otherwise, as to correspondence with any particular 
description or sample, fitness for purpose or 
merchantability are hereby excluded." 
The defendants were held to be in breach of the express 
conditions and those implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 s14. 
Those conditions were effectively excluded by the defendant's 
standard terms of sale, but it was held that they had failed to prove 
that those terms were reasonable for the purposes of s3 of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. In coming to this conclusion the 
judge applied the principles laid down by the House of Lords in 
George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. with 
reference to an appellate court treating an original decision with the 
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utmost respect and not interfering with such a decision unless the 
appellate court were satisfied that it had proceeded on an erroneous 
principle or was plainly and obviously wrong. 77 
In Phillips Products Ltd. v. Hyland and Another 78 the Court 
of Appeal applied the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 to a contract 
for the hire of plant so as to render ineffective a condition 
excluding the owner's liability for negligence. 
The Phillips company were carrying out extensions to their 
factory. They arranged with a builder, Pritchard, to undertake the 
building work, but the company was itself to be responsible for 
buying materials and arranging for the provision of plant. However, 
they gave permission to Pritchard to place an order with a firm 
called Hamstead Ltd for the hiring of a JCB excavator and Pritchard 
made arrangements by telephone with Hamstead Ltd. for the hire of 
a JCB excavator and driver. The first defendant, Hyland, arrived 
at Phillips premises with the machine. It was found as fact, at first 
instance, that Hyland had made it clear to Pritchard that he, 
Hyland, would have sole control of the operation of the machine. 
During the course of operating the excavator Hyland drove it into 
collision with part of the plaintiff company's buildings, doing 
considerable damage to them as a consequence. Phillips sued Hyland 
and Hamstead claiming damages against both defendants. 
Both defendants conceded that Pritchard had driven the 
excavator with less than reasonable care and that the cost of 
repairing the premises was 1' 3,043. The judge at first instance 
gave judgment for Phillips for that sum. At the trial the argument 
centred on the liability or otherwise of Hamstead Ltd. in tort. They 
77. 	[1983] 3 W.L.R. 163, per Lord Bridge of Harwich at p.171; 
see supra. 
Unreported; rt d; The Times, December 24 1984; before Slade L.J., 
Neil and Sir John Megaw JJ. 
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conceded that, apart from any special terms in the contract of hire 
they would have been liable for the negligence of Hyland as their 
employee, so as to entitle Phillips to judgment against them for the 
same sum as that awarded against Hyland. However, it was 
contended on behalf of Hamstead Ltd that c1.8 of Hamstead's general 
conditions incorporated in the contract gave them a complete defence 
to the claim. This provided : 
"When a driver or operator is supplied by the owner 
to work the plant, he shall be under the direction and 
control of the hirer. Such drivers or operators shall 
for all purposes in connection with their employment in 
the working of the plant be regarded as servants for 
all the claims arising in connection with the operation 
of the plant by the said drivers or operators. The 
hirer shall not allow any other person to operate such 
plant without the owner's previous consent to be 
confirmed in writing." 
The plaintiffs, on their part, submitted that if, on its proper 
construction, the wording of condition eight did operate to provide 
such an exemption, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 would 
preclude Hamstead from relying on it. 
The trial judge concluded that this argument was well 
founded. He therefore found it unnecessary to reach any decision 
as to the proper construction of condition eight and gave judgement 
for Phillips against both defendants. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeal the sole question in issue 
was whether or not c1.8 was rendered ineffective as a defence by 
reason of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The relevant section 
was s2 which provides 
"(1) 	A person cannot by reference to any contract term ... 
exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury 
resulting from negligence. 
(2) 	In the case of other loss or damage, 'a person cannot 
so exclude or restrict his liability for negligence except in so 
far as the term or notice satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness." 
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The court had, therefore, to determine whether the condition 
quoted, on the evidence and in the context of the contract as a 
whole, satisfied the requirement of reasonableness. 
In delivering the judgement of the Court of Appeal Slade L.J. 
held that the onus fell on Hamstead, under s11(5), to show that the 
condition was satisfied and, in accordance with s11(1) they had to 
show that it was "... a fair and reasonable one to be included 
having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought to have 
been, known to or in contemplation of the parties when the contract 
was made." 
At the time that the contract was made, all the relevant 
circumstances were known to both parties. The task which the trial 
judge had, therefore, set himself was to examine all the relevant 
circumstances and, then, ask himself whether, on the balance Of 
probabilities, he was satisfied that the condition, in so far as it 
purported to exclude Hamstead's liability for negligence, was a fair 
and reasonable term. He had concluded that he was not so 
satisfied. 
The question for the court was not a general question as to 
whether or not the condition was valid or invalid in the case of any 
and every contract of hire entered into between a hirer and a plant 
owner who used that condition. The question was whether the 
exclusion of Hamstead Ltd's liability for negligence satisfied the 
requirement of reasonableness imposed by the Act, in relation to the 
particular contract. 
Slade L.J. stated that it was necessary to bear in mind, and 
strive to comply with, the clear and stern injunction issued by Lord 
Bridge of Harwich, in regard to the issue of reasonableness, in 
George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. where 
it was said: 
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11 ... the appellate court should treat the original 
decision with the utmost respect and refrain from 
interference with it unless satisfied that it proceeded 
upon some erron,gus principle or was plainly and 
obviously wrong." 
On the facts and available evidence, their Lordships were not 
persuaded that the trial judge proceeded upon some erroneous 
principle or was plainly and obviously wrong in his conclusion that 
Hamstead Ltd had not discharged the onus of showing that the 
condition satisfied the requirement of reasonableness in the context 
of the particular contract of hire. 
In Rees Hough Ltd. v. Redland Reinforced Plastics Ltd., " 
and in Phillips Products Ltd. v. Hylands and Another 81 on the facts 
of both cases, the learned judge and the Court of Appeal were 
stricter in applying the reasonableness test than was the House of 
Lords in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds  
Ltd 
82 and in the approach taken to the construction of exemption 
clauses in standard form contracts by the House of Lords in Photo 
Production Ltd. v. Securicor Ltd.
83 . Since both judgements are 
currently unreported it is difficult to make a realistic criticism of 
either of them. However, certain issues would appear to be raised. 
In the Rees Hough case the expertise of the contractor was clearly 
central to the contract and on the evidence a breach of s14 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 was proved. However, what is not 
demonstrated in that case is whether the issues of equality of 
bargaining power, the reality of negotiation between the parties, 
including previous dealings, and the availability of insuring against 
the risk were addressed by the court. Similarly, in the Phillips  
Products case these same issues appear to have been left aside. 
79. [1983] 3 W.L.R. 163, at p.171. 
80. (1984) 134 N.L.J. 706. 
81. [1983] 3 W.L.R. 163. 
82. [1980] 2 All E.R. 556; see Chapter One. 
83. The Times, December 24,1984. 
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The approach of the Court of Appeal in this case contrasts with its 
detailed examination, earlier discussed, of a clause in a standard 
form excluding negligence in a plant hire contract in British Crane 
Hire Corporation Ltd. v. Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd. 84 
The Trade Practices Act and the Reasonableness Test  
The Trade Practices Act 1974 contained no provisions relating 
to the reasonableness test until the amendment of s68 by the Trade 
Practices Amendment Act (No. 2) 1977. This provided, in s68A, as 
follows : 
"(1) 	Subject to this section, a term of a contract for 
the supply by a corporation of goods of 
services other than goods or services of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption is not void under 
section 68 by reason only that the term limits 
the liability of the corporation for a breach of a 
condition or warranty (other than a condition or 
warranty implied by section 69) to - 
(a) 	in the case of goods, any one or more of 
the following: 
(i) the replacement of the goods or 
the supply of equivalent goods; 
(ii) the repair of the goods; 
(iii) the payment of the cost of 
replacing 	the 	goods or 	of 
acquiring equivalent goods; 
(iv) the payment of the cost of having 
the goods repaired; or 
(b) 	in the case of services - 
(i) 	the supplying of the services 
again; or 
the payment of the cost of having 
the services supplied again. 
(2) 	Sub-section (1) does not apply in relation to a 
term of a contract if the person to whom the 
goods or services were supplied establishes that 
it is not fair or reasonable for the corporation 
to rely on that term of the contract. 
84. 	[1974] 1 All E.R. 1059, for commentary on this case see N.E. 
Palmer [1974] 24(3) N.I.L.Q. 338. 
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(3) 	In determining for the purpose of sub-section 
(2) whether or not reliance on a term of a 
contract is fair or reasonable, a court shall 
have regard to all the circumstances of the case 
and in particular to the following matters; 
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions 
of the corporation and the person to 
whom the goods or services were 
supplied (in this sub-section referred to 
as "the buyer") relative to each other, 
taking into account, among other things, 
the availability of equivalent goods or 
services and suitable alternative sources 
of supply; 
(b) whether 	the 	buyer 	received 	an 
inducement to agree to the term or, in 
agreeing to the term, had an opportunity 
of acquiring the goods or services from 
any source of supply under a contract 
that did not include that term; 
(c) whether the buyer knew or ought 
reasonably to have known of the 
existence and extent of the term (having 
regard, among other things, to any 
custom of the trade and any previous 
course of dealing with the parties); and 
(d) in the case of the supply of goods, 
whether the goods were manufactured, 
processed or adapted to the special 
order of the buyer". 
This section, which was inserted as a result of pressure from 
suppliers, 
85
enables a corporation, in the supply of goods or 
services of a kind not ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption, to limit its liability for breach of an 
implied term.
86 A corporation will be liable for only (a) the 
replacement or repair of the defective goods, or (b) the re-supply 
of the services, or (c) alternatively the payment of the cost of 
replacing, repairing or re-supply of the goods or services. 
85. The suppliers in question were mainly in the computer 
industry. The background to this successful lobbying is usefully 
documented by K. McGregor 'Protest at Trade Practices Act: 
Computer Industry "Shutdown" The Australian Financial Review 15 
July 1977, 'Consumer Warranties: Supplier "Strike" Widens' The 
Australian Financial Review  6 July 1977. 
86. Except that relating to title, quiet possession and freedom 
from encumbrance (s69). 
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The chief result of this amendment is that a supplier of goods 
or services of a commercial nature may be able to limit the amount 
recoverable by a person who is injured by a defect in the goods or 
services rendering them unmerchantable or unfit for a particular 
purpose. Take, as an example, an accounting business supplied by 
a computer firm with a $15,000 computer partly on the basis of the 
following terms: 
"The machine (as described in CI.1) is sold subject to 
the following conditions and warranties. The machine 
is subject to a twelve months servicing guarantee 
under which the company undertake to replace the 
machine if unsatisfactory and to supply all parts and 
labour free of charge. This guarantee is in exclusion 
of all other conditions and warranties, both statutory 
and common law and the company are not liable for any 
damage to property (including consequential loss), 
injury to, or death of, any person consequent upon 
the use, operation or malfunction of the machine 
whether such use, operation or malfunction is due to 
or arising from negligence on the part of the company 
in respect of assembly, servicing, components or 
howsoever caused". 
If an employee of the accounting firm were fatally electrocuted 
because the console of the machine became "live" due to defective 
wiring in the computer itself, what would be the legal position under 
s68A? Presumably, the accounting firm would have accident 
insurance cover and therefore the dependants of the employee would 
be compensated.
87 The computer suppliers would only be liable to 
the accounting firm on the basis of the terms above and of s68A. In 
other words, the defective wiring would be repaired as part of the 
servicing agreement at no cost to the firm supplied. Even if a fire 
in the example had been more serious and the firm's building so 
severely damaged that its operations were interrupted, insurance for 
fire and loss of profits would be available and a prudent firm would 
have had such cover protecting it. If the instances given above are 
87. 	For reasons of brevity, the issue of suing in tort, on the 
basis of negligence, is not considered. 
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typical, and insurance cover can be provided at a reasonable cost 
(given that in relation to accident insurance the English Working 
Party understood such premiums to be low), one wonders whether it 
was necessary to enact a provision in s68A that added confusion to 
an already difficult Act. Was protection, both to the supplier and 
by way of the reasonableness test to a supplied business, really 
required? In other words, the possibility exists that s68A, in both 
of its aspects, was not needed as businesses ought to be able to 
look after themselves. Insurance can more appropriately cover the 
liability when it is apportioned by the use of a suitably worded 
88 
exemption clause. 
(B) 	The Issue of Unconscionability  
The reasonableness test provides no innovation of judicial 
practice. In the United States s.2-302 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) has set guidelines for the courts to strike down or 
modify contracts in whole or in part that are unconscionable.
89 
A 
number of cases within the last ten years, have further clarified the 
principles on which the courts will interfere with the terms of a 
contract which are held to be unfair. 
88. It should be noted that there has been no reported litigation 
on s68A. 
89. UCC article 2-302 reads: 
'(1) 	Wthe court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time 
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or 
it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of 
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
(2) 	When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract 
or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall 
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as 
to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court 
in making the determination.' 
For a ,useful and recent commentary on article 2-302 see J.R.Peden 
The Law of Unjust Contracts Butterworths 1982, Chapter Two. For 
particular reference to the economic and behavioural background of 
unconscionability see L.A.Kornhauser 'Unconscionability in Standard 
Forms! 64 Cal L.R. 1151 (1976) 
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Judicial Views of Unconscionability  
There exists authority, even though slight, indicating that 
the courts are prepared to declare an agreement unenforceable on 
the grounds that it is harsh and unconscionable.
90 
In the case of 
A.Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay 91 the plaintiff, a 
young and unknown song writer, entered into an agreement with the 
defendants whereby they engaged his exclusive services for five 
years under a standard form agreement. By this contract the 
plaintiff assigned to the defendants the world copyright in each 
original work he produced during the duration of the agreement and 
such work prior to it that he still owned and controlled. If, during 
the five year period the plaintiff's royalties and advances equalled or 
exceeded /5,000, the agreement would be automatically extended for 
a further five years. The defendants were under no obligation to 
publish any of the plaintiff's compositions and could terminate the 
agreement with month's notice. The plaintiff sought a declaration 
that the agreement was in restraint of trade; in response the 
defendants argued that the doctrine did not apply to standard form 
contracts which were generally accepted in the business world. 
The House of Lords held that a distinction had to be made between 
standard contracts freely made between parties on equal bargaining 
terms and the instant case. No presumption could be made on the 
90. For an examination of the history of the equitable doctrine 
relating to relief from unconscionable bargains see M. Cope 'The 
Review of Unconscionable Bargains in Equity'. (1983) 57 A.L.J 279. 
See a discussion of the cases in P.H.Clarke 'Unequal Bargaining 
Power in the - Law of Contract' (1975) 49 A.L.J. 229; see generally 
S.M. Waddams 'Unconscionability in Contrac ts ' (1376) 39 M.L.R. 369; 
M.P.Ellinghaus 'In Defence of Unconscionability' (1969) 78 Yale L.J.  
757; S.M. Waddams 'Unconscionability in Contracts' (1976) 39 M.L.R.  
369. 
91. (19741 3 All E.R. 616. See also F.Wooldridge 'Inequality of 
Bargaining Power in Contract' [1977] J.B.L. 312; V.Sinnadurai 
'Exemption Clauses v. Public Policy and Inequality of Bargaining 
Power' (1978) Mal.L.J. 130; K.L. Fletcher 'Review of Unconscionable 
Transactions' (1973) 8 U.Q.L.J. 45. 
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facts of the case that the terms were fair and reasonable. There was 
no obligation on the part of the defendants to publish the plaintiff's 
work and he could earn nothing during the contract if the 
defendants decided not to publish. As Lord Diplock stated : 
"The terms of this kind of standard form contract have 
not been the subject of any negotiation between the 
parties to it ... They have been dictated by the party 
whose bargaining power ... enabled him t . : 'If 
you want these goods and services at all, these are 
the only ternl on which they are obtainable. Take it 
or leave it." 
An early Tasmanian case, Harrison v. National Bank of 
Australasia Ltd.
93 provides an interesting example of the potential 
authority of the courts to open up a bargain. In that case, an 
elderly woman gave a bank security over land to raise money to 
assist her son-in-law in business, who was himself, and to the 
bank's knowledge, already considerably overdrawn. Her action was 
made without legal advice and without any personal knowledge of 
business, although she knew she would be liable should the business 
fail. In setting the agreement aside, Crisp J. held that the bank in 
the circumstances had a duty to the plaintiff which it had broken 
and the agreement would be set aside on the ground that it had 
been entered into ' ... without due deliberation, without independent 
advice and not knowing its true effect".
94 This Tasmanian case 
foreshadowed the much later English case of Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. 
Bundy 95 . The English Court of Appeal held that where a 
confidential relationship existed between the bank and its customer, 
the court would interfere to redress abuse of that relationship. 
92. Ibid., at p.622. The Court of Appeal followed Schroeder's 
case in Clifford Davies Management Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd.  
(1975) 1 All E.R. 237 where it refused to enforce a standard form 
publishing agreement with a musical group; see Lord Denning at 
p.240. 
93. (1928) 23 Tas. •L.R.1. 
94. Ibid., at p.8. See Peden Report comments at p.7. 
95. (1975) 1 Q.B. 326. 
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Account was taken of the fact that the plaintiff had mortgaged his 
sole remaining asset, his property, to raise money to support his 
son's business. The bank foreclosed and sought possession of the 
land. Evidence showed that the plaintiff, an elderly man without 
any head for business, had received no independent advice. The 
bank was held to have broken their fiduciary duty of care and the 
guarantee and charge were set aside on the grounds of undue 
influence. Lord Denning, in the course of his judgment, laid down 
a general principle (which was not required for the case to be 
resolved and may have been too widely stated) to be drawn from the 
cases which allowed the courts to interfere in harsh contracts : 
"They rest on 'inequality of bargaining power'. By 
virtue of it, the English law gives relief to one who, 
without independent advice, enters into a contract 
upon terms which are very unfair or transfers 
property. for •a consideration which is grossly 
inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously 
impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by 
his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue 
influences or pressures brougt to bear on him by or 
for the benefit of the other." 
The general principle which can be gathered from all these 
cases cited is that the courts will relieve a party of the burden of a 
harsh or oppressive contract if, due to the harshness or oppression 
resulting from the other party exercising his superior bargaining 
power, the contract is considered unconscionable.
97 
The above 
principle is narrower than that enunciated by Lord Denning in that 
the former view requires an actual exercise of inequality of 
bargaining power, while the latter appears based only on the 
existence of inequality. 
In Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v. Amadio and Anor.
98 
the High Court of Australia had to consider the position of two 
96. Ibid., at p.339. 
97. See note(1977) 51 A.L.J. 232. 
98. (1982-83) 151 C.L.R—T7-447; an appeal from the Supreme Court 
of South Australia. 
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elderly migrants (both, in their seventies), who were unfamiliar with 
written English, and who had been asked by their son to execute a 
mortgage in favour of a bank, over land which they owned, to 
secure the overdraft of a company which the son controlled. The 
son had told his parents that the mortgage was to be limited to 
$50,000 and to be for six months. The bank and the company had 
been selectively dishonouring the company's cheques in order to 
preserve the company's appearance of solvency. The bank and the 
company agreed that the overdraft which the mortgage was to secure 
ought to be reduced and cleared off within a short time, but these 
matters were not disclosed to the prospective mortgagors. The 
mortgage instrument which the bank submitted for execution 
contained a guarantee. The mortgage and the guarantee secured all 
amounts owing to the bank on the company's account. The 
mortgagors executed the deed mistakenly believing it to be limited to 
$50,000 and to be for six months. The bank was aware that it had 
been misinformed about the contents of the mortgage and the 
guarantee. 
On appeal by the bank from the Supreme Court of South 
Australia the High Court held that the instrument should be set•
aside unconditionally.
99 1 
The first ground was that the bank owed 
a duty to the mortgagors to disclose unusual features relating to the 
overdrawn account. The non-disclosure amounted to a 
misrepresentation which was sufficient to entitle the mortgagors to 
have the deed set aside. The second ground
2 
was that the 
mortgagors were under a special disability when they executed the 
deed containing the guarantee. The disability was sufficiently 
99. 	Gibbs C.J., Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ.; Dawson J. 
dissenting. 
1. Per Gibbs C.J., applying Goodwin v. National Bank of 
Australia Ltd. (1968) 117 C.L.R. 173. 
2. Per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ., applying Blomley v. Ryan  
(1956), 99 C.L.R. 362. 
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evident to the bank to make it prima facie unfair or unconscientious 
for it to be allowed to rely on the guarantee. The onus lay on the 
bank to show that the guarantee should not be set aside, and it had 
not been satisfied. 
In Gibbs C.J.'s view the instrument should not be set aside 
on grounds of unconscionability 
"In my opinion it should not be held that this was the 
case of an unconscientious bargain of the kind which 
equity would set aside, even in the absence of fraud, 
misrepresentation or undue influence. Of course, the 
bank did not meet on equal terms, but that 
circumstance alone does not call for the - intervention of 
equity, as Lord Denning M.R. clearly illustrated in 
Lloyd's Bank v. Bu ndy131. A transaction will be 
unconscientious within the meaning of the relevant 
equitable principles only if the party seeking to enforce 
the transaction has taken unfair advantage of his own 
superior bargaining power, or of the position of 
disadvantage in which the other party was placed. The 
principle of equity applies whenever one party to a 
transaction is at a special disadvantage in dealing with 
the other party because illness, ignorance, 
inexperience, impaired faculties, financial need or 
other circumstances affect his ability to conserve his 
own interests, and the other party unconscientiously 
takes advantage of the opportunity thus placed in his 
hands 'Blomley v. R yan141, per Kitto J., and see at 
pp. 405-406, per Fu
I 
lagar J. In the present case it is 
true that the respondents were elderly, did not have a 
complete mastery of the English language and had had 
no formal education. However, the bank did not take 
unfair advantage of any of these disabilities, if 
disabilities they were. The evidence shows, as Wells 
J. found, 151 that the bank relied on Vincenzo Amadio 
to explain the transaction to his parents, and he in 
fact persuaded them to enter into it. He was 
experienced in business matters, and well able to 
understand and explain the effect of the memorandum 
of mortgage. Of course, he did not give his parents a 
true explanation of the effect of the guarantee, and 
the bank did not disclose those matters which it should 
have disclosed. If one ignores the effect of the 
misrepresentation by Vincenzo Amadio and the 
non-disclosure by the bank there is simply no evidence 
that the bank made unfair use of its position. In 
other words, if misrepresentation (whether express or  
by non-disclosure) is established, there Is no need to  
3. 119751 Q.B. 326, at p.336. 
4. (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362, at p.415. 
5. In the Supreme Court of South Australia. 
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resort to the rules as to unconscientious bargains, and  
if misrepresentation is not gstablished the bank made no  
unfair use of its position." (emphasis added) 
In the view of the Chief Justice, the bank should fail only 
because of its failure to disclose to the respondents matters it was 
under a duty to disclose. 
In the view of the majority, Mason, Wilson and Deane J.J., 
the bank had been guilty of obtaining the execution of the mortgage 
and guarantee by the elderly couple when they , had limited use of 
English and they relied on their son in business matters. The bank 
had not discharged the obligation of showing that the transaction 
was fair just and reasonable. In tracing the equitable grounds upon 
which the courts had, historically, exercised jurisdiction to set aside 
contracts, Mason J. stated the broad principle on which relief on the 
ground of conduct would be granted as follows : 
"Relief on the ground of unconscionable conduct will be 
granted when unconscientious advantage is taken of an 
innocent party whose will is overborne so that it is not 
independent and voluntary, must as it will be granted 
when such advantage is taken of an innocent party 
who, though not deprived of an independent and 
voluntary will, is unable to make a worthwhile 
judgement as to what is in his best interest." 
Citing Fullagar J. in Blomley v. Ryan, Mason J. declared that 
it is impossible to definitively describe all the situations in which 
relief will be granted on grounds on unconscionable conduct : 
"The circumstances adversely affecting a party, which 
may induce a court of equity either to refuse its aid or 
to set a transaction aside, are of great variety and can 
hardly be satisfactorily classified. Among them are 
poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, 
infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or 
lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation 
where assistance or explanation is necessary. The 
common characteristic seems to be that they have the 
effect of placing on party at a serious disadvantage 
vis-a-vis the other." 
6. (1982-83) 151 C.L.R. 447, at pp.458-459. 
7. Ibid., at p.461. 
8. (1-9-56) 99 C.L.R. 362, at p.405. 
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Mason J. maintained that the situations listed by Fullagar J. 
were, in the latter's view "...exemplifications of an underlying 
general principle which may be invoked whenever one party by 
reason of some condition of circumstance is placed at a special 
disadvantage vis-a-vis another and unfair or unconscientious 
advantage is then taken of the opportunity thereby created. 119  
In Mason J.'s view, because times had changed new situations 
had arisen in which it might be appropriate to invoke such an 
underlying principle. So, for example, where entry into a standard 
form contract had been dictated by a party of much superior 
bargaining power. 10 
In such situations, the plaintiff seeking relief must establish 
unconscionable conduct, that is, that unconscionable advantage had 
been taken of his disabling condition or circumstances. The 
relationship between the bank and the elderly couple was one of the 
situations to which the general principle could apply. A bank's duty 
of disclosure does not require it to give information regarding 
matters affecting the, credit of the debtor or of any circumstances 
connected with the transaction which the debtor is about to enter 
which will make his position more hazardous. The fact that the 
bank's duty of disclosure is so limited, however, in Mason J.'s view 
had no bearing on the availability of equitable relief on the ground 
of unconscionable conduct. "A bank, though not guilty of any 
breach of its limited duty to make disclosure to the intending 
surety, may none the less be considered to have engaged in 
unconscionable conduct in procuring the surety's entry into the 
9. Citing the discussion of such a relationship by Lord Reid and 
Lord Diplock in Schroeder (A) Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macauly 
[1974] 3 All E.R. 616, at pp.622, 624 respectively, and by Lord 
Denning in Clifford Davis v. WEA Records [1975] 1 All E.R. 237, at 
p.240. 
10. (1982-83) 151 C.L.R. 447, at pp.463-464. 
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contract of guarantee." 11 
Particular factors in the case at issue established that there 
was a gross inequality of bargaining power between the bank and 
the elderly couple. The latter's ability to judge whether their entry 
into the transaction was in their own best interests, due to their 
desire to assist their son, was sadly lacking. The special 
disadvantage in which they were placed was their reliance on their 
son, who, to aid his own interests, urged them to provide the 
mortgage guarantee required by the bank as a condition of 
increasing the approved overdraft limit of the son's company. The 
couple's reliance on their son was largely due to their age, then 
having a limited command of written English and no experience of the 
type or level of business engaged in by their son and his company. 
They believed that the company's business was sound and 
prosperous, though with temporary financial needs. In fact, as the 
bank well knew, the company was in a dire financial condition. 
Deane J., in his judgement, noted that the equitable 
principles relating to relief against unconscionable dealings and those 
relating to undue influence were closely related. However, he 
regarded the two doctrines as distinct. Undue influence, like common 
law duress, looked to the specific quality of the agreement made by 
the weaker party .
12 Unconscionable dealing looked to the conduct of 
the stronger party in attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of, 
a dealing with a person under a special disability in circumstances 
where it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he 
should do so. In most cases, Deane J. noted, where courts of 
11. I bid. , at p.46 14. 
12. Ai — p.474 ibid. citing Union Bank of Australia Ltd. v. 
Whitelaw (1906) V.L7. -R. 711, at p.720; Watkins v. Coombes (1922) 30 
C.L.R. 180, at pp.193-194; Morrison N.77-7"Ost Finance Ltd. (1965) 
44 D.L.R. (2d) 710, at p.713. 
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Equity had granted relief against unconscionable dealing there had 
been an inadequacy of consideration, moving from the stronger 
party.
13  However, it was not essential that that should be so. 
In summing up his judgement Deane J. observed : 
"Ultimately, I have come to the view that Mr. and Mrs. 
Amadio are entitled to have the whole transaction set 
aside unconditionally. It is true that it is not 
ordinarily encumbent upon a bank to bring to the 
attention of a potential guarantor of a customer's 
account details of a type which are ordinarily to be 
expected[14] ... In the present case however, it was, 
as has been said, evident to the bank that Mr. and 
Mrs. Amadio stood in need of advice as to the nature 
and effect of the transaction into which they were 
entering. It is apparent that any such advice would 
have included the importance to a guarantor of 
ascertaining from the bank the state of the customer's 
account which was being guaranteed and any unusual 
features of the account. If such information had been 
obtained by Mr. and Mrs. Amadio, they would not, on 
the evidence and in the light of the learned trial 
judge's finding, have entered into the 
guarantee/mortgage at all. 	The whole transaction 
should properly be seen as flowing from the special 
disability which was evident to tyg bank and as being 
unfair, unjust and unreasonable." 
The majority decision in the Amadio case clearly demonstrates 
that the High Court of Australia is prepared to embrace the doctrine 
of unconscionable conduct which broadly follows the developments in 
England following Schroeder's case.
16 
However, the restrictive 
approach by the Chief Justice to the doctrine in Amadio's case 
indicates the need for legislative guidance in the development of 
criteria of unconscionability. 
13. Ibid., at p.475. 
14. tiling Goodwin v. National Bank of Australia Ltd (1968) 117 
C.L.R. 173, at p.175. 
15. (1982-83) 151 C.L.R. 447, at p.481. 
16. [1974] 3 All E.R. 616. 
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Unconscionability and Standard Form Contracts 
Accepted contract theory makes little or no allowance for the 
peculiarities of standardized form contracting.
17 
In the Butler 
Machine Tool Case
18 Lord Denning made the following observation in 
a judgement which had a classic 'battle of the forms' background: 
• • • in many of our cases our traditional analysis of 
offer, counter offer, rejection and so forth is out of 
date ... The better way is to look at all the documents 
passing between the parties and glean from them, or 
from the conduct of the parties, whether they have 
reached agreement on all material terms, even though 
there may be differences between forms and 
conditions printed' on the back of them". 
The tendency of American courts, it has been observed, is to 
subsume all problems of enforceability under the heading of 
2 
unconscionability 
0  This has been criticised as not only befogging 
basic contract principles and policy considerations but also blocking 
the orderly development of the relationship between s2-302 and 
concepts such as good faith, trade usage and specific restraints. 21 
Standard form contracts and the contracting processes 
associated with them depart from the comparable processes and rules 
associated with traditional contract law. The traditional rules mirror 
a world in which the parties exchange alternative sets of negotiable 
terms, the contract arising when and if the proposals correspond. 
17. In the U.S. context this is explored by R.Dugan 
'Standardized Form Contracts - An Introduction' 24 Wayne L.R. 1307 
(1978). See G.Gluck 'Standard Form Contracts : the Contract 
Theory Reconsidered' (1979) 28 I.C.L.Q. 72; J.N.Adams 'The 
Standardization of Commercial Contracts', onContractualization of 
Standard Forms' 7 Anglo Am.L Rev 136 (1978). 
18. Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v. Ex-Cell-0 Corporation  
(England) Ltd (1979) 1 All E.R. 965. 
19. (1979) 1 All E.R. 965, at p.968. See also Lord Wilberforce in 
New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v AM Satterthwaite (1974) 1 All E.R. 
1015, at pp.1019-1020. 
20. See R.Dugan 'Standardized Forms - An Introduction 24 Wayne  
L.R. 1307 (1978), at p.1314. 
21. Ibid. 
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The standard form contract represents, by contrast, a unilateral 
imposition of completely generalized terms. In addition such 
contracts negate the assumption of freedom of contract both in 
respect to the particular terms and so far as those terms are 
important features of the subject matter of the transaction, the 
entire contract. If a party cannot negotiate the particular terms of 
an equipment warranty it would appear that he has not freely agreed 
to those terms or the transaction as a whole. The generally 
accepted division of a standard form contract into terms subject to 
negotiation and terms not so subject rests on the doubtful premise 
that the two sets of terms are unrelated. However, both in theory 
and practice the standard terms define the legal rights and duties 
associated with the terms subject to negotiation. 
The Second Restatement of Contracts distinguishes between 
negotiated and standardized terms. 22 Para 237 states: 
"(1) 	Except as stated in Subsection (3) where a party 
to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests 
assent to a writing and has reason to believe 
that like writings are regularly used to embody 
terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts 
the writing as an integrated agreement with 
respect to the terms included in the writing. 
(2) Such 	a 	writing 	is 	interpreted 	wherever 
reasonable as treating alike all those similarly 
situated, without regard to their knowledge or 
understanding of the standard terms of the 
writing. 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that 
the party manifesting such assent would not do 
so if he knew that the writing contained a 
particular term, the term is not part of the 
agreement". 
The UCC both in its text and official Comments, indicates a 
considerable awareness of the problems involved in standardized form 
contracting. Significantly, s2-307 and s2-311 regulates incorporation 
of the standardized terms with little reference to agreement, real or 
assumed. UCCs 2-311(1) links incorporation of terms to the 
22. 	See Restatement (Second) of Contracts para's.229(d), 237. 
1tu 
existence of a specification agreement (presumably subject to 
negotiation) and with incorporation of subsequently specified terms 
dependent on commercial reasonableness and good faith. Under UCC 
s2-207(2) incorporation depends primarily on the concept of material 
alteration. However, it has been observed that American courts 
have yet to adopt a unified theory of incorporation of standard 
terms. 23 The chief weakness of article 2-302 has been the 
inadequacy of the guidelines provided.
24 
There have been shown to 
be considerable divergencies and inconsistencies between the cases. 
To overcome these Deutch has recommended enumerating the elements 
of unconscionability, rather than defining: 
"The elements will serve as guidelines and illustrations, 
not as rigorous definitions. But since the courts did 
not establish a general formula for this doctrine, it is 
the legislature's duty to formulate an5l 5 enumerate the 
essential elements of unconscionability". 
The requirement in s2-302(2) that the court afford the parties 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the commercial 
setting was introduced as a response to the concern expressed by 
businesses that commercial contracts might be made uncertain 
because courts would ignore their commercial circumstances. The 
official Comment 1 to s2-302 rejects the argument that the section is 
aimed at the "...disturbance of allocation of risks because of 
23. R.Dugan 'Standardized Form Contracts - An Introduction' 24 
Wayne L.R. 1307 (1978). 
24. See notably A.A.Leff 'Unconscionability and the Code: The 
Emperor's New Clause' 115 U Pa L Rev 485 (1967); J.C.Fort, 
'Understanding Unconscionability : Defining the Principle' 9 Loyola  
L.J. 765 (1978), at p.766; D.Yates Exemption Clauses in Contracts  
Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edition (1982), at p. 271. California dropped 
s2-302 from its commercial code due to s2-302's impreciseness and 
ambiguity. For a defence of the broad drafting of s2-302 see M. 
Ellinghaus 'In Defense of Unconscionability' 78 Yale L.J. 757 (1969); 
for a comparison with the provisions of the 1976 West German Law on 
Standard Contract Terms see A.H.Angelo and E.P.Ellinger 
'Unconscionable Contracts - A Comparative Study' (1979) 4 Otago L.  
R. 300, at p.328. 
77. 	S.Deutch Unfair Contracts Lexington (1977), at pp. 276-7. 
This recommendation is of considerable interest in Australia in that 
the Contracts Review Act  1980 (New South Wales) in s9(2) lays down 
a list of twelve factors that require consideration by the courts in 
determining the issue of unconscionability; see infra. 
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superior bargaining power". 
Instead, the principle underlying s2-302 is stated to be "one 
of the prevention of oppression and undue surprise". As a result, 
in instances of presentation of evidence under s2-302(2) the 
provisions of a contract apparently harsh on an abstract view have 
been commercially justified seen in their commercial context. Such 
evidence has been most frequently used in inter-business standard 
form contracts where only a small percentage of contracts have been 
found by the courts to be unconscionable. 26 
Desirability of Legislation on Unconscionable Contracts 
Statutory provisions within Australia already contain powers which 
courts and tribunals may use to review individual contracts and to 
ensure these conform to a basic concept of fairness. 27 In 1976 the 
Peden Report dealt with a reference from the New South Wales 
Minister of Consumer and Cooperative . Affairs and made 
recommendations concerning legislation on harsh and unconscionable 
contracts . 
28 
New South Wales has now brought down legislation 
26. See Fargo Machine Tool Co v. Kearney & Trecker Corp 
(1977) 428 F Supp 364, at 381; Jamestown Farmers Elevator Inc 
v. General Mills Inc. (1976) 413 F Supp 764, at 722. Cases in 
which evidence of a commercial setting did not preclude a finding 
of unconscionability include Majors v. Kalo Laboratories Inc (1975) 
407 F Supp 20 (contract requiring farmer to give notice of defect 
in an inoculant within 120 days of sale), Ashland Oil Inc v. 
Donahue (1976) 223 SE 2d 433 (dealership contract terminable on 
10 days notice but associated lease only terminable at the end of 
the year). See R.C.Griffin 'Standard Form Contracts' 9 
N.C.Cen.L.J. 	158 	(1978) 
27. Such 	statutes 	include 	the 	s 	30(1) Hire Purchase Act 1941 
(New South Wales), 	(now 	repealed) 	s 33(1) Hire Purchase Act 1959 
(Tasmania), 	Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (New South Wales) s88F, 
s22 Consumer Transactions Act 1972 (South Australia). 	For an 
example of judicial power given by statute to reopen a consumer 
credit bargain see s137 Consumer Credit Act 1974 (U.K.). 
28. Report on Harsh and Unconscionable Practices  1976 (Peden 
Report); see (1977) 51 A.L.J. 232. 	I am grateful to Prorii-s(-7. 
Peden for sending me a colt -c7f—his Report. 
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covering this area in the form of the Contracts Review Act 198029 
which is discussed later. 
If a solution was to be left to the courts alone, doubt has 
been expressed whether a wide doctrine of unconscionability is likely 
to develop in a short period of time. The Working Party on 
Consumer Protection Laws  in the A.C.T. endorsed the proposal to 
introduce the doctrine by legislation but noted: 
11 ... generally speaking in the purely commercial sphere it may be 
positively undesirable to interfere with the freedom of contract". " 
It might be argued, therefore, that there is no need to apply the 
doctrine to contracts of a commercial nature between businesses. 
Certainly, it has been earlier suggested that the reasonableness test 
(s68A) may not be needed. Would it, then, be inconsistent to urge 
the introduction of legislation embodying the unconscionability 
doctrine to apply to such contracts? 
The distinction between the reasonableness test and the 
concept . of unconscionability is essentially that, whereas 
unconscionability is a subjective test, that of reasonableness is 
objective, determined by the conduct and attitudes expected from a 
reasonable man. As has been observed: 
29. See J.R.Peden The Law of Unjust Contracts  Butterworths 
(1982) for a detailed commentary on the Act. For a critical review 
see A.L.Terry 'Unconscionable Contracts in New South Wales: The 
Contracts Review Act 1980' (1982) 5 A.B.L.R. 311. 
30. Working Party 1975, at p.21; cited in the Peden Report, 
p.11. 
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"A test of unconscionability can cater for the 
susceptibilities of the particular parties to the 
agreement in a way that the more objective criterion of 
reasonableness does not ... Also, by having regard to 
a test of conscience, the court can have regard to the 
conduct of both parties, not just the party against 
whom relief is sought. Conduct after the making of the 
agreement does int seem to play any part in the test of 
reasonableness". 
The point has been made that, in the majority of commercial 
contracts which contain exemption clauses, insurance arrangements 
can be made to apportion loss and risk without undue cost to those 
insuring. However, it is recognized that there may exist 
circumstances where the terms of a commercial contract can bear 
unfairly upon another party. Such an instance was provided where 
a government instrumentality imposed terms on a contractor through 
a standard form contract; in the High Court's decision South 
Australian Railways Commissioner v. Egan, Menzies J observed: 
"The contract is so outrageous that it is surprising that 
any contractor would undertake work for the Railways 
Commissioner upon its terms. 	It is, of course, a 
contract to which the doctrine of contra preferentem 
applies. The employment of such a contract tempts 
judges to go outside their function and attempt to 
relieve against the harshness of, rather than give 
effect to, what has been agreed by the parties. Courts 
search for justice but it is justice according to the lily; 
it is still true that hard cases tend to make bad law. 
The Peden Report and Aftermath 
The Peden Report (1976) which prepared the ground for the 
enactment of the New South Wales Contracts Review Act 1980 , took 
note of the argument that all unconscionable contracts should be 
open to review as to do otherwise would introduce an undesirable 
and confusing division in the law. On the other hand, the point• 
31. D.Yates Exclusion Clauses Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edition 
(1982), at p.277. Although the comment cited is made on the basis 
of applying s.2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code to consumer 
agreements in English contract law, the distinction between the two 
criteria are adopted for this argument. 
32. (1973) 47 A.L.J.R. 140, at p.141. 
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was taken that the great majority of ordinary commercial transactions 
which were not oppressive should be unaffected by the uncertainty 
of discretionary judicial powers. Although a submission was made by 
the Australian Federation of Contractors on allegedly one-sided 
contractual terms laid down by Government Departments and 
Authorities in their general conditions of contract and tender, the 
arguments of the Federation were felt to involve issues of competition 
and public interest under the Trade Practices Act rather than those 
of harshness and unconscionability. The position of partnerships 
and small proprietory companies, on the other hand, were regarded 
in this context as similar to that of an individual consumer. Large 
corporations and government bodies, by contrast, would be relatively 
sophisticated in commercial matters and have easily accessible legal 
advice. 
The Peden Report came down in favour of striking a balance 
between provisions covering all transactions and limiting them to 
consumer transactions only. This could be done by: 
(a) not excluding any class of contract from review; 
(b) precluding any public corporation or its 
subsidiary, government department or 
instrumentality from obtaining relief under the 
provision; 
(c) producing a greater degree of certainty and 
efficacy in the test for determining the types of 
contract requiring review by specifying factors 
which, to the extent they are relevant to the 
circumstances, should be taken into account in 
making such determinations. 	These should 
include "the commercial or other setting, purpose 
and effect of the contract" and "whether or not 
and when independent legal advice was obtained 
by the party seeking relief". 
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The Contract Review Act 1980  
The Contracts Review Act 1980 sets out at s9(2) twelve factors that 
require consideration by the courts in determining the issue of 
unconscionability. They are: 
"(a) 	whether or not there was any material inequality 
in bargaining power between the parties to the 
contract; 
(b) 	whether or• not prior to or at the time the 
contract was made its provisions were the 
subject of negotiation; 
(c) 	whether or not it was reasonably practicable for 
the party seeking relief under this Act to 
negotiate for the alteration of or to reject any of - 
the provisions of the contract; 
(d) 	whether or not any provisions of the contract 
impose conditions which are unreasonably 
difficult to comply with or not reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the legitimate 
interests of any party to the contract; 
(e) 	whether or not - 
(i) any party to the contract (other than a 
corporation) was not reasonably able to 
protect his interests; or 
(ii) any person who represented any of the 
parties to the contract was not reasonably 
able to protect the interests of any party 
whom he represented, because of his age 
or the state of his physical or mental 
capacity; 
(f) 	the relative economic circumstances, educational 
background and literacy of - 
(i) the parties to the contract (other than a 
corporation); and 
(ii) any person who represented any of the 
parties to the contract; 
(g) 	where the contract is wholly or partly in 
writing, the physical form of the contract, and 
the intelligibility of the language in which it is 
expressed; 
(h) 	whether or not and when independent legal or 
other expert advice was obtained by the party 
seeking relief under this Act; 
(i) 	the extent (if any) to which the provisions of 
the contract and their legal and practical effect 
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were accurately explained by any person to the 
party seeking relief under this Act, and whether 
or not that party understood the provisions and 
their effect; 
(j) 	whether any undue influence, unfair pressure or 
unfair tactics were exerted on or used against 
the party seeking relief under this Act - 
(I) 	by any other party to the contract; 
(ii) by any person acting or appearing or 
purporting to act for or on behalf of any 
other party to the contract; or 
(iii) by any person to the knowledge (at the 
time the contract was made) or any other 
party to the contract or of any person 
acting or appearing or purporting to act 
for or on behalf of any other party to the 
contract; 
(k) 	the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in 
relation to similar contracts or courses of dealing 
to which any of them has been a party; and 
(I) 
	
	the commercial or othg.f setting, purpose and 
effect of the contract". 
Litigation under the Contracts Review Act 
In Beaumont v. Helvetic Investment Corporation Pty Ltd 34 
Lusher J., in the New South Wales Supreme Court, indicated that 
the provisions of the Contract Review Act could not be raised by 
33. For comment on these factors see J.R.Peden The Law of 
Unjust Contracts Butterworths (1982), at pp.123-140 and A.L.Terry 
'Unconscionable Contracts in New South Wales : The Contracts 
Review Act 1980.' (1982) 5 A.B.L.R. 311, at pp.336-349. 	For 
comment on cases under the Act 1980 : W. Guild 'A Shield. or A 
Sword?' (1983) 21 Law Soc. J-TIN.S.W.) 48;IThe Contracts Review 
Act 1980 (N.S.W.) Scotching Beaumont, and other Developments' 
(1983) 21 Law Soc.J. (N.S.W.) 304. A Green Paper, The Trade  
Practices Act Proposals for Change  Canberra (1984), which is 
discussed later, proposes amendment of the Trade Practices Act  
under an exposure draft Trade Practices Amendment Bill. Clause 20 
of the Bill would insert a new provision, s.52A, prohibiting 
corporations, in trade or commerce, from making or varying 
unconscionable contracts on engaging in unconscionable conduct in 
relation to contracts. 
34. (1982) Australian Sales and Credit Reporter (subsequently 
referred to as A.S.C.) para. 55-194. See W. Guild 'The Contracts 
Review Act 1980 : A Shield or a Sword?' (1983) 21 Law 
Soc.J.  (N.S.W. ) 48. 
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35. In his Honour's view the Act way of a defence to an action 
could only be raised by way of a substantive application in 
proceedings arising out of contract.
36 
However, this view was 
not accepted by Rogers J. in Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney Ltd. v. W.W.& C.A. Pollard 37 in which he said : 
"In my respectful view, insofar as Lusher J. could be 
taken to be suggesting that the Act could not be relied 
upon and relief could not be sought by way of defence 
to an action on the contract claincid to be unjust, that 
approach should not be followed."'' 
In Pollard's, case the bank on several occasions during 1978 
advanced moneys by way of a bridging loan to the first defendant, 
who was carrying on a business under the name of Sportair 
Avaition, for the purchase of aircraft. In the same year, the first 
defendant also successfully applied to the plaintiff for a bill 
acceptance discount facility, in the sum of $65,000 for the acquisition 
of two aeroplanes. On 18 July 1979 the first defendant applied for 
further advances on behalf of "Warwick Pollard Holdings Pty Ltd 
trading as Sportair Aviation". Five days later the application was 
approved with an overdraft limit of $40,000 to be secured by 
guarantees of the first and second defendants. Both defendants 
made application to the plaintiff on 20 October 1980 for a personal 
loan of $55,000. The occupation of each was shown as a director of 
Sportair Aviation. The application was approved and on 29 October 
1980 the amount of the loan was credited as follows : $45,016.83, at 
the defendants' request, to an account held by the plaintiff with 
"Warwick Pollard Holdings Pty Limited trading as Sportair Aviation"; 
$9,157.17 to the defendants' personal account, the balance ($826) 
being paid in ancillary expenses. 
35. A.S.C. para. 55-194, at pp.56, 846- 56,847. 
36. Ibid. 
37. (1983) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 74. 
38. Ibid., at p.77. 
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The bank subsequently sued the defendants for $59,777.81, 
being moneys advanced to the latter by way of personal loan and 
interest payable thereon. The defendants denied that they were 
indebted to the bank. 
The bank sought an order on 11 October 1982 that the 
defence be struck out and, on the same day, the defendants filed an 
amended defence, claiming inter alia that they had not received any 
loan moneys from the plaintiff and had no knowledge as to whether 
the loan moneys were credited to their personal account and further, 
or in the alternative, that they did not authorise the plaintiff to 
distribute the loan moneys. 
The amended defence raised against the bank's claim was as 
follows: - 
(a) there was a material inequality in bargaining power 
between the defendants and the plaintiff arising, inter 
a I ia , 	from the economic circumstances of the 
defendants. 
(b) Prior to the alleged contract of loan, its provisions 
were not the subject of negotiation between the 
defendants arid the plaintiff. 
(c) It was not reasonably practical for the defendants to 
negotiate any alteration of or to reject any of the 
provisions of the alleged contract of loan. 
(d) Unfair pressure and unfair tactics were exerted on the 
defendants by the plaintiff, viz, the defendants 
overdraft account was cancelled. 
The defendants then proceeded to file a cross-claim, seeking 
repayment of $16,534.44 which they claimed to have paid, presumably 
as partial repayment of the loan which they now denied existed. 39 
39. 	Rogers J. expressly assumed this in his judgment : (1983) 1 
N.S.W.L.R. 714, at p.76. 
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On 25 January 1983, these cross-claimants amended their cross-claim 
seeking relief pursuant to the New South Wales Contracts Review Act 
1980 (NSW), that any loan found to exist was void and, 
alternatively, an order varying the loan (if found to exist) by virtue 
of s.7. 
Counsel for the bank primarily submitted that on the•
authority of Beaumont's case
40 
a substantive application for relief 
was required from the applicant and that the provisions of the act 
would not be raised by way of defence. Lusher J. in Beaumont's  
case had based his approach upon his interpretation of s.11 of the 
Act which provides : 
"(1) 	The Court may exercise its powers under this Act in 
relation to a contract on application made to it in accordance 
with rules of court, whether in : 
(a) proceedings commenced under subsection (2) in 
relation to the contract; or 
(b) other proceedings arising out of or in relation to the 
contract. 
(2) 	Proceedings may be commended in the Court for the 
purpose of obtaining relief under this Act in relation to a 
contract." 
Considering the identical section, Rogers J. was equally 
convinced that Lusher J.'s approach should not be followed.
41
. In 
so deciding, his Honour found guidance from similar provisions 
contained in ss 30 and 30A of the Money Lending Act 1941 (NSW). 
The first of these sections gives the Court power to re-open money 
lending transactions which are found to be harsh or unconscionable; 
the second gives the Court power to validate transactions which 
would otherwise be unenforceable by reason of non-compliance with 
provisions of the Money Lending Act. Rogers J., in referring to 
40. (1982) A.S.C. Para. 55-194. 
41. (1983) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 7 14, at p.77. 
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Castles v. Freidmann 42 indicated that s.30 of the New South Wales 
Money Lending Act (1941) 43 could be relied upon by way of defence 
to an action to recover the principal sum lent plus interest. 
Rogers J. determined that the Contracts Review Act was 
properly pleaded in the amended defence. It is submitted that his 
Honour correctly refused to follow the Beaumont decision. The 
relevant provisions in the Money Lending Act 1941 are similar to 
those contained in the Contracts Review Act. Accordingly, while it 
was perfectly open to a defendant in an action to institute separate 
proceedings claiming relief under the Contracts Review Act it would 
appear that it is not imperative that he should do so, but rather he 
could rely upon the provisions of the Act as a defence. 
Counsel for the bank in Pollard's case, also argued that, by 
virtue of s.6(2) of the Contracts Review Act, the transaction in the 
instant case fell outside the Act's ambit. This sub-section excludes 
the Act's operation if the transaction was entered into the course of 
or for the purpose of a trade, business or profession carried on by 
a borrower. The plaintiff argued that the defendants carried on the 
business or aircraft sales and, alternatively, that their business was 
controlling the corporate entity of Warwick Pollard Holdings Pty Ltd. 
On this matter his Honour was far from satisfied, in terms of proof, 
with the plaintiff's claim. Refusing, in his own words, to 
", speculate" his Honour found no evidence that the defendants were 
carrying on business in their personal capacty. 44 Indeed, the 
available evidence left open the very real possibility that the 
defendants borrowed in their personal capacity and then lent it to 
42, 	(1910) 11 C.L.R. 580; citing also Abraham v. Dimmock [1915] 
1 K.B. 662; Harrison v. Gremlyn Holdings Pty Ltd. (1961) 78 W.N. 
(N.S.W.) 711 
43. Since repealed; Moneylending Repeal Act 1981 (N.S.W.) 
44. (1983) A.S.C. Para 55-244, at p.56,239. (1983) 1 N.S.W. 
L.R. 74, at pp.79-80. 
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the abovementioned corporate entty.
45 
The approach of Rogers J. in not following Beaumont's case 
should be supported in that his judgment provides a less restrictive 
interpretation of the procedural operation of the Contracts Review  
Act, but the matter has yet to be authoritively decided judicially. 
By contrast, the case of Partyka v. Wilkie46 dealt with the 
reasonable clear issue of relief available from the court under the 
Contracts Review Act. 
In the Partyka case, the plaintiff, a Polish immigrant who had 
been in Australia little over a year noticed an advertisement in The 
Sydney Morning Herald on 7 July 1982 as follows : "Self-employment 
builder, painter, landscaper, handyman etc. Self-employed position 
in California. Free air tickets and accom. Ph. 29 1563". 
Upon meeting the persons who placed that advertisement - 
who represented themselves as Andy and Eva - the plaintiff was 
subsequently introduced to the defendant Wilkie. Andy told the 
plaintiff that if he wanted the job, as a tiler at a motel in California 
at $300 per week, he would first have to invest $6,900 in that motel. 
having only $6,600 the plaintiff procured a bank cheque in the 
defendant's favour for that amount and arranged that he would pay 
the balance form his first payment as a tiler in California. The 
plaintiff was then asked by the defendant to sign a document which, 
according to the former, he read and signed but did not 
understand. The document purported to be a declaration of trust 
by the defendant, the trust property being a 1% share in the motel. 
The beneficiary was given the right to have his title to the trust 
45. Rogers J. dismissed the bank's motion for summary judgement 
but made no orders as to cost. 
46. (1982) A.S.C. Para. 55-213. 
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property transferred, which Needham J. presumed was to himself. 
The trustee's obligation was to hold title to the trust property. 
On 14 July 1982 the plaintiff's solicitor wrote to the defendant 
requesting repayment of $6,600 to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought 
relief under s.7 of the Act which provides that where the Court 
finds a contract or a provision in a contract to have been unjust in 
the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made,' 
the Court may, inter alia if it considers it just to do so and for the 
purpose of avoiding as far as practicable an unjust consequence or 
result, declare the contract void in whole or in part. 
The plaintiff's argument was that the contract was unjust 
principally in the fact that, in answering the advertisement for work 
in California, he was met with a request to pay $6,900. 
Accordingly, the argument proceeded, the accommodation and air 
tickets, as advertised, were not free. Needham J. believed that in 
judging this matter one had to take into account the plaintiff's 
limited knowledge of English in order to gauge the justice of 
requiring him to pay over such a considerable sum especially when : 
"One would think any realistic person would become suspicious when 
seeing the offer being made."
47 
Upholding the plaintiff's submission, Needham J. declared 
under s.7(1) of the Act that the contract was void and ordered 
under s.8 of the Act and Schedule 1., that the defendant repay' to 
the plaintiff the sum of $6,600 with interest calculated at 10%, per 
annum from the date of payment until the date of his Honour's 
order. The defendant was also ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs 
of the proceedings. 
47. 	Ibid., at p.57,004. 
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In Cain v. Layf i eld  14 8 the defendant denied the validity of a 
contract for the sale of land pleading, inter alia, sale at gross 
undervalue, inequality of bargaining power, lack of independent 
advice and relief under the Contract Review Act 1980, s.7(1). In 
dealing with the case at issue Rath J. in the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales referred to the elements of Lord Denning's test of an 
unconscionable bargain in Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy
49 . Rath J. 
conceded the plaintiff had no independent advice, but was of the 
view that it was questionable as to whether this would have provided 
any useful guidance, having regard to the evidence as to the value 
of his land. The terms of the contract were not unfair, neither was 
the consideration grossly inadequate; there were no undue influences 
or pressures brought to bear on the defendants by the plaintiff or 
Mr Cain. Accordingly, the transaction was held to be not 
unconscionable according to the principles of equity. 
The defence based on the Contracts Review Act 1980 was then 
examined. Section 9(1) provides that, in determining whether a 
contract in unjust in the circumstances relating to the contract at 
the time it was made, the court shall have regard to the public 
interest and to all the circumstances of the case. The guidelines for 
the court, to the extent they are relevant are included in 
s.9(2)(a)-(l). The defence under para. (a) (inequality of 
bargaining power), had previously been rejected; there were no 
terms of the contract of an unusual kind or contrary to the interests 
of the defendant. Thus there was no valid defence under para.(d), 
"provisions unreasonably difficult to comply with or not reasonably 
necessary for the protection of any party to the contract". There 
was no evidence that, if the contract was at a gross undervalue, 
48. [1983-84] A.N.Z. Conv.R. 180. 
49. (1975) 1 Q.B. 326; see supra. 
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which Rath J. held was not the case, that this fact was known to 
the relevant party. There was no particular difficulty in the special 
conditions concerning the date of settlement. Therefore the defence 
failed under para.(g), S.7(1) and the physical form of the contract 
and the intelligibility of the language in which it is expressed. 
Section 9(2) is not exhaustive. 	It was a question for the 
court whether the contract was unjust in the circumstances relating 
to the contract at the time it was made. There was, in Rath J.'s 
view, no evidence of any circumstances which seemed to support a 
finding of injustice, however broadly the definition was interpreted. 
Accordingly there was no basis for the court to exercise its power 
under s.7 of the Act, and the cross claim was consequently 
dismissed. 
It would appear from the litigation under the Contracts  
Review Act that the courts are capable of exercising their discretion 
in applying the statutory criteria to cases before them. " 
A Critique of the Contracts Review Act 
The Contracts Review Act 1980 departs from the Peden Report 
recommendations in one important respect. The draft Bill on 
introduction in the New South Wales Parliament in December 1979 
received hostile reaction primarily because it sought to cover 
commercial transactions. As a result of this lobbying, essentially by 
the larger corporations, the Act, as passed, does not provide for 
relief to be given to a person in relation to a contract entered into 
in the course of or for the purpose of a trade, business or 
profession. An exception is made in the case of a person carrying 
50. 	For a recent case see Toscana v. Holland Securities 1 March 
1985 Equity Division (New South Wales) 3588/85. See also A.C.L.D. 
119851 35.114, 35.283. 
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on or proposing to carry on an undertaking wholly or principally in 
New South Wales which includes, (but is not limited to) an 
agricultural, pastoral, horticultural, or viticultural undertaking • 51 
This section clearly represents an important break with the policy of 
the Peden Report and the 1979 draft Bill. Obviously representations 
made by a part of the business community had this effect. By the 
same token, the agricultural lobby in the State was sufficiently 
influential in securing that the terms of the Act covered farmers in 
general.
52 To the extent that the section represented a compromise, 
it is clear that the small businessman (aside from the category 
provided for) who finds himself confronted by a standard form 
contract the terms of which are clearly unequally balanced in favour 
of the presenter is still unprotected. 
At the time when the draft Contracts Review Bill 1979 was 
about to be considered by the New South Wales Parliament the South 
Australian Parliament was dealing with its own draft Contract Review  
Bill. This Bill subsequently lapsed following a resolution by the 
Legislative Council of South Australia referring it to the Law Reform 
Committee of South Australia for its report and recommendations. 
The Law Reform Committee (subsequently referred to as the 
'Committee') duly published its Report. 53 The Bill as passed by the 
51. Contracts Review Act s6(2). 
52. For instances of successful farm lobbies in Canada to 
secure seller's obligations relating to quality and fitness of goods 
see Farm Implement Act 1970 (Alberta) Agricultural Implements 
Act 1968 (Saskatchewan) Farm Machinery and Equipment .ct 1968 
TPTince Edward Island). Restriction of relief available under the 
Contracts Review Act to a narrow class of reviewable contracts is 
regretted by A. L. Terry (1982 ) 5 A. B . L. R . 311, at p.321 ( see 
note 63 supra) who also criticises—tTie leg islation as bringing 
about an arbitrary and unnecessary division in the law of 
contracts. 
53. Forty Third Report of the Law Reform Committee of South  
Australia Relating to Proposed Contracts Review Legislation, 
Parliamentary Paper 160; subsequently referred to as the Forty 
Third Report, laid before the Legislative Council, 14 Novem
b 
er 
1978. The concern of the Council was principally with the effect 
of the proposed Bill on foreign contracts. 
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House of Assembly applied to all contracts which were subject to the 
law of South Australia and contained detailed criteria for determining 
whether a contract was unjust.
54 
The Committee made the 
supposition that since the Bill had passed the House of Assembly 
following a report of a select committee of the House and given the 
terms of resolution of reference by the Legislative Council the 
objects of the Bill were acceptable to both Houses. The Committee 
stated: 
• "... the law should be altered to enable the courts to 
reform contracts which are unjust and to modify the 
application to particular situations of unjust contractual 
terms so as to avoid the injustice which would otherwise 
ensue. Judges in the past have done their best to 
avoid or at any rate mitigate the harsh consequences of 
unjust contracts and have resorted to interpretations 
and distinctions which, we fear, at times have been 
little better than subterfuges in order to avert 
injustice. That judges should feel impelled to resort to 
such devices is no credit to the law. All too often, in 
spite of all efforts, courts have been compelled by 
existing law to enforce contracts in the knowledge that 
the result was manifest injustice. In our view this is a 
reproach to the law and ought to be remedied. We 
have considered the difficulties and arguments which 
have been raised against legislation of this kind. The 
acceptance of the objects of the Bill by both Houses of 
Parliament makes it unnecessary for us to canvass the 
arguments. We content ourselves with stating that we 
have considered the arguments that legislation of this 
kind may create uncertainty as to whether apparently 
binding contracts will be enforceable, and that such 
legislation may be used by the unscrupulous as the 
basis of litigation in order to delay the enforcement of 
obligations against them, but that we cannot regard 
those arguments as decisive. The same arguments 
could be raised in varying degrees against many of the 
existing rules of the Law of contract including those 
relating to mistake, misrepresentation, undue influence 
and, in certain areas, relief against harsh or 
unconscionable contracts. 	All rules which protect 
contracting parties against injustice may produce some 
uncertainty and ryr be used unscrupulously for 
purposes of delay". 
54. Contracts Review Bill 1978 (South Australia) c1.8. 
55. Forty Third Report, at p.1. 
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The Committee56  was particularly impressed by the experience of the 
United States with UCC s2-302. In the view of the Committee it had 
gathered from the literature that loss of confidence of businessmen 
and others in the binding force of contracts predicted by some as a 
consequence of the enactment of s2-302 had not occurred. Nor was 
there anything in the literature, according •to the Committee, to 
suggest that abuse of s2-302 in order to delay enforcement of 
contracts was greater than the abuse of other rules of law for that 
dishonest purpose.
57 
The approach of the South Australian Law Reform Committee 
in the comments selected above is in marked contrast to other views 
expressed concerning the desirability of controlling the terms of 
inter-business contracts.
58 In putting forward the view that 
unconscionable contract legislation such as the Contracts Review Act 
should be confined primarily to consumer contracts Professor Peden 
has advanced the following reasons: 
1. There was little evidence of unequal bargaining 
power leading to one-sided unconscionable terms 
between large corporations or government 
instrumentalities; 
2. Small 	businesses 	(including 	sole 	traders, 
partnerships or proprietary companies) are likely 
to require protection 	because 	they 	lack 
sophistication in commercial matters and ready 
access to legal advice. This is less likely to be 
the case with large corporations; 
56. The Committee consisted of King and . White J.J., Howard 
Zelling (now Zelling J.), J.F. Keeler, B.C. Cox and D.W. Bollen. 
D.F. Wicks produced a minority report which argued that the 
proposed Bill did not, "strike a reasonable balance between the need 
for justice and the need for certainty". 
57. Forty Third Report, at p.4. 
58. Note the approach of the draft ACT Ordinance on Harsh  
and Unconscionable Contracts (1976) and the Trade Practices Act  
Review Committee (Swanson Report)  (1976), at para's 9.56-9.62. 
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3. 	There is consequently a clear distinction to be 
made between purely commercial transactions 
where freedom of contract remains meaningful 
and dealings with consumers and wit business 
here greater protection is required. 
On the first point, it can be argued that although the standard form 
contract can be justified in modern commercial practice on grounds of 
reduction of transaction costs alone 60  it represents, in contrast with 
the contracting processes associated with traditional contract law, a 
unilateral imposition of completely generalized terms. Such contracts 
negate the assumption of freedom of contract which is supposed to 
remain meaningful within commercial transactions. 61 The UCC, both 
in its text and Official Comments, as earlier discussed, indicates a 
special awareness of the problems involved in standard form 
contracting. The Second Restatement of Contracts  specifically 
covers standard form contracts. By it a person is presumed to have 
adopted his agreement to it, and has reason to believe that the form 
in question is used to frame conditions governing the performance of 
similar agreements. 62 A party agreeing to the form is allowed to 
escape the application of one or more questionable clauses. He must 
show that the other party to the form had reason to believe that 
something in the form would prompt the assenting party to withhold 
59. Peden Unjust Contracts Butterworths (1982), at pp.84-85. 
60. See M.J. Trebilcock 'The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining 
Power in the Law of Contract: Post Benthamite Economics in the 
House of Lords' 26 U Toronto L J 359 (1976), at p. 364; G.Gluck 
Standard Form Contracts : The Contract Theory Reconsidered (1979) 
28 1.C.L.Q. 72. 
61. R.Dugan 'Standardized Form Contracts. An Introduction' 24 
Wayne L.R. 1307 (1978), at p.1320. 
62. Restatement (Second) of Contracts para. 237(1) (1973). 
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his consent. 63 
The second and third points put forward by Professor Peden 
for confining unconscionable contracts legislation primarily to 
consumer contracts make a distinction between small businesses which 
may need protection and large businesses which do not. Already the 
Contracts Review Act contains two anomalies. First, by virtue of s5 
the Act binds the Crown in all its capacities. Egan's case has 
already been cited as an instance where the Crown and its 
instrumentalities have imposed unjust terms in standard form 
contracts on weaker parties.
64  Section 5 will not remedy situations 
akin to Egan's case and the majority of contracts between businesses 
and the Crown in New South Wales will be unaffected. Excluded 
from s.5 will be a range of businesses such as from small builders to 
large construction companies. 
This is due to the second anomoly; s6(2) does not provide for 
relief to be given to a person who entered into the contract in the 
course of or for the purpose of a trade, business or profession 
other than a farming undertaking (or strata title and home unit 
corporation).
65 It appears inconsistent on policy grounds to protect 
farmers and, at the same time, leave small businesses as such 
outside the scope of the legislation. If, despite a desire by the New 
South Wales government to give relief to small businesses, this aim 
was defeated by an inability to find a workable definition of small 
business 
66 then the approach of the defunct South Australian 
63. Ibid., at para. 237(3). 
64. (1973) 47 A.L.J.R. 140; J.R.Peden Unjust Contracts (1982), 
at p.113. Note earlier evidence given by the Australian Federation 
of Construction Contractors in the Peden Report. See also Bright J. 
'Contracts of Adhesion and Exemption Clauses' (1967) 41 A.L.J. 261 
and in particular the commentary by the then President iirIET Law 
Council of Australia, H.E.Zelling, at p.272. 
65. Contracts Review Act 1980 (New South Wales) s4(2). 
66. See J.R. Peden Unjust Contracts (1982), at p.115. 
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Contracts Review Bill 1978 would seem to produce a more 
satisfactory result in this matter than the comparable Contracts 
Review Act of New South Wales. 
The view expressed above is confirmed by the proposals 
concerning unconscionable contracts outlined in a Green Paper, 
published by the Federal government in 1984, The Trade 
Practices Act : Proposals for Change.  The Green Paper proposes 
to amend the Trade Practices Act 1974 by adding a new section, 
s52A. This section would prohibit corporations in trade or 
commerce from making or varying unconscionable contracts or 
engaging in conduct in relation to contracts.
67 
 The proposed 
s52A(1), in guidelines set down as to what constitutes 
unconscionable conduct, closely follow those provided by the New 
South Wales Contracts Review Act 1980. However, the proposed 
s52A contains fifteen separate guidelines, as opposed to the 
twelve under the New South Wales Act.
68 
The three additional 
guidelines under the draft s52A are "(e) whether, in the case of 
a contract, any party to a contract, prior to the relevant time, 
failed to disclose information of a material kind to any other party 
to the contract"; "(n) if in the case of a contract for the 
acquisition of goods and services, at the relevant time a contract 
for the acquisition of identical or equivalent goods or services 
could have been made with another supplier, the difference (if 
any) between the price of the identical goods or services that 
would have been payable under the last-mentioned contract and 
the price of the goods or services under the first-menioned 
contract"; "(p) whether, and if so to what extent the contract 
67. Green Paper (1984) Canberra, p.50, cl 20 of the exposure 
draft termed the Trade Practices Amendment Bill  1984, but see 
Postscript infra. 
68. Contracts Review Act 1980 s 9(2). See Postscript infra. 
203 
or proposed contract as a whole favours any party to the contract 
or proposed party to the proposed contract even if no single 
provision of the contract or proposed contract is 
unreasonable. "69 
The proposed new section 52A breaks new ground not only 
in the context of the Trade Practices Act but of Australian law in 
general. If the proposal is given legislative form all contracts 
made by corporations 70 , both with consumers and between 
business, will be subject to tests laid down to judge whether a 
corporation has engaged in unconscionable conduct in relation to a 
contract, or made or varied an unconscionable contract. Clearly 
the Law Council of Australia in 1979 felt no qualms about the 
effect of a section similar to •the proposed s52A. In its 
submission to the Trade Practices Consultative Committee on Small  
Business and the Trade Practices Act the Law Council stated :- 
"Business generally would benefit from a general 
prohibition of harsh, unconscionable or unfair conduct 
which may or may not involve injury to competition or 
abuse of market power. This may 71je achieved by 
reference to such conduct in section 52." 
With the exceptions that the proposed s52A does not use the 
words "harsh" and "unfair" and ties the term "unconscionable" to 
contracts and deals with "conduct" relating to a contract rather than 
delaing with conduct as such, the government's proposals in the 
Green Paper cover the recommendations of the Law Council• of 
Australia. 
69. Draft 52A(2); the remaining guidelines are essentially similar 
to those in s9(2) of the New South Wales Contracts Review Act 1980. 
70. Subject to the exceptions in ss52A(4) and 52A(7) Trade 
Practices Act 1974. 
71. The Trade Practices Consultative Committee on Small Business  
and the Trade Practices Act AGPS Canberra (1980), at p.307. 
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Although the proposed section might be readily accepted by 
consumer groups and small businesses, larger corporations using 
• standard form contract could regard the innovation as creating 
uncertainty. Given that attitude, review and rewriting of standard 
forms will be needed should s52A be made law. One suggestion made 
by the Chairman of the Trade Practices Commission in order to 
obtain a period for such adjustment is that comments on the draft 
Bill in the Green Paper should include a recommendation that the 
commencement date for s52A be put back for a designated period. 
This would permit companies to review their internal policies with 
their legal advisers and for discussion with the Trade Practices 
Commission. 72 
Conclusion  
The bulk of standard form contracts used in inter-business 
transactions with exemption clauses forming an integral part of their 
content, deserve more suitable treatment than to be subjected to 
classical and outmoded concepts of freedom of contract.
73 
Nor is it 
satisfactory to leave their adjudication to. the vicissitudes of the 
doctrine of fundamental breach, albeit tamed to a rule of 
. 	74 
construction. 
The United Kingdom Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 provides 
the most recent instance of statutory control of exemption clauses in 
72. R.M. Bannerman in a paper commenting on the Green Paper, 
Sydney 22 March, Melbourne 23 March, 1984; at p.19. 
73. For a defence against modern attacks on freedom of contract 
see R.A.Epstein 'Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal' 18 J.Law  
Econ. 293 (1975). See Lord Denning's vivid account of the trials 
and torments of freedom of contract in George Mitchell (Chesterhall)  
Ltd v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036, 1043-1045. For 
a general critical review see J.H.Baker 'From Sanctity of Contract to 
Reasonable Expectation?' (1979) 22 Curr.Leg.Prob 17 et seq and see 
the references there cited. 
74. Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd (1980) 1 All 
E.R. s56; see now George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v. Finney Lock  
Seeds Ltd [1981] Lloyd's Rep. 476; [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036. 
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standard form contracts by means of a reasonableness test
75
. This 
statutory test has been invoked with sufficient frequency by the 
English courts to appraise that test's effectiveness in controlling 
exemption clauses in standard form contracts. 
In R.W. Green Ltd. v. Cade Bros. Farm
7 
it was held by the 
Court of 'Appeal to be fair and reasonable for seed potato merchants 
to rely on a limitation clause which limited their liability to the 
contract price of the seed potatoes sold. However, the merchants 
contract required that complaints had to be made within three days 
of delivery. This was held by the court to be unreasonable in 
respect of a defect, such as virus infection, which was not 
discoverable on inspection, within the time allowed by the contract. 
By contrast, George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock  
Seeds Ltd
77 Lord Denning distinguished the R.W. Green case from 
the one before him. In the latter case, the contract terms had been 
evolved over twenty years and the trial judge regarded the 
conditions as a set of trading terms on which both sides were 
content to do business. By contrast, Lord Denning regarded the 
present case as "borderline". The price of the cabbage seed in the 
George Mitchell case was small, but the damages claimed were high. 
The clause was not negotiated between persons of equal bargaining 
power but inserted by the seed merchants in their invoices without 
any negotiation by the farmers. In addition, the buyers had no 
opportunity of finding out if the seed was not cabbage seed while 
the sellers could and should have known this. Such a mistake could 
not have occurred without serious negligence by the seed, merchants 
or their suppliers. As to risk, the buyers were not covered by 
75. Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Schedule 2. 
76. [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602. 
77. [19821 3 W.L.R. 1036, affirmed by the House of Lords, (1983] 
3 W.L.R. 16. 
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insurance and, indeed, appropriate cover was not available. By 
contrast, it was possible for the seedsmen to insure against this risk 
and the cost of the premium would not materially have raised the 
price of the seeds. The protection of the clause for guarding 
against the very rare case, as instant in the present litigation, was 
not reasonably required. In the George Mitchell case Lord Denning 
applied the criteria in the statutory test for judging fairness and 
reasonableness - namely negotiability of the term or terms, equality 
of bargaining power and availability of insurance to cover the risk 
allocated by the exemption clause or clauses. 
In the most recent cases, Stagline Ltd. v. Tyne Shiprepair 
79 Group Ltd
78
, Rees Hough Ltd. v. Redland Reinforced Plastics Ltd  
and Phillips Products Ltd. v. Hyland  80  it could be said that the 
detailed and careful application of the reasonableness test by the 
Court of Appeal in the George Mitchell case was lacking. For 
example, Staughton J.'s observation in the Stagline  81 case, where a 
clause excluding economic loss was held not to be unreasonable, that 
small print and convoluted draftsmanship in the contract at issue 
could have tempted him to hold all the conditions unfair and 
unreasonable82 was contradicted by his own finding that the relative 
bargaining positions of the parties were broadly equal and 
additionally noting that commercial men were less concerned with the 
small print if they could secure a satisfactory guarantee clause. 83 
Another point of criticism of Staughton J.'s judgment is his 
observation (obiter) that when the contract was made between the 
plaintiffs and the defendants the latter were very busy and thus 
78. 119841 2 Lloyd's Rep 211. 
79. Unreported, (1984) 134 N.L.J. 706. 
80. Unreported, The Times December 24 1984. 
81. See note 73 supra. 
82. 119841 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211, at p.222. 
83. Ibid., at p.223. 
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reluctant to make any concession, whereas had they been short of 
work the defendants might have been much more ready to do so. In 
Staughton J.'s view it could not have been Parliament's intention 
that a clause in a shiprepairer's standard terms would be fair and 
reasonable one week - when the yard would be willing to make 
concessions - but unfair , the following week, when the yard was 
busy. 84 No doubt Staughton J. was correct in not taking the issue 
of the level of the defendant's business commitments into account on 
the facts which were available to him. However, his observations, 
although obiter, cannot be taken as representing what is clearly 
expressed in s11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
The other two cases, Rees Hough and Phillips Products85 
raise certain important issues in relation to the reasonableness test. 
In the Rees Hough and Phillips cases the learned judge and the 
Court of Appeal respectively were less well directed in their 
application of the reasonableness test than were the House of Lords in 
George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. " and 
in the approach taken to the construction of exemption clauses in 
standard form contracts by the House of Lords in Photo Production  
Ltd. v. Securicor Ltd. 87 In the Rees Hough case the expertise of 
the contractor was clearly central to the contract and on the 
evidence a breach of s14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 was proved. 
However, the court in Rees Hough did not appear to have addressed 
the issues of equality of bargaining power, the reality of 
negotiations between the parties, including previous dealings, and 
the availability of insurance to cover the risk allocated by the 
84. [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211, at p.223. 
85. (1984) 134 N.L.J. 706; The Times, December 24 1984 
respectively, discussed supra. 
86. 119851 3 W.L.R. 164. 
87. [1980] 2 All E.R. JS6; see Chapter One. 
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exemption clause or clauses. The Court of Appeal in the Phillips 
Products case also seems to have left these matters aside. It is 
regrettable that these two cases indicate a departure from the 
careful and rigorous application of the reasonableness test by the 
Court of Appeal in the George Mitche11 88 case. 
There would appear little doubt that the statutory 
reasonableness test embodied in the United Kingdom Unfair Contract  
Terms Act 1977 will be invoked more frequently by the English 
courts now that the Securicor 89 case has restricted the operation of 
fundamental breach. The similarly worded test in s.68A(3) of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act, by comparison, seems unlikely to 
provide a suitable means of examining commercial bargainings. 
Section 68A(1) itself is a statutory exemption clause 90 (in that it 
limits the liability of a supplier in a commercial contract of $15,000 
or under) and the reasonableness test contained in s68A(3) has 
never been the subject of litigation. Additionally, should the Trade 
Practices Act be amended as proposed, to include a new 
unconscionability section (s52A) the continued existence of a 
separate reasonableness test in the same Act would be anomolous. 
In that situation it can be argued that s68A(3) should be excised. 
In the light of these two facts it can be argued that in order to 
construct a statutory test for the control of exemption clauses in 
inter-business contracts the unreasonableness test should not serve 
as a suitable model for Australian legislation. 
88. [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1036. 
89. [1980] 2 All E.R. 556. 
90. See G.Q. Taperell, R.B. Vermeersh, D.J. Harland Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection 3rd. edition Butterworths (1983), 
para. 1753, for a discussion of s68A see supra. 
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The main distinction between the reasonableness test and the 
concept of unconscionability is that, whereas reasonableness is 
objective, determined by the conduct and attitude expected from a 
reasonable man, unconscionability is a subjective test. A test, or 
tests, of unconscionability, is more flexible than the reasonableness 
test in that unconscionability can take account of the position the 
particular parties in a way that the objective criterion of 
reasonableness cannot. A test of unconscionability allows the . court 
to have regard to the conduct of both parties, not merely the party 
against whom the relief is sought.
91 
The writer endorses the approach of the proposed amending 
s52A to the Trade Practices Act 1974 which would prohibit 
corporations, in trade or commerce, from making or varying 
unconscionable contracts or engaging in unconscionable conduct in 
relation to contracts. The application of the proposed s52A section 
to all contracts, including inter-business contracts, however, raises 
the issue as to whether such a proposal will not lead to uncertainty 
in business transactions. 
It has been noted that the experience of the American courts 
and the commercial community is that s2-302 of the U.C.C. has not 
led to a loss of confidence of businessmen in the finding force of 
contracts nor to uncertainty.
92 The main criticism of s2-302 would 
appear to be the lack of guidelines and its ambiguity. Given the 
relatively small proportion of inter-business contracts that have been 
struck down by the section there appears to be no reason to believe 
that applying unconscionability tests to such contracts in Australia 
would produce a different result. 
91. D. Yates Exclusion Clauses Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edition 
(1982), at p.277. 
92. See J.R. Peden The Law of Unjust Contracts Butterworths 
(1982), at p.47. 
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The main advantage which the proposed amending of s52A to the 
Trade Practices Act (and, by implication s9(2) of the New South 
Wales Contracts Review Act 1980) has over s2-302 is a more precise 
formulation of the criteria of unconscionability. If those provisions, 
as set out in the Green Paper, 93 were applied equally to commercial 
contracts it would seem that abuses existing in inter-business 
transactions could be specifically isolated and remedied. 
93. 	The Trade Practices Act : Proposals for Change Canberra 
(1984), at p.17. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROBLEMS OF TITLE AND 
STATUTORY WARRANTIES 
Introduction  
A seller has no right to sell goods under the Sale of Goods 
Act where he has no title to the goods and can pass none to the 
buyer.
1 
 The problems that stem from this general rule will be dealt 
with in the first half of this chapter by examining the issue of 
transfer of title by a non-owner, the "feeding" of title and the 
position of mercantile agents under the Sale of Goods Act and related 
case law. Voidable title will then be considered with reference to the 
II nemo dat" rule, the Twelfth Report of the English Law Commission 2 
and the recent proposals of the Law Commissions of England and 
Scotland in their Working Paper Sale and Supply of Goods (1983) 3 
concerning title, encumbrances and quiet possession. Specific 
solutions to the issue of voidable title will be illustrated in discussing 
the provisions of the Victorian Chattels Securities Act 1981. In 
conclusion to the topic of title to goods limited title will be dealt with. 
1. Section 36(1) (New South Wales); s27 (Victoria); ss21(2), 
24(1) (Queensland), (South Australia), (Western Australia); s26(2) 
(Tasmania), (A.C.T.); s35 (N.T.); ss33 SGA (1979) (U.K.); see 
K.C.T. Sutton Sale of Goods (1974) Chapter Fourteen; Benjamin Sale 
of Goods (1981) Sweet & Maxwell, at paras 262-265. 
2. Twelfth Report (Transfer of Title to Chattels) (1966) Cmnd. 
2958. 
3. Working Paper No 85 Scot. Law Corn. Consultative Memorandum 
No. 58. 
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The second half of this chapter deals with statutory 
warranties, particularly those relating to supply by manufacturers. 
The first part deals with manufacturer's liability under Division 2A of 
the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974 and the second part 
examines the corresponding State provisions in South Australia, the 
Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales. The third part 
considers the statutory warranties provided by the second-hand motor 
vehicle legislation in particular States. 
(1) 	Problems of Title under the Sale of Goods Act 
(a) 	Introduction  
A seller has no right to sell goods under the Sale of Goods 
Act where he has no title to the goods and can pass none to the 
buyer.
4 
As a general rule this Is expressed in the form that only 
the owner is capable of passing a good title to a buyer - nemo dat  
quod non habet - no one can give what he has not got. No one can 
give a better title than he himself possesses. 5 
The usual application of this rule is to cases where a person, 
obtains possession of the goods or documents of title, to them from 
the owner, disposes of them fraudulently to an innocent third party 
4. See note 1, supra. 
5. See on the proposed modification of the rule Twelfth Report of 
the English Law Reform Committee (1969) Cmnd. 2958, noted K.C.T. 
Sutton Sale of Goods Law Book Co. (1974), at pp.431-433. 
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for value, and then disappearing with the price. Even if the culprit 
is found he may often turn out to be incapable of being sued 
successfully. In addition to the common law exception of sale in 
, market overt, further exceptions to the nemo dat rule have been made 
by statute. 6 As noted by Lord Denning in Bishopsgate Motor Finance 
Corporation v. Transport Brakes Ltd: 
"In the development of our law, two principles have 
striven for mastery. The first is for the protection of 
property; no one can give a better title than he himself 
possesses. The second is for the protection of 
commercial transactions; the person who takes in good 
faith and for value without notice should get a better 
title. The first principle has held sway for a long 
time, but it has been modified by the common Ir itself 
and by statute to meet the needs of our times". 
These exceptions referred to are based on convenience and commercial 
necessity. 
The Sale of Goods Act contains the basic statement of the nemo 
dat rule in s26(1), 8 at the same time it protects the ability of a 
mercantile agent in possession to give good title to an innocent third 
party for value9 as in (s26(2): 
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, where goods are 
sold by a person who is not the owner thereof and who 
does not sell them under the authority or with the 
consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title 
to the goods than the seller had unless the owner of 
the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the 
seller's authority to sell". 
6. See infra. 
7. [1949] 1 K.B. 332, at pp. 336-337. 
8. Section 26(1) SGA (New South Wales); ss26, 27 SGA 
(Victoria); s21 SGA (South Australia), (Western Australia); s46 SGA 
(Queensland); s26 (SGA) (Tasmania), (A.C.T.) s25 SGA (N.T.); s21 
SGA (UK). 
9. Section 26(2) SGA (New South Wales); see note supra. 
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It is also made clear that nothing in the Act is to effect the 
provisions of the Factors (Merchantile Agents) Act 1923 (s26(2)). 10 
The Sale of Goods Act specifically lists, as exceptions to the 
nemo dat rule, sales under voidable title, 11 sales by a seller or buyer 
in possession after sale,
12 sales in market overt, 13 bona fide 
purchases of goods bound by a writ of execution 14 and provision for 
the revesting of stolen property on conviction of the thief. 15 It is 
the first two exceptions - sales under voidable title and sales by a 
seller in possession after sale - that will be examined because these 
provide particular problems. 
10. Factors (Mercantile Agents) Act 1923 (New South Wales); 
Factors Act 1891 (Tasmania); Mercantile Law Act 1936 (South 
Australia); Factors Act 1892 (Queensland) Goods Act 1958 (Pt II) 
(Victoria); Mercantile Law Ordinance 1962 (ACT) Factors Act 1889 
(UK). In Western Australia the English Acts of 1823, 1825, 1842 and 
1877 appear to be in operation but there is no Act based on the 
consolidating English Factors Act of 1889, see K.C.T.Sutton Sale of 
Goods (1974), p.249. 
11. Section 27 SGA (New South Wales), (A.C.T.); s29 SGA 
(Victoria); s23 SGA (South Australia), (Western Australia); s25 SGA 
(Queensland); s28 SGA (Tasmania); s23 SGA (UK). 
12. Section 28 SGA (New South Wales; ss30, 31 SGA (Victoria); 
s25 	SGA 	(South Australia), 	(Western 	Australia), 	s27 	SGA 
(Queensland); s30 SGA (Tasmania); s29 SGA (A.C.T.); s25 SGA 
(UK ). 
13. Not provided for in SGA (New South Wales), (Queensland), 
(A.C.T.), s28 SGA (Victoria); s22 SGA (South Australia), (Western 
Australia); s27 SGA (Tasmania); s26 SGA (N.T.); 522 SGA (UK). 
14. Section 29 SGA (New South Wales); s82 SGA (Victoria); s26 
SGA (South Australia), (Western Australia); s28 SGA (Queensland), 
(N.T.); s31 SGA (Tasmania); s30 SGA (A.C.T.); s26 SGA (UK). 
15. Not provided for in SGA (New South Wales); s83 SGA 
(Victoria); s24 SGA (South Australia), (Western Australia) s26 SGA 
(Queensland); s29 SGA (Tasmania); s28 SGA (A.C.T.); s27 SGA 
(N.T.); s24 SGA (UK). 
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(b) 	Transfer of Title by a Non-Owner  
The owner may be precluded by his conduct from denying the 
seller's authority in a number of ways.
16 He may actually represent 
in so many words, that the seller is the owner of the article or has 
the authority to sell. Again he may, by conduct, allow the seller to 
appear as the owner or have authority to sell. In other words, there 
may be estoppel by representation or by conduct. Linked with the 
doctrine of estoppel are the related doctrines of apparent ownership 
and that of apparent authority arising from the law of agency. 
Sutton regards the concepts as being different aspects of the same 
notion; apparent ownership and authority have regard to the third 
party's relationship with the transaction, whereas estoppel is 
concerned with conduct by the owner of the goods.
17 
The distinction 
may, thus, be of little significance, because the liability of the 
principal may be based both on apparent ownership or authority and 
separately on estoppel. In one respect the distinction is of 
significance in that the general view is that title by estoppel to 
personal property is available only against the true owner and 
individuals who are parties to his representation on which the 
estoppel is based.
18 
Thus, outsiders, such as bona fide purchasers 
for value from the person estopped, are not bound by the estoppel. 
In Eastern Distributors Ltd v. GoIdrung
19  the English Court of 
Appeal did make a distinction between estoppel and apparent 
authority. In that case, A, the owner of a van, entered into a 
scheme with a motor dealer, B, to enable him to finance the purchase 
16. See note 16 supra. 
17. K.C.T.Sutton Sale of Goods Law Book Co. (1974), at p.231. 
18. See Bank of England v. Cutler (1908] 2 KB 208, 234. 
19. [1957] 2 Q.B. 600. Ruled as wrongly decided by the Privy 
Council in Motor Credits (Hire Finance) Ltd v. Pacific Motor Auctions 
Pty Ltd [19651 A.C. 867; see infra. 
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of another vehicle from B. B, abetted by A, pretended to C, a hire 
purchase finance company, that he, B, was the owner of the van and 
sent C documents signed by A whereby he offered to take the van 
and the other vehicle on hire purchase from C. C accepted the offer 
concerning the van but declined the second proposal. Exceeding his 
actual authority from A, B concluded the transaction on this basis. 
B purported to sell the van to C who, then, hired it back to A, A 
believed the whole transaction to have been cancelled and at all times 
remained in possession of the van. A then sold the van to D, from 
whom C sought possession. 
If the van had not been sold by A to D, C could have 
recovered possession either on the basis that A was a party to B's 
representation that B owned the van, or because A had given B 
apparent authority to dispose of the van by signing documents which 
represented that B was the owner. Since B had never been in 
possession of the van C could not raise the statutory provisions. 20 
Complications arose when A sold to the bona fide purchaser for value, 
D was not a party to A's representation he was not estopped as he 
was a purchaser for value without notice. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeal was obliged to fall back on the 
distinction between the doctrines of estoppel and apparent authority. 
In contracts for the sale of goods, the courts had dealt with the 
problem of unauthorized sales on the basis of apparent authority and 
that of mercantile convenience had established that a buyer, who 
bought in good faith from a person who had apparently been given 
the right to dispose of goods by the true owner, acquired a title 
which was good against all the world.
21 
 This concept differed from 
that of "equitable estoppel" in that it transferred a legal title. 
20. See note 10 supra. 
21. [1957] 2 Q.B. 600, at p.606 per Devlin J. 
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Thus, B had been empowered by A to use documents which enabled B 
to represent to C that he was to the owner of the van and had the 
right to sell it. As a result C acquired a good title to the vehicle. 22 
It has been suggested that the above case could have been 
disposed of on the simpler ground that C had B's apparent authority 
to sell, even though B had exceeded that authority.
23 
The decision 
is authority for the proposition, that, in the case of representation of 
apparent ownership or ostensible agency in relation to goods, a bona 
fide purchaser for value from the apparent owner or the ostensible 
agent acquires good title. In the case of an owner of goods 
entrusting possession of them to a dealer with authority to sell, or to 
obtain offers, the owner would normally be estopped from denying the 
dealer's authority to sell if the dealer sold without, or in excess of, 
his authority. But this form of estoppel is now of little practical 
importance as it has been largely superseded by the statutory 
protection given to innocent purchasers under the Factors Acts. 24 
(c) 	Feeding of Title  
A seller who has no title to goods which he purports to sell 
but afterwards acquires a title before the buyer rejects the goods, 
may hold the buyer to the transaction. The buyer is estopped from 
denying the validity of the transaction and the subsequently acquired 
title of the seller goes to "feed" the previously defective title of the 
buyer. This "feeding of title" can be usefully illustrated by 
reference to particular leading cases involving hire purchase 
transactions. 
22. (19571 2 Q.B. 600 per Devlin J., at pp. 606-611. 
23. See P.S.Atiyah The Sale of Goods Pitman (Sixth edition) 1980, 
at p.227. 
24. See P.S.Atiyah ibid., see note 7 supra; ss5, 6 Factors 
(Merchantile Agents) Act 1923 (New South Wales); ss67, •68 Goods Act 
1958 (Victoria); Merchantile Law Act 1936 s4 (South Australia); 
Factors Act 1892 s3 (Queensland); Factors Act 1891 s5 (Tasmania); 
Merchantile Law Ordinance 1962 ss6, 7 (A.C.T.1; s2 Factors Act 1889 
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In a hire purchase agreement, there is an implied condition 
that the owner does, in fact, own the goods.
25 
In Karflex Ltd v. 
Poole
26 
it was held that an implied condition of title required the 
owner to have legal property in the goods at the time of execution of 
the hire purchase agreement. In Mercantile Union Guarantee  
Corporation Ltd v. Wheatley
27  the court, by contrast, held that such 
a condition did not require the owner to have title to the goods at 
the time of execution of the contract, but it would be sufficient if he 
gained it before delivery. In Butterworth v. Kingsway Motors Ltd, 28 
A took delivery of a car under a hire purchase contract dated 
January 3 1951 and purported to sell it to B on August 1 of that year 
under the mistaken belief she had the right to sell it subject to her 
continuing to pay the instalments. B sold to C and C, in turn, sold 
to the defendant, who then sold to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, then, 
after eleven months use of the car, received notice on July 11 1952 
from the original owners, the hire purchase dealers, requiring that 
the car be delivered to them. The plaintiff's solicitors then wrote to 
the defendant's solicitors claiming the return of the whole of the 
purchase price, 4.1,275, which had been paid on July 17 1952. 
About July 25 A paid off the balance of the hire purchase price to 
the original owners. The payment vested the title in the car in A 
and this title went to feed the defective title of the subsequent 
purchasers. The plaintiff then brought an action against the 
defendants for recovery of the purchase price. It was held, 
however, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full purchase 
9, Hire Purchase Act 1959 (Tasmania). 25. Section 
26. [1933] 2 K.B. 251. 
27. [1938] 1 K.B. 490. 
28. [1954] 1 W.L.R. 	1286. 
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price, %1,275, as the defendants were in breach of s12(1)(a). 29 As 
the market had dropped in the meantime the car was worth only 
about A00 on July 17, the date when the plaintiff repudiated the 
contract. The plaintiff was thus enabled by the Act to make a profit 
of /475, which may explain the view of the judge, Pearson J. that 
11 ••• the plaintiff's position was somewhat lacking in merits".
30 
The letter of July 17, 1952, from the plaintiff's solicitors to the 
defendant's soliditors constituted a rescission of the contract of sale 
and on that date the plaintiff was entitled to rescind and recover the 
purchase money from the defendants. The plaintiff was also entitled 
to maintain that he had no claim to possession of the car but a right 
to recover the purchase price from the defendants although when the 
writ was issued the plaintiff was in undisturbed possession of the car 
and there was no adverse claim against him. The hirer, A, having 
completed the payment to the owners in full about July 25, and 
having induced them to relinquish any claim which they had to the 
car, then acquired title to the car. The title acquired by A then 
went to feed the previously defective titles of the subsequent 
purchasers and accordingly, about July 25, the ownership of the car 
vested in the defendants. 
In Patten v. Thomas Motors Pty Ltd, 33 a hirer in possession 
of a motor car under a hire purchase agreement purported to sell it 
to a dealer who resold it to a third party. Thereafter, it changed 
29. Sale of Goods Act (1893) (UK); see now s12(1)(a) SGA 1979 
(UK); s17 SGA (New South Wales); (Tasmania) (A.C.T.); s16 Goods 
Act (Victoria); s12 SGA (South Australia), (Western Australia); s16 
(N.T.). 
30. [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1286, at p.1291. 	Pearson J. left open the 
question as to whether the plaintiff would have succeeded if he had 
not claimed the return of the money . before A paid off the owners. 
31. [1965] N.S.W.R. 1457. 
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hands several times until, eventually, it was bought by the defendant 
and sold to the plaintiff. All the transactions except the initial one 
were bona fide. The hire purchase company repossessed the car, 
but, subsequently, it transpired that, some time after the plaintiff 
had bought the car from the defendant, the hirer had borrowed 
money on the security of the vehicle to pay out the owner under the 
hire purchase agreement. The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
damages for the breach of warranty of title. The essential issue was 
whether the payment by the hirer in discharge of the owner's interest 
under the hire purchase agreement had fed both the contract between 
the hirer and the dealer and the subsequent transactions, so as to 
pass the property in the car from the hirer along the line of 
succession to the plaintiff. 
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
decided that •the hirer acquired title to the car on paying out the 
owner and that this acquisition "fed the estoppel" so that the legal 
estate passed along the chain of succession and vested in the 
plaintiff. Accordingly the plaintiff failed in his action. 32 The Court 
rejected the argument that the doctrine could not apply where a title, 
even a voidable one, had passed and it could not be invoked, as in 
the instant case, where no title at all passed originally from hirer to 
dealer. The Court did, however, place one limitation on the 
doctrine. This was where the purchaser had given notice of the 
rescission of the contract caused by a breach of the implied condition 
as to title as soon as he discovers the breach and before the title is 
perfected by feeding the estoppel. In this case there is no contract 
left to feed as recission has effectively ended it.
33 
32. • The Court relied upon, in support of this view, the cases of 
Butterworth v. Kingsway Motors Ltd (supra), Guthrie v. Motor 
Credits Ltd (1963) 37 A.L.S.R. 167, 168, —WMTeliorn—rilTs7t. Davidson 
[1911] 1 K.B. 463 and Lucas v. Smith [1926] V.L.R. 400. 
33. See Butterworth v. Kingsway Motors Ltd. [1954] 1 W.L.R. 
1286. 
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(d) 	Mercantile Agent and the Buyer or Seller in Possession After 
Sale 
(i) 	Protection of the Mercantile Agent under the Sale of Goods Act  
The Sale of Goods Act, as earlier noted, specifically protects 
the ability of a mercantile agent to give good title to an innocent 
third party for value and nothing in the Sale of Goods Act may affect 
the provisions of the Factors Act. 34 The Act provides as follows: 
"where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the 
owner, in possession of goods or of the documents of 
title to goods, any sale, pledge, or other disposition of 
the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary 
cause of business of a merchantile agent, shall, subject 
to the provisions of this Act, be as valid as if he were 
expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make 
the same; provided that the person taking under the 
disposition acts in good faith, and has not at the time 
of the disposition notice that the person making the 
disposition has not authority to make the same". 
A factor is defined by the Factors Act as: 
H a mercantile agent having in the customary course of 
his business such agent authority to sell goods, or to 
consign goods for the purpose of sale, or tcbuy goods 
or to raise money on the security of goods". 
The mercantile agent will bind the owner where the agent has 
possession of goods or documents of title to goods (such as bills of 
lading) with consent of the owner and pledges, sells, or otherwise 
disposes of such goods in the ordinary course of business, with or 
without the owner's authorization. 36 
34. See notes 9, 10 supra. 
35. Section 3 Factors (Merchantile Agents) Act 1936 (New South 
Wales), Merchantile Law Act 1936 (South Australia), Factors Act 1891 
(Tasmania); s65 Goods Act 1958 Part II (Victoria); s2 Factors Act  
1892 (Queensland); s4 Merchantile Law Ordinance (A.C.T.); sl 
Factors Act  1889 (United Kingdom). On merchantile agents see Benjamin 
Sale of Goods Sweet & Maxwell (1981), at para 491 et seg .; K.C.T.Sutton 
Sale of Goods Law Book Co. (1974), Chapter 15, p.5;iv. -S.Atiyah Sale 
of Goods Pitman, Sixth edition (1980), at pp.235-240. 
36. See ss9, 10 Factors Act 1892 (Queensland), ss11, 12; Factors  
Act 1891 (Tasmania), ss8, 9 Factors Act 1889 (United Kingdom). 
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(ii) 	Validity of Disposition by Mercantile Agent  
The two essential requirements for the disposition to be valid • 
are that the merchantile agent must be in possession of the goods 
with the consent of the owner and, second, that the agent must have 
acted in the ordinary course of business. Each of these will be 
discussed in turn. 
In Folkes v. King 37  a car owner delivered a car to a 
merchantile agent for sale at not less than 575. The agent sold to a 
buyer who purchased it in good faith and without notice of any 
fraud. The agent defaulted on the purchase price and the original 
owner sued to recover the car from the purchaser. The court held 
that as the agent was in possession with the original owner's consent 
the purchaser had good title as against the original owner. Where a 
person is induced to part with goods in circumstances amounting to 
larceny by a trick the buyer will still obtain possession with the 
seller's consent. That will be the case where, under s28 of the Sale 
of Goods Act, a person buys or agrees to buy goods and obtains 
possession of them or documents of title to them and disposes of the 
goods or documents to a bona fide third party. In that case the 
third party will receive a good title. 38 
In Pearson v. Rose & Young 39 the plaintiff delivered his car 
to a , merchantile agent, in order to obtain offers, but with no 
authority to sell it. The agent obtained possession of the registration 
book by a trick in such circumstances that the owner clearly had not 
agreed to parting with possession of it. The agent then sold the car 
as he had intended from the outset. The Court of Appeal held that 
the question as to whether the agent had committed the offence of 
37. [1923] 1 K.B. 283. 
38. SGA (New South Wales); see note 9 supra. 
39. [1951] 1 K.B. 275. 
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4 
larceny by a trick was quite immaterial.
O 
 In each case, the only 
question to be considered was whether the goods were in the agent's 
possession with the consent of the •owner. In the instant case, the 
mercantile agent had possession of the car with the consent of the 
owner, but not of the registration book. The Court further held that 
a sale without a registration book would not have been a sale in the 
ordinary course of business, and, therefore, the defendants were not 
protected by the Factors Act. From the judgments in the Pearson  
case, it appears that Denning L.J. was prepared to hold that "goods" 
for the purpose of the Factors Act, in the present context, referred 
to the car together with its registration book. 41 The basis of the 
decision, arguably, is not that the sale was outside the ordinary 
course of business of a mercantile agent, but that the agent did not 
have possession of the goods (i.e. the car and the log book) with the 
owner's consent. An alternative interpretation of the decision is that 
•the sale of a car with its log book obtained without the owner's 
consent is a sale outside the ordinary course of business of a 
mercantile agent.
42 
In Stadium Finance Ltd v. Robbins 43 this 
alternative view was accepted by the Court of Appeal and the opinion 
of Lord Denning rejected. In the Stadium Finance case the owner of 
a car left it with a dealer for display with a view to sale but as the 
owner wished to deal with the sale himself, he removed the ignition 
key but inadvertently left the log book in the locked glove 
40. 	The Theft Act 1968 (U.K.) has abolished the offence of 
larceny by a trick. In England where goods are stolen or obtained by 
fraud or other wrongful means, the title to that or any other 
property will not be affected by the conviction of the offender, 
despite any contrary enactment (s31(2) Theft Act 1968 (U.K.), 
repealing s24 Sale of Goods Act 1893). On convictionof an offender 
a court can order the restitution of goods to the owner (s28, Theft 
Act 1968). 
417 	Vaisey J. and Somervell L.J. seem to have reached this 
position also; [1951] 1 KB 275, 284, 290, 291. 	See K.C.T.Sutton 
Sale of Goods (1974), at p.266. 
42. See criticism of Pearson's case in note in (1951) 67 L.Q.R. 3. 
43. [1962] 2 Q.B. 664. 
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compartment of the car. The dealer obtained keys, took possession 
of the log book, and sold the car to a finance company. Ormerod 
and Danckwerts L.JJ. regarded "goods" for the purposes of the 
Factors Act as simply including the car, without keys and log book 145 
and they regarded the vehicle as being in possession of the dealer 
with the owner's consent. Willmer L.J. took the contrary view and 
regarded the dealer, whether he was or was not in possession of 
either the key or the log book, as not being in possession of the car 
in his capacity as a mercantile agent. His Lordship saw retention of 
the key by the owner as meaning that the owner retained a power of 
disposa1.
45 
The Court, however, was unanimous that the sale by the 
dealer to the finance company was not in the ordinary course of 
business of a mercantile agent, because the log book did not come 
into the possession with the owner's consent.
46 The Court of Appeal 
appeared to overlook the fact that at the time of the sale to the 
finance company the hirer who took possession of the car, in 
accordance with normal practice, also received an ignition key and 
saw, but did not examine, the registration book produced by the 
dealer; therefore the transaction appeared to be valid.
47 
The 
combined effect of both the Pearson and Stadium Finance cases is to 
limit the protection given to a bona fide purchaser under the Factors  
Act.
48 
(iii) 	Effect of Pearson and Stadium Finance in other Commonwealth 
Jurisdictions  
However, it is doubtful that the Stadium Finance or Pearsons 
44. [1982] 2 Q.B 664, at pp.670, 676. 
45. [1962] 2 Q.B. 664 at p.674. 
46. [1962] 2 Q.B. 644, per Willmer J. at p.675. 
47. See criticism of the decision K.C.T.Sutton Sale of Goods  
(1974) 267; note by J.A.Hornby (1962) 25 M.L.R. 719, 772-723; 
(1962) 78 L.Q.R. 468. 
48. K.C.T.Sutton Sale of Goods Law Book Co. (1974), at p.267. 
225 
decisions would be followed in either Australia or New Zealand. In 
both jurisdictions less importance is attached to the certificate of 
registration. The certificate is not an exact equivalent of the log 
book, in that the certificate of registration is renewed each year and 
does not "run with" the vehicle during its life. In Victoria, New 
South Wales and Western Australia certificates of registration do show 
details relating to title, including particular encumbrances.
49 In 
Canada the case of Durham v. Asser 5° it was decided that the 
English decisions had no application to sales by mercantile agents of a 
motor vehicle without a certificate of registration. 
(iv) 	Effect of the Pacific Motor Auctions Case  
Until 1965, it could be asserted that for a third party to 
obtain good title under s28 of the Sale of Goods Act 51 a seller must 
not be simply in possession of the goods when resold but the seller 
must be in possession as seller, and not in some other capacity, as a 
bailee for example. 52  In that year the Privy Council handed down its 
decision in Pacific Motor Auctions Pty Ltd v. Pacific Motor Credits  
(Hire Finance) Ltd.
53 
There, a motor dealer, A, a finance company 
B, which was the plaintiff, and a third party purchaser, C, which 
was the defendant, (also a car dealer) were involved. The course of 
49. See J.R. Peden 'Title Problems in Relation to Chattels - 
Proposals for a Registration System for Motor Vehicles in Australia' 
(1968) 42 A.L.J. 239. See now Chattels Securities Act 1981 
(Victoria); discussed infra. 
50. (1968) 67 D.L.R. (3d) 574, 583, 584. 
51. Sale of Goods Act 1923 (New South Wales); see note 21; the 
section in the Sale of Goods Act is similar to ss8 and 9 Factors Act 
1889 (UK), ss9 and 10 Factors Act 1892 (Queensland), ss 11 and 12 
The Factors Act 1891 (Tasmania), the words 'or under any agreement 
for sale, pledge or other disposition thereof' being omitted in the 
equivalent section of the Sale of Goods Act. 
52. Staffs Motor Guarantee Ltd v. British Wagon Co Ltd [1934] 2 
KB 305; Eastern Distributors v. Goldring [1957] 2 QB 600. 
53. [1965] AC 867; followed, in Worcester Works Finance Ltd v. 
Cooden Engineering Co Ltd [1971] 3 All E.R. 708 (CA). 
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dealer A's business was for it to purchase cars on its own behalf and 
then offer them to B to finance on a "floor plan" or "display plan" 
arrangement. If the offer were accepted, the property in the 
vehicles passed to finance company B but they remained on display at 
A's premises. All the sales of display plan cars were made by A in 
its own name and an assurance was given to the buyer that A was 
the owner of the car with the knowledge of B. In other words, B 
was a party to A's representation of ownership. A was in debt to C, 
the third party purchaser (the defendant), and C, consequently, 
purchased twenty nine cars from A, which constituted the initial 
debt. It was arranged that the cars would be sold back to A if the 
cheques representing payment were met within a week. C obtained 
from A declarations that C was the sole owner of the vehicles which 
had been sold, but those declarations transpired to be false in 
respect of sixteen of the twenty nine cars which were owned by B 
under the display plan arrangement. Before that transaction, B had 
cancelled A's authority to handle its cars held on the display plan. 
C was unaware of this and further, had acted bona fide throughout. 
When C refused to hand the vehicles over to B an action was 
brought. 
The trial judge in the Supreme Court of New South Wales held 
that the plaintiff B, by it's conduct in clothing A with apparent 
authority or apparent ownership to sell, was estopped from denying 
A's authority to sell. In addition, it was immaterial whether the 
transaction was in the ordinary course of business or not, since the 
limitation applied where the only basis of the apparent authority is 
the possession of goods, and where the Factors Act is applicable; but 
is not an essential requirement for the application of the common law 
principle of estoppel, as had been expounded in Eastern Distributors  
v. Goldring. " 
54. 	(1957] 2 Q.B. 600. 
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In the High Court, the decision was reversed by a majority, 
Taylor and Owen JJ. holding that the case was one involving 
ostensible agency rather than ownership, since the defendant C knew 
that A had obtained "floor plan accommodation" from the plaintiff B, 
and that it was clear that A was dealing in vehicles of which it had 
possession but were not its property. The ostensible agency 
extended no further than authorizing A to sell in the ordinary course 
of business. Hence, there was no estoppel against the plaintiff. 
On appeal to the Privy Council, the Judicial Committee found it 
unnecessary to consider what it termed the "... difficult question of 
estoppel", instead it based its decision to allow the appeal on the 
strict provisions of s28(1) of the Sale of Goods Act. 55 In the High 
Court, the argument that under this subsection C had obtained good 
title to the vehicles as a bona fide purchaser from a seller continuing 
in possession of the goods, had been rejected on the ground that the 
character of A's possession had changed, and it remained in 
possession, not as a seller, but by virtue of its rights as a bailee. 
The Privy Council decided that the interpretation placed on s28(1) in 
Staffs Motor Guarantee Ltd v. British Wagon Co Ltd and Eastern  
Distributors Ltd v. Goldring 56 wrong; ruling that both these 
decisions were wrongly decided in this respect, and that s28(1) 
afforded a complete defence to B's claim. In Staffs Motor Guarantee 
Ltd v. British Wagon Co. Ltd.
57 
A, a- motor vehicle dealer, sold a 
lorry to the defendant finance company which then hired it back to 
A, giving A permission to sub-let the lorry to a would-be purchaser 
on hire purchase. The lorry was not delivered to the finance 
55. (New South Wales); see note 24 supra. 
56. [19341 2 K.B. 305; [1957] 2 Q.B. 600 respectively. 
57. [1934] 2 K.B. 305. 
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company and remained with A. A later sold the lorry to the plaintiff 
finance company, which let it out to B, who took possession of the 
vehicle. When A defaulted under his hire purchase agreement with 
the defendant hire purchase company, the latter repossessed the 
lorry from B and refused to give it up when the plaintiff finance 
company demanded it. The claim by the plaintiffs was based on the 
Factors Act and on s25(1) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893, the 
equivalent of s28(1) of the New South Wales Sale of Goods Act 1923. 
MacKinnon J., in the English High Court, held that where goods had 
been entrusted to a dealer, not as a mercantile agent dealing in those 
goods, but as a hirer and therefore as a bailee, a purchaser from the 
dealer could not rely on the Factors Act to obtain a good title. On 
the facts of the instant case, the purpose of the hiring was not to 
enable the dealer to obtain the goods on terms for his own use, but 
to allow him to "resell" the goods by sub-letting them on hire 
purchase. The claim by the plaintiff under the Sale of Goods Act 
also failed on the ground that, although A, as seller, continued in 
possession after the sale of the lorry to the defendant finance 
company, A's continued possession was not as seller, but as bailee 
under a hire purchase agreement. In Eastern Distributors Ltd. v. 
Goldring 58 the English Court of Appeal were faced with the following 
facts. A was the owner of a van and he wished to buy a car from 
B, a car dealer. At B's suggestion, A authorized B to sell the van 
to a hire purchase finance company, C, to obtain an agreement by C 
to sell the van to A on hire purchase terms and to pay the proceeds 
of the sale to C in paying the deposits on the hire purchase of both 
the van and the car. B's authority to sell the van was limited to 
carrying out together both the sale of the van and the car to C, and 
58. 	[1957] 2 Q.B. 600. 
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B had no authority to carry out one transaction without the other. A 
signed four blank hire purchase documents in respect of each vehicle 
and gave them to B, leaving B to complete them. A sales note in the 
proposal form relating to the van contained a printed statement by 
which B certified that the vehicle was his absolute property. Without 
any further authority from A, B sold the van to the plaintiffs as his 
own and accepted A's hire purchase proposal with respect to the van 
as a genuine hire purchase transaction, but did not implement the 
agreement relating to the car. B subsequently told A that the whole 
of the transaction was cancelled. Shortly afterwards A sold the van, 
which he believed to be his own property to the defendant, D, who 
bought it in good faith and without knowledge of A's dealings with 
the van. A made no payments under the hire purchase agreement. 
The plaintiff, C, terminated the agreement and claimed the van or its 
value from the defendant, D. The Court of Appeal held," inter alia  
that the plaintiff finance company, C, were entitled to recover the 
van from the defendant D, for the following reasons. First, 
although B had no actual authority to sell the van to C, A, by 
providing B with documents that enabled B to represent himself to C 
as entitled to sell the van, had given B apparent authority to sell the 
van and A was precluded (within s21(1) of the English Sale of Goods 
Act 1893
60 ), from denying B's authority to sell. C, therefore, had 
acquired the title to the van which A himself had, and A was left 
with no title to the van that he could pass to D, the defendant. 
Second, s25(1) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893 61 did not 
render the sale to D valid and effective because, if that section were 
to apply, it would be necessary that the seller (whom the court 
59. Lord Devlin delivering the judgment of the court; Staffs Motor 
Guarantee Ltd. v. British Wagon Co Ltd [1934] 2 K.B. 305 followed. 
60. Section 26 S.G.A. (New South Wales). 
61. Section 28 S.G.A. (New South Wales.) 
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assumed to be A and not B for the purposes of s25(1)) should have 
remained in possession as seller. Although the hire purchase 
agreement was unenforceable 2 it was not thereby rendered void and 
was effective to change A's possession, in his character as seller, to 
possession as bailee. 63 
The Privy Council in the Pacific Motor Auctions case 64. , held, 
ruling that both the Staffs Motor Guarantee and the Eastern  
Distributors cases were wrongly decided in respect of s28(1) of the 
New South Wales Sale of Goods Act, that the words "continues .. in 
possession" in s28(1) of the New South Wales Sales of Goods Act 
referred to the continuity of physical possession, irrespective of any 
private agreement between the seller and the first buyer which might 
alter the legal title under which possession was held. Therefore, 
unless there is an actual transfer of physical possession the seller is 
to be treated as continuing in possession and is able to pass title 
under s28(1). Thus, the essential basis for determining whether a 
seller is or was in possession as a seller is whether he has remained 
in physical possession throughout. 56  
(e) 	Voidable Title  
(i) 	The "Nemo Dat" Rule : The Problems Illustrated  
A person who has a voidable title to goods can confer a good 
title to them on a bona fide purchaser for value, providing the 
62. By the terms of s2(2) of the Hire Purchase Act 1938 (now 
repealed). 
63. P.S. Atiyah raises the question as to why the case was not 
disposed of on the simpler ground that B had A's agreement to sell, 
although B, in fact, exceeded that authority; see P.S. Atiyah Sale of 
Goods Seventh Edition (1985) at p.272 on the issue of apparent 
5111fiTrity in the Eastern Distributors case [1957] 2 Q.B. 600 per 
Devlin L.J., at p.606. 
64. [1965] A.C. 867. 
65. The Privy Council approving Mitchell v. Jones (1905) 214 
N.Z.L.R. 932. Contrast the result in-6'WeTM Ertors Ltd v. 
Paramotors Ltd [1962] SASR 1; K.C.T.Sutton Sale of Goods Act, 
(1974) at 237. 
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seller's title has not 4: 5een avoided at the time of sale. Thus s27 of 
the Sale of Goods Act provides: 
"when the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, 
but his title has not been avoided at the time of the 
sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, 
provided he buys them in good faith and without notice 
of the seller;s defect of title". 
The main result •of this section, which embodies a common law 
principle, is that, if a person buys goods by fraudulent means and 
disposes of them before the original seller avoids the contract a buyer 
in good faith from the defrauder will obtain a good title. However, a 
distinction must be made between a contract which may be void for 
mistake and a contract which may be voidable for fraud.
67 
In the 
case of a contract void for mistake, the contract is a nullity in that 
the buyer acquires no title and, consequently, none can be passed to 
an innocent third party.
68 If the contract is voidable for fraud, the 
innocent third party purchaser must ensure that the original seller 
has not rescinded the contract prior to the sale to the third party 
and has, thus restored property in the goods to the original seller.
69 
In Car & Universal Finance Co Ltd v. Caldwell
70  the English Court of 
Appeal held that, in general, the defrauded party could only rescind 
the contract by communicating with the other party to the contract, 
and notifying him of the recission. However, where a defrauder, by 
absconding, made communication with him impracticable, the seller 
could rescind the contract by showing an intention to rescind the 
contract and by taking all possible steps to regain the goods, for 
example, such as informing the police of the loss. The court left 
open the question as to whether the contract would be rescinded 
66. (New South Wales), s25 (Queensland); s29 (Victoria); s28 
(Tasmania); 	s23 	(South Australia), 	(Western Australia); 	s27 
(A.C.T.); s24 (N.T.); s23 (U.K.). 
67. See Lewis v. Averay (19721 1 Q.B. 198. 
68. Ibid. 
69. As in Cundy v. Lindsay (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459. 
70. 119651 1 Q.B. 525. 
232 
where the innocent party's inability to communicate with the defrauder 
was not due to the latter deliberately avoiding contact. The Court 
was agreed that, notwithstanding the general rule that election to 
rescind by the seller must be communicated, seizure of the goods by 
the seller without the buyer's knowledge, but before resale to an 
innocent third party, would effectively end the contract and revert 
the title to the seller. It should be noted that the decision in 
Caldwell's case is of limited practical effect because in the 
circumstances in which it applies the third party will get good title 
under s28 of the Sale of Goods Act.
71 
(ii) 	The "Nemo Dat" Rule: The Twelfth Report of the English Law  
72 Reform Committee (1966)  
In 1963, the English Law Reform Committee was asked to 
consider the modification or supplementation of the nemo dat rule in 
its application to the transfer of chattels in the interests of people 
who were the victims of theft, fraud, or operative mistake. 
The Committee in its Report, Transfer of Title to Chattels  
(1966), rejected the suggestion made in Ingram v. Littlen by Devlin 
L.J. that there should be a system of apportionment of loss between 
the true owner of the goods and an innocent third party purchaser. 
The Committee did propose the repeal of the market overt provision in 
the Sale of Goods Act74 and its replacement by a provision enabling a 
71. New South Wales; see note 12 supra; also Newtons of Wembley  
Ltd v. Williams [1965] 1 Q.B. 560. 
72. Twelfth Report (Transfer of Title to Chattels) (1966) Cmnd. 
2958. 
73. [1961] 1 QB 31, 73; this case was overruled in Lewis v. 
Averay, see note 67 supra. Rejected by the Committee specifically on 
grounds of uncertainty, and procedural difficulties. For comment on 
the Twelfth Report see K.C.T.Sutton Sale of Goods Law Book Co. 
(1974) at pp.431-433. 
74. Section 28 	(Victoria); 	s22 (South Australia), 	(Western 
Australia); s27 (Tasmania); s26 (N .T.); s22 (U.K.). 
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person, including a financier, who purchases goods in good faith and 
without notice of any defect in title by retail or trade premises 75 or 
at public auction, to obtain a good title. The onus of proof of bona 
fides would be on the purchaser, 76 who would not acquire a good 
title "... if he had actual knowledge of any fact or circumstances 
which should have led him to infer the existence of some defect of 
title or to make enquiries which would have revealed the existence of 
such a defect".
77 
Lord Donovan's reservations in the Report on this 
point should be noted. He considered that it would be very hard to 
disprove the buyer's bona fides even where there were doubts at the 
time of the purchase. His Lordship's conclusion was that the 
suggested amendment might well become a cloak for fraud, and 
increase, rather than diminish, the amount of unrecovered stolen 
property.
78 
The Committee envisaged its proposal as covering any 
unauthorized disposal of goods by a trader at trade premises and 
including goods entrusted to him for storage and repair.
79 
So, a 
motor trader with vehicles in his possession, on display plan for the 
purpose of attracting offers to buy or held for storage or repair, 
could give good title on sale to an innocent purchaser, whether or 
not he was in possession of the vehicles as a merchantile agent or 
acted in the ordinary course of business. 
Good title would also be given to an innocent purchaser in this 
situation, whether or not the circumstances gave rise to an estoppel 
75. Defined as premises open to the public at which goods of the 
same or similar description were normally offered for sale by retail in 
the course of business carried on at those premises, but not 
including a street market (as in Newtons of Wembley (see note 71 
supra). 
76. Effectively abrogating the decision in Whiteham Bros v. 
Davison 119111 KB 463. 
77. Twelfth Report par.33, at p.14. 
78. Ibid., at p.18. 
79. Twelfth Report, paras.18, 29, at pp.9, 13. 
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against the owner, or the trader could be shown to be a seller who 
had continued in possession of the goods. For this reason, the 
Committee saw no reason to change the law concerning sale by a 
mercantile agent and that may have been the reason for it not dealing 
with the issue of title by estoppel and for not recommending any 
change in s25 of the Sale of Goods Act" in the light of the Pacific 
Motor Auctions81 decision. 
The Committee proposed that contracts which were void under 
the then existing law on the basis that the owner of the goods was 
deceived or mistaken as to the identity of the person with whom he 
dealt, should be treated as voidable in so far as third parties were 
concerned. Thus, a bona fide third party would acquire good title 
provided he obtained possession before the owner rescinded the initial 
contract of sale. This position may have been reached with the 
decision in Lewis v. Averay. 82 To ensure full protection of the 
innocent purchaser the Committee recommended, effectively nullifying 
the decision in Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v. Caldwell,
83 
that 
notice of recission of a voidable contract ought not to be effective 
unless and until that rescission was communicated to the other 
contracting party. This proposal has been criticized as going too far 
in protecting the bona fide purchaser, as the suggestion has been 
made that a more suitable alternative would be to provide •that a 
purported recission by the seller shall be ineffective, unless the 
purchaser had notice of it, or the seller had recovered possession of 
the goods.
84 
80. Section 28 (New South Wales); see note 12 supra. 
81. (1965) A.C. 867, see supra. 
82. (19721 1 Q.B. 198. 
83. [1965] 1 Q.B. 525. 
84. J.R.Peden 'Title Problems in Relation to Chattels - Proposals 
for a Registration System for Motor Vehicles in Australia' (1968) 42 
A.L.J. 239, at p.242. 
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The Committee also recommended the abrogation of the decision 
in Newtons of Wembley Ltd v. Williams85 in so far that it allowed a 
buyer in possession of the goods with consent of the seller under a 
voidable contract to pass good title to a third party, even after 
effective recission of the voidable contract. The Committee also 
urged amendment of that decision in so far as it related to s25 of the 
Sale of Goods Act86 that the transaction should have the same effect 
" as if" the buyer in possession were a mercantile agent. 
The Committee finally recommended a restriction of the rule in 
Rowland v. Divan. 87 That case laid down that if a seller had no 
right to sell the goods, in breach of the relevant provision of the 
Sale of Goods Act, 88 then there was a total failure of consideration 
and the buyer could recover the purchase price without any set-off 
for depreciation, even though the buyer may have made considerable 
use of the goods, since the buyer did not acquire property in the 
goods. The Committee proposed that the buyer, in any action for 
breach of the implied condition as to title, should recover no more 
than his actual loss, taking into account any benefit he might have 
9 received while the goods were in his possession. 8 	It should be 
noted that a statutory exception to the principle in Rowland v. Divall  
exists under s6(3) of the United Kingdom Torts (Interference with  
Goods) Act 1977. Hence, if proceedings are brought by the buyer 
against the seller for recovery of the purchase price because of 
85. (19651 1 Q.B. 560;  Twelfth Report para.16. 
86. Section 28 (New South Wales) see note 24 supra. 
87. [1923] 2 K.B. 500. 
88. Section 17 (New South Wales), (Tasmania), (A.C.T.); s16 
(Victoria), 	(N.T.); 	s15 	(Queensland); 	s12 	(South Australia), 
(Western Australia). 
89. Thereby preventing recission by the buyer on discovering the 
true situation before the seller was given a chance to rectify the 
situation; see Butterworth v. Kingsway Motors Ltd [1954] 1 W.L.R. 
1286. 
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failure of consideration then, if the seller acted in good faith, an 
allowance is made, where appropriate, for any improvement affected 
by the seller or by any person from whom the seller derived his 
purported "title" to the •goods. The improver must be assumed to 
have improved the goods in the mistaken but honest belief that he 
had good title to them. 90 
(iii) 	Comment on the Committee's Proposals  
The recommendations of the Committee indicate a general trend 
towards greater protection for innocent buyers by piecemeal 
exceptions to the nemo dat rule. It has been pointed out, in 
criticizing the approach of the Committee, that protecting the titles of 
innocent buyers does not necessarily prevent theft and, further, that 
the nemo dat rule should be retained and not subjected to wholesale 
exceptions, as proposed by the Committee, a consequence which would 
prejudice chattel owners and their insurers. 91 Against this 
contention it may be argued that, in the context where most such 
problems respecting title occur - namely in the sale of motor vehicles 
- the incidence of insurance against the risk of defective or 
non-existent title should more equitably and relatively inexpensively 
be borne by finance companies and dealers. However, the central 
problem would seem to be the provision of a means whereby a buyer 
can satisfy himself simply and inexpensively before purchase that the 
seller's title to a vehicle is unencumbered. 92 This matter ought to be 
considered in the light of recent legislation in Victoria, 93 which is 
90. Sections 6(1), (2) and (4) Torts (Interference With Goods) Act  
1977 (United Kingdom). 	See Benjamin, Sale of Goods (1982) 
para.266. 
91. J.R.Peden 'Title Problems in Relation to Chattels - Proposals 
for a Registration System for Motor Vehicles in Australia' (1968) 42 
A.L.J. 239. 
92. Ibid., at p.244. 	The choice appears to lie between an 
information register and the issue of certificates of title by a central 
registry, see infra. 
93. Chattels Securities Act 1981 (Victoria), infra. 
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dealt with after noting recent proposals in this area by the English 
and Scottish Law Commissions. 
(f) 	Recent Proposals Relating to Title, Encumbrances and Quiet 
Possession  
In its recent Working Paper, Sale and Supply of Goods (1983) 
the English and Scottish Law Commissions made proposals, on the 
basis of consultation, which included reform of the law in the area 
relating to title, encumbrances and quiet possession. 94 
The Law Commission had reached the view in an earlier 
Working Paper published in 1975,  it was unrealistic for the 
courts to take the view that there had been a total failure of 
consideration, as a result of the supplier being in breach of the 
implied condition as to title, where the customer had benefitted 
significantly from the use of the goods for which he contracted. 
One method of solving the problem of the unjust enrichment of 
the customer which the Law Commission had regarded as being 
obvious would be to prevent him from being entitled to terminate the 
contract for breach of the implied term as to title or, at least, to 
94. Working 	Paper No. 	85 Scot. 	Law Corn. 	Consultative 
Memorandum No. 58; see Chapter Three with respect to the Law 
Commission's proposals concerning quality and fitness of goods. 
95. Working Paper No 65 on Pecuniary Restitution on Breach of 
Contract (1975). The Law Commission published a Report (Law. Corn. 
No 121 (1983)) on some of the matters examined in its Working Paper. 
This Report stated that it was thought more appropriate for the 
problem of title to be dealt with in a later consultative document; see 
Report at paras. 1.9 - 1.12. 
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restrict that right by applying the doctrine of acceptance in contracts 
of sale to breaches of that implied term in all contracts of supply. 96 
The Law Commissions, however, rejected this method because 
breaches of implied term were not similar, in their result, to breaches 
of other statutorily implied terms. The innocent party, in the former 
situation, might be sued by the true owner of the goods in 
conversion and might claim the goods from the purchaser who could 
either lose possession or not be able to resell safely. The Law 
Commissions, therefore, recommended provisionally that the statutory 
rules as to acceptance should not apply where there had been any 
breach of the implied term as to title. 97 Accordingly, the Law 
Commissions provisionally recommended that the only way to prevent 
unjust enrichment by a purchaser (either in contracts for sale or hire 
purchase) was to ensure that the customer was not automatically 
entitled to the return of the whole price and that the court should 
take into consideration any significant use or possession of the goods 
which the customer had enjoyed. 98 
In considering alternative ways of reforming the law, the Law 
Commissions had considered various options. In respect of the party 
in breach being given the opportunity to cure his defect in title 
where appropriate the Law Commissions regarded this as a complicated 
solution. Although the right to terminate on breach of title had the 
appearance of inflexibility, it did create certainty. The Law 
Commissions, therefore, provisionally recommended that for, breach of 
the implied term as to title, the innocent party should be entitled to 
96. Working Paper No. 85, at para 6.6. 
97. Ibid. 
98. Working Paper No. 85, at para. 6.7. 
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terminate the contract in all cases without first having to give the 
supplier the opportunity to remedy the breach. 99 
The Law Commissions considered the extent of the appropriate 
monetary entitlement of the innocent party once he had lawfully ended 
the contract. In its earlier Working Paper, the Law Commission had 
proposed that after rejection, the innocent party should be entitled to 
have his money refunded, subject to a deduction for use and 
possession of the goods. 1  . There were, however, problems inherent 
in the valuation of use and possession, and the Law Commissions, 
thus regarded it as unsatisfactory to base a detailed test on the 
valuation of use and possession alone. 2 An alternative solution would 
have been to prevent the innocent party from claiming the return of 
his money and to restrict him to a remedy in damages. This would 
mean that, in most cases, the customer would be entitled to the cost 
of a replacement article in addition to damages for consequential 
loss. 3 
Another course of action would be to grant the customer, on 
breach of the contract, an entitlement either to damages or to the 
return of all the moneys paid subject to a deduction for use and 
possession, whichever was the greater amount. 4 This solution had 
been earlier canvassed in the Working Paper as applicable to breach 
of one of the other implied terms in a contract for the supply of 
goods other than sale. 5 
99. 	Working Paper No. 85, at para 6.10. 
1. Working Paper No. 65 (1975), at para 78. 
2. Working Paper No. 85, at pare 6.11. 
3. Ibid., at para 6.12. 
4. Working Paper No. 85, at para 6.13. 
5. Ibid., at paras 5.9 and 5.13. 
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The Law Commissions were of the view that, if the customer 
still had possession of the goods he ought to be entitled to terminate 
the contract only those goods had been were returned, even if they 
were not substantially in the same state as they were when possession 
has passed. Their state would, however, be taken into account in 
assessing damages or valuing the use and possession of the goods. 
In the case of a customer unable to return the goods, he should be 
entitled to terminate the contract only if the reason for that inability 
was that the true owner had repossessed the goods from the 
customer. Where the customer had voluntarily given up the goods 
and repossession was not regained the remedy should be damages 
only.
6 
Overall, the Law Commissions proposed that specific provision 
should be made that, where the supplier was in breach of the implied 
term as to title, the customer should be entitled to terminate the 
contract except where : 
(a) he is in possession of the goods but refuses to restore 
them; 
(b) he is unable to restore the goods for a reason other 
than that the true owner has repossessed them from 
.7 
him. 
If the customer was not entitled to terminate the contract, he 
should, in the view of the Law Commissions, be entitled to claim 
damages.
8 
6. Working Paper No. 85, at para 6.16. 
7. Ibid., at para 6.17. In addition the common law rules as to 
affirmation, waiver and estoppel and personal bar should, in the view 
of the Law Commissions, continue to apply, but s.35 of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 (U.K.) would not (governing acceptance of the goods
by the buyer). For equivalent provision in Australia see s.38 (New 
South Wales); s.42 (Victoria); s.35 (South Australia), (Western 
Australia; 	s.37 	(Queensland), 	(N.T.); 	s.39 	(A.C.T.); 	s.40 
(Tasmania). 
8. Working Paper No. 85, at para 6.17. 
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The Law Commissions also considered the problem, although it 
rarely occurred of where the true owner of the goods had not made a 
claim in conversion, either against the customer or the supplier, at 
the time when the customer rejects the goods. In an extreme case, a 
customer who had had possession of the relevant goods for a 
substantial time, he might be able to recover, perhaps, three 
quarters of the price from the supplier. On the other hand, the 
customer may subsequently be sued in conversion by the true owner 
and the measure of damages be likely to be equal to the price paid 
for the goods. 9 Noting earlier proposals in the 1975 Working 
Paper,
10 
 the Law Commission put forward a solution for consideration 
under which the customer should be given a statutory indemnity 
against the supplier, enabling him to sue the supplier on the 
indemnity when he himself was sued by the true owner. " 
In respect of the existing terms as to encumbrances and quiet 
possession, the Law Commissions noted that these warranties in the 
Sale of Goods Act had excited little litigation. The Working Paper 
had earlier noted the criticism of the concept of warranty on the 
ground that it was undesirable that there should be any category or 
term for the breach of which rejection was never available. This 
criticism was accepted by the Law Commissions which considered that 
it was unsatisfactory that the law should not provide the innocent 
party with the right to terminate the contract, no matter how serious 
the breach. Unless it was specifically provided in the Sale of Goods  
Act itself the Law Commission doubted if a modern court would 
classify any term as one no breach of which gave the right to reject, 
except where the parties had expressly provided. Accordingly, the 
9. Ibid., at para 6.18. 
10. Ibid., Working Paper No. 85, at para 6.20. 
11. Working Paper No. 85, at para 2.32. 
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Law Commissions provisionally recommended that the remedies 
proposed for breach of the implied terms as to description, quality, 
fitness and sample
12 
would be equally appropriate for breach of 
implied terms as to encumbrances and quiet possession.
13 . 
(g) 	Chattels Securities Act 1981 (Victoria)  
An attempted solution to some of the problems posed by the 
nemo dat rule and its exceptions now exists in Victoria as a result of 
the passing of the Chattels Securities Act 1981. Part Ill of the Act 
provides for the registration of security interests in motor vehicies14 
and puts any purchaser of vehicles on constructive notice of the 
contents of that register. A system of registration is created which 
provides for public searches of the register and provides for 
compensation to either a security holder whose interest is 
extinguished or to a purchaser who loses entitlement to a vehicle 
under the Act. The register provides for the registration of names 
of persons who are holders of security interests (s15). Such an 
interest is defined to mean a security for the payment of a debt or 
other obligation consisting of, (a), an interest in goods or, (b), an 
interest in goods under a mortgage, charge, lien, pledge, trust or 
power. The register also provides for public search and the issue of 
a certificate containing particulars of entries in the register. The 
system thus established provides for registration by a security holder 
rather than an alternative method of registration of all vehicles 
through registration of engine number. 15 
12. Ibid., at paras 4.43, 4.59. 
13. Working Paper No. 85, at para 6.23. 
14. The definition used is that of the Motor Car Act 1958 
(Victoria) 'any vehicle propelled by internal combustion'. 
15. Originally recommended by the Molomby Committee, but 
rejected by the Report of the Supplementary Committee as being 
impracticable, recommending the system now in use in Victoria. The 
Victorian System under the Motor Car Act 1959 was favoured by 
J.R.Peden, (see note 91 supra) who, in a 1967 survey found all 
vehicle registration authorities in the States and territories opposed 
to the introduction of a title registration system. 
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The system so created does not seek to provide a government 
guaranteed "certified title" guaranteed by government which could be 
a pre-condition to registration. The registration system set up by the 
Chattels Securities Act 1981 relies upon voluntary registration, with 
no penal sanctions for a failure to register (s16). However, failure 
to register could place a security holder at a considerable 
disadvantage in the event of a claim to ownership by a bona fide 
purchaser for value. An interest in goods held by a mortgagee, a 
lessee, or the owner under a hire purchase contract (ss8-10) will be 
extinguished where a person purchases goods (or purports to do so) 
for value and in good faith and without notice of the interest of the 
mortgagee or lessee. If the purchase is made from a dealer, the 
purchaser is protected from a valid challenge to his title to the goods 
from any security interest registered during the fourteen day period 
prior to the purchase of the vehicle (s23). 
Registration of an interest (under s16) operates as 
constructive notice of the contents of the certificate to a vehicle 
purchaser. Where a purchaser has failed to search the register, that 
will be no defence to the claim of a security holder and the purchaser 
would have no claim for compensation from the Transport Regulation 
Fund (s24). A person is deemed to have notice of a security interest 
in goods in the following circumstances: where the purchaser had 
actual notice of a security interest or other interest or other interest 
entered on the register, or had been put on inquiry as to such 
interest and had deliberately failed to enquire further (s2(3), 
s25(3)). The following will not be regarded as a purchaser for value 
in good faith and for value and without notice: where the purchaser 
is a member of the same household as the seller, where the buyer and 
seller are related corporations, or where either the purchaser or 
seller is a body corporate and the other is a natural person who a 
director officer of that body corporate (s11). In the event that all of 
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the above tests do not apply, then the purchaser will gain priority 
over prior claims of a mortgagee or a lessee, whose claims will be 
extinguished (ss9, 10). In this event, any of the security holders 
can apply to the Credit Tribunal for compensation to be paid from the 
Transport Regulation Fund. The scheme provided for in Part III of 
the Chattels Securities Act 1981 thus protects the innocent purchaser 
and the innocent security holder is also protected by statutory 
compensation. 
(h) 	Limited title  
The Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974 provides that a 
seller may, by an express term of the contract, indicate his intention 
only to pass limited title: 
II a contract of sale in the case of which there appears 
from the contract or is to be inferred from its 
circumstances an intention that the seller should 
transfer only sitch title as he or a third person may 
have" (s69(3)). 
It may be difficult to infer any such intention from the circumstances 
surrounding a contract. The view of Aitkin L.J. in Niblett v. 
Confectioners' Materials Co Ltd
17 
was that the comparable qualification 
in the English Sale of Goods Act 1893 had been inserted to exclude 
sales by a sheriff under a writ of execution and to other cases where 
there is, by implication or express terms, no warranty of title. 18 In 
the South Australian case of Warmings Used Cars v. Tucker19 it was 
held there was no intention to guarantee title in circumstances where 
the seller was virtually in the position of a commission agent 
purchasing goods from a third party for sale to the buyer. 
16. Section 69(3); see s12(3) Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK). 
17. [19211 3 K.B. 387. 
18. Ibid., at p.401. 
19. [19561 S.A.S.R. 249. 
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(i) 	Exemption Clauses  
The protection of the implied term as to title, quiet possession 
and freedom from encumbrances given by s69 of the Trade Practices 
Act essentially applies only to those goods which have been supplied 
to a consumer by a corporation. It is open to a partnership or other 
non-corporate body to exclude or vary this implied term (or the 
others) in a contract under the Sale of Goods Act, which provides for 
two parties to a contract for sale to exclude any requirements of the 
Act, by either express agreement or in the course of dealings 
between them.
20 
Whether a particular exemption clause will 
effectively relieve the seller of liability depends on whether the 
clause, construed on the basis of its wording and on the basis of the 
commercial or other purpose of the contract, was intended by the 
parties to cover the liability it is sought to exclude or restrict. 21 It 
is likely that a court would require strong evidence that a generally 
worded exemption clause was intended by the parties to relieve the 
seller of liability for failure to pass the property in the goods to the 
buyer. As was rightly observed in Rowland v. Divan, "the whole 
object of a sale is to transfer property from one person to 
another" 
22 
20. See Chapter Two; s57 SGA (New South Wales); s61 SGA 
(Victoria); s54 SGA (Western Australia), SGA (South Australia); s56 
SGA (Queensland); s59 SGA (Tasmania); s58 SGA (A.C.T.); s.55 
SGA (U.K.). See s61(1)(a) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK). 
See on this point P.S.Atiyah Sale of Goods 6th edition (1980), at p.52; 
Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Committee (1966) Cmnd. 2958, at 
para 38. Compare and contrast the convention on the Uniform Laws  
on the International Sale of Goods art. 52. This convention came into 
effect in 1972. 
21. See Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 2 
W.L.R. 283; see in particular Chapter One. 
22. 11923] 2 K.B. 500, at p. 507 per Aitkin L.J.; see Northwest 
Co Ltd v. Merland Oil of Canada and Gas and Oil Products Ltd [1936] 
4 D.L.R. 248. See Benjamin Sale of Goods Act Sweet & Maxwell 
(1981), at para.285; 
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(2) 	Manufacturer's Liability  
(a) Introduction  
Consumers are generally encouraged to regard manufacturers 
as being chiefly responsible for the safety and quality of goods they, 
the consumer, purchase, even though there is usually no contractual 
link between the two parties. Consumers are led into this assumption 
as a result of mass production, distribution and advertising by the 
manufacturer. 23 Moreover, because of his commanding position in the 
chain of distribution, the manufacturer is best placed to control 
effectively the flow of defective goods by recall programmes, product 
modification or both. Under the doctrine of privity of contract, 
however, only the person who directly has any rights under it can 
sue and then only in relation to the person with whom he made the 
contract. 
(b) Manufacturer's Liability under Division 2A of the Trade  
Practices Act  
Division 2A now significantly alters the doctrine of privity of 
contract by making the manufacturer (or importer) liable to the 
consumer (the supplier still remaining liable as in the past).
24 
The 
Swanson Report had recommended that the Trade Practices Act be 
23. See G.Q. Taperell, R.B. Vermeesch, D.J. Harland Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection 3rd edition •Butterworths 1983 at 
p.873. 
24. Trade Practices Amendment Act 1978 s14 inserting Division A 
in the Principal Act, ss74A-74L, infra. On manufacturer's liability 
general ly G .Q . Taperel I , R . B . Nrer'meersch , D .J . Harland Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Butterworths 3rd edition (1-9-137), 
Chapter Eighteen; A.J. Duggan and L.W. Darvall (eds.) Consumer  
Protection Law and Theory Law Book Co. (1984), at pp.70-102; J.L. 
Goldring and L.W. Maher Consumer Protection Law in Australia 2nd 
ed. Butterworths (1983), Chapter Four; R. Cranston Consumers and  
the Law 2nd ed. Weidenfeld and Nicholson (1984), Chapter Five; C.J. 
Miller and P.A. Lovell Product Liability Butterworths (1977), Chapter 
Nine to Fourteen inclusive; G.L.Fricke 'Manufacturer's liability for 
breach of warranty' 	(1959) 	33 A.L.J. 	35; 	S.J.Stoljar 'The 
International Harvester case : A Manufacturers  liability for defective 
chattels' (1959) 32 A.L.J. 307. 
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amended so that manufacturers became liable to consumers for breach 
of express obligations and be under duties similar to the implied 
obligations of suppliers in consumer contracts. 26 Under these 
proposals the consumer was to keep his existing right to sue the 
immediate supplier for breach of an implied term who, in turn, would 
be entitled to be indemnified by the manufacturer. The Trade 
Practices Amendment Act, 1978, which largely embodied the 
Committee's proposals, was largely based on the Law Reform 
(Manufacturers Warranties) Ordinance 1977 (ACT) and the 
Manufacturers Warranties Act 1974 (South Australia). 
(i) 	Persons to Whom a Manufacturer is Liable  
The class of consumers who can benefit from a manufacturer's 
liability is specified by s74A(2)(a) of the Trade Practices Act. This 
Section provides that: 
11 ... a reference to goods shall, unless the contrary 
intention appears, be read as a reference to goods of a 
kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption". 
This is clearly a narrower definition, than the $15,000 requirement in 
s4B. Thus, a consumer, as defined in 4B, may have a remedy 
against a supplier in Division 2 of the Act but be without remedy 
against a manufacturer for the purposes of Division 2A. Such a 
position is obviously anomalous. 
Unlike the South Australian and ACT legislation on 
manufacturers' liability, Division 2A does not define "consumer" to 
include successors in title to the consumer who was originally 
supplied. A manufacturer is, however, liable under s74D(1) for 
25. 	Swanson Report, at paras 9.120-9.127. 
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goods that are not of merchantable quality to the original consumer 
and any other person deriving title from him. For instance, where a 
wife were injured by a blender given to her as a birthday present by 
her husband, she would be able to sue the manufacturer under 
s74D. 26 She would, however, in the view of authoritive authors in 
Australian trade practices law, be unable to rely on or enforce an 
express warranty or other obligations laid upon a manufacturer by 
Division 2A.
27 Conversely, a person who simply used the blender 
and was injured would have no claim under s74A.
28 
(ii) 	Liability of a Manufacturer to a Consumer .  
The liability of a manufacturer (being a corporation) to a 
consumer arises when goods are supplied to a consumer. "Goods" 
include, under s4(1), "... animals, fish, minerals, trees and crops." 
"Manufactured" includes "... grown, extracted, produced, processed 
and assembled". This wide definition, thus, covers crop growing and 
mining. A corporation which produces a final product from 
components which other firms have put together, will, by reference to 
those assembled goods, be treated as having manufactured that 
particular product. A corporation is regarded as having 
manufactured goods if it holds itself out to the public as manufacturer 
of those goods (s74A(3)(a)), or if it applies to goods it supplies, or 
allows to be, supplied, its corporate or brand name (s74(A)(3)(b)). 
The result will be the same if the corporation allows another supplier 
26. The example is taken from G.A. Taperell, R.B. Vermeesch, 
D.J. Harland Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Butterworths 
(1983),at p.882; 3rd edition but see infra regarding s74A and 
secondhand goods. 
27. G.A. Taperell, R.B. Vermeersch, D.J. Harland op.cit, at 
p.882. 
28. However the Trade Practices Act provides, by s82, that a 
person who suffers loss or damage by conduct of another person in 
breach of a provision of Part V (or Part IV) may recover damages 
against that person or any person involved in the breach. 
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or promoter of its goods to represent the corporation to the public as 
the manufacturer of the goods (s74(a)(3)(c)). Since a particular 
product, for the purposes of Division 2A, may be regarded as having 
been manufactured by two or more corporations it seems likely that a 
consumer could sue either the manufacturer of the component or the 
final manufacturer of the goods in the case of goods proving 
defective. Normally, a consumer would sue the final manufacturer, 
either because of difficulty in proving the defect was due to a 
component fault as distinct from incorrect assembly or other cause, or 
because of difficulty by the consumer in identifying the component 
manufacturer. 
(iii) 	Identification of the Manufacturer  
The consumer will have no right to compensation in the case of 
a defective product against the manufacturer unless he can identify 
that manufacturer. This problem may only occasionally arise, but the 
situation is not catered for in Division 2A of the Act. One solution, 
which is adopted in the Draft European Convention on Products  
Liability,
29 is to make any supplier liable as a manufacturer where 
the product does not indicate the identity of any of the persons liable 
as manufacturers, unless the supplier discloses on demand to the 
consumer the manufacturer (or importer, when relevant) or the 
person who supplied the goods to the supplier. 
29. 	Article 3(3) of the Convention; published 1975 and submitted 
for observation by governments of Member States of the Council of 
Europe. The Convention was opened for signature In its final form 
on 21/1/77. See D.J.Harland 'Products Liability and International 
Trade' (1977) 8 Sydney L.R. 358, 376-377; D.J.Harland 'The liability 
to consumers of manufactuers of defective goods - an Australian 
perspective' (1981) 5 Zeitschrift fur Verbraucher politik/Journal of 
Consumer Policy 212, S.Galitsky 'Manufacturer's Liability : An 
Examination of the Policy and Social Cost of a New Regime' (1980) 3 
U.N.S.W. L.J. 145; G.M.Gregg and T.D.Tzovaras, 'The Liability of 
Manufacturers and Importers under the Trade Practices Amendment 
Act 1978' (1979) 10 Fed L.R. 398. 
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(iv) 	Circumstances in Which Liability Occurs  
The express warranties and implied terms which Division 2A 
defines arise where a corporation, in trade or commerce, supplies 
goods it manufactures to another person who acquires them for 
re-supply, those goods being then supplied (not necessarily by the 
person acquiring them from the corporation) to a consumer. Where 
the consumer suffers loss or damage by failure of the corporation to 
observe the express warranties or implied terms the consumer may 
recover compensation through the courts. 
Division 2A does not proceed on the basis that the 
manufacturer and the consumer are presumed to be in a direct 
contractual relationship (unlike the corresponding South Australian 
and ACT legislation). 30 A manufacturer who sells directly to a 
consumer is not liable under Division 2A, although he would be liable 
under Division 2 (ss69-72). However, Division 2A imposes obligations 
on a manufacturer in relation to repairs and spare parts, which are 
not placed on a supplier (s74F). These obligations, and those 
concerning express warranties, should apply both to manufacturers 
and suppliers. In the case of "house branded" goods purchased by a 
consumer from a retailer (that is, goods branded as those of the 
retailer), it will not be of practical assistance to the consumer that 
the retailer will be regarded as the manufacturer. Furthermore, the 
consumer may not know the identity of the manufacturer, thus 
debarring the consumer from exercising rights (such as those of 
repair and spare parts) which are obtainable against a manufacturer. 
It is therefore recommended that the law be reformed so that the 
obligations to repair and to supply spare parts should be available to 
the consumer against the supplier as well as the manufacturer. 
30. 	Law Reform (Manufacturer's Warranties) Ordinance 1977 
(A.C.T.), Manufacturer's Warranties Act 1974 (South Australia), 
s5(1); see infra. 
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(c) 	Implied Obligations  
The obligations that are imposed on the manufacturer in the 
supply of goods to a consumer are similar to those implied terms that 
apply to a supplier under ss70-72. The obligations of a manufacturer 
in Division 2A are those of fitness for purpose (s74B), 
correspondence with description (s74C), merchantable quality (s74D), 
correspondence with sample (s74E). 
(i) Fitness for Purpose  
Where a consumer makes known, either directly or by 
implication, any particular purpose for which the goods are to be 
used, the goods must be reasonably fit for that purpose whether or 
not goods are commonly supplied for that purpose. The obligation 
does not arise if it can be shown that the consumer did not rely, or 
it was unreasonable for him to do so, on the seller's or 
manufacturer's skill and judgment. There is no liability on the part 
of the manufacturer if goods are rendered unsuitable for a particular 
purpose owing to damage or alteration by another person, after the 
goods have left the manufacturer's control. 
(ii) Correspondence with Description and Sample  
Goods sold by description must comply with the description 
given them by the seller or manufacturer. A sale by description 
occurs when a consumer selects goods on the basis of the description 
of the goods or where goods are purchased to the specification of the 
consumer. If goods do not perform according to their description, 
(e.g. "fully automatic" applied to a washing machine), the consumer 
has rights against either the manufacturer or the seller. A 
manufacturer is not liable to a consumer for goods which do not 
comply with a description unless the description was applied to the 
goods by or on behalf of the manufacturer, or with his consent, 
express or implied. The manufacturer has no liability due to the 
goods being made unsuitable after they leave his control. 
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Goods sold by reference to a sample and description must 
conform to both. A manufacturer is only liable where he supplies the 
sample or it is supplied with his express or implied consent. He is 
not liable where, having left his control, the failure of the bulk of 
the goods to correspond with the sample in quality or the existence of 
a defect was due to an act or omission of a person other than the 
manufacturer, or beyond human control. 
(iii) 	Merchantable Quality  
A manufacturer will not be liable to a consumer in respect of 
goods not being of merchantable quality with regard to defects which 
have been specifically drawn to the consumer's attention before the 
contract of supply was made or defects which ought to have been 
revealed to a consumer who examined the goods before the contract 
was made. Merchantable quality is defined in identical terms to 
those in s66(1)(a) of Division 2. In determining whether goods are 
of merchantable quality regard is given to the description applied to 
them by the manufacturer, and, where the price is relevant, note 
must be taken of the price paid to the manufacturer as an indication 
of quality. A manufacturer, again, will not be liable to a consumer 
for goods which were not of merchantable quality due to an act or 
omission of a person other than the manufacturer, or which were 
beyond human control. As already noted (see supra (i) "Persons to 
whom a manufacturer is liable") this section gives rights not only to 
the original consumer but any person who obtains title from him. 
The section has the paramount effect of making the manufacturer 
strictly liable to a consumer (or person obtaining title from him) in 
situations where the only remedy previously would have been for the 
consumer to sue in tort for negligence by the manufacturer. 
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(iv) 	Spare Parts and Repair Facilities  
The Law Reform Commission, in their Working Paper on Implied  
Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods, noted that there 
appeared to be no general legal requirement, under English law, for a 
seller, supplier or manufacturer to maintain stocks of spare parts of 
1 
to provide servicing facilities.
3 
	The Commission observed that the 
Ontario Report had recommended that in consumer sales, there should 
be an implied warranty that spare parts and reasonable repairs 
facilities would be available for a reasonable period of time in the case 
of goods that normally require repairs. 32 For example, in 
California, a manufacturer of consumer durables which are covered by 
an express warranty must maintain sufficient service and repair 
facilities within the State to carry out the terms of the warranty. 33 
In accordance with specific recommendations of the Swanson 
Report, the Trade Practices Amendment Act 1978, in s74F, now gives 
consumers who acquire goods a right of action against a manufacturer 
who fails reasonably to ensure the availability of required repair 
facilities or spare parts to consumers. 34 The manufacturer's liability 
under this section depends on information about the availability of 
repair facilities or spare parts given at or before the time of 
purchase of the goods. The manufacturer will be liable, in the case 
31. 	Law Corn. No. 95 (1975) at para.76. See also paras.115-122, 
where the Commission was of the opinion that it would be wrong to 
make it an additional term in contracts of supply that the supplier 
should maintain stocks of spares or servicing facilities. The Law 
Commissions, as noted earlier, confirmed this view; Sale and Supply  
of Goods (1983), at para 2:16. 
32-7-75ntario Report, at p.45, recommendation (e). 
33. The Song-Beverley Act (California Civil Code, ss1790-1792). 
34. Inserting Division 2A in the principal Act, see Swanson 
Report, at para.9.127; see also Trade Practices Comm ission 
Information Circular No.26, 5/1/79 at pp.8-9. See the Irish Sale of 
Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 s12. 
254 
where no information is given, if he fails to make available reasonable 
repair facilities and a reasonable supply of spare parts. The 
manufacturer's liability is restricted where the manufacturer, or 
someone on his behalf, notifies consumers prior to acquisition of the 
goods, that no repair facilities or spare parts will be available or will 
only be available from certain sources or for a limited time (s74F(3)). 
The Court, in determining whether a corporation acted unreasonably 
in failing to ensure facilities for repair of goods were, or a part was 
reasonably available at the relevant time, must take into account all 
the circumstances of the case, and in particular, those that prevented 
supply of facilities or spare parts beyond the manufacturer's control. 
The restriction of liability under s74F(3) weakens the 
usefulness of the whole section. Although, in the case of an 
overseas manufacturer, there might well be difficulties in the supply 
of spare parts and the provision of repair facilities, the local company 
agent, importer or retailer could normally be expected to make 
arrangements for the provision of such facilities. There could be 
legitimate reasons for the delay of supply in those particular 
circumstances, which, in any case, would be caught under the 
provision allowing the court to take into account, in considering such 
a consumer complaint, circumstances beyond a manufacturer's control. 
In order to strengthen protection for the consumer, to encourage the 
adequate provision of servicing and spare parts and, thereby, give 
legislative encouragement to competition between suppliers, s74F(3) 
could profitably be removed from the Act. 
(d) 	Express Warranties  
Under s74G of the Trade Practices Act a manufacturer is liable 
to compensate a consumer for any loss or damage suffered because of 
a failure by the manufacturer to ensure that goods accord with any 
express warranty he has given or allowed to be given in relation to 
those goods. An express warranty is defined as: 
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• • • in relation to goods, means an undertaking, 
assertion or statement in relation to the quality, 
performance or characteristics of the goods given or 
made in connexion with the promotion by any means of 
the supply or use of the goods, the natural tendency of 
which is to induce persons to acquire the goods". 
(s74A(1)) 
The understanding, assertion or statement as provided has to be 
linked with the, "... quality, performance or characteristics of the 
goods" in order to amount to an express warranty. It has been 
suggested that a promise by a manufacturer that servicing facilities 
will be available for a particular period at defined places is not a 
promise relating to the performance of the goods themselves. That 
may also be the case with an express promise that spare parts will be 
available for a certain period. Similarly, a promise by a manufacturer 
that he will repair or replace defective goods after a given period 
from the date of purchase, will not amount to an express warranty. 
If this is the case, then the consumer will only be able to enforce the 
manufacturer's promise if he can prove, which would be difficult, a 
collateral warranty. The limitation in s74A(1) is based on s3(1) of 
the South Australian Manufacturers' Warranties Act 1974, whereas the 
corresponding subsection of the ACT Law Reform (Manufacturers'  
Warranties) Ordinance 1977, s3(1) is not so limited. It therefore 
seems desirable that s74A(1) be reworded to follow the more liberal 
provision of the ACT Act35 and so enable the consumer to enforce a 
manufacturer's promise to repair or provide spare parts without 
having to prove the existence of a collateral warranty. 
35. 	See G.Q.Taperell, R.B.Vermeersch and D.J.Harland, Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection 3rd edition Butterworths (OM, 
Chapter Eighteen for a detailed survey of the topic of manufacturer's 
liability. 
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(e) Second-hand Goods  
• 	 Section 74D expressly covers second-hand goods in relation to 
merchantable quality. It has been suggested that liability may also 
arise in a supply of such goods to a consumer by the effect of 
s74F(1)(b). Under s74F(1)(b), a manufacturer's liability is 
dependent on the fact that a person (whether or not the person was 
one who originally acquired the goods for re-supply from the 
manufacturer) supplies goods to the consumer. Provided that the 
purchaser of any second-hand goods, is a consumer s74F(1)(b) 
applies since it is not limited to the initial supply of the goods to the 
consumer. It has also been argued that s74F(1)(b) would apply even 
in the case of a private sale of a second-hand car (or other such 
goods) or by a non-corporate supplier.
36 
However, because s74D 
gives a right to sue where goods are of unmerchantable quality to 
any person who obtains title through the consumer to whom the goods 
were supplied, it is thereby implied that only the first consumer has 
any standing to sue under the other provisions of Division 2A. The 
position is unclear: although, on one view, though s74D gives a right 
to sue to anyone who acquires the goods by way of gift, the section 
does not limit the effect of the wording of other provisions of Division 
2A.
37 
(f) Indemnity Against Manufacturers 
A supplier is given a statutory right to an indemnity against a 
manufacturer in certain circumstances. Under s74H, where a 
consumer has the right to a refund and/or damages from the seller 
for breach of a condition or warranty under the Trade Practices Act, 
36. Ibid., at p.882. 
37. G .Q . Taperell , R. B . Vermeersch , D. J . Harland Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection 3rd edition Butterworths (1983), at 
p.883. 
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and such breach stems directly from an act or default with the 
control of the manufacturer, then the seller may seek an indemnity 
from the manufacturer. Such an action may begin up to three years 
after the date on which the seller partly or wholly made payment or 
on which he is sued by the consumer, whichever is the earlier. 
Liability of the manufacturer to the consumer and the liability to 
indemnify the seller ceases ten years after the date when the goods 
were first sold to a consumer (s74J). In a case where the 
manufacturer is directly liable to consumers - such as where the 
goods are for personal, domestic or household use - the seller has a 
right to a full indemnity for what he has paid in discharging his own 
liability; including, in appropriate circumstances, that for 
consequential loss. Where the goods are of a commercial nature, the 
manufacturer cannot be directly sued by a consumer and, unless 
agreed otherwise, is liable to the seller for the reimbursement of the 
cost of replacing or repairing the goods, whichever is lower 
(s74L(1)). This provision is subject to a test of reasonableness, 
when the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case. 
In particular, the court must have regard to the availability of 
suitable alternative sources of supply and equivalent goods and 
whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the 
special order of the seller. This section is subject to the operation 
of any contractual term between the manufacturer and the seller 
which imposes greater liability on the manufacturer than that under 
s74L(1). 
The statutory provisions which provide an indemnity against 
the manufacturer should do much to allay the concern of retailers 
with regard to the imposition of exemption clauses upon them in 
contracts of supply for resale. Even though this indemnity applies 
only in the case of consumer goods, it is in this specific area where 
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The manufacturer will avoid liability in this last case if spare parts 
were unavailable in circumstances not reasonably foreseeable by the 
manufacturer (s4(4)) or if he takes reasonable steps to ensure that 
the consumer is notified at the place where he, the consumer, is sold 
the goods, to the effect that the manufacturer does not undertake 
that spare parts will be available (s6(2)). This apart, any attempt 
by the manufacturer to exclude liability for a statutory or implied 
warranty is an offence (s6). The Governor is further empowered to 
make regulations to regulate the form of written warranties and 
prevent any misleading practices in their use. The seller of 
manufactured goods to a consumer is entitled to any indemnity against 
the manufacturer where such seller is liable to a consumer for a 
breach of any condition or warranty implied by law respecting quality 
of the goods of the statutory warranty (s7). 
The overall effect of the Act is to make the manufacturer 
strictly liable to the consumer where the manufacturer supplies 
defective goods to the consumer if the defect makes the goods 
unmerchantable. The liability arises on the basis that a contract is 
presumed between the manufacturer and the consumer, unlike the 
04 provisions of Division 2A of the Trade Practices Act. 
(b) 	Australian Capital Territory  
The Law Reform (Manufacturers' Warranties) Ordinance 1977 
imposes non-excludable warranties in respect of goods ordinarily 
acquired for private use or consumption. Sale includes hire for up to 
six months and hire purchase. A consumer includes a person 
deriving title to goods through a consumer (s3(3)). Manufacturer 
includes an importer of goods from an overseas manufacturer. A 
40. 	See supra. 
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manufacturer is liable under warranties similar to those under Division 
2A of the Trade Practices Act, including when he sells directly to the 
consumer (s4). However, where goods are sold by description the 
manufacturer is only liable on the statutory warranty that the goods 
correspond with the description he has applied to them. Provisions 
governing the supply of spare parts and repair facilities are similar 
to those under the South Australian legislation. The manufacturer 
may totally exclude his liability in respect of spare parts and 
servicing or after a specific period. Any other attempt to exclude 
liability to a consumer is void and an offence (s7). A manufacturer 
is liable to indemnify a seller to a consumer on terms similar to the 
South Australian Manufacturers Warranties Act 1974 but the right may 
be limited or excluded by contract (s8). 
(c) New South Wales  
The Commercial Transactions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
19711 amended the Sale of Goods Act 1923 by enabling the court, in 
proceedings by a consumer concerning the sale of goods (not being 
second-hand) that these were not of merchantable quality, to bring 
the manufacturer into such proceedings. The power of the court is 
discretionary and if the court regards the manufacturer as liable to 
remedy the defect it may make order requiring him to pay the 
estimated cost of this to the buyer, to remedy the defect and in 
default pay the estimated cost of repair to the buyer.
41 
Only the 
original consumer, not a successor in title, can bring the proceedings 
against a manufacturer. 
(d) Queensland  
The 	Consumer Affairs Act 	1970-1974 defines 	those 
41. 	Sale of Goods Act 1923 (New South Wales) s64(5) as inserted 
by the Commercial Transactions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1974. 
There are similar provisions under amendments to the Hire Purchase 
Act 1960 (New South Wales); now repealed by The Hire Purchase 
re-kal Act 1983 (New South Wales). 
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representations that will constitute an express warranty in a supply 
of goods or services to a consumer (ss36A-36G). The Act lays down 
the minimum information to be contained in any warranty by a person 
whose principal place of business is in Queensland. Any express 
warranty given must give a r;ght additional to that given by general 
law and must not limit, restrict or otherwise affect any express or 
implied warranty that a person would have without the benefit of the 
Act. The warranty must relate to every major component of the 
goods. 
(4) 	Second-hand Motor Vehicle Legislation  
The other main area of States legislation which contain 
provisions in respect of non-excludable warranties in consumer 
transactions are the Acts dealing with the sale of second-hand motor 
vehicles 142 . Those statutes currently in force are the New South 
Wales Motor Dealers Act 1974, the South Australian Second Hand  
Motor Vehicles Act 1971, the Victorian Motor Car Traders Act 1973, 
the Western Australian Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1973, the 
Queensland Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971,43  the A.C.T. Sale of 
Motor Vehicles Ordinance 1977, the N.T. Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 
1979. Tasmania has no separate legislation. 
(a) 	Statutory Warranties  
All Australian States and Territories, with the exception of 
Tasmania and Queensland provide statutory warranties for 
second-hand vehicles.
44 A dealer must repair or make good a defect, 
or arrange for this to be done, where he sells the vehicle in 
42. On second-hand vehicle legislation see P.Latimer Australian  
Business Law C.C.H. (1984), at pp.395-406. 
43. This Act deals with auctioneers, real estate agents, debt 
collectors and motor dealers. 
44. Section 41(1) (Victoria); s27(1) (New South Wales); s34(1) 
(Western Australia); s24(1) (South Australia); s23(1), (2) (A.C.T.); 
s20(1), (2) (N.T.). In Queensland, a motor dealer is required to 
provide a roadworthiness certificate on the sale of a used motor 
vehicle, ibid. 
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question. It is immaterial that the defect did not exist at the time of 
sale. The vehicle must be in a reasonable condition having regard to 
its age and the distance for which it has been driven. The above 
applies according to the vehicle price and the warranty period laid 
down. 45 
Under the legislation in New South Wales, South Australia and 
Western Australia the provisions outlined apply. In New South Wales 
these provisions also apply where the vehicle is new and has been 
driven less than 20,000 kilometres or for less than three months 
(whichever is first).
46 In New South Wales, South Australia and 
Western Australia the provisions outlined apply to second-hand cars 
the price of which is $1,500 or over and the vehicle has been driven 
5,000 kilometres or before three months after the day of sale have 
expired (whichever is first). In the case of similar cars the price of 
which is under $1,000, the provisions apply before the car has been 
driven 3,000 kilometres and before the expiry of two months 
(whichever is first). 47 
The dealer will not be liable for the repair of a vehicle where 
the defect has been due to incidental or accidental damage after the 
sale of the vehicle, or is due to misuse or negligence on the part of 
the driver of the vehicle after sale, or where the purchaser has had 
the vehicle in his possession for three months before the sale. The 




45. See Table, P.Latimer Australian Business Law C.C.H. (1983), 
at p.298. 
46. Section 27(1) New South Wales. 
47. Section 27 (New South Wales); s24 (South Australia); s34 
(Western Australia). 
48. Section 28 (New South Wales); s41(3) (Victoria); s24(3) (South 
Australia); s34(2) (Western Australia); s23(6) (A.C.T.); s20(6) 
(N.T.). 	New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital 
Territory also exclude liability for defects where the purchaser was a 
trade owner (or an employee of the dealer in Victoria). In the 
Northern Territory a dealer is not liable where the contract excludes 
statutory warranties (s20(8)). 
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(b) Excluded defects  
A dealer is allowed to put a notice on a second-hand vehicle 
offered for sale particularising any defect that he believes to exist in 
that vehicle; and his estimate of the fair cost of repairing or making 
good that defect.
49 
By attaching such a notice the dealer is then 
excused from complying with the statutory warranty set out in the 
relevant motor vehicle legislation. 
If the dealer states, in his estimate, a cost which turns out to 
be below the actual cost of the repair, the purchaser may sue for, 
and recover, the difference in cost. These provisions do not apply 
to a defect in a second-hand vehicle which has been sold by a dealer 
should a notice relating to any defect be attached to the vehicle at all 
times when on sale and the purchaser has signed a copy of the notice 
before or at the time of sale; and the dealer has given the purchaser 
at the time of sale a true copy of the notice signed by the purchaser. 
(c) Disputes  
Disputes between a purchaser of a second-hand car and the 
dealer from whom he has purchased are dealt with by different 
procedures according to the relevant motor vehicle legislation. In 
Victoria, the Motor Car Traders Committee may make an appropriate 
determination if both parties agree in writing. A matter cannot be 
referred to the Small Claims Tribunal once it is •submitted to the 
Committee. The Committee may make such orders as it sees fit; these 
orders are final and binding on both parties. Where the parties do 
not agree to submit the dispute to the Committee, either party may 
apply to a Magistrate's Court for determination of the dispute. 5° In 
New South Wales, where there is a disagreement between the 
49. Section 29 (New South Wales); s41 (Victoria); s25 (South 
Australia); s35 (Western Australia); s24 (A.C.T.). Since the 
• Queensland legislation requires roadworthiness on the sale of a used 
car defects cannot be excluded. 
50. Section 43 Motor Car Traders Act 1973 (Victoria). 
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purchaser and the dealer over a warranty and its related obligations 
the purchaser may make a written application to the Commissioner for 
Consumer Affairs to investigate and determine the agreement. 51 The 
Commissioner will not be empowered to determine the dispute if 
proceedings are pending before a court or tribunal or if the matter 
has already been decided. A dispute is not regarded as settled 
unless terms of the settlement are incorporated in a document and 
signed by the purchaser, the dealer and the Commissioner. Where 
the Commissioner is unable to settle a dispute he may refer it to a 
dispute committee constituted under the Act. The Commissioner is 
not bound to follow the recommendations in the report of the disputes 
committee. After investigation of a dispute the Commissioner makes a 
determination, the terms of which are final and binding on both 
parties. In South Australia, where a similar dispute arises and the 
dealer and the purchaser agree in writing to submit the dispute to 
the South Australia Prices Commissioner, the Commissioner may hear 
and determine the dispute or appoint another person to do so.
52 A 
determination of the dispute is final and binding on both parties. In 
Western Australia, the Commissioner for Consumer Protection may 
advise both the dealer and the purchaser in writing that he proposes 
to determine the dispute unless proceedings have commenced in a 
court of competent jurisdiction or in the Small Claims Tribunal. If 
neither party objects within fourteen days of the Commissioner's 
letter, the Commissioner may hear and determine the dispute or he 
may appoint another to do so.
53 
A determination by the Commissioner 
is final and conclusive and there is no appeal. In the A.C.T., on a 
written request of either the purchaser or the dealer to the Registrar 
51. Section 31 Motor Dealers Act 1974 (New South Wales). 
52. Sections 26, 27 Second-hand Motor Vehicles Act, 1971 (South 
Australia). 
53. Sections 36, 37 Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1973 (Western 
Australia). 
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of Motor Vehicles, the Registrar shall hold an inquiry and determine 
the dispute provided that proceedings are not pending or the matter 
has not been previously determined by a court. The Registrar may 
make any order that seems just, other than an order for rescission. 54 
The Registrar may refer the dispute to the Court of Petty Sessions 
for determination if, in his opinion, a rescission order is likely to be 
made or the matter is a complex one. An appeal is available to any 
person aggrieved by the order made by the Registrar to the Court of 
Petty Sessions within twenty one days. 
(d) 	Roadworthiness and Title to Vehicles  
The desirability of roadworthiness checks to vehicles and 
accompanying certificates has been canvassed in Tasmania, by various 
interest groups, which included the Tasmanian Consumer Protection 
Council, the Royal Automobile Club of Tasmania (R.A.C.T.) and 
particular commercial bodies, including the Tasmanian Automotive 
Chamber of Commerce. 55 The last named organization favoured a 
system of licensing private motor trade operators as testing centres, 
a pattern which currently exists in the United Kingdom. Government 
testing stations were regarded as providing the most thorough system 
of vehicle checking. Queensland legislation requires a certificate of 
roadworthiness on all vehicles, under the Inspection of Machinery Act  
1951-1971, (s44I), and in addition to yearly and half-yearly 
inspections by officers of the Division of Occupational Safety and 
54. Section 27 Sale of Motor Vehicles Ordinance 1977 (A.C.T.) 
55. These groups and bodies gave evidence before the Select 
Committee of the Tasmanian Legislative Council enquiring into the 
desirability of proceeding with the Second-Hand Motor Vehicle Dealers 
Bill 1978. The Bill subsequently lapsed, despite support by the 
R.A.C.T. and the Tasmanian Consumer Protection Council. I am 
grateful to the Clerk of the Legislative Council, Mr John Chilcott, for 
permission to refer to the evidence given to the Legislative Council 
and to Mr Peter Hodgman M.H.A. for access to his copies of the 
Committee's files. 
266 
Weights and Measures, random inspections are made at the premises of 
used car dealers. 
If transport licensing authorities in Australia issued vehicle 
documentation in the form of a registration book (as is the case in 
the United Kingdom) which then accompanied a vehicle as it changed 
hands the dealer and the purchaser may have a better protection than 
is now the case. The desirability of showing clear details of title, 
including encumbrances, on motor registration certificates 56 has been 
dealt with earlier and the solution adopted by the Chattel Securities 
Act 1981 (Victoria) has been noted. 57 
(5) 	Problems of Title and Statutory Warranties : Conclusions  
The legislative solution of the Victorian Chattels Securities Act 
1981 to some of the problems raised by the nemo dat rule, which have 
been examined earlier, 58 deserves commendation as an attempt to 
protect both the bona fide purchaser for value without notice and the 
true owner. Notably the Act does not alter the nemo dat rule by 
adding further exceptions 59 to it, but instead provides a simple and 
inexpensive means of checking ownership of motor vehicles. The 
recommendations of the Twelfth's Report of the English Law Reform 
Committee" indicated a general trend towards greater protection for 
innocent buyers by piecemeal exceptions to the nemo dat rule. In 
criticizing the approach of the Committee, it has been pointed out 
that it would be a better policy to retain the nemo dat rule and not 
subject it to general exceptions as proposed by the Committee, since 
56. See supra. Such provisions apply in South Australia, Victoria 
and Western Australia. 
57. See supra, Part (A). 
58. See Part (A) supra. 
59. As recommended by J.R. Peden 'Title Problems in relation to 
chattels - proposals for a registration system for motor vehicles in 
Australia,' (1968) 42 A.L.J. 239, at pp.241-244. 
60. Transfer of Title to Chattels (1966) Cmnd. 2958; see Part (A) 
supra. 
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the latter course would have the result of prejudicing chattel owners 
and their insurers. 61 Against this argument can be set the 
contention that in the context where such problems concerning title 
occur - that is, in the sale of motor vehicles - the cost and incidence 
of insuring against the risk of defective or non-existent title should 
more equitably and relatively inexpensively be borne by the finance 
companies and dealers. Since, however, the central problem seems to 
be the provision of a means whereby a buyer can satisfy himself 
simply and inexpensively before a vehicle is purchased that the 
seller's title is unencumbered, the Victorian Chattels Securities Act  
1981 would appear to provide a more appropriate solution than that 
proposed by the English Law Reform Committee in the Twelfth Report. 
The recent Working Paper Sale and Supply of Goods (1983) 62 by the 
English and Scottish Law Commissions came to the provisional 
recommendation that the only way to prevent unjust enrichment by a 
purchaser was to ensure that the customer was not automatically 
entitled to the return of the whole price and that the court should 
take into consideration any significant use or possession of the goods 
which the customer had enjoyed.
63 
In respect of this recommendation 
It should be noted that under the Victorian Chattels Securities Act 
1981 if a purchaser gains priority, which is confirmed, under the Act 
and the interest of any security holders" is extinguished as a 
result, these security holders can apply to the Victorian Credit 
Tribunal for compensation to be paid from the Transport Regulation 
Fund. 65 
61. J.R. Peden (1968) 42 A.L.J. 239, at p.244. 
62. Working Paper No. 85, Scot Law Corn. Consultative 
Memorandum No. 58. 
63. Ibid., at para 6.7. 
64. The interests of a mortgagee, lessor or 'owner' under hire 
purchase are specifically listed; Chattels Securities Act 1981 
(Victoria) ss 8-10 inclusive. 
65. Ibid., s.24. 
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If the successful application of solutions to the problems 
concerning defects in title have proved difficult to obtain, then, by 
contrast, the legislative requirement of manufacturer's liability (and, 
at a more specialized level, that of motor vehicle dealers) to 
consumers has arguably been easier to resolve. The Trade Practices  
Act 1974 Division 2A has not proceeded, however, on the basis that 
the manufacturer and the consumer are presumed to be in a direct 
contractual relationship. This is distinct from the legislation on 
which Division 2A was modelled, the South Australian Manufacturers  
Warranties Act 1974 and the A.C.T. Law Reform (Manufacturers 
Warranties) Ordinance 1977, which founds liability on the footing that 
such a contract is presumed between the manufacturer and the 
consumer. One difference, therefore, between Division 2A of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 and the preceding South Australian and 
A.C.T. legislation, is that unlike the latter the Commonwealth Act 
does not define "consumer" to include successors in title. One 
significant result of this distinction is that a person, such as a wife, 
injured by a blender given to her as a birthday present by her 
husband would be unable to rely on or enforce an express warranty 
or other obligations alid upon a manufacturer by Division 2A. 67 This 
difference between the two sets of legislation accentuates the 
continuing importance of the doctrine of privity of contract, despite 
the significant alteration to it made by Division 2A. The following 
chapter, Chapter Six, examines in detail the underlying problems in 
the doctrine of privity of contract, some of the solutions attempted in 
different common law jurisdictions, and the relationships of these 
solutions to exemption clauses. 
66. 	See G.A. Tapperell, R.B. Vermeersch, D.J. Harland Trade 




PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND EXEMPTION CLAUSES 
Introduction  
It has already been shown that Division 2A of the Trade 
Practices Act has made important changes in the operation of the 
doctrine of privity of contract.
1 
The desirability of further changes 
in this doctrine, with special reference to product liability and to 
third party liability in bills of lading, can only be outlined. The 
factors involved in any reforms concerning product liability have, 
however, been fully explored by the Law Commissions in the United 
Kingdom
2 
and reference can also be made to experience in the United 
States. 
The essence of privity of contract is that only a person who is 
a party to a contract may sue for its breach. The implications of 
this may be aptly illustrated by the case of Daniels v White. 3 There, 
Mr Daniels purchased a bottle of lemonade from Mrs Tabard, the 
landlady of a public house, the defendants being the manufacturers 
and bottlers of the product. As a result of carbolic acid being 
present in the lemonade, both Mr Daniels and his wife became ill as a 
result. Neither of them were entitled to sue the manufacturers in 
contract, although Mr Daniels might recover from Mrs Tabard. On 
1. See Chapter Five. 
2. See particularly Working Paper No. 64, Liability for Defective 
Products (1975), at paras.119-134. 
3. [1938] 4 All E.R. 258, see Working Paper, ibid., para. 120. 
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the above facts he did sue Mrs Tabard in contract and he recovered 
in respect of his illness without proof of negligence.
4 
Whites were in 
apparent breach of their contract of supply with Mrs Tabard but the 
Daniels were not a party to this contract. They could sue Whites in 
tort in respect of their illness on proof of negligence. The claim, on 
these grounds, failed on the facts. The judge, Lewis J., found that 
the method of bottling the lemonade was "foolproof" and that there 
was a "proper supervision: of the employees engaged. 5 It should be 
noted that Daniel's case has been criticised,
6 
particularly the failure 
of Lewis J. to consider whether one or other of the employees had 
negligently omitted to empty or clean the offending bottle. 7 The 
unwillingness of Lewis J. to infer negligence on the part of the 
defendant company is out of step with the general trend of cases. 8 
(A) Product Liability  
Vertical and Horizontal Privity  
In English law the advantages of strict contractual liability are 
offset by the requirements of privity which confine the benefits and 
4. Recovery was based on the breach of the implied condition of 
merchantable quality imposed by s.14(2) of Sale of Goods Act 1893 
(U.K.). 	The plaintiff failed to establish a breach of an implied 
condition of reasonable fitness for purpose since reliance on the 
seller's skill or judgement could not be shown. 
5. [19381 4 All E.R. 258, at pp.362-363. 
6. See note (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 352; note in (1939) 51 A.L.J. 387. 
7. (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 352, where it is observed that Grant v. 
Australian Knitting Mills (1933) 50 C.L.R. 387 was not cited to Lewis 
J. in Daniels case. In Grant's 	 Evatt 	said (at p.442), '... the 
defenc-i—Eir—rinevitable accident' can seldom apply where a plaintiff is 
able to prove that an adequate system of manufacture has been 
instituted but the resulting product has become dangerous and caused 
injury to him solely through an omission to carry out some essential 
part of the processes. In such instances the inference is almost 
inescapable that omission is the result of carelessness on the part of 
some servant or other of the manufacturer.' 
8. See Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.); Donoghue  
v. Concrete Products (Kirkcaldy) Ltd, Chaproniere v. Mason (1905) 
21 T.L.R., 633, 634 (C.A.), 1976 S.L.T. 58; Lockhart v. Barr 1943 
S. C. ( H . L. ) 1. 
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liabilities to the immediate contracting parties. 	As a result, a 
purchaser may not claim under a contract of sale against anyone other 
than his immediate vendor (vertical privity). For example, the 
purchaser cannot, under the common law rules, sue a wholesaler or 
manufacturer in contract. Similarly, a contractual remedy is available 
only to the purchaser (horizontal privity). It is not available to a 
third party, irrespective of how close his connection with the 
purchaser and the product. 
In the United States remedies have been provided for the 
consumer by the dropping of the requirement of a contractual link 
between the consumer and the producer. The principle was clearly 
established in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors9 that manufacturers, 
generally, were taken to warrant that their products were of 
merchantable quality and reasonably fit for their purpose. In the 
Henningsen case a Chrysler car was purchased from authorised 
dealers by a husband as a gift for his wife. She was injured due to 
faulty steering causing the car to go out of control when she was 
driving it. There was no evidence of negligence by the 
manufacturers, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey held, on 
appeal, against the dealers and the manufacturers and also held that 
the wife was entitled to recover against them even though she was 
not the purchaser. The court noted: 
11 ... an implied warranty of merchantability chargeable 
to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer 
extends to the purchaser of the car, members of his 
family, and to other persons occupying or using it with 
his consent. ... Those pernns must be considered 
within the distributive chain". 
Developments which have occurred in the United States have resulted 
from the extension of buyers' rights against manufacturers, and an 
extension of third parties' rights against retailers and manufacturers. 
9. 161 A 2d 69 (1960). 
10. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors 161 A 2d 69 (1960), at p.100. 
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This is what is meant by dispensing with the requirements of vertical 
and horizontal privity. These terms can be explained as follows: 
"If the manufactured product is thought of as 
descending a chain of distribution from the producer to 
the middleman and on to the retailer who sells to the 
public, 'vertical privity' is the privity which each of 
these persons has with his predecessor and successor, 
and 'horizontal privity' is the ensuing privity of 
contract between the retailer and the first domestic 
consumer who buys from him, and then between uthat 
consumer and any sub-consumer if such there be". 
Vertical Privity  
One way of overcoming the requirements of vertical privity is 
to permit an ultimate consumer to sue the manufacturer on the 
manufacturer's contract of sale. Once it could be established that the 
manufacturer was in breach of his own contract with the retailer or 
supplier, the ultimate consumer would have a right of action against 
the manufacturer. In the example of Daniels case above Whites could 
have been sued directly, in contract, by Mr Daniels. 
Such an approach, however, does not place a direct and 
separate duty on the manufacturer. The consumer takes the benefit 
of obligations which the manufacturer has undertaken in respect of 
his own transaction. This approach is distinct from that of making 
the manufacturer liable on implied warranties similar to those under 
contracts for the sale of goods; the solution provided in Division 2A 
of the Trade Practices Act takes such a line. 	The essential 
limitations of the first solution are as follows: 	first, although the 
retailer cannot exclude his liability to the consumer, the manufacturer 
may well have excluded his liability to the retailer. 	Second, the 
11. 	Law Commission Working Paper No.64, at para.120. 	The 
problems of vertical and horizontal privity are dealt with in Chapter 
Five, 'Liability for Defective Products' Ontario, Law Reform 
Commission's Report on Consumer Warranties and Guarantees in the 
Sale of Goods Ontario (1972). See also C.J.Miller and P.A.Lovell, 
Product Liability, Butterworths (1977), at pp.22-31 for a clear and 
stimulating resume of the issues. 
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retailer may have taken up certain tasks or has prepared the goods 
before their distribution leaving the manufacturer clear of any 
liability for breach of contract. Third, there may be such a time 
difference between the manufacturer's and the consumer's contracts 
that limitation periods may have expired. Fourth, the buyer may 
have considerable difficulty in making out a case for breach of 
contract, as he would not know what the terms of the producer's 
contract with the retailer were.
12 If the claim related to personal 
injuries such a problem could be overcome by applying to the court 
for discovery of documents. However, this action would only be 
appropriate in the case of a large claim. 13 An additional objection to 
the relaxation of vertical privity in the case of consumer sales only, 
would be that this would separate such contracts from others, such 
as those for the supply of goods and services. uniform principle 
of recovery would appear desirable as between consumer and 
non-consumer sales, and as between sales and the supply of 
services.
15 Lastly, for those outside the immediate purchaser there 
would be no recovery on the original contract unless the limitations of 
horizontal privity were relaxed. 
Horizontal Privity  
In various situations, the requirement of privity works 
injustice to persons who, although obviously users or consumers, 
cannot recover damages for their injuries as they did not purchase 
the goods themselves. This would have applied in the case of gifts, 
as where a husband purchases a hot-water bottle for his wife, which 
12. See Law Commission, ibid., para.127. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Law Commission Working Paper No. 64 Liability for Defective 
Products (1975), at para.122. 
15. C .J . Mi I ler and P. A. Lovell , Product Liability Butterworths 
(1977), at p.27. 
274 
bursts and scalds her. 	The husband can claim for breach of 
merchantable quality and fitness of purpose plus any medical expenses 
which he might have incurred; his wife's only claim (prior to the 
amendment of the Trade Practices Act) against the supplier or 
manufacturer would have been on proof of negligence. The same 
situation would apply, however, if a visitor were similarly injured 
when staying with the household. There have been limited attempts 
by the common law to allow recovery by a third party by use of 
agency principles.
16 In addition, an injured party has been regarded 
as the purchaser, irrespective of the position between the 
purchasers; this has been the approach taken in cases of food 
purchased in a restaurant.
17 
The extension of contractual benefits to 
third parties and the ambit of liability for particular loss or damage 
has been explored, particularly in the United States. 
Article 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (1966 Revision) 
provides three alternative remedies. Alternative A states that: 
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends 
to any natural person who is in the family or household 
of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is 
reasonable to expect such person may use, consume or 
be affected by the goods and who is injured in person 
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude 
or limit the operation of this section". 
The provision is limited to personal injury of a narrowly defined 
category of persons and only horizontal privity is relaxed. A person 
who had received the goods as a gift would only be able to sue on 
the warranty if he came within 'the family or household of his buyer 
or ... a guest within his home'. Even then he would only be able to 
sue on the retailer's warranty, not on the manufacturer's. 
Alternative B of Article 2-318 extends a seller's warranty more 
widely than under the provisions of Alternative A. Alternative B 
covers: 
16. Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co 158 A 2d. 110 (Md. 1960) (wife 
as agent of husband). 
17. Lockett v. A and M Charles Ltd [19381 4 All ER 170; Wallis v. 
Russell 119021 2 1k 585. 
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11 ... any natural person who may reasonably be 
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods 
and who is injured in person by breach of the 
warranty". 
Here, the person receiving the gift in the last example could sue on 
the seller's warranty and an action could be brought against the 
manufacturer or any other supplier along the line of distribution. 
Alternative C extends a seller's warranty to include: 
11 ... any person who may be reasonably expected to 
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured by breach of warranty".
-18 
The general trend of judicial decisions in the United States has been 
to move away from Alternative A of Article 2-318 and enlarge the 
scope of recovery. A wide range of plaintiffs have been given the 
benefit of strict liability, irrespective of whether the privity rules 
have been relaxed; implied warranties have been applied to 
manufacturers or strict liability in tort has been invoked. These 
plaintiffs have included members of a purchaser's family, his guests, 
employees, users and borrowers, lessees, passengers, beauty parlour 
patrons, rescuers, bystanders, hospital patients, repairers and 
visitors.
19 
As a result of these developments two authorities have 
summed up the current position: 
"There is little doubt that the trend is towards 
imposing liability without fault where any person is 
injured or suffers propegy damage through contact 
with a defective product". 
18. Alternative C is close to the approach of the Restatement of 
Torts 2d, s402A. None of the Alternatives extends the warranty to a 
case of economic loss without physical damage. 
19. •See C.J.Miller and P.A.Lovell, Product Liability (1977), at 
p.30, citing Greenberg v. Lorenz 173 N.E. 2d 773 (N.Y., 1961); 
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich 7•7:793 P. 2d 799 (1939); Conklin v. 
TITO Waldorf Astoria Corporation  161 N.Y.S. 2d 205 (1957); Petterson  
v. Lamb Rubber Co. 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960); Chapman v. Brown 198 
F.Supp. 78 affirmed 304 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir., 1963); King v. Douglas B  
Aircraft Co., 159 50 2d 108 (Fla. 1963); Garthwait v.  urgio, 216 A. 
2d 189 (Corn. 1965); Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 255 N.E. 
2d 173 (N.Y., 1969); Elmore v. American Motors Corporation 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 652 (1969); BeriThThirT v. Lily-Tulip Corporation 177 50 2d 362 
(Fla. App., 1965), Conolly v. Hagi, 188 A. 2d 884 (Conn., 1963); 
Handrigan v. Apex Warwick Inc., 275 A. 2d 262 (R. I., 1971). 
20. Ibid. 
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Product Liabilities Remedies - Tort or Contract? 
The provisional view of the Law Commission was that if 
additional remedies were needed for the ultimate purchaser or user of 
defective products, they would be more conveniently provided by 
imposing new statutory obligations on the producer than by altering 
the rules of contract law.
21 
The Ontario Law Reform Commission 
noted the developments flowing from the United States case in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.
22 Here the Supreme Court of 
California had abandoned the approach of creating implied warranties 
on the grounds that "... the remedies of consumers ought not to 
depend on the intricacies of the law of sale", 23 and held that the 
liability of the manufacturer was imposed as a rule of public policy 
and was tortious in nature. 24 This view has been followed in later 
decisions.
25 However, the courts were divided as to whether the 
theory of strict tortious liability applies also to defects causing only 
economic loss. It was held to so apply in Santor v. A & M 
Karaghensian Inc, 26 but not to do so in Seely v. White Motor Co. 27 
In Seely's_ case the Supreme Court of California held that principles of 
sales contract law governed claims for economic losses. The courts 
subsequently have been divided in their approach. 28 The choice of 
'theories preferred affects such matters as the e xtent and nature of 
21. The Law Commission, Working Paper No.64, Liability for 
Defective Products, para .134. 
22. (1963) 377 P 2d 897. 
23. Citing Kelter v. Armour and Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (1912). 
24. Ontario Law Reform Commission (1972) Report on Consumer 
Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods, at p.68. 
25. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. 37 Cl Rptr. 896 (Supreme 
Court of California, 1964); Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and  
Rental Service 212 A 2d 769 (N.J. 1965); Stuart v. Crestview Mutual  
Water Co. 110 Cal Rptr 652 (1969); Eln-7)t7---.e v. American Motors  
Corporation 75 Cal Rptr 652 (1969); Sili.— Massey Ferguson Inc.  
296 F. Supp 776 (1969). 
26. (1965) 207 A 2d 305. 
27. (1965) 403 P 2d 145. 
28. See 	comment, 	'Economic 	Loss 	in 	Products 	Liability 
Jurisprudence' (1966) Columbia Law Review 917; C.J.Tobin 'Products 
Liability: a United States Commonwealth comparative survey' (1969) 3 
N.Z.U.L.R. 377. 
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the remedies of the ultimate buyer and the admissibility and effect of 
exemption clauses. 
The Ontario Law Reform Commission came down in favour of 
the manufacturer's liability being governed by sales contract 
principles and not the law of tort. The Ontario Law Reform 
Commission accepted the argument of Chief Justice Traynor in Seely's 
case that there was a basic distinction between a claim for personal 
injuries or physical damages on one hand, and a claim for economic 
loss alone.
29 
Despite situations where defective goods caused both 
personal injuries and economic loss the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission felt that the distinction could be made in the great 
majority of cases. It cited, in support, the fact that there were only 
a few claims in respect of car warranties against domestic and foreign 
manufacturers involving personal injury or physical damages. 30 The 
advantages of the sales contract principles approach were seen to be 
the following. First, it followed an approach made in respect of farm 
machinery legislation in the Canadian provinces and in the doctrine of 
collateral warranties. Second, it put the liability of both the retailer 
and the manufacturer on a similar footing. Third, the manufacturer 
was free to limit or disclaim his liability under the law of sale of 
goods. Fourth, provincial legislatures were given flexibility in 
reaching a basis for products' liability •31 
The provisional view of the British Law Commissions, cited 
earlier, that additional remedies for the ultimate purchaser or user of 
defective products would be best provided without altering contract 
law was reiterated by the Law Commissions in their later report in 
29. Ontario Law Reform Commission (1972) Report on Consumer 
Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods,  at p.70. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ontario Report (1972), at p.70. 
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1977 on Liability for Defective Products.
32 
This report stated as 
follows: 
11 ... we have reached the conclusion that the advice 
which we received is sound and that the law of contract 
should not be extended to meet the problem. If 
additional rights and remedies are to be provided they 
should lie in tort or delict. We note in this context 
that the American law of liability for defective products 
went through a phase when the remedies against 
producers and the remedies against retailers for 
non-purchasers was framed in contract but 3 pave now 
been generally accepted as remedies in tort". 
Accordingly, the Law Commission arrived at the following 
recommendations on the basis of main policy considerations previously 
laid down: 
"(a) 	The loss should lie primarily on the person who 
created the risk. If 10,000 products are 
manufactured in the same run and one, being 
defective, causes an accident, the easiest way of 
spreading the loss fairly is to place it on the 
manufacturer, who can recover the cost of 
insuring against the risk in the price charged 
for his product. 
(b) Liability should be imposed on those in the chain 
of manufacture and distribution who are in the 
best position to exercise control over the quality 
and safety of the product. 	This gives the 
manufacturer the incentive to improve the safety 
standard of his product and reduce the risk of 
further accidents. 
(c) The risk of injury by defective products should 
be borne by those who can most conveniently 
insure against it. The producer is likely to be 
in the best position to do this. 
(d) As the producer is linked in the public mind 
with the product, rather than the retailer, there 
is an expectation that a producer should provide 
compensation when a defective product causes 
harm. 
(e) It is desirable to make it easier to bring actions 
in tort or delict against manufacturers of 
defective products by removing difficulties 
relating to evidence and procedure, particularly 
as the manufacturer may have exclusive 
knowledge of the product's manufacture, design 
and testing. 
32. The Law Commission No.82; the Scottish Law Commission 
No.45, Liability for Defective Products (1977). 
33. Ibid., at para.33, citing Greenman v. Yuba Products Inc 
(1963) 377 P 2d. 897. 
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(f) Litigation can be kept to a minimum by 
permitting a direct action by an injured person 
against the person ultimately responsible for 
causing the injury. 
(g) The recommendations are limited to claims arising 
out of personal injury and death. Strict liability 
for defective products should not extend to 
property damage or other heads, such as 
economic loss. 
(h) The number of persons in the chain of 
manufacture and distribution who should be 
liable to third parties should not exceed the 
number needed to ensure that adequate rights 
and remedies are available to injured persons. 
If this were not done costs, and resultant price 
to the ultimate consumer, would increase. 
(i) The law should not place such heavy additional 
liabilities on producers so as (i) to place them at 
an undue competitive disadvantage in the 
international market or (ii) inhibit technical 
innovation or research or (iii) cause reputable 
manufactuws to cease production with the 
country". 
The major difficulty the Law Commission found was that of 
assessing the cost to the producer of assuming additional liability. 
Strict liability in tort or delict, as recommended, might initially lead 
to an increase in insurance premiums. On the material available to 
the Commission, the likelihood of producers ceasing business or 
setting up abroad as a consequence of strict liability being imposed 
was felt to be slight and a justifiable risk on policy grounds. 
This issue of calculating the cost to producers of strict 
liability was also tackled by the Pearson Committee in their Report in 
1978. The Committee concluded in favour of strict liability in tort by 
producers for death or personal injury caused by defective 
products.
35 
The Committee found that the number of injuries caused 
by products in the United Kingdom was relatively small, and the risk 
34. Law Commission, No.82, Liability for Defective Products, 
para. 38 . 
35. Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for 
Personal Injury (1978) Cmnd. 7054, at paras.1224, 1225, 1230 -1236; 
referred to subsequently as The Pearson Report. 
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of death was lower than for other categories of injury. No published 
statistics existed but a personal injury survey by the Committee 
suggested that between 30,000 and 40,000 injuries a year (about 1 
per cent of all injuries) may be caused by defective products other 
than drugs. Of these, over 10,000 occurred during the course of 
work, and a further 10,000 involved services as well as defective 
products. It was estimated that around 5 per cent of the 38,000 to 
40,000 injuries attracted compensation through tort or contract with 
an average amount of less than/500 being paid (half the average for 
tort compensation as a whole). Claims for products and services 
liability made up 1 per cent of all claims on insurers, but only formed 
0.3 per cent of business in the courts. This and other evidence from 
the Committee's survey suggested that product liability claims tended 
to be disposed of at an earlier stage. These figures did not give an 
indication of the growing nature of the problem.
36 
Some objections to 
strict liability rested on the argument that in some industries 
premiums would have been so substantially increased as to act as a 
restraint on technical innovation. Additionally, in industries where 
catastrophic risk of the thalidomide variety existed, insurance cover 
to meet the potential liability might prove impossible to obtain. 
However, for most industries, the Committee felt that the cost of 
products liability insurance would be small in relation to other 
costs.
37 
The American experience is often cited as an indication of the 
escalation of insurance premiums in a regime of strict liability for 
36. Ibid., at paras.1201-1203. 
37. Pearson Report, (1978), at paras.1228, 1229. The Committee 
were also influenced in their view by their recommendations for 





Such a comparison is misconceived. 	First, in America 
lawyers (and even, in some cases, witnesses) may claim remuneration 
on a contingency basis by receiving a percentage of the damages 
which is a contributing factor in making litigation more expensive in 
the United States than other common law countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Australia.
39 
Second, the cost of medical treatment in 
the American awards is higher than those that apply in Australia (and 
certainly in the United Kingdom with its National Health Service 
system). Third, jury trial is used to a much greater extent than in 
this country to assess issues of liability and the level of damages; as 
a result trials are longer and more expensive and the general level of 
damages awarded are much higher than in other common law 
jurisdictions.
40 . Fourth, many high awards, have not been based on 
strict liability but on proof or admission of fault by the persons 
sued and the readiness of the American courts to award punitive 
damages.
41
. For these reasons the American experience in the 
products liability field is not an appropriate guide. 
38. See Ontario Law Reform Commission (1979) Report on Products 
Liability where the products liability insurance crisis in the United 
States is discussed (at pp.72-73). The Commission noted that the 
American Interagency Task Force on Product Liability concluded that 
there was no foundation for public concern at the so called crisis and 
that there was no evidence that manufacturers could not obtain 
insurance or that, except in a few cases, it could not be afforded by 
them; United States Department of Commerce Interagency Task Force 
on Product Liability Final Report (1978), at pp. VI-2, p.V-17 et seq. 
pp. V12 et seq. 
39. Pearson Report (1978), at para 233, where it is noted that the 
contingency fee system may well absorb as much as 40 or 50 per cent 
of the damages awarded. 
40. Pearson Report (1978), at para 233. 
41. Ontario Law Reform Commission (1979) Report on Products  
Liability, at p.75; the Commission expressly referred to the judgement 
of 3.5 million damages awarded against a car manufacturer for a 
defect in the designed location of a fuel tank in a motor vehicle, 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1978) 21 ATLA Rep. 136 (California 
Supreme Court). The Commission noted (at p.75) that in Canada it 
was unlikely that its courts would award punitive damages in a 
product liability case as the power to award such damages had 
generally been exercised in cases of deliberate infliction of damage. 
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Liability in Tort or Contract? 
The choice of policy lies not simply between strict liability in 
tort or an extension of s sales contract law. The Accidents 
Compensation Act 1974 in New Zealand established a national scheme 
of compensation which circumvented both of these alternatives and 
introduced no fault liability over a very wide area of accidents and 
injuries. The Woodhouse Report42 recommended that an essentially 
similar scheme be set up in Australia. Discussion of no fault liability 
is outside the area of this chapter and reference on this topic should 
be made to relevant authorities. 43 
(B) Third Party Liability on a Bill of Lading  
As earlier noted at the commencement of this chapter the 
doctrine of privity of contract prevents anyone who is not a party to 
a contract from enforcing or benefitting from its provisions. A 
stranger to the contract cannot claim protection of an exemption 
clause within the contract, unless he can bring himself within one of 
the exceptions to the doctrine. In the commercial context the rule 
often works as a barrier to the intentions of the parties and to defeat 
the purposes of a business agreement. 
The Problem Stated  
The problem arising from the doctrine is commonly met when 
damage to goods occurs when stevedores are unloading a ship. A bill 
of lading, signed by the consignors and carriers, contains clauses 
limiting the amount in respect of the goods shipped, or units of the 
particular goods. Although the terms of a bill of lading may attempt 
42. Report of the National Committee of Inquiry on Compensation 
and Rehabilitation in Australia  (1974) Canberra (1974) (Parliamentary 
Paper No.135) 3 vols; referred to as The Woodhouse Report. 
43. See P.S.Atiyah Accidents, Compensation and the Law (3rd 
edition) Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980. 
283 
to extend limitations and protection from liability to the stevedores, 
the stevedores will not be parties to the agreement. Having been 
hired by the carriers the stevedores are in a contractual relationship 
solely with the carriers. The key issue to be resolved in numerous 
cases has turned on whether the stevedores can take the benefit of 
protection given to them in the contract between the consignor and 
the carrier and, if so, in what terms need the bill of lading be 
drafted to achieve this result.
44 
The drafting of what is commonly 
known as a "Himalaya
„45 
clause had the intended effect of granting 
the benefit of an exemption clause on all servants or agents 
(including independent contractors) of the carriers and asserting that 
the carrier was contracting as agent or trustee for such servants or 
agents, who were, thus, to be considered as contracting parties. 
Midland Silicones Case and Lord Reid's Four Conditions of Exemption  
In Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd 46 the House of Lords 
appeared effectively to deny the protection of an exemption clause 
which had been claimed by stevedores. In that case, a drum of 
chemicals was shipped to London from New York. The contract of 
carriage exempted the carriers from liability above $500 (US) per 
44. See, for a discussion of both the cases and the issue of the 
protection of stevedores, N.E.Palmer 'The Stevedore's Dilemma : 
Exemption Clauses and Third Parties' [1974] J.B.L. 101, 220; 
F.D.Rose 'Return to Elder Dempster' (1975) 4 Anglo—Ali L. Rev. 7, 
G.Battersby 'Exemption Clauses and Third Parties' [1975] 25 U. of 
Toronto L.J. 371, [1978] 28 U. of Toronto L.J. 75; A.J.Duggan 
'Offloading the Eurymedon' (1974) 9 M.U.L.R. 753; D.Yates Exclusion  
Clauses in Contracts (1982) Chapter 5. 
45. In Adler v. Dickson [1955] 1 Q.B. 158 the Court of Appeal 
held that Tffi—Tnaste r and boatswain of the 'Himalaya' could not take 
advantage of an exclusion clause in a passenger ticket evidencing the 
contract of carriage between the plaintiff and the shipowner on the 
basis of the absence of privity of contract between the plaintiff and 
the third party. Hence the use of the term 'Himalaya' to describe a 
clause intended to circumvent the effect of the decision in Adler v. 
Dickson.  
46. 119621 A.C. 446. 
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package. While the drum was being unloaded in the Port of London, 
it was damaged by a firm of stevedores employed by the carriers; the 
damage being assessed at three times the limit in the bill of lading. 
The shipowners had, for some years, contracted with the stevedores 
to unload their vessels and the agreement between them, provided 
that the stevedores should have such protection as is afforded by the 
terms of the bills of lading. 
The stevedores admitted negligence in unloading the drum, but 
argued that they were entitled to rely upon the limitation provision in 
the bill of lading, even though they, the stevedores, were not 
mentioned as parties in the bill. 
The House of Lords held that the stevedores could make no 
such claim to entitlement as they were strangers to the bill of lading. 
Their Lordships refused to accept that the stevedores could obtain 
protection from the principle of vicarious immunity. This had been 
established in Elder Dempster & Co Ltd v. Paterson, Zochonis & Co 
Ltd.
47 
In that case, a company had agreed to carry the plaintiffs' 
cargo of palm oil from West Africa to England. The contract between 
the plaintiffs and the company to which the shipowners had not been 
a party, contained an exclusion clause that purported to exclude 
liability on the part of the charterers and also the shipowners for bad 
stowage. The barrels of oil were damaged by bad stowage and the 
plaintiffs sued both the charterers and the shipowners. The House 
of Lords held that the clause protected both the charterers and the 
shipowners against the consequences of bad stowage. The result of 
the decision appeared to be that where a party had employed an 
agent to carry out a contract, that agent was entitled to any 
immunity which the contract gave the principal, in carrying out the 
47. 	[1924] A.C. 522. 
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contract. 	This principle of vicarious Matti-MY, 'although now 
defunct, 48 is arguably consistent with the doctrine of agency, that 
doctrine itself being a useful and long established exception to the 
doctrine of privity.
49 
In Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd their Lordships 
criticised the decision in Elder Dempster on the basis that the 
principle in that case did not establish any general exception for 
contracts of carriage by sea. Their Lordships distinguished Elder 
Dempster from the case before them on the basis of two facts. The 
first was that the third parties seeking the benefit of the provisions 
in the bill of lading in Elder Dempster were shipowners and not 
stevedores. The second was that, in the Elder Dempster case, the 
bill of lading had been signed by the master of the ship. The 
conclusion in the House of Lords was that the Elder Dempster case 
was to be confined to its special facts and was not authority for the 
principle that agents or servants acting under a contract which 
contained an exemption clause could obtain benefit of that clause. 
The Midland Silicones decision was, henceforth, invoked to 
defeat the intentions of carriers and stevedores alike to the extent 
that carriers now provided for an indemnity on the part of the 
forwarding agent for all claims losses and expenses, howsoever 
arising. " 
48. See N.E.Palmer Bailment, Law Book Co (1979), at p.998. 
49. D.Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet and Maxwell 
(1982), at p.162-3; see the application and extension of the principle 
in Mersey Shipping and Transport Co Ltd v. Rea (1925) 21 Lloyd's 
LR 375, 377 by Scrutton L.J. but disapproved 6V —the House of Lords 
in Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones [1962] A.C. 446, Wilson v. 
Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1956) 95 C.L.R. 
43, 69-70, 74-75, 80-81, Adler v. Dickson [1955] 1 Q.B. 158, by the 
Supreme Court of the United States TTaVg11 Machinery Corporation v. 
Robert C Herd & Co Inc [1959] 1 Lloyd's Rep 305. 
50. See Canadian General Electric Co Ltd  v. The Lake Bosomtwe  
and Pickford & Black Ltd [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 81; York Products  
Ltd v. Gilchrist Watt and Sanderson Pty Ltd  [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 3 
T-Sijpreme Court of New South Wales) affirmed on appeal to the Privy 
Council [1970] 3 All E.R. 825; Cabot Corporation v. Mormacscan  
[1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep 351. 
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However, the agency argument put forward on behalf of the 
stevedores in Midland Silicones was regarded by Lord Reid as being 
capable of proving successful in specific circumstances, and this view 
provided a basis for later attempts to provide protection for third 
parties. He said: 
"I can see a possibility of success of the agency 
argument if [first] the bill of lading makes it clear that 
the stevedore is intended to be protected by the 
provisions in it which limit liability, [secondly] the bill 
of lading makes it clear that the carrier, in addition to 
contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is 
also contracting as agent for the stevedore, [thirdly] 
the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, 
or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would 
suffice, and [fourthly] that any difficulties about 51 
consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome". 
It must be noted that the stevedores in Midland Silicones were not 
referred to in the bill of lading, nor was there a clause purporting to 
extend protection to anyone other than the carriers nor any 
suggestion that this protection be shared by the servants, agents or 
independent contractors of the carriers. The contract did not 
provide that the carrier, for the purpose of such immunities, be 
regarded not only as contracting as principal in his own right but 
also as contracting as agent for anyone to whom he delegated the 
performance of the contract. For these reasons the stevedores had to 
rely almost exclusively on the Elder Dempster principle. 
It should be noted that under the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1971 (CwIth) it is provided: 
"If an action is brought against a servant or agent of 
the carrier (such servant or agent not being an  
Independent contractor) [emphasis added] such servant 
or agent shall be entitled to avail himself of the 
defences and limits of liability whibcp the carrier is 
entitled to invoke under these rules'. 
However, in many cases the stevedore has acted as an independent 
contractor and cannot therefore be afforded protection under the 
51. [1962] A.C. 446, at p.474. 
52. Article 4, rule 2 which incorporated the Hague Rules. 
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Act. 53 In Wilson v. Darling Island Stevedoring and Literage Co 
Ltd 54 the High Court of Australia had to consider whether the 
stevedoring company engaged by the shipowner could be regarded as 
an agent of the shipowner. Fullagar J. made the following 
observation: 
"The word 'agent' appears to me to be often misused in 
this connection ... It seems to me quite wrong to say 
that a stevedoring company engaged by a shipowner to 
load or unload a ship is an agent of the shipowner, just 
as it would be wrong to say that a builder is an agent 
of a building owner. If A engages B to lay out a 
garden for him, and B engages C to do the actual 
work, C is not in any intelligible legal sense B's agent. 
B is an independent contractor, and C is either A's 
servant or an independent contractor with A. Agency 
in the 4pgal sense supply does not come into the 
matter". 
This argument does not, and did not, suggest that the carrier may 
never act as an agent for the stevedore. Construction of an agency 
contract was still possible on the basis of Lord Reid's four 
requirements. 
The Eurymedon Case  
In 1974 Lord Reid's four conditions were found to be met for 
the first time in the Privy Council's decision in New Zealand Shipping  
Co Ltd v. A M Satterthwaite (The Eurymedon). 56  In this case, 
53. 	As in Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones [1962] A.C. 466, 
Adler v. Dickson [1955] 1 Q.B. 158. 
(19 -95-C.L.R. 43. 
55. Ibid., at p.70. 
56. 11974] 1 All E.R. 1015; [1975] A.C. 154. For comment on the 
case, its background and implications, see N.E. Palmer 'The 
Stevedore's Dilemma : Exemption Clauses and Third Parties' [1974] 
J.B.L. 101, 220; B.Coote note in (1974) 37 M.L.R. 453, P.J.Davies 
and N.E.Palmer 'The Eurymedon Five Years On' [1979] J.B.L. 337; 
C.A.Ying 'The Himalaya Clause Revisited' (1981) 22 Mal.L.R7T12;note 
F.Dawson (1974-5) 6 N.Z.U.L.R. 161; F.M.B. Reynolds note in 
(1974) 90 L.Q.R. 301; P.H.Clarke 'The Reception of the Eurymedon 
Decision in Australia, Canada and New Zealand' (1980) 29 I.C.L.Q.  
132; D.G.Powles 'The Himalaya Clause' (1979) L.M.C.L.Q. 331; 
S.M.Waddams note in (1977) 55 Can.Bar.Rev 327; L.J. Kovats 'Who is 
to pay for the Stevedore's Negligence?' (1974) L.M.C.L.Q. 121 N.E. 
Palmer Bailment (1979) Law Book Co., at pp.986-1007 (bailment and 
third parties 
288 
drilling machinery was sent from Liverpool to Wellington by the 
consignor for transhipment to the plaintiff as consignee in New 
Zealand under a bill of lading issued by agents for the carrier. A 
clause in the bill of lading conferred certain exemptions and 
immunities on the carrier. The consignors signed the bill of lading 
which contained the following clause: 
"It is hereby expressly agreed that no servant or agent 
of the carrier (including every independent contractor 
from time to time employed by the carrier shall in any 
circumstances whatsoever be under any liability 
whatsoever to the shipper, consignee or owner of the 
goods or to any holder of this bill of lading for any 
loss, damage or delay of whatsoever kind arising or 
resulting directly or indirectly from any act neglect or 
default on his part while acting in the course of or in 
connection with his employment and, without prejudice 
to the generality of the foregoing provisions in this 
clause, every exemption, limitation, condition, and 
liberty herein contained and every right, exemption 
from liability, defence and immunity of whatsoever 
nature applicable to the carrier or to which the carrier 
is entitled hereunder shall also be available and shall 
extend to protect every such servant or agent of the 
carrier acting as aforesaid and for the purpose of all 
the foregoing provisions of this clause the carrier is or 
shall be deemed to be acting as agent or trustee on 
behalf of and for the benefit of all persons who are or 
might be his servants or agents from time to time 
(including independent contractors as aforesaid) and all 
such persons shall to this extent be, or be deemed to 
be parties to the contract in or evidenced by this bill 
of lading ... The carrier will not be accountable for 
any goods of any description beyond 100 in respect of 
any one package or unit unless ... [followed by 
arrangements for specifying valuer. 
On arrival in Wellington, the machinery was damaged by the 
negligence of employees of the stevedore. The consignees of the 
goods, who at this point had become its owners, sued the stevedores 
more than one year after the cause of action arose. The stevedores, 
who were in an unusual relationship with the carriers in that the 
stevedores owned the latter, admitted negligence but claimed the 
protection of the bill of lading; which included a provision that 




At first instance58 Beattie J. rejected the argument that in 
signing the bill of lading the carriers were themselves acting as 
principals and, at the same time in respect of the benefits of the 
limitation clause, as agents for the stevedores. When the bill of 
lading was signed, the stevedores had not undertaken to perform any 
obligation in relation to the consignors. On this basis, the judge 
held the stevedores could not force the party to adhere to their part 
of the bargain. The agency argument, as a result, was not 
sustainable. Additionally, the complex provisions inserted in the bill 
of lading too were held to be inadequate to circumvent the doctrine of 
privity of contract. Beattie J. also rejected the vicarious immunity 
principle enshrined in the Elder Dempster decision which he regarded 
as overruled by the Midlands Silicones case. He also rejected the 
argument which had been advanced by Lord Denning (obiter) in the 
Midlands Silicones
59 
case that where stevedores were specifically 
mentioned in the bill of lading the cargo owners may be bound to an 
implied consent to the risk of the stevedores negligence. He finally 
rejected the contention that the bill of lading in terms of the clause 
cited above created a trust of the consignor's promise which the 
stevedores could enforce as beneficiaries of the trust. However, 
Beattie J. was able to construe the consignor's signing of the bill of 
lading as an offer to whoever unloaded the goods at the final 
destination that they (the stevedores) should take the benefit of the 
immunities given to the carriers in the bill of lading. This offer, 
made through the agency of the carriers, was viewed by the judge as 
57. Incorporating the Schedule to the Carriage of Goods Act 1924 
(U.K.). 
58. [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep 399; [1972] N.Z.L.R. 385. 
59. [1962] A.0 446, at pp.489-490. 
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accepted and turned into a binding contract when the stevedores 
commenced unloading the goods in Wellington (on the basis of 
Carlin's" case). This unilateral contract embodied the benefits of 
immunity in the main contract between the consignor and the carrier. 
The consideration for the consignor's offer was the stevedore's 
unloading the goods in that performance by the stevedores of a 
pre-existing contractual obligation with the carriers amounted to good 
consideration on the part of the performer. 61 




	They held that the device of a unilateral contract did not 
aid the stevedores as the facts of the case was not akin to that in 
Carlill's case; further, the bill of lading was not so phrased to be 
construed as an offer of immunity capable of acceptance. In their 
view the relevant clauses were drawn on the basis of relations 
between the parties when the bill of lading was signed not at a later 
date when a given event took place to supposedly turn the offer into 
a contract. 
The Privy Council, on appeal by the stevedores from the 
decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, by a majority held that 
the clause at issue did protect the stevedores. 63 Lord Wilberforce, 




"There is possibly more than one way of analysing this 
business transaction into the necessary components ... 
the bill of lading brought into existence a bargain 
initially unilateral but capable of becoming mutual, 
between the shipper and the [stevedores], made 
through the carrier as agent. This became a full 
contract when the stevedores performed services by 
discharging the goods. The performance of these 
60. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Ltd [1893] 1 Q.B. 256. 
61. Beattie J. relying on Scotson v. Pegg (1891) 6 H & N 296; 152 
• E. R. 121. 
62. [1973] 1 N.Z.L.R. 174. 
63. New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v. A M Satterthwaite & Co Ltd  
[1975] A.C. 154, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Simon dissenting. 
64. See supra. 
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services for the benefit of the shipper was the 
consideration for the agreement by the shipper that the 
appellant should have the benefit of the egmptions and 
limitations contained in the bill of lading". 
This statement appeared to approve both the bilateral and unilateral 
theories of analysis, without attempting to distinguish between the 
two, although the unilateral approach was favoured. 
This latter analysis has its problems. If it is valid until there 
was an act of performance, such as unloading the goods at Wellington 
in the case at issue, no immunity would be given to the stevedores, 
or if they damaged the goods prior to unloading. Equally, the 
owners could withdraw such a unilateral offer before performance.
66 
The alternative approach which was suggested by Lord Wilberforce 
was an immediate bilateral contract having been concluded between the 
consignors and the stevedores through the agency of the carriers. 
On this basis, the agreement of the stevedores to unload the goods 
provided the consideration, rather than the act of unloading, even 
though the stevedores were under a duty to the carriers to unload 
the cargo. In Lord Wilberforce's view "... an agreement to do an act 
which the promissor is under an existing obligation to a third party 
to do, may quite well amount to valid consideration and does so in the 
present case".
67 
The secondary contract would, therefore, come into 
existence contemporaneously with the main agreement, protecting the 
stevedores prior to the unloading of the goods (on the basis of the 
bilateral contract analysis). 
The overwhelmiri§ consideration which was implicit in the Privy 
Council decision in the Eurymedon was that of commercial realities. 
In the words of Lord Wilberforce: 
65. [1975] AC 154, at 167-168; [1974] 1 All ER 1015, 1020. 
66. See F.D.Rose and N.E.Palmer 'Return to Midland Silicones', 
note in (1976) 39 M.L.R. 466. 
67. [1975] AC 154, 168; [1974] 1 All ER 1015, 1021 citing Scotson  
v. Pegg (1861) H & N 295. 
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"The whole contract is of a commercial character, 
involving service on one side, rates of payment on the 
other, and qualifying stipulations as to both. The 
relations of all parties to each other are commercial 
relations entered into for business reasons of ultimate 
profit. To describe one set of promises, in this 
context, as gratuitous, or nudum pactum, seems 
paradoxical and is prima facie implausible. It is only 
the precise analysis of this complex of relations into the 
classical offer and acceptance, with identifiable 
consideration, that seems to present difficulty, but this 
same difficulty exists in many situations of daily life, 
e.g. sales at auction; supermarket purchases; boarding 
an omnibus; purchasing a train ticket; tenders for the 
supply of goods; offers of reward; acceptance by post; 
warranties of authority by agents; manufacturers; 
guarantees; gratuitous bailments; bankers' commercial 
credits. These. are all examples which show that 
English law, having committed itself to a rather 
technical and schematic doctrine of contract, in 
application takes a practical approach, often at the cost 
of forcing the facts to fit uneasily into ne marked slots 
of offer, acceptance and consideration." 
The United States courts had, as Lord Wilberforce pointed out, dealt 
with a similar clause in a case where the carrier contracted as agent 
for the stevedores and other independent contractors.
69 
In their 
Lordships' view, there was no reason why Commonwealth law should 
be more restrictive and technical as regards agency contracts than in 
the United States. "Commercial considerations should have the same 
force on both sides of the Pacific". 70 In the view of their Lordships: 
11 ... to give the stevedore the benefit of the exemptions 
and limitations contained in the bill of lading is to give 
effect to the clear intentions of a commercial document, 
and can be given within existing principles. They see 
no reason to strain then law or the facts in order to 
defeat these intentions". 
Accordingly, one might regard the Privy Council decision in New 
Zealand Shipping Co Ltd as upholding a commercial bargain without 
subjecting it to the over-narrow technicalities of the doctrine of 
68. [1975] A.C. 154, at pp. 167; [1974] 1 All E.R. 1015, at 
pp.1019-1020. 
69. Carle and Montanan i Inc v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines 
Inc [19681 1 Lloyd's Rep 260; see also Tessler Bros (BC) Ltd v. intaf 
iriCific Line [1972] A.M.C. 937. 
70. Per Lord Wilberforce [1975] A.C. 154, at p.169; [1974] 1 All 
E.R. 1015, at p.1021. 
71. Ibid. 
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privity of contract. 72 
However, despite the tenor of the Privy Council decision, 
uncertainies remained, chiefly due to the obscurity of the content and 
interrelationships of Lord Reid's four conditions, and these were 
sufficient to ensure that the Eurymedon was rarely followed in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, and was distinguished and disregarded 
more often than it was applied.
73 
In Herrick v. Leonard and Dingley Ltd
74 
a consignee of a 
motorcar which was being carried under an automobile carriage 
contract sued a stevedore in respect of damage which occurred while 
unloading the car. The Supreme Court of New Zealand distinguished 
the Eurymedon as the automobile carriage contract did not make it 
clear that the stevedore was intended to be protected by its 
provisions. 
72. See N.E.Palmer [19741 'The Stevedore's Dilemma: Exemption 
Clauses and Third Parties' J.B.L. 101, 117-118, where Lord 
Wilberforce's point is taken that theproblem is to ensure that 
consignors and consignees should not be helped to evade exemptions 
which they have knowingly accepted (and which are embodied in 
freight rates) by breaking their agreements and suing the servants, 
agents or independent contractors of the carrier. The majority of the 
Privy Council held that even if the Merchantile Law Act 1908 (N.Z.) 
s13 did not apply (by which the consignees were made subject to the 
same liabilities in respect of such goods as if the contract contained 
in the bill of lading had been• made with them) then previously 
established case law, principally Brandt v. Liverpool, Brazil and  
River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1924] 1 K.B. 575 bound a 
consignee to all the immunities and benefits in the bill once he had 
accepted it and requested delivery of the goods. Note the UK 
equivalent of the New Zealand statute is the Bills of Lading Act 1855. 
73. See P.H.Clarke 'The Reception of the Eurymedon Decision in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand' (1980) 29 I.C.L.Q. 132; 
P.J.Davies & N.E.Palmer 'The Eurymedon Five Year s Oir1 [1979] 
J.B.L. 337. The decision was not followed in The Federal Schelde 
[1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 285 (Quebec), The Suleyman Stalskiy [1976] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 609, Calkins & Burke Ltd v. Empire Stevedoring Co Ltd  
[1976] 4 WWR 337 (British Columbia), Lummus Co Ltd v. East African  
Harbours Corporation [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 317 (Kenya), the decision 
was distinguished in Herrick v. Leonard and Dingley Ltd [1975] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 566, apparently ignored in Philip Morris (Australia) Pty Ltd  
v. The Transport Commission  [1975] Tas.S.R. 128 (Tasmania), and 
exceptionally followed in Eisen und Metall AG v. Ceres Stevedoring Co  
Ltd [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 665 but reversed on appeal to the Quebec 
tiTirt of Appeal, [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 665. 
74• 	[1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 566. 
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In The "Suleyman Stalskiy" 75 (1976) the case was distinguished and 
as a result, the stevedore failed because the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia held that the carrier had no authority to contract as 
agent for the stevedore. Apparently, no evidence had been led in 
this respect and no inference was drawn. Again, in Eisen und Metall  
A.G. v. Ceres Stevedoring Co Ltd and Another 76  the case was 
distinguished by the Court of Appeal in the District of Montreal and 
the stevedore failed because in the province of Quebec, it was illegal 
to contract out of liability resulting from gross negligence. In 
Lummus Co Ltd v. East African Harbours Corporation " , the High 
Court of Kenya refused to follow the Eurymedon on the basis of 
contrary decisions of the East African Court of Appeal which 
ante-dated the Eurymedon but which were regarded as binding. 
Although there was no specific disagreement evident from these cases, 
the impression which emerged was one of reluctance to adopt the 
Eurymedon as a strong precedent. 
"Salmond & Spraggon" and the "New York Star"  
In Port Jackson Stevedoring Pty Ltd v. Salmond & Spraggon 
(Australia) Pty Ltd78 a cargo of cartons of razor blades was shipped 
on a vessel called the New York Star. The bill of lading constituted 
a contract between the consignor and the carrier. A "Himalaya" 
exemption clause (identical to that in the Eurymedon case) in the bill 
purported to exempt the carrier's servants, agents, and independent 
contractors from loss or damage of whatsoever kind arising directly or 
indirectly from any act, neglect or default whilst acting in the 
employment of the carrier. There was also a requirement in the bill 
Rep. 609. 75. [1976] 2 Lloyd's 
76. [1977] 1 	Lloyd's Rep. 665. 
77. [1978] 1 	Lloyd's Rep. 	317. 
78. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 333 (High Court of Australia). 
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that any action in respect of loss or damage had to be brought within 
one year after delivery. The consignor assigned its rights under the 
bill of lading to the consignee (Sa!mond & Spraggon) and the carrier 
employed stevedores (Port Jackson Stevedoring) to off-load the goods 
store them in a dockside warehouse. This was done by the 
stevedores, but their employees allowed a thief to take the goods from 
the warehouse, and drive away with them, though the thief had not 
got the necessary documents of ownership. It was accepted by both 
the consignees and stevedores in the ensuing action that the 
stevedores had acted negligently. In an action for damages brought 
by the consignee for damages the stevedore claimed that the 
"Himalaya" and time clauses described above protected them from 
liability for the loss of the goods, even in the case of any admitted 
negligence. The consignee argued that privity of contract prevented 
the stevedores from claiming the benefit of the exemption clauses in 
the bill of lading in that the stevedores were not a party to that bill. 
The stevedores, on their part, claimed that the carriers had entered 
into the bill of lading not only on their own behalf, but in respect of 
the exemption clause and the time clause, as agent for the 
stevedores, as that was expressly stated in the bill. 
In the hearing at first instance in the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales,
79 
Sheppard J. found for the stevedores. The necessary 
agency, in his opinion, had been established by ratification which 
enabled the stevedores to rely on the exemption clauses. This 
decision was reversed on appeal to the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal. 80 That court held that the off-loading and storing of goods 
by the stevedore although done as result of the agreement with the 
79. Unreported, 14/7/1975. 
80. [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 445; see P.H.Clarke 'The Reception of 
the Eurymedon Decision in Australia, Canada and New Zealand' (1980) 
29 I.C.L.Q. 132, 139-141. 
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The High Court did find, with one dissentient, 86 that the stevedores 
had provided consideration by unloading the goods, Mason and Jacobs 
JJ. holding that the stevedores did act in reliance on the shipper's 
offer. 
The interpretation placed upon the relevant terms of the bill of 
lading by Barwick C.J. is worth noting in the light of the approval 
which was given to it by the Privy Council in its later decision. 87 
Barwick C.J. was of the opinion that there was a contract between 
the consignor and the stevedores which became binding when the 
stevedores began to carry out the unloading and the stevedores had 
the protection of the exemption clause even after the goods were 
off-loaded from the ship. In Barwick C.J.'s view, the bill of lading 
was neither a contract nor an offer, but was a pre-contractual 
bargain between the consignor and the stevedores. Once the 
stevedores carried out services in relation to the cargo then the 
exemptions from liability were to apply between the parties: 
I find no difficulty in interpreting the arrangement 
made by the bill of lading and its acceptance by the 
consignor as providing that if, In fact, the appellant 
stevedored the cargo, leaving aside for the moment 
what the stevedoring involved, the appellant should 
have the benefit of the clauses of the bill including the 
benefit of the time limitation expressed in c1.17 of the 
bill of lading. I am unable to treat the clauses of the 
bill of lading as in any respect an unaccepted but 
acceptable offer by the consignor to stevedore ... To 
agree with another that, in the event that the other 
acts in a particular way, that other shall be entitled to 
stated protective provisions only needs performance by 
the doing of the specified act or acts to become a 
binding contract. ... The performance of the 
contemplated act both supplies the occasion for those 
conditions to operate and the consideration which makes 
the arrangement contractual ... we have here an 
arrangement, a compact with agreed conditions to attend 
the performance of certain acts, which are not promised 
to be done. True enough that, until such performance, 
the consensus has nothing upon which to operate. But 
that is its essential characteristic, to provide an agreed 
consequence to future action should that action take 
86. Stephen J. 
87. [19801 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317, at p.322. 
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place: 	to attach conditions arising from conduct. 	If 
one desires to use the terms, it could be said that the 
arrangement is mutual: it is bilateral: to it there are 
two parties both agreeing to the terms of the intended 
consequence, on the one hand the consignor and on the 
other the stevedo% acting through its authorised 
agent, the carrier". 
The High Court, by its decision in Port Jackson, therefore, 
restricted the operation of the Eurymedon. Two of the judges, 
Stephen and Murphy JJ. did not follow the Eurymedon in Australia 
for reasons of policy.
89 
Both argued that in a country such as 
Australia which was dependant on foreign carriers for the movement 
of goods, the interests of shippers would be prejudiced to allow 
carriers to exclude liability for themselves and those performing 
services on their behalf. As Murphy J. put it: 
"Australian importers have no real freedom in their 
arrangements; to regard these as being in the area of 
contract is a distortion. The bill of lading in this case 
shows that, although there are references to the 
carrier's obligations, the thrust of the document is to 
relieve the caRier and its agents from virtually all 
responsibility". 
Therefore, both Murphy and Stephen JJ. were of the opinion that 
Australian courts should not agree to a doctrine such as that of the 
Eurymedon which assisted ship-owning nations to the detriment of 
ship-user nations. 
The Privy Council, in hearing the appeal from the High Court 
of Australia, unanimously reaffirmed the correctness of the decision in 
the Eurymedon. In relation to the matter of consideration and the 
construction of the contract the Privy Council did not discuss the 
issue of consideration but essentially approved Barwick C.J.'s 
examination 91 : 
88. (1978) A.L.R. 333, at pp. 3 143-3 14 14. 
89. (1978) A.L.R. 333, Stephen J., at pp.355-56, Murphy J., at 
p.376. 
90. Ibid., at p.376. 
91. (1979) A.L.R. 333, at pp. 343-344. 
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"The provision of consideration by the stevedore was 
held to follow from this board's decision in 
Satterthwaites case and in addition was Odependently 
justified through Barwick C.J.'s analysis". 
The Board felt that any stevedores employed by the carrier would 
normally and typically come within the phrase "servant or agent of 
the carrier" in clause 2 of the bill of lading. The normal situation 
was that stevedores had the benefit of any arrangement between a 
carrier and a shipper, where it was understood that the carrier would 
employ stevedores to carry out work in relation to the goods and 
where the intention was clearly expressed that the stevedores should 
benefit from the terms contained in the bill of lading.
93 
Lord 
Wilberforce gave the essence of the Judicial Committee's as follows: 
"[The Satterthwaite] case was a decision, in principle, 
that the Himalaya clause is capable of conferring on a 
third person falling within the description 'servant or 
agent of the carrier (including every independent 
contractor from time to time employed by the carrier)' 
defences and immunities conferred by the bill of lading 
on the carrier as if such persons were parties to the 
contract contained in or 'evidenced by the bill of lading 
... Their Lordships would not encourage a search for 
fine distinctions which would diminish the general 
applicability in the light94 of established commercial 
practice, of the principle". 
The argument that the bill of lading did not have any effect 
on the stevedore's rights and liabilities after the goods had passed 
over the ship's rail was dealt with by the Committee in practical 
fashion. The respondents had argued that the stevedores were not 
acting as carriers nor carrying out any duties as carriers under the 
bill of lading once they had unloaded the vessel and after the goods 
had been stored. At this point, ran the argument, the stevedores 
92. [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317, at p.322. 
93. Ibid., per Lord Wilberforce, at p.321. 
94 . 	[1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317, at p.321. 
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were not acting as carriers but were simply bailees, so that the bill 
of lading could not regulate the duties of stevedores as bailees. 
Although the High Court had based their majority decision on this 
argument, the Committee regarded it as unreal to suggest that the 
carrier's obligations ended as soon as the goods were discharged over 
the ship's rail, even though the bill of lading (Clause 8) provided for 
the termination of the carriers liability at that point. The bill of 
lading elsewhere (Clause 5) specifically provided that, while the 
carrier's responsibility as a carrier ended as soon as the goods left 
the ship's tackle, its liability after that was to be that of an ordinary 
bailee. The bill of lading, therefore, in the Judicial Committee's 
view, envisaged a continuing responsibility for the goods and the 
carriers' operating in accordance with those terms and it recognised 
the usual commercial practice by which the stevedores take delivery 
of the goods, sorting and storing them until the consignee arrived to 
take them. 	If the carrier acted as a stevedore itself, its liability 
would be determined by the terms of the bill of lading. 	Since 
stevedores were employed and made a party to the bill of lading their 
liability had been similarly governed. 
The Judicial Committee regarded the argument that the 
stevedores could not rely on the written terms of the bill of lading 
since they were in fundamental breach of contract as unsound and 
misconceived. This was the case because of the fact that the carrier 
had been specifically discharged from all liability unless an action was 
brought within one year after the goods were, or ought to have 
been, delivered (Clause 17). In any case, the Committee was of the 
view that, that particular clause did not relate to performance, since 
it came into effect only after the performance of the contract had 
become impossible or been given up. The clause then regulated the 
way in which liability for breach of contract was to be established. 
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The Judicial Committee found it to be similar to arbitration or forum 
clauses,
95 
which, on clear authority, survive a repudiatory breach. 
Accordingly, on construction and analysis, the clause plainly operated 
to exclude the claim by the respondents against the stevedores. 96 
The decision of the Privy Council in the New York Star  
underlined the commercial realities of the transactions involved. It 
may be argued, as it was in the High Court by Stephen J., 97 that it 
would make ,greater commercial sense to hold careless stevedores liable 
to a shipper or a consignee who do not appoint or control them, 
rather than give stevedores immunity and, thus, put the risk on the 
shipper or consignee (or his underwriter). Although the shipper 
obtains the benefit of a lower freight rate if such stevedores were 
exempt from liability, arguably there would be no sanction available to 
ensure that the stevedore would take care of the goods and, thus, 
avert loss. Even if the stevedoring contract provided that the 
carrier indemnify the stevedore against all liability, the carrier might 
justifiably bear the risk rather than the shipper since the carrier is 
in a position to influence the conduct of the stevedore. However, no 
cargo owner is likely to drop his insurance cover simply because he 
has legal recourse against a wrongdoing third party, such as a 
stevedore, since claims can generally be settled more expeditiously 
against underwriters than against the wrongdoer. To leave this risk 
ultimately with the carrier or the stevedore therefore involves an 
element of double insurance, which increases cargo transport costs, 
as the carrier will insure his potential liability for cargo damage with 
95. [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep 317, at p.322, Lord Wilberforce citing 
Heyman v. Darwins (1942) A.C. 365, (1942) 72 Li .L. Rep 65, Photo 
Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 1 All E.R. 556, at 
p.567, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 283, at p.295. 
96. [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317, at p.322. 
97. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 332, at p.355. 
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his P & I Club,
98 
and the cargo owner will insure the same risk of 
damage to the cargo with his underwriters.
99 
Developments Since the New York Star  
Recent decisions in Australia have favourably adopted the 
Privy Council decision in the New York Star, and, indeed, have 
arguably extended it. In Broken Hill Pty Ltd v. Hapag-Lloyd  
Aktiengesellschaft l Toll Chadwick, an inland carrier and agent of the 
ocean carrier Hapag-Lloyd, negligently damaged goods in transit 
between Sydney and Newcastle. Clause 4(1) of the combined 
transport bill of lading provided that the carrier should be entitled to 
subcontract the carriage or any part of it. Clause 4(2) stipulated 
that there should be no claims made against any party by whom any 
part of the carriage was performed other than the carrier. 
"Sub-contracting and Indemnity 
4(i) 	The carrier shall be entitled to sub-contract on 
any terms the whole or any part of the carriage. 
4(ii) 	The 	merchant 	[ie. 	the 	cargo 	interests] 
undertakes that no claim or allegation shall be 
made against any person whomsoever by whom 
the carriage or any part of the carriage is 
performed or undertaken (other than the 
carrier) ... and if any such claim or allegation 
should nevertheless be made to indemnify the 
carrier against all consequences thereof. 
Without prejudice to the foregoing every such 
person shall have the benefit of all provisions 
herein benefiting the carrier and [sic] if such 
provisions were expressly for his benefit; and in 
entering into this contract, the carrier, to the 
extent of these provisions, does so not only on 
98. Protecting and Indemnity Club; an association or club of 
shipowners formed to insure eaqh other against maritime losses. 
99. Note the trend in current international conventions is to permit 
the carrier's 'servants or agents' to avail themselves of defences and 
limits of liability open to the carrier against a shipper; see Art IV 
bis, r 2 of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
1. 	(1980) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 572. 
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his own behalf but also as agent and trustee for 
such persons". 
BHP, the consignees, sued Hapag-Lloyd and Toll Chadwick for 
damages. Toll Chadwick cross claimed for damages against 
Hapag-Lloyd and Hapag-Lloyd cross claimed against BHP. In the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales Yeldham J. noted: 
"Some of the foregoing defences ... raise squarely for 
consideration the application to this bill of lading, and 
to the circumstances of the present case, of principles 
enunciated in New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v. AM 
Satterthwaite 6 Co Ltd and in Port 21ackson Stevedoring  
Pty Ltd v. Salmond and Spraggon". 
As the stevedores had a similar provision in the bill of lading to that in 
The New York Star, Toll Chadwick, the inland carrier, pleaded clause 
4(2) in its defence. In a notice of motion filed by Hapag-Lloyd 
before the hearing of the action, the ocean carrier sought to have the 
cargo owner's claim against the inland carrier permanently stayed on 
the ground that a Court of Equity would have intervened to restrain 
the breach of the negative provision in clause 4(2) and because of 
the circuity of action. The latter instance would occur were the 
cargo owners to recover damages from the inland carrier, who could 
claim an indemnity from the ocean carrier, who, in turn, would be 
entitled to be indemnified by the cargo owners under the terms of the 
bill of lading. The cargo owner argued that the ocean carrier lacked 
a proper interest in bringing the motion, and was also precluded by 
the equitable doctrine of laches (delay in fi ling the motion). 
The New South Wales Supreme Court held that the ocean 
carrier had a legal right to the performance of the contract and the 
shipowner had a sufficient interest in enforcing the promise, since 
rates of carriage and other commercial transactions between the ocean 
carrier and inland carriers would be affected by the inland carrier's 
2. 	Ibid., at p.577. 
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knowledge that they were protected by clause 4(2). The stay was 
granted as there was, in the court's view, no unjust advantage 
accruing to the ocean carrier as a result of delay in filing the motion. 
As the inland carrier was sufficiently protected by the court order 
permanently staying proceedings brought against it by the cargo 
owners the court did not pronounce on the alternative ground raised 
by the ocean carrier to support a stay of proceedings (that is, the 
circuity of action), nor on the merits of the cross-claim by the ocean 
carrier against the cargo-owners. 
Yeldham J. held that Hapag-Lloyd could subcontract its duties 
under the express terms in clause 4(1), and, by so doing, were able 
to transfer the indemnity in clause 4(2) to Toll Chadwick, the inland 
carrier and third party. Because the plaintiff, the cargo owner, had 
agreed not to make any° claim against the parties, including 
sub-contractors, a stay of proceedings would be granted, preventing 
the cargo owner from pursuing a claim against the sub-contractor. 
The exact terms of clause 4(2) of the bill of lading, which contained 
a promise that the cargo owner would not make a claim against the 
sub-contractor, was thus given appropriate effect. 
In Sidney Cook Ltd v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft and  
Another 3 Hapag-Lloyd had entered into an agreement with the sellers 
of a printing unit to carry it from Hamburg to Sydney. The seller 
endorsed the bill of lading over to Sidney Cooke Ltd, the purchaser. 
The printing unit was damaged whilst in the control of the agent of 
Hapag-Lloyd, the operators of an inland container terminal, before 
delivery to Sidney Cooke and eighteen days after discharge from the 
vessel. The bill of lading was identical to that in the BHP case 
above and contained a definition of 'carriage' which included the 
whole of the operation• from receipt of the cargo until delivery. It 
3. 	[1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 588. 
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had been stipulated in the contract that the carriage could be 
sub-contracted, as it had been in clause 4(1) in the BHP case, and 
that an indemnity to the sub-contractor could be transferred as in 
clause 4(2) of the same case. 
In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Yeldham J. held 
that clause 4(1) was binding and that clause 4(2) of the bill of lading 
would not only be limited in its operation to the carriage by sea. 
The bill of lading made reference to three stages in the carriage 
where damage was possible; from receipt of the goods until loading, 
during sea carriage, and from discharge before delivery. Yeldham J. 
agreed with the reasoning of the Privy Council in the New York Star 
that a search for fine distinctions should not be made which would: 
11 ... confine the contract of carriage to the mere 
sea-leg of the entire operation and preclude a stevedore 
or person in the situation of a second defendant from 
receiving the benefit irf a clause such as that presently 
under consideration". 
Accordingly, he rejected the argument advanced by the plaintiffs that 
the proper construction of the clause only applied to the carriage by 
sea and did not apply to the terminal operators who had handled the 
cargo more than two weeks after its discharge from the vessel. 
Yeldham J. also stipulated that those who had been sub-contracted 
part or all of the sea-leg, were not "carriers" for the purposes of 
Art. 3 r8 of the Hague Rules. Therefore, clause 4(2) was not, 
refuting the plaintiffs argument, void on the basis of Art. 3 r8 of the 
Rules. The Supreme Court of New South Wales, as in the BHP case, 
stayed the action against the terminal operators and gave them the 
benefit of clause 4(2). 
A year later, Yeldham J. in the same court in the case of 
Celthene Pty Ltd v. W.K.J. Hauliers Pty Ltd and Another 5 applied 
4. Ibid., 596. 
5. [19811 1 N . S.W. L. R. 606 ( Common Law Division) . 
306 
the principles which had been outlined in the Eurymedon and The 
New York Star cases and also Lord Reid's four criteria in the 
Scruttons Ltd case outside the carriage of goods by sea and held 
them to additionally apply to the carriage of goods by road. The 
plaintiffs were the owners and consignors of goods to be sent by road 
from Melbourne to consignees in Sydney. The consignment note 
issued by the consignor to the carrier purported to give the 
sub-contractor(s) of a carrier the protection of certain exemption 
clauses in the consignment notes. These included provisions under 
which the carrier was empowered to sub-contract any the goods the 
subject of the contract, and by which the goods were carried at the 
consignor's risk and not of the carrier. Further, the carrier was not 
to be liable in tort, contract or otherwise for any loss or damage to 
the goods carried whether caused by the carrier or others. The 
actual carriage of the goods was undertaken by W.K.J. Hauliers Pty 
Ltd who had been hired on behalf of the consignors by Alltrans 
Express, a division of TNT Management Pty Ltd. In the course of 
the carriage to Sydney the goods were extensively damaged as a 
result of the admitted negligence of an employee driver of W.K.J. 
Hauliers. 
In the ensuing action by the plaintiff against the carriers and 
their driver, it was common ground between the parties that the 
plaintiff was entitled to succeed unless the defendants could establish 
that they were protected by conditions 3 and 5 of the contract of 
carriage. These were as follows: 
113 . 	The Consignor hereby authorises the Carrier (if 
it should think fit to do so) to arrange with a 
sub-contractor or sub-contractors for the 
carriage of any goods the subject of this 
contract. Any such arrangement shall be 
deemed to be ratified by the Consignor upon 
delivery of the said goods to such 
sub-contractor or sub-contractors who shall 
thereupon be entitled to the full benefit of these 
terms and conditions to the same extent as the 
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carrier: in so far as it may be necessary to 
ensure that such sub-contractor or 
sub-contractors shall be so entitled the Carrier 
shall be deemed to enter into this contract for 
its own benefit and also as agent for the 
sub-contractor or sub-contractors ... 
5. 	The goods are at the risk of the Consignor and 
not the Carrier and unless expressly agreed in 
writing the Carrier shall not be responsible in 
tort or contract or otherwise for any loss of or 
damage to or deterioration of goods or 
misdelivery or failure to deliver or delay in 
delivery of goods including chilled, frozen, 
refrigerated or perishable goods either in transit 
or in storage for any reason whatsoever 
including without limiting the foregoing the 
negligence or wilful act or default of the Carrier 
or others and this clause shall apply to all such 
loss of or damage to or deterioration of goods or 
misdelivery or failure to deliver or delay in 
delivery of goods as aforesaid whether or not 
the same occurs in the course of performance by 
the Carrier of the contract or in events which 
are in the contemplation of the Carrier and/or 
the Consignor or in events which are foreseeable 
by them or either of them or in events which 
would constitute a fundamental breach, of the 
contract or a breach of a fundamental term 
thereof ..." 
In his judgement, Yeldham J. noted that although the problems that 
had arisen in past cases, particularly in the Eurymedon or The New  
York Star cases concerned carriage of goods by sea it did not follow 
that Lord Reid's four criteria in the Scruttons case
6 
case related only 
to sea carriage of goods and to stevedoring operations: 
"... none of the decisions to which I was referred or 
which I have consulted for myself lend support to the 
view that the principles [in The Eurymedon or The New 
York Star] may only successfully be applied in cases 
concerned, as they were, with sea carriage. It is 
apparent that, in the future, as in the past, that type 
of carriage will continue to provide most frequently the 
occasion where the application of the relevant principles 
can be considered ... But it is plain that the various 
cases have been decided by the application of the 
ordinary principles of the common law to the facts of 
the particular matter ... 
6. 	11962] A.C. 446, at p.474. 
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Barwick C.J., whose judgement [in Port Jackson  
Stevedoring Pty Ltd] was expressly approved by the 
Judicial Committee, said ((1978) 139 CLR 231, at p250): 
'Their Lordships decision in The Eurymedon was of 
great moment in the commercial world and, if I may say 
so, an outstanding example of the ability of the law to 
render effective the practical expectations of those 
engaged in the transportation of goods. It is not a 
decision of its nature to be narrowly or pedantically 
confined ... ' 
I do not think the Chief Justice, in the passage which I 
have set out, was intending to confine the principle to 
the transportation of goods, and certainly not to the 
transportation of goods by sea. Rather it was an 
acknowledgement that the result [in The Eurymedon] 
had been arrived at by the application of ordinary 
principles to a particular commercial situation which was 
of great importance. Perhaps it is easier, because of 
the intimate association between many shipowners or 
charterers on the one hand and stevedores on the 
other, for the relevant criteria to be satisfied in cases 
of sea carriage than in situations such as the present 
matter is concerned with. But it is plain that the same 
problems are arising and will continue to arise with 
greater frequency in future in the case of road 
transport, especially with the ever-increasing tendency 
for much of it to be sub-contracted, and for consignors 
and consignees to be given the option of insurinq the 
goods or themselves accepting the risk of damage". 
His Honour could not see any reason to confine Lord Reid's four 
criteria to clauses limiting the time within which claims might be made 
as opposed to exemption clauses which purport to displace liability. 
To refuse so to confine the four criteria did not, in Yeldham J's 
view, offend against commercial morality. The plaintiffs were aware 
of the conditions in the consignment note including the clauses cited 
above, and had in their possession a copy of such clauses which 
could be read at leisure. The plaintiff deliberately refrained from 
insuring, doubtless preferring to carry any risk which might be 
involved. The evidence, in the judge's opinion, 8  also established 
that the defendant hauliers had continued to sub-contract since its 
formation with TNT exclusively and had in their possession books of 
7. [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 606, at pp.611-612. 
8. Ibid., at p.613. 
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the relevant consignment notes and were aware of the substance of 
the relevant conditions which were for the benefit of the defendant 
and their employees. TNT would therefore be entitled to assume, in 
the absence of a directive from the defendant, that it had authority 
to contract on the defendants' behalf in relation to exemption from, or 
limitation of, liability. Yeldham J. was of the view9 that the second 
defendant, the driver, had ratified the act TNT Management Pty Ltd 
in purporting to contract on his behalf by his defence in the present 
proceed ing s . 
10 Nor would such ratification unfairly prejudice a third 
party. 
Following Barwick C.J.'s analysis in Salmond & Spraggon, 11 
Yeldham J. found that consideration was provided by the defendant 
haulier by its performance of the contract. The wide words of c1.5, 
in the judge's view, no matter how narrowly they were construed, 
placed the goods at the sole risk of the consignor and excluded the 
carrier from liability in the event that, by its negligence, they were 
damaged or destroyed: 
11 ... Plainly the parties agreed that, unless the 
consignor required insurance, the goods should be 
carried at its sold risk. In the absence of any 
deliberate or wanton destruction or other dealing with 
the goods, it does not seem to me that, even upon the 
strictest construction of c1.5, it can be argued that 
they did not intend to exempt the carrier or its 
sub-contractors and their servants from the 
consequence of neglige95e, even if such negligence 
resulted in destruction". 
9. [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 606, at pp.614-615. 
10. 119811 1 N.S.W.L.R. 606, 612 citing the finding of Beattie J. 
in A.M. Satterthwaite and Co Ltd v. New Zealand Shipping Co 
Ltd [1972] N.Z.L.R. 385, 39 14, 395 who held that it had occurred in 
TER case. As actual authority was found the Privy Council did not 
have to deal with that question. 
11. See supra. 
12. [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 606, 618. 
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Finally, the House of Lords decision in Photo Production Ltd v. 
Securicor Transport Ltd
13 was followed and was cited in support of 
the view that it was neither unfair or unjust to hold the plaintiff to 
its bargain and •the clause should not, by any artificial rule of 
construction, be held not to be operative in the present 
circumstances: 
"Here the words are clear, even making allowance for 
the fact that they must be read contra proferentem and 
that exemption from liability for negligence is not to be 
lightly inferred, it is plain that the clause is of 
sufficient width to operate upon the facts in the 
present case". 
Accordingly the defence of each defendant based on the provisions of 
the consignment note succeeded. 
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
approved Celthene in Life Savers (Australasia) Ltd v. Frigmobile Pty  
Ltd and Another.
14 
In that case, the first respondent agreed to 
carry a load of chocolate from Sydney to Brisbane in a refrigerated 
van which was carried by lorry owned by the second respondents, 
and was driven by the latter's employee. The contract of carriage, 
evidenced by an invoice, required that the cargo was to be chilled 
and maintained at a required temperature. The reverse of the invoice 
contained various conditions, one of which provided that the carrier 
entered into the contract as an agent for its sub-contractor(s) and 
that the consignor authorized the carrier and its sub-contractor(s) to 
arrange for carriage of any of the contract goods. Such an 
arrangement was to be deemed as being ratified by the consignor on 
delivery of the goods to sub-contractor(s) who would then be entitled 
to the terms and conditions to the same extent as the carrier. 
1 43 . 	1[ 1 9 8 30 1] 1A .C. .8w2 .7 L., 
see Chapter Two supra. 
case see S.W.Cavanagh 
A.L.J. 67. 
citing in particular Lord Diplock at p.850; 
R. 431. For a discussion of the Life Savers 
'The Ultimate Exclusion Clause' (1985) 59 
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Another condition provided that the carrier would not be treated as a 
common carrier and, hence, accepted no liability as such, the goods 
being at the owner's risk. The carrier was not to be liable for loss 
of or damage whatsoever to any goods under the custody or control 
of the carrier or its sub-contractor. The carrier, additionally, was 
not liable for any consequential loss or damage, loss or damage to 
include that caused by the negligence or wilful act or default of the 
carrier, whether or not such loss or damage was forseeable or 
contemplated by the carrier. 
The chocolate was carried in excess of the required 
temperature and was damaged. On a finding for the respondents in 
the lower court, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appea1. 15 
Hutley J.A., following the judge in the court of first instance, 
applied the Securicor case to the construction of the exemption 
clause,
16 
noting that that case was binding on the Court of Appeal, 
unless there were inconsistent decisions of the High Court or the 
Privy Council standing in the way of its application. He rejected the 
argument of the appellants that exemption clause should be cut down 
where it would defeat the main objects of the contract. He noted 
Lord Denning's remarks in the Privy Council decision in Sze Hai Tong  
Bank Ltd v. Rambler Cycle Co Ltd 17 to the effect that a wide 
interpretation of an exemption clause would have the effect of 
defeating the main objects of the contract and, therefore, must be 
limited to give them effect. 18 However, in Nutley J.'s view this 
doctrine of the fundamental term had never been adopted by the High 
Court of Australia to its full extent. There was, in the judge's 
opinion, no bar to the Court of Appeal following the Securicor  
15. On appeal from Rogers J. 
16. [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 431, at p.436.. 
17. (1959) A.C. 576. 
18. Ibid., at p.587. 
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decision. The House of Lords in that case had recognised that the 
assumption of or exemption from legal liability could not be 
disassociated from the costs of providing a service. Similar 
recognition could be given in Australian courts without this being 
prevented by any precedent. Therefore the contract evidenced by 
the invoice should be construed according to its terms. Hutley J.A. 
refused to accept that "wilful" did not include deliberate acts of 
destruction during the journey by an employee: 
"As the acts leading to the claim [in Securicor] were 
wilful and deliberate, I cannot regard the distinction as 
sound. Any businessman's reading of this provision 
would know that whatever happened to the goods 
was at his risk and if he wished to protect himself he 
did so by insurance. The legal position of this carrier 
is precisely similar to that .p9f the security organization 
in the case of [Securicor]". 
The appellants had submitted that the Celthene20 case was 
wrongly decided in that the decisions in the Eurymedon and The New  
York Star were only applicable to bills of lading. Nutley J.A. could 
see no reason why similar terms in contracts of land carriage to the 
bills of lading in these cases should not have the same effect,
21 
unless some other essential feature were omitted. The employee of 
the haulier must be taken to have accepted the goods on the terms of 
the contract which protected him and the consignor making an offer 
direct. The employee, in the judge's view, 22 was in a stronger 
position than that of the stevedore, as he was present at the time of 
the contract and also the agent by whom the contract was made. The 
consignor made the offer to him that if he carried the goods he would 
be under no liability and the offer was accepted by the haulier's 
employee when he took the goods into his custody. There was, in 
19. [1983] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 431, at p.436. 
20. [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 606. 
21. Ibid., at p.437. 
22. [1983] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 431, at p.437. 
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Hutley J.A.'s view, no need for ratification, but if this was not 
correct, ratification had taken place. He regarded the decision in 
Celthene as being correct and observed: 
"The form of contract here used, patterned on 
provisions in favour of stevedores and other 
sub-contractors in bills of lading, strains doctrines of 
privity of contract and consideration but these 
difficulties have been overcome. There would appear to 
me to be no reason why the same form is not applicable 
to all forms of transportation of goods, ancin if used, 
should be given the same effect in all cases". 
In summary, then, it appears from the BHP, Sidney Cooke, 
Celethene and Life Savers (Australasia) decisions that 
sub-contracting, and transfer of indemnity to third parties which 
have been specifically appointed as agents to the carrier is now 
acceptable under contractual arrangements. It also seems possible for 
the carrier and agents to obtain a promise that the cargo owner will 
not make a claim against the sub-contractor or sub-contractors, (see 
clause 4(2) in the BHP case). The "Himalaya" clause need not refer 
solely to sub-contractors, but to any persons performing services 
covered in the definition of carriage. The cargo owner will have a 
much more difficult task in claiming against the sub-contractor. Not 
only has the cargo owner agreed in the contracts discussed above not 
to make claims against the sub-contractor or other agents, but he has 
agreed to indemnify the carrier as well. The carrier in turn must 
indemnify the sub-contractor in a user contract. This brings in what 
is commonly referred to as the circular indemnity, the merchant, in 
the end, meeting his own claim. Not surprisingly, therefore clause 
4(2) has been described as "the ultimate Himalaya clause."
24 
These 
23. Ibid., at p.438. Glass and Mahoney J.A.'s gave concurring 
judgements, pp.438 et seq. 
24. A.T. Scotford 'Current Status of the Himalaya Clause' 
Insurance Broker (1981) June, at p.15. 
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developments may be regarded as an important evolutionary stage - 
in that the principle of the Eurymedon has been applied by the courts 
to a contract of land carriage. 
Conclusion  
The cases discussed in the previous pages concerning third 
party liability in a bill of lading need to be set in the context of the 
commercial practicalities of insurance and freight costs. It has been 
suggested that the extension of protection to third parties under 
"Himalaya" clause provisions, is dangerous, because it neglects the 
proposition that, it would only be fair and equitable for persons 
causing damage to cargo, to be held responsible or liable for the 
damage or loss which had been caused by their negligence, otherwise 
they may continue to be irresponsible in the course of their duties. 25 
There is also the contrary argument that it would be commercially 
unreal to suggest that warehousemen, hauliers, and stevedores, are 
going to be negligent in their practices in a competitive environment, 
for the reasons of having protection under exemption clauses, which 
have been designed so that the apportionment of the risk can be 
properly dictated by way of insurance.
26 
Many sub-contractors will attempt to exclude their liability in 
their user contracts. Some state that if they are negligent, they will 
only be liable up to a certain amount in respect of damage or loss. 
Such exemption or exclusion clauses which protect the sub-contractor, 
may be taken into consideration by the carrier when setting freight 
25. C.R. Carruthers' The Impact of the Decision in Port Jackson  
Stevedoring Pty. Ltd. v. Salmond Spraggon Pty Ltd. (Tfie New York 
Star) New Zealand Shippinp Co. T_td. v. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co.  
Ltd. (the Eurymedon)' Maritime Law Association of Australia and New 
7Filand Converence Christchurch, 1978, at p.2. 
26. A.T. Scotford 'Current Status of the Himalaya Clause' The 
Insurance Broker June 1981, at p.15. 
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rates. 	However, if the carrier finds the sub-contractor often 
negligent in providing his services, the carrier himself will end up 
meeting the claims of his clients, or if the carrier has exempted 
himself and the sub-contractor, thereby claiming immunity, the 
carrier will eventually lose his credibility in an open market. This 
situation would be unlikely where the carrier has a wide choice of 
sub-contracting services at his disposal. Also, in the case where a 
carrier sub-contracts to a road haulier, he will often find that it is 
an owner/driver operation, where the due diligence and care of the 
owner is extended, for the purposes of widening clientele and 
business contracts. Even if an owner/driver could not be held 
accountable for acts of negligence, loss of credibility in a competitive 
environment would eventually force his services out of the market. 
Therefore, it would seem that the carrier should bear the 
responsibility of providing clauses of limitations and exclusions in the 
main contract of carriage, and arranging for the proper channels of 
transport by way of sub-contracting, as opposed to having several 
individual contracts covering each leg of the journey. As an 
Australian insurance authority has argued: 
'... in the modern world of combined transport the 
regime of risk that has been adopted is that the 
carrier, consistent with his accepting responsibility to 
move the goods from point A to point B, says: 'I will 
be responsible for them during that entire operation, 
subject to some agreed exemptions, and if you have any 
complaint you should Airect it to me and not to one of 
my sub-contractors'." 
If sub-contractors are having to continually honour claims and 
arrange for protection through insurance policies and employ the 
necessary clerical branches to cope with claims for damage or loss, 
not only will freight rates increase, but the additional bureaucracy 
needed for the expanded operation will decrease its efficiency. The 
sub-contractor's only duty is to execute that portion of the carriage 
26. 	Ibid., at p.15. 
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which he has contracted for, with the specialized services and staff 
under his jurisdiction. Therefore, there is no need to discourage 
negligent acts, by making the sub-contractor strictly liable for 
damage or loss, as he undertakes his duties with as much care as he 
can reasonably exercise, as his services are already subjected to the 
competition of other specialists, in the same field. 
Thus, it seems clear, that the decision of the Privy Council in 
the New York Star emphasized the commercial realities of the 
transactions involved. Even if the stevedoring contract provided that 
the carrier indemnify the stevedore against all liability, it might be 
justifiable for the carrier to bear the risk rather than the shipper 
since the carrier is in a position to influence the stevedore's conduct. 
However, as has previously been noted,
27 
no cargo owner is likely to 
dispense with his insurance cover solely because he has legal 
recourse against a wrongdoing third party, such as a stevedore, 
since claims can be more expeditiously settled against underwriters 
than against the wrongdoer. Further, freight rates are established 
with respect to insurance costs and the apportionment of risk. 
Contractual agreements with express exemptions are arranged between 
the carrier and the cargo owner. It would appear to be a reasonable 
supposition that the less risk the carrier assumes, the lower the cost 
of carriage. This was recognized by Yeldham J. in Sidney Cook Ltd.  
v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengersellscheft when be observed: 
11 ... The bill of lading is to give effect to the clear 
Intentions of a commercial document ... the effect of 
damaging validity to the clause would be to encourage 
actions against servants, agents and independent 
contractors in order to get round exemptions (which are 
almost invariably compulsory) accepted by shippers 
against carriers, the existence, and presume5I8 efficacy, 
of which is reflected in the rates of freight." 
27. See supra. 
28. [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 588, at p.594. 
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The three decisions of the New South Wales Supreme Court; 
the B.H.P., Sidney Cook and Celthene29 cases, underline the validity 
of the above statement besides significantly extending Lord Ried's 
four conditions
30  for third party protection under a contract of 
carriage to subcontractors undertaking the land transportation in a 
contract involving sea carriage. Although neither of these decisions, 
nor that of the Privy Council in The New York Star 31 , are binding 
on the High Court of Australia it is to be hoped that, for the reasons 
given above, they would be followed by that court and in other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
29. [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 572, (1980) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 588, [1981] 1 
N . S.W . L. R. 606 respectively. 
30. [1982] A.C. 446, at p.474. 
31. [1978] 18 A.L.R. 333. 
318 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
EXEMPTION CLAUSES IN INTER-BUSINESS CONTRACTS 
- THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
Introduction  
Exemption clauses are an integral part of contracts which 
regulate dealings between businessmen. Where these agreements fall 
into the category of standard form contracts they can be regarded as 
a formalised system of delineating rights and duties, with exemption 
clauses (as in other contracts) performing the role of assigning 
understood and recognisable risks or defining the duties of the 
promisor or also acting as a deterrent to other parties should they 
seek to break the bargain. It, therefore, becomes important to know 
what emphasis is given to exemption clauses by businessmen in 
contracting between themselves. 
The utilization of the legal process by businessmen to plan 
aspects of their commercial dealings has been characterized by 
Professor Summers as the "grievance remedial technique" and the 
"private arranging technique" . 1 
The grievance remedial technique is used when the parties 
invoke legal remedies following on the breach of a commercial 
agreement. Those remedies would include repudiation of contracts, 
out of court settlements, actions for damages and the use of 
commercial arbitration. The private arranging technique requires the 
parties who are using the contract to regulate their current 
relationship and future dealings. In a contract of supply; for 
1. 	R.S. Summers 'The Technique Element in Law' (1971) 59 Calif 
L Rev 733. 
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instance, the parties might detail terms concerning description of the 
goods supplied, delivery, payment, servicing and cover eventualities 
such as delay, strikes, and apportionment of risk in the event of 
non-performance, part-performance or modified performance of the 
obligations of the contract. Both the grievance remedial and private 
arranging techniques come together where a given contract specifies 
remedies or procedures if something should go wrong with the 
agreement, for instance, an arbitration clause, a liquidated damages 
clause or an automatic termination provision. 
Exemption clauses will be incorporated in contracts both as 
part of the private arranging and grievance remedial techniques. 
Lord Diplock in the Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport 
Ltd.
2 
case provided an analysis of the situation arising on a breach 
of what he termed a primary contractual obligation compared with a 
resultant and consequent secondary obligation then owed by the party 
in default. 3 A primary contractual obligation, for example, would be 
that property and possession of goods are transferred. A secondary 
contractual obligation would be the liability for the payment of 
damages in the event of a breach of the primary contractual 
obligation. Both parties' primary obligations remain unchanged, so 
far as they have not been fully carried out, unless the innocent 
party is entitled to, and elects to, treat himself as discharged from 
his obligations because of the guilty party's b;•each. This will also 
occur where the event resulting from the failure of one party to 
perform a primary obligation has the effect of depriving the other 
party of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended by the 
parties he should obtain from the contract. It would also occur 
where the contracting parties have agreed, expressly or by 
implication of law, that any failure by any one party to perform a 
2. [1980] 1 All E.R. 556. 
3. Ibid., at pp.566-567; see Chapter 1, supra. 
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particular primary obligation, irrespective of the gravity of the event 
that has in fact resulted from the breach, entitles the other party to 
elect to put an end to all remaining, unperformed primary obligations. 
If a party makes such a lawful election, a secondary obligation is 
discharged to pay monetary compensation to the innocent party for 
the loss sustained as a result of the future non-performance of the 
primary obligations of the innocent party. Both the primary and 
secondary obligations, can be excluded or modified by a suitably 
worded exemption clause. 
In the context of inter-business contracts, Lord Diplock's 
following observation highlights one key role that the commercial 
world has come to expect exemption clauses to perform: 
"In commercial contracts negotiated between businessmen 
capable of looking after their own interests and of 
deciding how risks inherent in the performance of 
various kinds of contract can be most economically 
borne (generally by insurance) it is, in my view, 
wrong to place a strained construction on words in an 
exclusion clause which are clear and fairly susceptible 
of one meaning only even after due allowance has been 
made for the presumption in favipur of the implied 
primary and secondary obligations". 
It is, therefore, of practical importance to discover what role 
businessmen themselves assign to exemption clauses in their 
commercial contracts as distinct from the view that the courts have 
taken of them. 
Research on Exemption Clauses  
Research into the attitudes of businessmen to the procedural 
role of provisions in commercial contracts has been undertaken in the 
United States, Britain
5 and, more recently, Tasmania. 
[1980] 1 All E.R. 556, at p.568. 
5. 	See D.Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet & Maxwell 
(1982) 2nd edition, at pp.16-33 and see note 8. 
321 
(i) U.S.A.  
In the United States Professor Macaulay in 1963 carried out 
research among 48 companies and six law firms in Wisconsin. 6 He 
analysed contracts, in a manner similar to Summers,
7 
as involving two 
distinct elements: "(a) rational planning of the transaction with 
careful provision for as many future contingencies as can be 
foreseen, and (b) the existence or use of actual or potential legal 
sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for 
non-performance". Macaulay isolated the four categories which might 
be appropriately so predicted as: (a) description of primary 
obligations, (b) contingencies, (c) defective performance (d) legal 
sanctions, in which exemption clauses might play a key role. 
Macaulay's conclusions were that, although each category might be 
given detailed consideration in many inter-business dealings, in 
others there would be little or none, particularly in relation to legal 
sanctions and the effects of defective performance. He also 
discovered that contractual practices were very little used in 
post-contractual adjustment of relationships between the parties, even 
though tacit reliance on contractual rights was evidenced. The 
grievance procedures of the courts were equally little utilized by 
businessmen. 
(ii) Britain  
Confirmation in Britain of Macaulay's conclusions was obtained 
in the published research of Beale and Dugdale in Bristol in 1973 and 
6. 	S.Macaulay 'Non-contractual Relations in Business' (1963) 28 
Am. Sociological Rev. 45; See also S.Macaulay 'Changing a continuing 
relationship between a large corporation and those who deal with it : 
automobile dealers, and the legal system' (1965) Wis L.Rev. 740; 
S.Macaulay 'Private legislation and the duty to read - business run 
by IBM machine, the law of contract and credit cards' (1966) 19 
Vanderbilt L.Rev. 1051; S.Macaulay 'Elegant Models, Empirical 
Pictures and the Complexities of Contract' (1977) 11 Law and Society  
Rev. 507. 
77- See supra. 
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1974.
8 This involved interviews of nineteen engineering firms, mainly 
in Bristol.
9 However, unlike Macaulay, their survey found a 
considerable awareness that an exchange of conditions, which might 
be in conflict in a typical "battle of the forms" 1° situation, would not 
necessarily lead to an enforceable contract. Those firms contracting 
by this method were concerned to reach a clear understanding on 
particularly important points or on ones where difficulty was 
anticipated. The conclusion was that legal enforceability appeared 
secondary to reaching a common understanding. Provided that the 
two sets of relevant conditions contained terms commonly found in the 
trade there would be a sufficient basis for any dispute to be settled 
without difficulty; thus, even such common understanding did not 
have to be very precise.
11  Overall, the Beale and Dugdale survey 
concluded that businessmen steered clear both of contractual remedies 
as being too inflexible and lawyers as not being sufficiently 
understanding of commercial problems.
12 
Similarly, there was a 
general reluctance to use the law in the general planning of business 
operations, except where a clear risk justified careful planning, tough 
bargaining and detailed legal drafting. 
A detailed study was carried out in England during 1974-1976 
8. H.Beale and T.Dugdale 'Contracts between Businessmen : 
Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies' [1975] 2 B.J.L.S. 45. 
9. The researchers indicated that manufacturing engineering 
contracts of purchase and sale were chosen because of their relative 
simplicity and that their findings might have no validity outside that 
area; ibid., p.46. 
10. --STe Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corporation  
(England) Ltd 119791 1 All ER 959 where the defendant's acceptance 
differed significantly from the plaintiff's offer, both being contained 
in standard form documents. 
11. [1975] 2 B.J.L.S. 45, at p.50; the survey noted tightening up 
of procedures showing itself as a result of the entry of younger 
managers. 
12. H. Beale and T.Dugdale 'Contracts between Businessmen'. 
(Planning and the use of Contractual Remedies) [1975] 2 B.J.L.S 45, 
at p.59. 
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and the results subsequently incorporated in Yates' published work.
13 
The aim of that study was to ascertain first, when exemption clauses 
would be drafted into agreements and why, and second, the 
circumstances in which they are relied upon during 
the grievance remedy procedures. Using Manchester and Bristol as 
respective bases for surveys in the north west and south west areas 
of England, a total of 51 firms took part, 31 being light, heavy 
mechanical or civil engineering firms, 12 being finance companies and 
eight being insurance companies or Lloyds. Yates's detailed study 
found that limitation and procedural clauses (such as arbitration 
provisions) were more common than exclusion clauses in commercial 
agreements. In the latter case, exclusion clauses tended to be 
drafted so as to prevent liability arising on the part of the supplier 
as the result of particularly specified causes beyond his control: such 
as, delay caused by strikes, the non-availability of materials, or 
• government action. In respect of limitation and procedural clauses, 
some firms limited liability in their contracts of supply to a particular 
sum. In the case of a liquidated damages clause, some firms held 
these figures to be a genuine attempt to pre-estimate damages while a 
significant group of engineering companies considered that the figures 
specified did not relate realistically to the likely loss sustained, as 
where, for instance the breaking of a steel cable might involve a•
huge liability in respect of consequential loss. Even so, these firms 
were convinced of the commercial sense of such clauses and that their 
inclusion in the contract could discourage litigation except where 
business relations between the parties had broken down for other 
reasons. 
Time limitation clauses were commonly found in contracts for 
the supply of goods. These clauses either set limitations on a party's 
13. 	D.Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet & Maxwell (1982) 
2nd edition, at pp.16-33. 
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right to arbitrate or on the time within which appropriate claims had 
to be made or notified. It was found to be rare that clauses to 
exclude liability in regard to express contractual conditions on 
warranties were used, except in the case of specially negotiated 
agreements. Where such clauses were used, they were justified on 
the basis that businessmen wished to be made clear to both parties 
what the aims and purposes of the relationship were by means of a 
declaration of intent, without such declarations necessarily attracting 
legal liability. 
Some firms had apparently devoted considerable time and effort 
in drafting clauses to exclude the implied terms under the Sale of 
Goods Act. In particular, the implied conditions as to title, quiet 
possession and freedom from charge and encumbrance " proved an 
area of difficulty for legal departments in manufacturing firms because 
of their potential utility in litigation involving patent infringement. 
In none of the firms surveyed were contracts used which expressly 
excluded the right to reject or rescind or exclude the right to 
damages, although some firms did imply this in contracts where the 
only undertaking was to repair or replace defective goods. 
Three main reasons were given by the firms surveyed by 
Yates for incorporating exemption clauses in contracts. First, the 
desire to avoid court proceedings; second, to exclude or reduce 
liability for consequential loss and, third, conformity with common 
practice. The desire to avoid court proceedings was a reason given 
for using limitation clauses in order to give each party a clearer 
indication of their respective positions. Arbitration clauses, time limit 
clauses and "contingency" clauses were also inserted in an endeavour 
14. 	Section 12, Sale of Goods Act 1979 (U.K.); s17 (New South 
Wales); s16 (Victoria); s12 (South Australia), (Western Australia); 
s15 (Queensland); s17 (Tasmania), (A.C.T.); s16 (N.T.). 
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to avoid litigation 15 . The study found amongst the firms surveyed a 
marked distrust of lawyers and particularly, a lack of confidence in 
judges' ability to understand businessmen's problems. The desire to 
avoid, exclude or reduce liability for consequential loss, particularly 
in large engineering contracts (which were specially negotiated) was 
shared by sub-contractors and also by manufacturers and other 
suppliers. In contrast to the sub-contractors the manufacturer or 
contractor would take out extensive insurance cover. The function of 
exclusion or limitation clauses in these contracts was to pass on those 
risks which the insurance company had either refused to cover or 
would only do so at a very high and commercially unacceptable 
premium. Apart from these large and complex engineering contracts, 
most businesses insured against few risks, and those were loss by 
fire and theft, flood and sprinkler damage, loss through explosion or 
similar occurrence, loss or damage in transit, and less frequent, loss 
due to failure to meet delivery dates. Apart from those risks most 
small manufacturers appeared to act as their own insurers, taking the 
liability for the risk themselves. The desire to conform with common 
practice was evinced by the use of standard forms in the majority of 
contracts in the engineering industry. The buyer would frequently 
order on his own conditions and the seller acknowledge with his 
printed conditions. The significance of an exact correspondence 
between offer and acceptance was often not apparent to the 
businessmen surveyed. Firms that did not make use of a lawyer in 
drafting their standard form conditions 16 either drafted their own or 
15. See R.S. Summers 'The Technique Element in Law' (1971) 59 
Calif L Rev 733 supra. See D. Yates 'Exclusion Clauses in Contracts' 
Sweet and Maxwell (1982), at pp.26-27. 
16. Twenty five per cent of the sample of engineering firms. 
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used standard conditions of a professional body such as the 
Institution of Civil Engineers.
17 
All finance houses and insurance companies received 
considerable legal assistance in drafting their terms. 	Insurance 
companies attempted to protect their clients from losing the "battle of 
the forms" by stipulating that insurance cover would only be provided 
if the contract were concluded by the client on their terms. 18 
(iii) 	Tasmania  
A survey of thirty organizations between 1980 and 1982 in 
Tasmania was able to yield further information concerning business 
contractual practices. The survey involved interviewing thirty 
organizations and firms, of which fifteen subsequently completed a 
detailed questionnaire which was later analysed by a computer 
programme. 19 Of the fifteen, three consisted of the Hydro Electric 
Commission and two State Government departments. The remaining 
twelve were private firms which fell into the following categories: 
17. Other standard conditions were those of the Royal Institute of 
British Architects, the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, the 
Institute of Electrical Engineers, the Association of Consulting 
Engineers and the Joint Contracts Tribunal. 
18. See Chapter Two; D.Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts, 
Sweet & Maxwell (1982) Chapter 2. 
19. The questionnaire was a modified version of that used by Beale 
and Dugdale in their 1973-1974 survey. 	In their survey the 
questionnaire was not used except as a general interviewing guide. In 
the Tasmanian survey detailed interviewing notes were kept, even 
when firms subsequently declined or omitted to complete the 
questionnaire, or, as was not infrequent, referred the matter to their 
head offices in Melbourne or Sydney. In addition standard form 
contracts were collected from firms and organizations interviewed. 
The resultant sample obtained in the questionnaire therefore 
represents Tasmanian-based operations that had a degree of 
autonomy, or were in fact Tasmanian companies, or were not in the 
private sector. 
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Manufacturing and Processing 	 3 
Mining 	 1 
Tourism 1 
Finance 	 4 
Car Retail 2 
Transport 	 1 
A comparison of private and public sector responses to specific 
questions provides a basis for outlining particular contractual 
practices. 
Q1
20 Do you ever alter your standard conditions for particular sales 
(including services)? 
YES 	 NO 
PUBLIC 	 2 	 2 
PRIVATE 	 8 	 8 
With a few exceptions in the retail trade and one in manufacturing, 
all firms and organizations surveyed used standard conditions. 
However, there were varying attitudes to their function. Where the 
conditions were those of a manufacturer supplier, as in the case of 
the sale of a new car, the position was that the conditions could not 
be altered or negotiated.
21 
One leading carrier in Tasmania indicated 
that the bulk of its contracts were made by telephone and were 
20. The questions quoted are not in the order in which they were 
given on the actual questionnaire. In the case of one government 
department two questionnaires were completed to cover different 
functions. In the case of the private sector some firms completed two 
to cover purchasing and supply, or more if they had separate 
divisions of operation. 
21. This did not apply in the case of the sale of used cars by a 
retailer. 
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difficult to control and supervise. Carriage was accepted on the 
carrier's standard terms which were set out on the back of the 
consignment note. Where loss or damage did occur, clients often 
wished to vary the terms which excluded liability. As a result of the 
pressure of claims the firm surveyed had now endeavoured to adhere 
very closely to the terms of the contract. In the case of major 
customers, these firms negotiated their own terms, which resulted in 
extra clauses being included and a separate legal document being 
drawn up, often by the customer, which the carrier's solicitors then 
checked. Finance firms used standard documents except in the case 
of commercial loans. In the case of leasing and hire purchase, the 
standard form terms were not usually altered in any way. However, 
one firm did negotiate on the terms for wholesale and bailment finance 
such as "floor plan" agreements.
22 
In the case of commercial loans, 
individual documentation was prepared by local solicitors; in one 
instance, these lawyers acted directly on behalf of the Head Office in 
Sydney and, hence, could not receive any varying or contrary 
instructions from the local manager. 
In the case of a large chemical manufacturer, the company did 
not use a standard form either for sales or contracts of supply. It 
considered that what was essentially important was the intent of each 
party in each case. Some contracts were complex and technical and 
others were very simple and flexible. The overriding concern of the 
company was that it maintained good relationships with those it dealt 
22. 	In a 'floor plan' or 'display plan' agreement a finance company 
enters into an agreement with the dealer company under which goods, 
such as cars, are purchased by the dealer company in its own name 
and on its own account and put on a 'floor plan' by the dealer 
company and accepted by the finance company which then pay a•
percentage of the price (usually 90 percent) of the cars to the dealer 
company that that latter company has paid for the cars. See Chapter 
Five, supra, in particular see Pacific Motor Auctions Pty. Ltd. v. 
Motor Credits Ltd. [1965] A.0 867. 
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with and that sales were made and goods were supplied. Contractual 
practices, then, became subordinate to obvious commercial strategy 
and intent. Another large processing firm which sold fertilizers 
observed that, although the terms of its sales contracts on their price 
lists and sales invoices had not been altered for about eight years, it 
did vary them from time to time to suit its own changing business 
practices and to meet the requirements of groups of farmers on the 
basis of an annual review. In the case of a large consumer produce 
manufacturer, although it did not alter its standard terms which were 
contained on its blank order form it did treat everything as 
negotiable between itself and the product distributors. However, 
despite constant pressure by distributors to alter those terms, the 
firm concerned was adamant that it would adhere to them. 
In the public sector one government department which dealt 
with purchasing and supply always insisted on adherence to its own 
conditions, but was prepared to alter standard conditions in its 
contracts where there had been a change in the type and complexity 
of the contracts, and such a course of action had been advised by 
solicitors or government. In the housing sector
23 
all government 
work was put out to public tender. All contracts were negotiated but 
the main terms of the tender contract for construction work were 
applicable to unless there were strong reasons for variation, addition 
or omission of clauses. In practice, there was a strict adherence to 
the tender contract. Requests to alter or vary terms after the 
contract had been agreed were not usually accepted, unless extra 
work by the contractor was involved. On the purchasing side, all 
tenders were based on total and unvarying concurrence to the terms 
of tender, those being in standard form. Road and related construction 
23. 	Two divisions were surveyed, one dealing with house 
construction, the other dealing with purchase of materials. 
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contracts were made on the basis of one national standard form 
contract
24 which with related documents were currently subject to 
alteration in the light of experience gained in contracting construction 
work on national highways. In the case of tenders, the Minister 
could intervene, informally or otherwise, on behalf of another 
contractor often with the effect of ironing out inequality in 
contracting. Although variation of contracts was not an issue as 
such, main contractual problems centred around specification and 
documentation as cost related extensions of time. The Hydro Electric 
Commission used standard tender forms for its four branches which 
covered building, plant and machinery, distribution of power and 
stores. Each branch could alter its tender forms as it saw fit, but, 
if there were any major changes, these were scrutinised by the 
Commission's own legal officers. Mostly standard forms were used in•
agreements for supply of power but none were used for installations. 
In the case of bulk consumers, contracts were negotiated. In relation 
to tenders, terms could be negotiated but, as a policy, the 
Commission generally kept to its conditions satisfied in the tender. 
Do you consider that your arrangements as to cancellation are 
satisfactory? 
YES 	 NO 
PUBLIC 	 4 	 0 • 
PRIVATE 	 11 	 1 
The overwhelming majority of firms and organizations surveyed 
regarded their contract cancellation arrangements as satisfactory. 
24. 	National Public Works Conference, Edition 3 (1981), hereafter 
referred to as N.P.W.C.. 
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The sole exception to that question was found in the answers from a 
tourist operator who had experienced difficulties with their own 
system of ordering supplies. However, these appeared to relate to 
problems of supervision of procedures rather than attributable to the 
contract terms themselves. 
Q3 	In relation to your existing arrangements concerning 
cancellation, do you consider that if you insisted on your full 
legal rights, you would be: 
(a) better off than under your existing arrangements; 
(b) worse off than under your existing arrangements; 
(c) in the same position as under your existing 
arrangements; 
(d) no opinion? 
(a) 	(b) 	(c) 	(d) 	TOTAL 
PUBLIC 	0 	0 	4 	0 	4 
PRIVATE 	1 	3 	4 	3 	11 
The public sector which had been surveyed indicated a stricter 
adherence to contractual legal rights relating to cancellation than did 
the private sector. Those firms in the private sector which regarded 
insistence on full legal rights as placing them in a worse position than 
they would have been under existing arrangements usually argued on 
the grounds that to take the first option would only be giving a firm 
a short term gain. In one instance, where fertiliser sales had been 
cancelled by farmers as a result of bad weather or delays in delivery, 
the firm concerned accepted such reasons in order to maintain good 
relations with purchasers; a general point which has already been 
made. Where insistence on full legal rights in connection with 
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cancellation was regarded by a firm as preferable to its existing 
arrangements that view reflected a dissatisfaction with the way in 
which its contractual procedures were being conducted. 
Q4 	(a) 	If you allow a purchaser to cancel before you have 
started to fill his order, would you expect him to 
compensate you for the loss of sale or supply? (Private 
sector) 
(b) 	If you , allow another party to cancel before you have 
started to act on the contract, would you expect him to 
compensate you for any loss? (public sector) 
YES 	 NO 
PUBLIC 	 0 	 4 
PRIVATE 	 1 	 9 
Both sectors, which were surveyed did not usually expect 
compensation from a purchaser who cancelled after an order had 
begun to be filled, or (in the case of the public sector) once the 
contract had begun to be performed. In the public sector, where 
compensation was provided for in the contract, this was normally 
payable on a scale agreed between the parties on the making of the 
contract. Liability for the other party to compensate also arose; in 
one instance, on grounds of non-performance or unsatisfactory 
performance. The isolated case in the private sector where 
compensation was expected from a cancelling purchaser, was in the 
car retail trade where compensation was payable on a scale agreed 
with the purchaser at the time of cancellation of the contract. 
333 
Q5 	Do you consider that your arrangements concerning delay in 
delivery are satisfactory? 
YES 	 NO 
PUBLIC 	 3 	 1 
PRIVATE 	 12 	 1 
Most firms and organizations considered that their arrangements 
concerning delay in delivery were satisfactory. In the public sector, 
one department that did regard its arrangements as unsatisfactory 
contracted for the supply of some materials on the basis of quotation 
forms on an informal basis. In the event of negotiation with the 
potential supplier over particular problems not being met, such as 
specification or delivery time, the department cancelled the order and 
went on to consider the next lowest quotation. In the private sector, 
one firm, while accepting cancellation by farmers of their fertilizer 
orders due to delay in delivery or because of weather conditions for 
reasons of good relations, regarded its cancellation arrangements as 
unsatisfactory on the basis of orders that the firm had to forgo as a 
result. 
In the case of substantial delay caused by difficulties outside 
the other parties' control, most firms and organizations considered 
this entitled them to cancel the arrangement or allowed the other 
party to do so. In the case of the Hydro Electric Commission, its 
purchase contracts contained a force majeure clause which allowed for 
late delivery in the event of circumstances beyond the supplier's 
control. If the delay or circumstances were extreme, total 
cancellation might be allowed. One car retailer indicated that, in the 
case of substantial delay, a new delivery date could be negotiated. 
Where completion was delayed by some factor which was within the 
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other party's control most firms and organizations either made a small 
allowance in respect of the delay or compensated the supplier in full 
for any loss he might suffer. The transport firm and the purchasing 
division of a large processing company both allowed the supplier to 
cancel the contract. In this situation, the Hydro Electric 
Commission's contract had a liquidated damages clause which would be 
applicable. 
Q6 	(a) 	have you ever had to refuse further dealings with 
another party who was unsatisfactory? (Public) 
(b) 	Have you ever had to refuse further dealings with a 
buyer who complained unjustifiably too often? (Private) 
YES 	 NO 
PUBLIC 
	
4 	 0 
PRIVATE 
	
4 	 7 
All the public sector organizations surveyed had experienced refusal 
of further dealings with another party who turned out to be 
unsatisfactory. Given the specifications that were listed in 
departmental and Hydro Electric Commission contracts of supply, this 
might reflect necessarily exacting statutory requirements, particularly 
in civil engineering works and the supply of components, akin to that 
found in Professor Yates survey noted above.
25 That this experience 
was not equally shared by the private sector indicates that either the 
bargaining power lay more with the other party, or, more probably, 
that the essence of dealing was to secure a contract, particularly in a 
competitive environment. 
25. 	D. Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet and Maxwell 
(1982), at p.24. 
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Q 7 	Is your firm (or Department/Commission) insured against losses 
resulting from sales and supply contracts? 
YES 	 NO 
PUBLIC 	 0 	 4 
PRIVATE 	 6 	 11 
The public sector response requires considerable qualification. In the 
case of the departments dealing in such contracts and the Hydro 
Electric Commission's own contracts there were extensive provisions 
for insurance in the contracts themselves. In the case of contractors 
undertaking road construction or related works, the provisions of the 
national standard public works contract applied (NPWC Edition 3 
(1981)) and these included detailed insurance requirements. 26 Before 
commencing, the contractor was required to take out an insurance 
policy to cover his liabilities as defined in the contract against any 
loss of or damage resulting from any cause whatsoever , to the works 
(including temporary works) and all materials and other things 
brought to the site by or on behalf of the contractor or by his 
sub-contractors. The insurance cover might exclude excepted risks 
under the contract, one such being any negligent act or omission of 
the principal, superintendent of the employees, or professional 
2 
consultants, or agents of the principal.
7 
 The cover might also 
exclude consequential loss of any kind, but not loss or damage to the 
works, or the cost of repairing faulty design, workmanship and 
materials and fair wear and tear or gradual deterioration but not, in 
all cases, the resultant loss or damage. Also excludable from cover 
26. N.P.W.C. Edition 3 (1981) cl's 16.2-22. 
27. Ibid., cl. 16.2. 
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might be damages for delay in completing or for the failure to 
complete work.
28 
Housing construction contracts, in the case of that 
department, were all insured with the Tasmanian Government 
Insurance Office by the department. 
The policy covered the works on the basis of the NPWC 
contract noted above, 29 but excluded construction machinery and 
plant, tools and equipment, temporary buildings and scaffolding. 
Also excluded from cover were the cost of rectification of faulty 
design, loss or damage resulting from any risk specifically excepted 
in the specification, a standard war and invasion clause, 30 and loss 
or damage resulting from nuclear reaction radiation or radioactive 
contamination. The department, under this contract, bore costs or 
expenses uninsured under the above heads unless, in the case of the 
cost of rectification of design or loss or damage due to nuclear 
reaction, these were caused by the contractor or his servants or 
agents. Also excluded from insurance cover, were consequential loss 
of any kind or description, including penalties, losses due to delay, 
lack of performance and loss of contract. In addition, the cost of 
replacement, repair or rectification of defective workmanship was 
excluded as was the cost of making good wear, tear, corrosion, 
oxidation due to lack of use and normal atmospheric conditions. 
The Hydro Electric Commission required, in its contract for 
the supply of machinery, that the contractor took out insurance in 
the joint names of the contractor and the Commission, for plant and 
materials ordered for the work which were on site and to keep them 
insured against destruction or damage by fire until the works were 
28. N.P.W.C. Edition 3 (1981) c1.17. 
29. Ibid. 
30. N.P.W.C. Edition 3 (1981) c1.16.2(c). 
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taken over under the contract by the Commission.
31 	
In its 
construction contract, the Commission laid down that every insurance 
be effected in the Tasmanian Government Insurance Office and such 
proposals and policies be submitted to the Commission's solicitor for 
examination and be subject to the Commission's approval.
32 
These 
policies were to be made in the joint names of the Commission and the 
contractor.
33 
The contractor was required, at his own cost, to 
insure against loss or damage by fire to the full insurable value all 
work and materials on which the Commission's engineer had provided 
a progress certificate and all materials supplied by the Commission 
used in connection with the work as well as all working plant.
34 
The 
contractor was also required to insure, at his own cost, against all 
liability to pay workers' compensation for the duration of the 
contract.
35 Should the contractor default in complying with the 
above provisions the Commission might insure and would pay all 
premiums which might, in turn, be deducted from any sums payable 
to the contractor on complet
ion. 36 The Commission's contract 37 
required the Contractor to insure the work and plant against all loss 
or damage in the joint names of the contractor and the Commission 
while the work and plant were at the contractor's risk. 38 The 
contract provided for payment by the Commission of premiums in the 
31. General Conditions of Conditions of Contract (A - Machinery) 
based on General Conditions of the Institution of Engineers,  
Australia, c1.22. 
32. General Conditions of Tendering and Contract (B -  
Construction); c1.30. 




37. General Conditions of Contract (Performance Contract -  
Document C). 
38. Ibid., c1.13(2). 
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event of non-payment within a specified time by the contractor with 
similar provision for deduction as above. 38 Money payable under 
insurance in the case of loss or damage was to be received by the 
Commission which might apply it towards completion of the contract or 
at its option retain the money and credit it to the contractor on final 
completion. All insurance was to be carried out through a company 
approved by the Commission. The contractor was also required to 
take out workers' compensation and employers liability insurance in 
favour of both the contractor and the Commission. 40 The contractor 
was responsible for, and required to indemnify the Commission against 
liability, for any damage or injury to any persons or any property 
caused by the contractor, his sub-contractors or his or their 
employees. The contractor was required to insure against these risks 
and the Commission could recover from the contractor the amount of 
all claims, damages, costs and expenses paid, suffered or incurred by 
the Commission in respect of any such damage. 41 
The contractor was liable for the storage and protection, 
including insurance against fire, loss and damage, of all equipment 
from such time as it was ready for despatch ex factory until delivery 
in accordance with the contract.
42 
Within the private sector, those firms insured against losses 
resulting from contracts had the following arrangements. One major 
processor, generally covered its own insurance by having a high 
excess premium under a contract works insurance policy, the terms of 
which were included on the back of their purchasing orders and 
39. General Conditions of Tendering and Contract (B - 
Construction), c1.32. 
40. CI.14(1)(2); subject to the Workers' Compensation Act 1927 
(Tasmania) as amended. 
41. CI.15(1). 
42. Conditions of Tendering and Contract - Form No.EB1-(1966). 
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invoices. In the case of a major carrying company the conditions of 
contract on the back of its invoices stated that the carrier would 
effect insurance on the goods on written instructions from the 
consignor for the latter's benefit. 43 
A chemical company carried insurance for loss profits, being 
prepared to claim on the policy for losses of over $10,000 and had 
done so in the last five years. The insurance premium in this 
example was calculated on the total value of goods sold and supplied 
annually. A mining company selling to a sole purchaser on long term 
contracts insured against loss of the product in transit overseas. 
Although prepared to claim for losses over $10,000 no such claim had 
been made in the preceding five years. The premium was based on 
the value of each shipment made. 
Q8 	What is the source of your conditions of supply or sale? 
(Private sector) 
Trade or professional organization 	1 
Drafted on firm's instructions by an 
outside professional lawyer 	 7 
Drafted on the advice of a lawyer 
within firm's organization 





The source of standard form contracts has already been noted in 
connection with the public sector. In the private sector the firms 
43. 	The carrier stipulating in the document that it was not a 
common carrier and would accept no liability as such. 
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surveyed indicated that their conditions of contract were either 
drafted by an outside lawyer on the firm's instructions or drafted by 
a lawyer within the firm's organization. The use and variation of 
standard forms and the individual drafting of contracts by local legal 
firms for commercial clients has already been noted under Question 1. 
Q9 	If your standard terms of offer differ from the standard terms 
of your acceptor, do you: 
(a) insist your terms be followed, or, 
(b) negotiate the differences, 






(a) Insist on your terms 
(b) Negotiate 
(c) Accept acceptor's terms 
Not stated 	 6 
The organizations surveyed in the public sector generally indicated a 
strict adherence to contractual terms. In the case of a general 
purchasing department, it regarded circumstances as indicating the 
appropriate course of action and would even opt for (c) but only 
when no other course was possible, for example, a supplier having a 
monopoly over a commodity. The private sector firms overall showed 
a greater willingness to negotiate differing terms in the "battle of the 
forms" situation. This approach may simply have indicated a 
recognition of commercial realities. 
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Q1 0 	Has a purchaser/customer ever 
(a) threatened you with legal action, 









Litigation or its threat by purchasers was not a common experience 
amongst private firms, but the majority had recorded isolated 
instances. The general picture obtained from the survey, confirming 
earlier studies, was that litigation, actual or threatened, was 
carefully avoided, and that firms would explore all reasonable forms 
of negotiation and conciliation as an alternative. 








Arbitration was registered with only one firm as a means of settling a 
dispute. In this instance, the car retail firm had acted at the 





Q12 	Would you consider the most effective threat against an 
uncooperative purchaser to be: 
(a) withdrawal of future supplies, 
(b) withdrawal of credit facilities, 
(c) a complaint to the purchasers trade association, 
(d) legal action 
(Private sector) 
The two main sanctions against uncooperative purchasers that private 
firms regarded as most effective were legal action and withdrawal of 
future supplies. This contrasts with the avoidance of litigation by 
private firms when the steps towards an action were initiated by a 
purchaser or customer. Arguably, the term legal action was regarded 
as including all preliminary steps to litigation and, therefore, the 
response should not be interpreted as unqualified approval for issuing 
a writ against the other party. Withdrawal of future supplies was 
particularly listed as a sanction by some manufacturing and 
processing firms and withdrawal of credit facilities by finance firms. 
No firm indicated that they regarded a complaint to the uncooperative 
purchaser's trade association as being an effective threat. 
In the public sector, all the government departments surveyed 
and the Hydro Electric Commission regarded the most effective 
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sanction in the above circumstances to be a refusal to deal further 
with the other party. 
Conclusion  
The Tasmanian survey confirms the general conclusion of the 
earlier investigations into inter-business contractual practices that 
legal enforceability appears secondary to reaching a common 
understanding. It does not wholly substantiate the conclusion of the 
Beale and Dugdale survey that businessmen avoided both contractual 
remedies as being too inflexible and lawyers as not being conversant 
with commercial problems.
44 
Evidence in the Tasmanian survey 
indicates that local law firms were retained for drafting individual 
commercial loan agreements on a regular basis by most of the finance 
firms investigated, an undertaking aided by the standard forms of 
each company being retained for variation on the law firms word 
processors. Despite a natural commercial distaste for being on the 
receiving end of litigation, threatened or actual, business firms and 
public sector organizations did not appear averse to using the legal 
process where negotiation and compromise had failed. The main 
function of exemption and limitation clauses in contracts used by the 
public sector organizations, particularly those used in housing 
construction, public works and by the Hydro Electric Commission, was 
to pass on those risks to contractors which were not covered by 
insurance. The apportionment of these risks was delineated with 
considerable care in the drafting of the contracts themselves. This 
contrasted, as noted by Yates in his survey when comparing 
engineering firms with other businesses, with the private sector 
44. 	H. Beale and T. Dugdale 'Contracts between Businessmen : 
Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies' [1975] 2 B.J.L. 545, 
at p.59. 
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where most firms insured against a few risks, or were their own 
insurers.
45 
Exemption and limitation clauses then appear in 
commercial practice to perform subsidiary yet integral functions in 
inter-business contracts of delineating and apportioning risks and 
from preventing certain primary liabilities from even arising within a 
contract. The Securicor 146 decision therefore accords with the view of 
the business world that exemption clauses must be construed in their 
commercial context. 
45. D. Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet and Maxwell 
(1982), at p.25. 
46. Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Ltd. [1980] 1 All E.R. 
556, particularly Lord Diplock, at p.568. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EXEMPTION CLAUSES - THE NEED FOR FURTHER CONTROL 
Introduction  
The Trade Practices Act has made important changes in the 
control of exemption clauses and their effect upon implied terms in 
consumer contracts. The Act does not, however, cover such 
contracts which contain terms limiting or excluding liability for death, 
damage or injury arising from negligence. The desirability of further 
control of exemption clauses is considered in this chapter, 
particularly in the light of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
(U.K.). 1 
The Second Report2 of the English and Scottish Commissions 
will be considered as a starting point for the examination of the 
desirability of controlling contracts which contain terms limiting or 
excluding liability for death, damage or injury from negligence. The 
recommendations of the Second Report led to the enactment of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act, criticism of which will be examined, 
1. The Act is divided into two parts. Part 1 contains the English 
provisions and operate as the law for England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland; Part II contains the Scottish provisions and solely affects the 
law of Scotland. The term 'U.K.' in the text is used for convenience. 
See P.K.J. Thompson Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 Butterworths 
(1978) at Chapter 7 for a discussion of the differences between the 
English and Scottish provisions. 
2. Second Report on Exemption Clauses; The Law Commission and 
the Scottish Law Commission (Law Corn No.69); Scot Law Corn No.39) 
(1975). Hereafter referred to as the Second Report. 
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particularly in respect of the premises on which the Act is based and 
specific provisions which would appear to give rise to problems. One 
of the specific problems is what precisely constitutes dealing on 
written standard terms of business for the purposes of s3(1) of the 
Act. Another problem is the effect of s13(1) of the Act which 
controls the exclusion or restriction of rights or remedies or subjects 
a person to any prejudice as a result of pursuing any such rights or 
remedies. 
The Law Commissions' Recommendations  
The Second Report of the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions in 1975 was concerned with provisions excluding or 
limiting a legal duty or obligation owed by one person to another 
which did not come within the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973. (U.K.)
3 
The relevant area of the Second Report is Part III 
which deals with exclusion of liability for negligence. 
The term "negligence" was used in the Second Report to refer 
to the breach of a duty or obligation which was imposed by common 
law or under a contract to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable 
skill, or to the breach of duty of care which was imposed on 
occupiers of premises by the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 (U.K.). 4 
Provisions which excluded or restricted liability for negligence 
which had occurred in the course of a business dealing ought to be 
subject to a general form of control in the shape of a reasonableness 
3. Ibid. 




The two Commissions reached different conclusions as to the 
scope of the situations within which exemption clauses should be 
controlled. 
The Law Commission recommended that the controls should 
apply to the provisions of contracts of all types and to contract terms 
and notices which applied conditions to licences or to the conferring 
of other benefits. 6 The Scottish Law Commission recommended that 
the control should apply only to: 
(1) contracts for the supply of goods (including 
contracts of sale of goods, hire purchase 
agreements and the redemption of trading 
stamps); 
(2) contracts of services and apprenticeship; 
(3) contracts for services of all types; 
(4) contracts of insurance; 
(5) licences to enter upon or use land. 
Such controls should not apply to exemption clauses in contracts 
which are concerned with the transfer of ownership or possession of 
land or interests in land, except that it should extend to exemption 
clauses in respect of contracts for services in so far as these relate 
to the use of land.
8 
The Commissions also took different views as to what the 
reasonableness test should be and how it should operate. 
The Law Commission recommended that the test should be 
based on the notion as to whether it was fair and reasonable to rely 
on the contract terms or notice having regard to all the circumstances 
of the case. The onus of showing that it was not fair and reasonable 
to rely on the clause should rest with the party challenging the 
exemption clause. In contracts for the supply of goods, legislation 
5. Second Report, at para. 69. 
6. Ibid., at para 240. 
7. Second Report, at para. 257. 
8. Ibid. 
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implementing the Report's recommendations should list matters to 
which, in particular, regard should be had but would not be the case 
with legislation implementing Parts Ill  (negligence) and IV 
(contractual obligations) of the Report. 9 
The Scottish Law Commission recommended that the test should 
be whether it was fair and reasonable to incorporate the term in the 
contract or notice having regard only to matters which were or ought 
or in the contemplation of the 
or of the giving of the notice. 
fair or reasonable should rest on 
clause. Legislation implementing 
not set out particulars to which 
reasonably to have been known to 
parties at the time of the contract 
The onus of showing that it was not 
the party challenging the exemption 
the Report's recommendations should 
regard was to be had. 10 
Provisions excluding or restricting liability, incurred in the 
course of business, or for death or personal injury, the Commissions 
recommended should be void in the following circumstances: 
"(a) 	Where a person is killed or injured in an 
accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment and the liability is that of his 
employer. 
(b) Where a person is killed or injured while being 
carried as a passenger by land or water or in 
the air and the liability is that of the carrier. 
(c) Where a person is killed or injured in 
consequence of a defect or malfunction or the 
mismanagement of a device for the movement of 
persons 	(including 	lifts, 	escalators 	and 
fairground contrivances). 
(d) Where a person is killed or injured while making 
use of a car park (ie. any facilities for parking 
motor vehicles) and the liability is that of the 
occupier or manager of the car park". 
9. Second Report, at paras. 169 and 178-182. 
10. Second Report, at paras.169-176. See also Appendices A and B 
respectively; these contain the Draft Exemption Clauses (England and 
Wales) Bill (at p.117) and the Draft Exemption Clauses (Scotland) Bill 
(at 	p.168). 	The 	Scottish 	Law 	Commission 	recommended 
reconsideration and amendment of s55(5) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1893 and s12(4) of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, see 
para.196. 
11. Second Report, at para.94. 
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It was also recommended that a power should be given to the 
Secretary of State (acting on recommendations of the Director General 
of Fair Trading) to direct that provisions excluding or restricting 
liability incurred in the course of business should be void in cases of 
death or personal injury resulting from negligence. The Director 
General's recommendations should only be made where persons need 
protection because in his view: 
11(i) 	they specially depend for their personal safety 
on the skill and care of others; 
(ii) either they are not in a position to negotiate or, 
if they are, their bargaining position in relation 
to exemption clauses is weak; and 
(iii) they are exposed to the unfair or unriTsonable 
use against them of exemption clauses". 
The Law Commissions' recommended special control over 
exemption clauses in manufacturers' "guarantees". Provisions 
excluding or restricting liability for loss or damage arising while 
goods were in consumer use, as a result of the negligence of a 
person concerned in the manufacture or distribution of goods, should 
be avoided if they were contained in a guarantee. If the guarantor 
was also the supplier of the goods, damages for injury or loss 
suffered by the person supplied owing to a defect in the goods might 
be recoverable, for example, in an action for breach of the term of 
fitness for purpose of merchantability. The Commissions did not 
consider, therefore, that such an exemption clause of the sort in 
question should be avoided where the guarantee related to goods 
supplied by the person giving the guarantee to the person accepting 
it under a contract between them. 13 
The control of provisions excluding a defendant's liability for 
negligence incurred in the course of a business should apply even 
where it might be assumed from the plaintiffs' conduct that he was 
12. Ibid., at para.97. 
13. Second Report, at paras 99-105. 
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voluntarily accepting the risk. Where the Law Commissions' proposed 
that provisions were void or ineffective, the fact that a person 
agreed to or was aware of the provisions was not, of itself, to be 
regarded as sufficient evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily 
assumed the risk. 14 
The Commissions objected to proposals that control over 
exclusion or limitation of liability should, first, take the form of a 
complete ban, whether in all transactions or in consumer transactions, 
or, second, be limited to specific activities. A complete ban, in the 
Commissions' view, would not go far enough. 
In Ow Commissions' view: 
"T he comments we have received leave us in no doubt 
that clauses or notices exempting from liability for 
negligence are in many cases a serious social evil and 
our review of the powers at the disposal of the court 
for dealing with such clauses show that they are far 
from adequate. The case for some st iqcter form of 
control seems to us to be unanswerable". 
The Commissions came down in favour of a general control of 
exemption clauses in contracts by the use of a reasonableness test 
that would apply to exemptions from liability in both consumer and 
commercial contracts. However, in special cases, there would be 
a complete ban on such exemptions.
16 
The arguments for and against 
the reasonableness test and alternative systems of control have 
already been canvassed. 17 
In reviewing the inadequacy of the existing legislation, the 
Commissions saw no justification for gaps in control over contracts of 
employment, carriage in motor vehicles and by rail, sea and air and 
those relating to car parks and to movement by mechanical devices 
(such as lifts). These lacunae were essentially as follows: the 
14. Ibid., at para.105, 131, 135. 
15. Second Report, at para.44. 
16. Ibid., at para.46. 
17. See Chapter Four, supra. 	
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employer remained free to contract out of his liability in respect of 
the death or personal injury to an employee where this was due to 
the latter's own negligence. A carrier by motor vehicle (unless a 
public service vehicle) was free to exclude his liability to a passenger 
where the use of the vehicle was not required to be insured against 
third party risks. The carrier by public service vehicle, if not 
required to be insured against third party risks, was free to exclude 
his liability to a passenger who was not travelling under a contract. 
Rail carriers were free to exclude liability to passengers travelling on 
a free pass. Carriers on land by means of a vehicle other than a 
motor vehicle, carriers on an inland waterway and carriers by sea 
were free to exclude liability for death and injury to a passenger. 
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that a total ban should 
apply to both contracts of employment and to all carriage of 
passengers. The freedom the sea carrier had particularly could not 
be defended. Sea passengers usually entered into contracts of 
carriage without benefit of legal advice, were unable to vary the 
terms of carriage, and hence, were sometimes inadequately insured.
18 
The Commissions also took note that certain activities, although 
they did not involve carriage as such, had a resemblance to it. A 
member of the public who used a lift or escalator in a department 
store or used a fairground ride like the "Big Dipper" relied on the 
care and skill of the person or persons operating the mechanical 
device in question. There should therefore be a total ban on 
excluding or limiting liability for death or personal injury resulting 
from negligence suffered by any person as the result of the defect, 
malfunction or mismanagement of any device for the movement of 
18. 	Second Report, at paras.85 and 86; the Commission noted the 
effect of the acceding by the United Kingdom to the Athens 
Convention on the Carriage of Passengers and the Luggage by -SeT;- 




The Commission paid particular attention to exemption clauses 
and notices exempting liability for negligence in car parks. 20 Many 
operators of car parks, it was noted, relied on such clauses and 
attempted, in some cases, to introduce such clauses by notices or 
tickets or a combination of both. These clauses had been criticised 
widely as being unreasonable and unfair both within and outside 
parliament.
21 
Negligence by the proprietor was not presumed; it 
was for a claimant to prove. The impossibility and unlikelihood of a 
car park user negotiating the terms of admission were well illustrated 
by Megaw L.J.: 
"It does not take much imagination to picture the 
indignation of the defendants if their potential 
customers, having taken their tickets and observed the 
reference therein to contractual conditions which, they 
said, could be seen in notices on the premises, were 
one after the other to get out of their cars, leaving the 
cars blocking the entrances to the garagh, in order to 
search for, find and peruse the notices!" 
The Commission stated that their recommendations should apply to all 
car parks, which included lorry parks and all parking facilities for 
motor vehicles, operated in the course of a business. These would 
include car parks operated by a firm whose business was not that of 
providing car parking facilities. The Commission recommended that 
the operator of a car park should not be allowed to exclude or 
restrict liability for death or personal injury as the result of his 
19. Ibid., at para.87; the Commissions viewed the recommendation 
as covering lifts, escalators, 'travelators' and 'coaster trains'. 
20. Second Report, at paras 88-93. 
21. Ibid., at para.88, the Law Commissions did not refer 
specific-0T to any Parliamentary debate on the matter nor mention 
criticism by the courts. However, in Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking  
[1971] 2 Q.B. 163 Lord Denning said of the exemption clause at issue 
'...it is so wide and destructive of rights that the court should not 
hold any man bound by it unless it is drawn to his attention in the 
most explicit way .. In order to give sufficient notice, it would need 
to be printed in red ink with a red hand pointing to it, or something 
equally startling (at p.170). For a review of car parking cases see 
N.E. Palmer Bailment Law Book Co. (1979), at pp.195-213. 
22. Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163, 173. 
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negligence or that of his employees, and such purported exemptions 
should be void.
23 
Exemption Clauses and Negligence: Provisions of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act
24 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 affects exemption clauses 
in contracts generally. The Act deals specifically with negligence in 
s2. This is divided into (a) breach of the duty to take reasonable 
care or exercise reasonable skill and (b) breach of the common duty 
of care under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957. These constitute the 
main heads of tortious liability which are most likely to be subject to 
restriction or exclusion by exemption clause or notice. Liability 
under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and Consumer Protection Act 
1961 is a more limited area dealt with by the Unfair Contract Terms  
Act; there are, lastly, heads of tortious liability to which the Act 
does not apply. 
Section 2 of the Act provides as follows: 
11 (1) 
	
A person cannot by reference to any contract 
term or to a notice given to persons generally or 
to particular persons exclude or restrict his 
liability for death or personal injury resulting 
from negligence. 
(2) In the case of loss or damage, a person cannot 
so exclude or restrict his liability for negligence 
except so far as the term or notice satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness. 
(3) Where a contract term or notice purports to 
exclude or restrict liability for negligence a 
person's agreement to or awareness of it is not 
of itself to be taken as indicating his voluntary 
acceptance of any risk". 
Section 2(1) bans the use of any exemptive methods to exclude or 
limit a claim in respect of personal injury or death, whether by notice 
23. Second Report, at paras.88-93. 
24. See P.K.J.Thompson, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977  
Butterworth (1978) Chapter Nine; R.Lawson, Exclusion Clauses after  
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Oyez (1978) at pp.83-84; 
D.Yates, Exclusion Clauses in Contracts 2nd edition (1982) at 
pp.81-110; J.Livermore, Legal Aspects of Marketing  Heinemann, 4th 
edition (1984), at pp.16-21. 
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or contract term. The only exception to the ban is in regard to 
terms exonerating employees from claims by their employers. Terms 
in manufacturers' guarantees that limit liability for negligence are 
banned and made void by virtue of s5. The section only applies to 
goods of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption 
and only where loss or damage arises from the goods proving 
defective while in consumer use. 
Apart from the terms and notices restricting •or excluding 
liability in negligence which are prohibited by the Act, other such 
terms and notices are subjected to the reasonableness test, which is 
contained in s11. The effect of this section is that the term or notice 
must be fair and reasonable having regard to the circumstances which 
were, or ought reasonably to have been, in the contemplation of the 
parties when the contract was made (or, in the case of a notice, 
having regard to all the circumstances at the time of the accident). 
In both cases, if the term or notice limits the liability to a specified 
sum the court must have regard, in particular, to the resources 
available to the defendant and the availability of insurance. 
In certain contracts, business liabilities in negligence may be 
excluded or limited. This is the case with contracts of employment 
which limit the liability of the employee. In a number of contracts 
liability (which includes liability for negligence) may be excluded or 
restricted except in relation to a consumer. Schedule 1 to the Act 
lists contracts of marine salvage or towage, charter-parties of ships 
or hovercraft and contracts for carriage of goods by such craft 
(whether the contract requires this or merely permits it). These 
exceptions are restricted to contracts between businessmen and do not 
apply to claims in respect of personal injury or death. 
For the purposes of the Act liability in negligence can be 
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excluded or restricted in two ways:
25 
(a) by a term in a contract 
made between the plaintiff and defendant and (b) by a notice brought 
reasonably to the plaintiff's attention. In (a) a contract is presumed 
to exist between the plaintiff and defendant. Where, in such a case, 
a plaintiff has a claim in negligence, he may often have an additional 
claim in contract for breach of the contractual duty of care. In the 
majority of reported cases, the courts have tended to construe 
exemption clauses as effective to include liability in contract, but not 
for negligence in tort, (as for instance, in White v. John Warwick 
Cycle Co Ltd 26 ). A widely drawn clause that purported to exclude 
liability in tort and contract is within the ambit ot the Act and would 
only be enforced if it was congruent with the reasonableness test. 27 
Notices may also be used to exclude or limit liability in 
negligence in the case of manufacturers' guarantees and where advice 
is given other than under a contract where a legal duty of care 
arises as in a Hedley Byrne situation. 28 In the Hedley Byrne 
case it was held that a notice that investment advice given in a 
publication was "without responsibility" protected the defendants in 
proceedings against them in negligence
29
. Notices excluding or 
limiting liability are controlled by the Act in cases of business 
3 
liability when the reasonableness test must be applied.
O 
 Notices 
25. Unfair Contract Terms Act,  (1977) ss 2(1), 5(1). 
26. [1953] 1 W.L.R.1285, see Chapter One. See also Alderslade 
v. Hendon Laundry [1945] 1 All E.R., 244, at p.245 per. Lord Greene 
M.R.; Rutter v. Palmer [1922] 2 K.B. 87, at p.92 per Scrutton L.J.; 
Halls v7-Tri—wklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205, at p.213 per 
Scrutton L.J. 
27. See Coats Patons (Retail) Ltd v. Birmingham Corporation  
[1971] 69 Local Government Reports 356; Hollier v. Rambler Motors 
(AMC) Ltd [1972] 1 All E.R. 399. 
28. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 
465; see also Mutual Life and Citizen's Assurance Co Ltd  v. Evatt 
[1971] AC 793; see now Paramatta City Council v. Shaddock (1987-76 
A.L.R. 385. 
29. See note 33. Stevenson v. Nationwide Building Society  (198 4) 
272. For example 663; non-contractual notice. 
30. Section 1(1). 
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excluding or limiting liability in manufacturers' guarantees are banned 
in the case of consumer goods in consumer use. This ban does not 
apply to non-consumer goods or goods put to commercial use. The 
terms and notices of all manufacturers' guarantees are subject to a 
reasonableness test which depends on whether the goods are consumer 
goods and if they are applied consumer goods. The Act applies to 
terms or notices which purport to exclude or restrict liability for 
breach of the common law duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability  
Act 1957. Terms or notices which exclude or restrict liability for 
personal injury are banned, whilst those affecting other loss or 
damage are only effective if they comply with the reasonableness test. 
The Act only applies to liability owed to a lawful visitor in respect of 
breach of obligations or duties arising from the occupation of premises 
1 used for business purposes of the occupier. 3  
The Misrepresentation Act 1967 is amended by s8 of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act. 32 Terms excluding or restricting liability, and 
remedies, for misrepresentation, unless they clear the reasonableness 
test, are, in consequence, invalid. The section is not limited to 
cases of business liability or where a party deals as a consumer. 
Contract terms excluding or restricting liability for a tort 
other than negligence will not normally be of practical importance, 
3 
with one possible exception.
3 
	This will apply where goods are left 
with another person, as in the case of luggage deposited in hotels, 
on trains, or left behind in former lodgings. The person who retains 
such goods and then disposes of them, when not allowed to do so by 
contract with the person who left them, will be liable in conversion. 
The above situations are not covered by the Unfair Contract Terms  
31. Section 2(1),(2). 
32. Inserting a new s3 in the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (U.K.). 
33. For example, where such terms or notices limit liability in 
trespass, 	nuisance, 	deceit, 	defamation, 	intimidation, 	wrongful 
interference with goods, or Rylands v. Fletcher torts. 
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Act. 34 
Criticism of the Unfair Contract Terms Act  
The Unfair Contract Terms Act has been criticised, both on 
the premises on which it is based and also in respect of specific 
provisions, noteably by Palmer and Yates. 35 
The Act itself would appear to be drafted on the firm premise 
that exemption clauses do not effect the accrual of obligation; that is, 
they do not form part of the primary obligations in a contract, but 
operate as defences to accrued rights of action. 36 The judgement of 
Lord Wilberforce in the Securicor case takes a defensive view of 
exemption clauses while Lord Diplock was prepared to acknowledge 
that primary obligations (as well as secondary obligations) could be 
modified 37 or recast by the terms of the contract. Lord Diplock took 
the view that the primary obligation of Securicor to provide a night 
patrol to the factory carried out by a person who would exercise 
reasonable care and skill towards the premises' safety was modified by 
the exclusion clause. It has been argued that, if Lord Diplock's view 
of the role of exemption clause is preferred in future cases, and 
there is a strong support both from academic writers 38 and the tacit 
practices of the business community for that view, then the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act may prove to be ill-adapted to deal with the 
demands made upon it.
39 
Two provisions in the Act dealing with a 
34. See P.K.J. Thompson, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 
Butterworths (1978) at pp.56-58; see also N.E.Palmer, Bailment Law 
Book Co. (1979), Chapter Nine; Chapter Eighteen, at pp.688-692. 
35. N.E.Palmer and D.Yates 'The Future of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act' [1981 ] C. L. J . 108; N . E. Palmer 'Exclusions of Liability 
under Non-Contractual Bailments and Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977' 
(1978) N.L.J. 915; D.Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts (1982), 
Chapter-TFFee; N.E.Palmer Bailment, at pp.952-954; see also B.Coote 
note in (1978) 41 M.L.R. 312. 
36. B.Coote ibid; see Chapter One supra. 
37. [1980] 1 -ATTE.R. 556, at pp.564, 568. 
38. B. Coote 'The Second Rise and Fall of Fundamental Breach' 
(1981) 55 A.L.J. 788; D. Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts  
(1982), at pp.92, 132. 
39. N.E. Palmer and D. Yates 'The Future of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977' [1981] C.L.J. 108, at p.123. 
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term which goes to primary obligations can be used to illustrate this 
problem. 
Unfair Contract Terms Act : Section 3(2)(b)  
Under s3(2)(b) a party contracting with another who deals 
either as a consumer or on the first party's written standard terms of 
business cannot, by reference to any contract term, claim to be 
entitled: 
"(i) to render a contractual performance substantially 
different from that which was reasonably 
expected of him, or 
(ii) 	in respect of the whole or any part of his 
contractual obligation, to render no performance 
at all, 
except in so far as (in any of the cases mentioned 
above in this subsection) the contract term satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness". 
This section is aimed at clauses which have the effect of depriving 
the person against whom they are invoked of contractual rights 
expressed in such terms that the promisee may be led to believe that 
the promisor is undertaking an obligation more valuable to the 
promisee than it in fact is. The Law Commission in their Second  
Report on Exemption Clauses (1975) had in mind the facts of 
Anglo-Continental Holidays Ltd v. Typaldos Lines (London) Ltd" 
when they made their proposals for control of provisions in contracts 
that cut down duties owed.
41 
In the Typaldos case the defendants, 
travel agents, agreed to book for the plaintiffs, also travel agents, 
cruises on a named ship travelling on a fixed route. The agreement 
was made subject to a clause which provided that vessels, sailing 
dates and itineraries, were "... subject to change without prior 
notice". In reliance on this clause, the defendants offered the 
plaintiffs cruises on a different ship following a different itinerary. 
40. [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 61. 
41. Second Report on Exemption Clauses (1975) Law Corn No 69 at 
pp.55-57; See Chapter Two. 
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The vessel substituted was inferior to the first named ship and the 
plaintiffs regarded the itinerary substituted as also inferior. In the 
Court of Appeal, Lord Denning, assuming the clause to be part of the 
contract, appeared to regard it as an exemption clause and held that 
the defendants could not "... rely on a clause of this kind so as to 
alter the substance of the transaction". 142 Lord Russell, however, 
did not regard it as an exemption clause in the sense that the courts 
had traditionally regarded them. "It is a clause under which the 
actual contractual liability may be defined, and not one which will 
excuse from the actual contractual liability".
43 
The type of clause in 
the Typaldos case now falls under s3(2)(b) of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act. 
In a case where s3 (2 ) ( b) has prima facie application 
" reasonableness" has to be considered at a number of points. Where 
a consumer enters into a contract containing exemption clauses (which 
are procedural or definitive, others ambiguous or obscure) which is 
not signed, but may be binding on him on the basis of reasonable 
notice
44 
 it is suggested that there may be at least six occasions on 
which the court has to consider the reasonableness of the terms: 
(1) Incorporation: 	If 	the 	clauses 	are 	not 
reasonable, or are of a kind that the consumer 
would not reasonably have expected to be 
included in the contract, he may44 not be 
regarded as having consented to them. 
(2) Construction: 	If the meaning argued for the 
clauses is not reasonable, and they are 
ambiguously drafted, another more reasonable 
construction may be preferred. 
(3) Section 3(2)(a): 	If the procedural clauses are 
not reasonable they are to that extent invalid 
under the Act. 
42. [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 61, at p.66. 
43. [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 61, at p.67; see also reference to the 
Typaldos case by the Law Commissions in Second Report on Exemption  
Clauses (1975), at para. 144. 
44. See Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 1 All E.R. 686; 
Parker v. S E Railway Co [1877] 2 C.P.D. 416; see Chapter One. 
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(4) Section 3(2)(b): 	If the definitional clauses are 
contrary to what the consumer reasonably 
expected (thus their essential reasonableness is 
relevant) they fall under this subsection and 
(5) Section 3(2)(b)(i) 	renders them ineffective 
except so far as they are reasonable. 
(6) A common law test of reasonableness may be 
applicalake at the time of reliance on the 
clause. 
Arguably the result of applying the test in most cases will be the 
same. Thus, in applying (a) and (b) together with (d) and (e) to a 
pre-emptive clause, if the clause is sufficiently reasonable to have 
been incorporated on the basis of reasonable expectation, without 
specific notification and assent, it could be regarded as a clause that 
the consumer might reasonably expected to have been there. It 
might, therefore, be a reasonable clause, particularly if the court has 
already held that only the more reasonable meaning applies. 
Therefore, in most cases the statutory test may add very little and, 
on the arguments already used 46 that have favoured unconscionability 
over reasonableness as a statutory hurdle for contractual terms, any 
Australian legislation in this area should not in this respect follow the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act. 
Another way in which s3(2)(b) may be avoided is for the 
trader to argue that the other party did not deal "on the other's 
written standard terms of business". 47 In a recent Scottish case, 
McCrone v. Boots Farm Sales Ltd. 48 Lord Dunpark expressly avoided 
45. On the basis of Lord Denning's views expressed in Gillespie v. 
Roy Bowles Transport Ltd [1973] Q.B. 400, at p.416; Photo 
Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd (C.A.) [1978] 3 All E.R. 
146, at pp. 151-152, 153, Levison v. Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co 
Ltd [1978] Q.B. 69. 
46. See Chapter Four, supra. 
47. Section 3(1) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
48. 1981 S.L.T. 103. No facts are reported, for discussion of the 
case see R.Lawson 'The Unfair Contract Terms Act : A Progress 
Report.'(1981) 131 N.L.J. 933 and for the specific problems on the 
use of the phrase 'R- i-a-a—rd form contract' in s17(1) of Part II of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act which applies to Scotland; see E.J.Jacobs 
'Written Standard Terms of Business' [1983] J.B.L. 226. 
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formulating a comprehensive definition of the equivalent term in the 
Scottish part of the Act. The phrase "written standard terms of 
business" is not defined in the Act chiefly because the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission considered that the 
courts were well able to recognise standard terms used by persons in 
the course of their business and to lay down a precise definition of 
"standard form contract" (as the Scottish part of the Act is worded) 
would leave open the possibility that terms clearly contained in a 
standard form might fall outside the definition. 49 Both Commissions 
gave examples of what would be included within "standard form 
contracts" as the following: "printed documents setting out 
conditions of various kinds, terms found in catalogues and price lists, 
and terms set out or referred to in quotations, notices and 
tickets". 5° This wide interpretation was also given to the term 
"standard form contract" in McCrone's case by Lord Dunpark: 
"If the section is to achieve its purpose the phrase 
'standard form contract' cannot be confined to written 
contracts in which both parties use standard forms. It 
is, in my opinion, wide enough to incltisle any contract, 
whether wholly written or partly oral". 
In discussing standard forms, the Commissions classified them broadly 
into two types. 52 First, there is the form adopted for commercial 
dealings of a particular type, such as the Royal Institute of British 
Architects. Second, there is the form produced by, or on behalf of, 
one of the parties to an intended transaction for incorporation into a 
number of contracts of that type without negotiation. The Commission 
made it clear that they regarded standard terms as including those 
inserted in a blank part of printed contract or incorporated by 
49. Second Report on Exemption Clauses (1975), at paras 151-157. 
50. Ibid., at para 152. 
51. 1981 S.L.T. 103, at p.105. 
52. Second Report on Exemption Clauses (1975), at para 152. 
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reference to a handwritten document. A standard form contract, in 
the Commission's view, need not be wholly in writing, since contracts 
were often partly written and partly ora1. 53 The lack of opportunity 
to vary or negotiate terms the Commission did not regard as a 
distinguishing feature of standard form contracts. 54 
Therefore, it appears that although the English part of the 
Act uses the words "written standard terms of business" and the 
Scottish part employs the phrase "standard form contract" 55 the 
Commissions regarded them as meaning the same thing. It may be 
that common sense would suggest that both parts of the Act should 
be given the same effect, nor is there any good reason why English 
and Scottish law should differ on this point. However, the fact 
remains that different wording is used. The Scottish part of the Act 
defines "consumer" as "a party to a standard form contract who deals 
on the basis of written standard terms of business of the other party 
to a contract who himself deals in the course of business". 56 The 
English part of the Act simply •refers to dealing on "the other's 
written standard terms of business". The crucial issue would appear 
to what extent may terms be varied and still be standard. In the 
McCrone case, Lord Dunpark obiter regarded the phrase "standard 
form contract" as wide enough to include any contract, whether 
wholly written or partly oral, which includes a set of fixed terms or 
conditions which the offeror applies, without material variation, to the 
contract. 57 Although his Lordship was not attempting a 
comprehensive definition it is to be regretted that the Commissions' 
failure to distinguish between the two phrases referred to, and to 
provide a definition of them, has created an uncertain area 
53. Ibid., at para 154. 
54. Second Report para 156. See Chapter Four. 
55. Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 Part 1, s3 and Part II, s17(2) 
respectively. 
56. Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 Part II s17(2). 
57. 1981 S.L.T. 103, at p.150. 
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within the law. In the course of the passage of the Unfair Contract  
Terms Act through the House of Lords an amendment was proposed, 
subsequently withdrawn, which read: 
11 • • • standard terms of business means terms which 
have been fixed in advance by the party putting them 
forward with the object of constituting conditions of 
contract for use in stanchrd form whether generally or 
with any specific party". 
Arguably, both parts of the Act should have been worded on the 
basis of s17 with reference to standard form contracts. Standard 
form contracts might be defined as a written collection of proposed  
contract terms fixed in advance for use in similar transactions and  
presented to the other dealing party as a condition of doing  
business. 59 The House of Lord's proposal on written standard terms 
of business mentioned above would constitute a workable parallel 
definition. 
Borderline cases can be anticipated, even with the definitional 
changes above, where written standard terms of business are the 
basis of the contract but are varied for the contract at issue, or 
where additional oral or written terms are purportedly incorporated 
by reference. From earlier discussion, such written terms might be 
regarded as standard, even with variation or reference to external 
terms. 
The supposition that a written agreement, either supplemented 
by orally agreed terms, or by terms implied at law or varied by an 
external terms, oral or written, would fall within the Act, is made on 
the basis that, were it otherwise, the provisions of the Act could 
easily be evaded. This line of approach must also mean that only a 
part of contract which was entirely in writing need be on standard 
58. Proposed by Lord LyeII; House of Lords Committee Stage, H.L. 
Debates Vol. 384 cols. 445 et seq. 
59. See West German Law on Standard Contract Terms 1976 para 1; 
the definition above is a modification of the West German definition. 
See Chapter Four. 
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terms to come within the Act. 60 
There is also the question of when a party has dealt on the 
others' written standard terms of business. In British Crane Hire  
Corporation v. Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd 61 plant was ordered over the 
telephone and the contract documentation was later sent on to the 
plaintiffs. In assessing whether there had been a previous course of 
dealings to incorporate exemption clauses into the contract, the Court 
of Appeal noted that both firms were in the plant hire business and 
were familiar with the terms of the hire contract.
62 
However, it 
seems unlikely that many cases will arise where a party will be able 
to deny successfully that it has been dealing on the basis of the 
other's written standard terms of business. 
However, it is still open as to whether dealing for the 
purposes of s3(1) of the Act would require more than one transaction 
between the parties for the section to operate. 
Unfair Contract Terms Act : Section 13(1)  
Section 13(1) provides: 
"To the extent that this Part of this Act prevents the 
exclusion or restriction of any liability it also prevents 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to 
restrictive or onerous conditions; 
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in 
respect of the liability, or subjecting a person to 
any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing 
any such right or remedy; 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or 
procedure; 
and (to that extent) section 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent 
excluding or restricting liability by reference to terms 
and notices which exclude or restrict the relevant 
obligation or duty". 
60. See R.Lawson Exclusion Clauses after the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act Oyez (1978), at p86. 
61. [1974] 1 All E.R. 1059; see note by N.E.Palmer (1974) 25 
N.I.L.Q. 338; see Chapter One. 
62. [1974] 1 All E.R. 1059, at p.1062. 
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Section 13(1) does not cover exclusions or restrictions of duty which 
fall under s3(2)(b), (ie. reference to any contract term excluding or 
restricting any liability for breach of contract). Section 2 and 
ss 5 to 7 are drafted solely in terms of restriction or exclusions of 
liability. The effect of s13(1) then appears to be that the same 
conditions which the Act applies to an exclusion or restriction of 
liability must similarly be applied in connection with the duty which 
(had it existed and been broken) would have produced that liability. 
Both the liability and the duty can be modified under section 2, 5, 6 
and 7 only in terms of the Act. So in the case of death or personal 
injury arising from conduct performed in the course of business, the 
duty of care cannot be excluded or restricted by a term or notice at 
all. 63 
A literal interpretation of 13(1) would deprive the parties of 
practically all capacity to agree and define the content of all the 
obligations undertaken. To assume that every term or notice which 
displaces a particular obligation must, as a matter of policy, be 
subject to the same controls as a term or notice that modifies liability 
for breach is arguably fallacious. Parties may exclude a primary 
duty from their contractual relationship with full knowledge and 
consent. If, by a literal interpretation of s13(1), such an excluded 
duty is compelled to be readmitted this might be regarded as 
re-writing the contract for the parties. 
One example may suffice to illustrate this. 64 A seller, entitled 
to displace the operation of the implied condition of reasonable 
63. In the case of a consumer contract of sale no term or notice 
which purports to exclude or restrict the implied conditions as to 
description sample, quality or fitness will stand; in the case of a 
non-consumer contract such term or notice will only be valid to the 
extent that it is shown to be reasonable. 
64. See N.E.Palmer and D.Yates 'The Future of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977' [1981] C.L.J. 108, at pp.127-128 for this 
and other examples. 
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fitness65 by showing that it was unreasonable for the buyer to have 
relied on his skill and judgment, would , (on the basis of a literal 
interpretation of s13(1)) be prohibited from showing evidence of a 
term or notice containing a warning to that effect in the case of a 
consumer sale. 
In criticising the drafting of s13(1), it can be argued that the 
draftsman had overlooked the distinction between a purely verbal 
deletion of a primary duty (ie. an evasion purporting to take effect 
by specific agreement alone) and a circumstancial displacement of a 
primary duty (ie. a negation which is a corollary to the promissory 
content of a transaction, but cannot be included as this would run 
counter to the transaction as a whole). Although the first may be 
legitimately controlled under s13(1), the second cannot be so without 
recasting and standardising agreements in an unacceptable manner. 
A realistic interpretation of s13(1), it is suggested, is to limit that 
part discussed to those situations in which the express modification of 
a primary duty is completely at odds with the general circumstances 
of the disputed contract. 
The deletion of duty should only be controlled where the court 
is convinced that, but for that deletion, that duty would inevitably 
have arisen in a legal relationship incorporating all the other 
incidents of the disputed relationship. 
The conclusion may be made that both the content of s13(1) 
and the reasonableness test of s3(2)(b) pose no great threat to 
carefully drawn definitional exemption clauses covered by the Unfair  
Contract Terms Act. This position can be regarded as further 
strengthened by the approach to exemption clauses in the Securicor 
65. 	Section 14(3) Sale of Goods Act 1979 (U.K.) 
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case by Lord Diplock. 66 
Exemption Clauses and Negligence: Reform of Australian law  
The Trade Practices Act is notably deficient by comparison 
with the Unfair Contract Terms Act  in that the former does not deal 
with contracts and notices which exclude liability for death, damage 
or injury arising from negligence. 
There is little doubt that the observations of the Second  
Report concerning clauses or notices exempting from liability for 
negligence that these, in many cases, were a serious social evil could 
be equally applied in the Australian context. 67 The Unfair Contract 
Terms Act could be used as a model for an amendment to the Trade 
Practices Act or for a separate enactment subject to certain 
qualifications. The view has been put that there should be no 
control in the form of a reasonableness test over exemption clauses in 
commercial contracts.
68 As an alternative, it has been proposed that 
the tests contained in the New South Wales Contracts Review Act 
(1980) be applied to all contracts. 69 In the light of the English cases 
in which the reasonableness test in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
has been considered it may be that the test will prove viable as a 
guide to the courts. In the Australian context a preference for 
statutory tests to establish unconscionability has been argued.
70 
66. See Chapter One. The restrictions of both ss1 3 (1 ) and 
13(2)(b), it is contended, can be avoided by the use of definitional 
exclusion clauses and the deletion of the normal contractual 
relationship between trader and customer through the use of 
sub-contractors or non-contractual sub-bailees. 	See D.Yates and 
N.E.Palmer 'The Future of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977' [1981] 
C.L.J. 108, at pp. 131 -134; N.E.Palmer 'Exclusions of Liability under 
Non-Contractual Bailments and Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977' 
(1978) 128 N.L.J. 915. 
67. Second Report on Exemption Clauses (1975), at para. 44. 
68. See Chapter Four. 
69. Ibid. 
70. See Chapter Four. 
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However, the Unfair Contract Terms Act, in respect of its 
provisions concerning negligence, would still serve as a useful basis 





The current state of the law relating to exemption clauses has 
been described, fittingly, as "unmanageably complex") These 
complexities, in part, have stemmed from the past failure of the 
courts to recognise that exemption clauses are an integral part of a 
contract and should not be ignored in assessing the rights and duties 
of the parties to the agreement. The Securicor decision marks a 
turning point in English law where the commercial realities were 
allowed to predominate over the vicissitudes of fundamental breach. 
Where parties are of equal bargaining power and employing a contract 
that clearly delineates and appropriates the risks, rights and 
liabilities of both sides fundamental breach
2 
should not have to 
intrude as a means of determining those rights and liabilities. 
Arguably in Australia the law had in Sydney City Council v. West3 
reached the position laid down in the Securicor case by the House of 
Lords. Construing an exemption clause to relieve a party from 
liability for what would otherwise have been a fundamental breach of 
contract in H and E van der Sterren v. Cibernetics (Holding) Pty.  
Ltd.
4 the High Court of Australia clearly indicated that in a 
commercial bargain that was of clear financial benefit to the plaintiff 
1. D.Yates Exclusion Clauses in Contracts Sweet & Maxwell 2nd 
edition (1982), at p.264. 
2. Or, by implication, breach of a fundamental term. 
3. (1965) 114 C.L.R. 481; see Chapter One. 
4. (1970) 44 A.L.J.R. 157; see Chapter One. 
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such an arrangement was reasonable. 5 
It might seem therefore that inter-business contracts should 
remain clear of further interference, other than that required by the 
existence of the vitiating factors of mistake, misrepresentation, 
duress and fraud, and that the legislature should not attempt to 
impose statutory tests outside the realm of consumer contracts. It 
has been argued that in the majority of commercial contracts which 
contain exemption clauses insurance arrangements can be made to 
apportion loss and risk without due cost to those insuring. However, 
there may exist circumstances where the terms of a commercial 
contract can bear unfairly upon another party, for example in a 
government standard form contract with a contractor. 6 The solution 
suggested is for the criteria contained within the New South Wales 
Contracts Review Act 1980 to be embodied in legislation applying to 
all contracts. Given the relatively small proportion of inter-business 
contracts that have been struck down by s2-302 of the UCC in the 
United States there appears no reason to believe that applying 
unconscionability tests to such contracts in Australia would produce a 
different result. The advantage, already noted, that the Contracts 
Review Act has over s2-302 is a more precise formulation of the 
criteria of unconscionability. 7 Applying these provisions equally to 
5. See N.E.Palmer Bailment Law Book Co. (1979), at pp.942-944; citing 
Metrotex Pty Ltd v. Freight Investments Pty Ltd [1969] V.R. 9 
(Supreme Court, Pull Court) as "a vivid example of the willingness of 
Australian Courts to adopt a laissez-faire philosophy in the analysis 
of bailees exclusions and to extend such exclusions where appropriate 
to quite severe or aggravated forms of breach. 	In such an 
environment fundamental breach has little part to play as an effective 
rule of law"; ibid., at pp.943-944. 
6. See South Australian Railways Commissioner v. Egan (1973) 47 
A.L.J.R. 140; Chapter Four. 
7. Contracts Review Act 1980 s9(2). Contrast D.Yates Exclusion  
Clauses in Contracts Sweet & Maxwell 2nd edition (1982), who would 
leave commercial contracts to be adjudicated by the common law 
principles enunciated in the Securicor case and apply tests of 
unconscionability to consumer contracts only; at p.283; see Chapter 
Four supra. 
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commercial contracts would, with precision, isolate and remedy those 
abuses existing in inter-business contracts. 
The other side of the coin, reform of the implied terms in 
contracts of supply, requires, it has been suggested, a recasting of 
the Sale of Goods Acts and amendment of the Trade Practices Act. 
The comparison can be made between the approach of the Irish Sale 
of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 and the United Kingdom 
Sale of Goods Act 1979. While the latter remains essentially a 
restatement of the original 1893 Act, as a commercial code, the Irish 
Act reformulates, amongst other matters, implied terms in contracts of 
supply, borrowing, in part, from the Australian Trade Practices Act. 
The proposed Tasmanian legislation, the Supply of Goods and Services  
Bill, 8 goes further by repealing the Sale of Goods Act 1896 and 
applying implied terms to all contracts of supply. This Bill appears 
to be more in line with the Trade Practices Act than does the 
Victorian Goods (Sales and Leases) Act 1981. 	The Victorian 
legislation, by covering sales and leases only, creates piecemeal 
reform, and fails to mirror, as is desirable for State legislation, the 
wider coverage of the Trade Practices Act. Unless uniformity is 
created, the Tasmanian model being offered as an example, Australian 
legislation in this field will increasingly develop into a maze of 
statutory requirements governing the supply of goods and services in 
which both consumers and traders will be lost. 
Changes to the implied terms of title and merchantable quality, 
including recent proposals in the United Kingdom by the Law 
Commissions in their Working Paper Sale and Supply of Goods 9 have 
8. See Appendix B. 
9. Working Paper No. 85 (The Law Commission), Consultative 
Memorandum No. 58 (The Scottish Law Commission); see Chapter 
Three. 
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earlier been considered. 10 In respect of the implied term of title the 
reforms brought in by the Victorian Chattels Securities Act 1981 
exemplify a rational solution to some of the problems posed by the 
nemo dat rule. The provision in this Act for registration of security 
interests in motor vehicles giving a purchases constructive notice of 
11 
the contents of that register 	could well be copied by other 
jurisdictions including the United Kingdom where the recommendations 
of its own Law Commission concerning the nemo dat rule have yet to 
be acted upon.
12 
The proposals of the Law Commissions of England and Scotland 
concerning merchantable quality, subject to criticisms already made, 
serve to more precisely delineate key elements that should be included 
within a new definition. The four elements proposed; those of fitness 
of purpose, appearance, finish and freedom from minor defects, 
suitability for immediate use, durability and safety, would appear to 
be both relevant and desirable in respect of consumer contracts. 
What does appear inappropriate is to apply liability for minor defects 
as an element in merchantable quality to both commercial and 
consumer contracts. 
The Law Commission's reluctance to accept different standards 
for commercial and consumer contracts in relation to this particular 
factor is hard to understand. In certain cases, where minor defects 
had been specifically provided for in a commercial contract, the result 
would be that the express intention of the parties would be defeated 
by statute. The experience of businessmen at the hands of the 
10. Chapters Five and Three. 
11. Chattels Securities Act 1981 (Victoria) Part Ill; s15. 
12. Twelfth Report (Transfer of Title to Chattels (1966) 
Cmnd.2958. 
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convoluted judicial treatment of fundamental breach in its English 
setting, might well have alerted any charged with a review of the 
implied terms not to confuse solutions to problems in consumer 
contracts with those arising from bargains struck between parties 
dealing commercially. 
What is clear from the previous examination of the issues is 
that transactions of the latter half of the twentieth century can no 
longer be successfully regulated by enactments of the late nineteenth 
century. Reform, long overdue, should aim at producing a more 
rational environment in which commerce can conduct itself and the 
consumer obtain suitable protection and redress. It is not suggested 
that both requirements are easy to balance against each other, but in 
the preceding pages an attempt has been made to assist the debate, 
with a view to reform. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
In December, 1985, the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1985 
was read a third time in the House of Representatives. This Bill 
seeks to make significant changes in the existing Trade Practices Act 
1974. The Bill has since been published together with an explanatory 
memorandum and the following comments relate to the Bill as it may 
affect some of the content in the foregoing chapters. 
1. Consumer Definition  
Clause 5 of the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1985 
(subsequently referred to as the Bill) proposes the raising of the 
monetary limit in s4I3 from $15,000 to $40,000 in order to provide for 
inflation over the last eight years and to provide some additional 
protection for small business purchases. An amendment to s4 1 of the 
Trade Practices Act provides that all purchases of commercial road 
vehicles 2 are deemed to be consumer purchases. Under this 
provision, truck owner-operators who purchase a truck for use in their 
business are given the protection offered by the warranties and 
conditions implied by Division 2 of Part V of the Trade Practices Act. 
2. Definition of Services  
Clause 37 proposes the repeal of s74(3), which defines 
services, and leaves s4(1) of the Trade Practices Act to define this 
term. This will mean that the warranties under s74 will apply to all 
contracts for the supply of services.
3 
A new ss74(3) provides, 
however that the section does not apply to contracts for the storage 
or transportation of goods for commercial purposes. Contracts of 
1. Sub-section 4B(1)(a)(ii). 
2. As defined by ss 4B(4). 
3. As defined by s4(1). 
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insurance are covered by the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (CwIth.) 
and arguably this area needs no additional regulation at 
the federal level. In the area of transportation and storage of goods 
for the purpose of a business, business parties have well-established 
insurance arrangements which sometimes involve limitation of liability 
in a way contrary to s74. It was judged that no useful purpose 
would be served in upsetting these arrangements, and for this reason 
contracts for the storage and transport of goods for a commercial 
purpose have been exempted from the application of s74. 
3. 	Unconscionable Conduct  
Clause 21 proposes to insert a new s52A(1) prohibiting a 
corporation, in trade or commerce, in connection with supply or 
possible supply of goods and services, from engaging in conduct that 
is unconscionable. The term "unconscionable" is not defined in the 
section although s52A(2) provides guidance as to matters to which the 
Court should have regard. The Explanatory Memorandum cites the 
general principles for use in determining whether conduct is 
unconscionable stated in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. V. Amadio 
and Another: 
"Unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of 
the stronger party in attempting to enforce, or 
retain the benefit of a dealing with a person 
under a special disability in circumstances 
where it is not consistent with equity or good 
conscience that he should do so. The adverse 
circumstances which may constitute a special 
disability for the purposes of the principles 
relating to relief against unconscionable dealing 
may take a wide variety of forms and are not 
susceptible to being catalogued ... the common 
characteristic of such adverse circumstances 
seems to be that they have the effect of placing 
one pyty at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
other." 
4.• 	(1983) 46 A.L.R. 402; see Chapter Four supra. 
5. 	Ibid. per Deane J., at p.423. 
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Sub-section 52A(2) is intended to give some guidance to the 
Court as to matters to which it should have regard in considering 
whether the conduct in a particular case is unconscionable within the 
meaning of the section. The Court may have regard to: 
"(a) 	the relative strengths of the bargaining 
positions of the corporation and the 
consumer; 
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged 
in by the corporation, the consumer was 
required to comply with conditions that 
were not reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the legitimate interests of 
the corporation; 
(c) whether the consumer was able to 
understand any documents relating to 
the supply or possible supply of the 
goods or services; 
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure 
was exerted on, or any unfair tactics 
were used against, the consumer by the 
corporation or a person acting on behalf 
of the corporation in relation to the 
supply or possible supply of the goods 
or services; and 
(e) the 	amount 	for 	which, 	and 	the 
circumstances under which, the consumer 
could 	have 	acquired 	identical 	or 
equivalent goods or services from a 
person other than the corporation." 
Section 52A(2) makes it clear that these criteria do not limit 
the matters to which a Court may have regard for the purposes of 
determining whether a corporation has breached s52A(1). It should 
be noted that the section only applies to supply to a consumer by a 
corporation and does not follow the earlier draft which included 
inter-business transactions.
6 
4. 	Exclusion under Separate Contracts  
Section 68 provides that the implied conditions and warranties 
6. 	See The Trade Practices Act : Proposals for Change Canberra 
(1984) , c1.20, at p.17. 	For discussion of the original proposal see 
Chapter Four supra. 
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under Division 2 of Part V of the Trade Practices Act cannot be 
excluded or modified. It does not, however, presently cover the 
situation where these implied conditions and warranties are excluded 
by a term in a contract separate from the contract under which the 
goods or services are supplied, for example, a blanket indemnity 
clause in a separate contract. Clause 35 of the Bill seeks to amend 
s68 so that any term in any contract which seeks to exclude or 
modify the application of Division 2 to a contract to which it would 
otherwise apply, is deemed void. 
5. 	Liability for Loss or Damage from Breach of Certain Contracts  
The existing s.73 absolves a finance company from all liability 
under the Act for the defective condition of goods it has provided in 
certain circumstances. The section ensures that the dealer who 
actually handles the goods, rather than a company that finances the 
transaction, is responsible under the conditions and warranties 
implied by Division 2 for the quality of goods supplied by way of 
hire-purchase or lease. 
However, in some cases the credit provider must carry some 
fault. If he has an arrangement with the supplier to provide credit 
in respect of purchases from the supplier, he is aiding the supplier's 
business. He is then in a better position to know of the solvency of 
the supplier and depending on the connection he may be able to 
exercise some control over the supplier's business conduct. 
Under the credit legislation recently introduced in New South 
Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and the Australian Capital 
Territory, where a credit provider who is linked to the supplier 
provides credit to a consumer in respect of a purchase from the 
supplier, the credit provider and the supplier are liable jointly and 
severally for any breach of the contract of sale, misrepresentation or 
failure of consideration. 
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The existing s.73 is being repealed and replaced with a section 
modelled on and consistent with the linked credit provider provisions 
in the State Credit legislation. 7 Section 74(1) provides that a "linked 
. credit provider" 8  is liable jointly and severally with the supplier for 
any misrepresentation, failure of consideration or breach of the 
contract of sale. However, where judgment is given against a 
supplier and a linked credit provider, the consumer must first 
demand payment from the supplier and may exercise his rights against 
the credit provider only to the extent that the judgment was not 
satisfied by the supplier. It is a defence if the credit provider 
establishes that the credit provided was not as a result of an 
approach from the consumer induced by the supplier, or that he was 
satisfied by due enquiry before becoming a linked credit provider of 
the supplier's financial standing and good business conduct and 
subsequently he had no reason to suspect that a consumer might be 
entitled to recover loss against the supplier (sub-s. (3)) . 
Where the credit provider is not linked to the supplier, the 
credit provider is not liable for breaches of the conditions and 
warranties implied by Division 2. 9 In these circumstances the 
consumer can seek redress from the supplier. 
6. 	Title to Goods under Division 2A  
The substantive provisions of Division 2A are amended under 
c1.39 to provide that a person who derives title to the goods under a 
consumer (for example, by way of gift) or who acquires the goods 
from a consumer, has the same rights against the manufacturer as 
7. Credit Act 1984 (Victoria) s24; Consumer Credit Act 1984 (New 
South Wales) s24. 
8. Defined in ss74(14). The terms 'continuing credit contract' 
and 'loan contract' used in s73A and s73B respectively are defined in 
terms of s48 and s5(1) Consumer Credit Act 1984 (New South Wales) and 
Credit Act 1984 (Victoria). 
9. Sub-section 74(2). 
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does the original consumer. However, this would mean that a used 
car dealer who buys a car from a consumer for the purpose of 
re-selling it in the course of his business would also be given these 
rights. As it is intended that Division 2A confers rights only on 
consumers, it is provided that Division 2A rights are not conferred 
on persons who acquire goods for the purpose of re-supply. 10 
Currently, the rights conferred by Division 2A, except for 
those conferred by s.74D, only apply to the original consumer 
purchaser.
11 
Under s.74D, the manufacturer's liability with respect 
to merchantable quality arises 
not only in favour of the original consumer but follows title in the 
goods. It has been considered anomalous that this section alone 
should afford rights against the manufacturer to persons who derive 
title to the goods under, or acquire the goods from, the consumer - 
such persons should also be able to claim under ss.74B, 74C, 74E, 
74F and 74G. Section 74B is therefore amended to provide that 
persons who acquire goods from a consumer or derive title to the 
goods under a consumer (e.g by way of gift) may seek redress 
through Division 2A." 12 
7. 	Actions in Respect of Non-Compliance with Express Warranty  
Division 2A of Part V does not apply to goods supplied 
directly from manufacturer to consumer. Although the manufacturer 
would normally be bound by the conditions and warranties implied by 
Division 2 in the case of direct supply, Division 2 does not confer 
rights equivalent to those conferred by ss.74F and 74G. It is 
proposed therefore that these sections are amended by c1.43 to 
10. CI.38(6) inserting para. (aa) after 74A(2)(a). 
11. See Chapter Five, supra.  
12. Subject to the exception noted, see footnote 9 supra. 
Equivalent amendments to s74B are proposed to ss74C - G inclusive 
and s74J (see cl's 40-45). 
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provide that where a manufacturer supplies goods directly to a 
consumer, the manufacturer has the same responsibility as 
manufacturers who sell indirectly to consumers. 
8. Repair Facilities and Spare Parts  
As with s.74F above, s.74G is being amended by c1.44 to 
provide that where a manufacturer supplies goods directly to 
consumer, he has the same responsibility in respect to complying with 
an express warranty as he would if he sold indirectly to a consumer. 
The word "statement" in ss74G(2) is replaced, under the proposed 
amendment, with "representation" to standardise language throughout 
the Act. 
Sub-section (2)(a) is being amended to cover undertakings as 
to the provision of services and supply of parts that are or may be 
required in the 
future. This amendment is consistent with the amendment to the 
s.74A definition of "express warranty". The existing s.74A definition 
of "express warranty" only refers to claims by the manufacturer in 
relation to the quality, performance or characteristics of the goods. 
This definition does not cover promises about services to be provided 
or spare parts to be supplied in the future in excess of the statutory 
requirements (for example, repairs under warranties) or promises 
about the availability in the future of replacement components (for 
example, replacement plates in a crockery set). The s.74A definition 
of "express warranty" is therefore being amended to cover such 
promises. 
9. Product Safety and Information Standards  
Clause 34 of the Bill sets out to repeal ss62, 63 and 63AA of 
the Trade Practices Act and replacing them with a Division 1A of Part 
V dealing with product safety and information standards and product 
recall powers. 
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(i) 	Warning Notice to the Public  
The new s65B gives the Minister the power to publish in the 
Gazette a warning notice, stating that certain goods are under 
investigation as to their safety or to determine whether a product 
safety standard should be prescribed in relation to the goods under 
s.65C (see below). The notice may also warn the public of possible 
risks associated with using the goods. 
Under s65B(2) where such a notice has been published 
advising of an investigation, as soon as practicable after the 
completion of the investigation the Minister is required to insert a 
notice in the Gazette advising of the outcome. This notice may 
contain an announcement of what future action is to be taken in 
relation to the goods. However, this second notice is not required if 
a notice in relation to the goods has been issued under s65J or s65L, 
as a s65J or 65L notice would supercede a warning notice issued 
under s65B(1). 
(1i) 	Product Safety Standards and Unsafe Goods  
The new s65C reproduces in Division 1A the existing s62, 
which is repealed under the proposed c134. Section 65C contains 
certain innovations. For example s65C(2) allows for the prescription 
of safety standards consisting of requirements as to methods of 
manufacture or processing, and as to testing of the goods during or 
after manufacture, as are reasonably necessary to protect persons 
using the goods. 
Sub-section 65C(3), consistent with the U.N. Guidelines on 
Consumer Policy to which Australia is a signatory, prohibits the 
export of goods which do not comply with consumer product safety 
standards or have been declared unsafe or made the subject of a 
permanent banning order under the section, unless the Minister has 
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consented in writing to the export of the goods. This allows the 
Minister to consent to the export of such goods in appropriate 
circumstances, for example, where a foreign government requests 
supply of a certain product. 
Sub-section 65C(7) provides that if the Minister's declaration 
under ss65C expires and a prescribed consumer product safety 
standard in respect of the goods does not exist the Minister may 
impose a permanent ban on the goods. 
Sub-sections 65C(8) and 65C(9) are amended to cover a good 
which is unsafe not because of a defect but because of its very 
nature (for example, a toy catapault). 
Further, where the Minister proposes to issue a notice under 
s65C(5) or 65C(7) or s65J applies and provides an opportunity for a 
hearing in relation to the publication of the notice. 
(iii) Product Information Standards  
The new s65D reproduces in the new Division 1A the existing 
s63 which is being repealed. Consistent with the new s65C, s65D(2) 
permits the prescription of product information standards consisting 
of requirements as to methods of manufacture or processing as well as 
the other matters contained in the existing s63(2). 




provides for the Minister to declare product 
safety or information standards. Section 65E(1) allows for the 
prescription of one standard as both a product safety standard and a 
product information standard if necessary. 
(v) Compulsory Product Recall  
The new s65F provides the Minister with power to order a 
mandatory product recall in certain circumstances. The provision is 
proposed for use where voluntary recall measures do not exist or 
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recall action taken by suppliers is unsatisfactory. Suppliers will be 
actively encouraged by the Commonwealth, State and Territory 
Governments to develop and (when needed) implement effective recall 
procedures. 
Sub-section 65F(1) provides that, where a corporation 
supplies, on or after 1 July 1986, goods that: 
(a) are of a kind likely to be used or intended to be used 
by a consumer; 
(b) do not comply with a prescribed product safety 
standard or have been declared unsafe or permanently 
banned under s65C; or 
(c) are of a kind, in the opinion of the Minister, which will 
or may cause injury to a person; 
and the Minister considers that the corporation has not taken 
satisfactory action to recall the goods, the Minister may require the 
supplier to take action to recall the goods or disclose to the public 
the nature of the defect and procedures for disposing of the goods. 
The Minister may also require the supplier to advertise that he 
undertakes to repair or replace the goods or refund the price. 
Where the supplier chooses to refund the price of goods, and 
period of twelve months or more has elapsed since the acquisition of 
the goods from the supplier, s65F(2) provides that the Minister may 
specify in the notice that the amount of the refund may be reduced 
for past use, in accordance with a specified formula. 
It should be noted that, under s65F(1)(c), this mandatory 
recall power may only be exercised where the supplier has not taken 
satisfactory remedial action. This power of recall is exercisable 
13. 	Reproducing the existing s63AA which is to be repealed. See 
c1.30 of the Bill. 
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subject to s65J, which provides the supplier with certain rights to a 
. 	14 
hearing. 
Under s65F(3), the Minister may give directions in the recall 
notice or in another notice published in the Gazette as to the manner 
in which the supplier is to carry out the recall. Sub-section 65F(4) 
provides that where a supplier undertakes to repair the goods, they 
shall be repaired so as to remedy the defects or to comply with the 
relevant product safety standard where such a standard has been 
prescribed. Sub-section 65F(5) makes similar provision where the 
supplier has undertaken to replace the goods. Where the supplier 
undertakes to repair or replace goods, ss65F(6) makes it clear that 
the supplier bears the cost of the repairs or replacement, including 
transport costs. 
Sub-section 65F(7) provides that, where goods which are being 
voluntarily recalled or are subject to a mandatory recall notice issued 
under s65F(1) have been exported, the exporter must notify the 
person overseas to whom he/she supplied the goods that they are 
subject to recall and the reason for their recall, and under s65F(8) 
provide the Minister with evidence of the notification. This prevents 
goods which are subject to recall action in Australia being dumped 
without notice of the recall on overseas markets. 
(vi) 	Compliance with Product Recall Order  
The new s65G requires suppliers to comply with the 
requirements of a recall notice issued under s65F, and prohibits the 
supply by a corporation of goods to which the notice relates and, 
where the notice identifies a defect or dangerous characteristic, which 
carry the defect or dangerous characteristic identified in the notice. 
14. 	See infra. 
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(vii) Loss or Damage caused by Contravention of Product Recall  
Order  
The new s65H is a deeming provision similar to ss65C(8) and 
65D(7). It provides that where a corporation contravenes s65G, and 
a person suffers loss or damage by reason of a defect in the goods or 
of not having information about the unsafe characteristics of the 
goods, the person is deemed to have suffered the loss or damage 
because of the failure of the corporation to comply with s65G. The 
person could then recover the amount of loss or damage under s82 of 
the Trade Practices Act.
15 
(viii) Opportunity for Conference for Suppliers  
The new s65J provides an opportunity (subject to ss65L and 
65M - see below) for suppliers who would be affected by a notice 
issued by the Minister under ss65C (product safety standards) and 
65F (compulsory product recall) to seek a hearing before the notice is 
issued. Sub-section (1) requires the Minister, when proposing to 
publish a notice under ss65C(5), (7) or 65F(1), to publish a notice in 
the Gazette setting out a copy of the draft notice and a summary of 
the reasons for the proposed publication of the notice. Persons who 
supply or propose to supply goods of the kind affected by the notice 
are then invited to inform the Trade Practices Commission within ten 
days of a date specified in the Gazette if they wish the Commission to 
hold a conference in relation to the proposed publication. 
15. 	Section 82 provides that any person who suffers loss or 
damage by the conduct of another person done in breach of 
aprovision Part IV or V may recover the amount of the loss or damage 
by action against that other person or any person involved in the 
breach. 
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10. 	Offences against Part V  
Section 79 is being amended to double the maximum level of 
times for a contravention of Part V
16 
to $100,000 for a corporation 
and $20,000 for a natural person. 
A new s79(4) is being inserted in the Act to allow the Federal 
Court to grant an injunction or make a corrective advertising order in 
addition to imposing a fine on the person in prosecution 
proceedings.
17 
16. Other than ss52 and 52. 
17. The present position is governed by the Crimes Act (CwIth) 
1914 ss5 and 5A. In effect s79 of the Trade Practices Act is being 
amended to cover the offences created by the Crimes Act. 
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EXEMPT ION CLAUSES : EXAMPLES 
, , JOHN McSHANE MOTORS , 
I 
i 




) 	THIS WARRANTY 1S ISSUED TO 	  
) 
of 	  ) 
) 	In respect of the use vehicle described as follows:— 
) 
I 	Make 	 Year 	 
) 
) 	Reg. No 	 Engine No. 	  Speedo Reading 	 
) 
> 	1. Should any mechanical defect, subject to exclusions below, which affect the 
) 	
normal operation of the vehicle develop during a period of 	  days, 
) 	commencing on 	  or up to the time the vehicle has 
) 
) 	been driven 	
 kilometers, whichever termination shall be reached first, 
) 	
John McShane Motors will supply PARTS ONLY necessary to rectify the defect. 
) 	2 BATTERIES, GENERATORS and OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT are inclu- 
) 	ded only for the first 14 days of this Warranty. 
3. TYRES and TUBES are not inclur!ed in this Warranty. 
) 
4. THIS WARRANTY is expressly in lieu of all other Warranties expressed or 
implied and all other obligations or liabilities on our part, and John McShane 
)Motors neither assume or authorise any other person to assume for them any 
)
liability in connection with this vehicle except the obligation created by this 
Warranty. 
i 	
5. THIS WARRANTY shall not apply if the vehicle is repaired or altered with- 
	
out the permission of JOHN McSHANE MOTORS, or if the vehicle has been 	
0 
subjected to abuse, negligence or accident or has been driven in any reliability 
i or speed trial or test. 
6 THIS WARRANTY Is not transferable or assignable. 1 
7. 	  3 ? .) 
OWNERS please note that this Warranty oxpires at 	  kilometers 
Or on 	  whichever Is the sooner. 
JOHN MeSHANB MOTORS 
By 	  




TERMS AND CONDITIONS Or THE WITI1Val ORDER 
1. Any order taken by any representntivo or employee must be acceated in writing by the Company 
before the same shall be bindino on the Company rind such accaptance shall ba doemed to have 
been communicated to the Customer whorl notice In writing of such acceptance shall have boon 
posted or telegraphed to him in the ordinary way by prepaid letter or telegram or handed to him. 
For the purposes of this clause the words "notice in writing" shall be deemed to include a copy of 
the duly accepted original hereof. Notwithstanding such acceptance by the Company the Company 
may refuse to deliver in accordance with such order. and may cancel any contract arising out of 
such order if the Company receive information that any particulars supplied arc inaccurate or that 
the Customer is not a fit and solvent person to the satisfaction of the Company. 
2. Delivery shall be taken by the Customer (unless othermise stated hereon in writing) and all 
things done and payments made at the Head Office of the Company in DerWent Park. That if the 
Goods are handed over to me at any place other than your above address delivery shall for the pur-
pose of this instrument be deemed to be made as and from the time when it left such address. And 
the Goods from such time shall be at my risk and expense. 
3. The Customer agrees to accept the vehicle with present specgicatIons or with any alteration or 
modification adopted by the Company and/or manufacturer in respect of the vehicle mentioned 
herein. 
4. Every endeavour will be made to give delivery on the date within mentioned but delivery on 
such date cannot be guaranteed and failure to deliver on such date shall not void or give a right to 
void the contract arising from the acceptance of the within order Or render the Company liable for 
damages. The Company shall not be liable for any delays arising from strikes lockouts accidents 
wars or any causes beyond its control. 
5. In the event of the customer falling or refusing to take delivery of the goods herein described 
on the delivery date all moneys paid as deposit on this order and any goods which the Company has 
taken over as part or whole payment for the goods shall be forfeited to the Company. 
6. The property in any car or goods agreed to be sold shall be and remain In the Company until 
payment in full of the total purchase price. The property in any car or goods agreed to be hired shall 
be and remain in the said Company or Nominee until payment in full of the total rental and all other 
moneys which shall be payable by the Customer under the hiring agreement to be signed by the 
Customer before he obtains delivery of such car or goods. 
7. This order if and when accepted by the Company shall be in substitution for any previous order 
contract or agreement if any made by or entered into by the Customer relating to the car or goods 
referred to in the within order. 
8. Prices and Conditions of Sale may be altered at any time without notice, and all products and 
parts therefor are so!d subject to the prices and Conditions of Sale ruling at the time of delivery. 
In the event of increase of price, however, the Customer may in writing cancel this order within seven 
days of receiving notice of the increase. 
9. That in entering into this Instrument I have depended entirely on my own judgment and that this 
instrument embodies the entire terms, inducements and representations whatsoever made or given 
to me by you or any other person, and I declare that all implied conditions or werranties, statutory 
or otherwise, are hereby nerjatived. My taidno delivery of the Goods shall be conclusive evidence 
that the same are in satisfactory order and condition and fit for the purposes for which I require 
them, and despite any error or misdescription no cleim or objection in respect of the Goods shall 
be admissible after such delivery. 
10. If any term or provision or part thereof of this contract is or shall be for any reason invalid or 
unenforceable the validity and enforceability of the remainder hereof shall be in no way affected 
thr.”-c:by. 
CONDITIONS OF PARKING  
WREST POINT HOTEL CASINO  
REST Egg 
WREST POINT 
.HOTEL - CASINO 
CONDITIONS OF PARKING 
Cars driven to and from car path end parliod *ere 
entirely et tho custenseris Ask. Australian National 
Illohls ltd., the Hotel Meows., sod disk servants wird 
*gm.% shall not be mponsibb or Pals hr any loss 
or nsirdelivety of or demags or Injury of wIsahnset 
hind to th. sustenwes motor vehicle, or of or to any 
talkies carriod *mon or *web% or of or to way 
accessories bolonging thereto howsoever that loss, nth- 
delivery, damage, or injury shell be caused. No 
variation of thee, sonditions shall bind Australian 
National Hotels Ltd. or the sold Llama* unless made 





SI-00.received with tit.mksi THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC COMMISSION 
GORDON RIVER ROAD 
NOTICE AND WARNING 
The Gordon River Road provides the only vehicular access to South.West Tasmania. The Hydro. 
Electric Commission has been charged with the responsibility of protecting Me fauna and flora of the area from users of 
the Gordon River Road. which is vested in the Commission. Your co-operation to this end is invited. 
Boating maps and other informative material can be provided at the gatehouse. Maps cost St-00 each. 
The following conditions apply in respect of this road: 
. 	PRIVATE ROAD 
The Gordon Road is a private road controlled by the Commission. 
You are entering, as a licensee, upon a construe:ion area where there are dangerous con-
ditions if construction work is in progress and heavy machinery, trucks md other vehicles operating. 
There is dancer of possible rock falls and slipper; conditions. You enter entirely at your own risk and 
take the area as you find it with its attendant dangers. You shall not have or make any claim for 
injury or &image howsoever occasioned against the Commission, its contractors or its or their 
employees whether due to negligence, breach of duty or other default. 
ENTRY TIMES AND CLOSURES 
The Road is normally open 24 hours daily. 
Visitors are warned that the Road may be closed wholly or in part at any time if dan-
gerous conditions exist as the result of snow or damage by rain or floods or if construction work is 
proceeding in the vicinity. 
The gatekeeper has authority to refuse entry. 
ROAD SAFETY 
The Road has, been designed for a 40 m.p.h. speed except on sections indicated by signs 
where the designed speed is,30 m.p.h. Drivers must observe all signs, beware of loose surfaces and 
soft edges and at all times . drive carefully. 
VEHICLE SAFETY FACILITIES 





There is a service station at Strathgordon with facilities for haulage and repair of vehicles 
and fuel is available there only. 
Drivers of motor vehicles are partietiLirly warned against proceeding on the Road without 
sufficient fuel as supplies are not available on the route of the Road. The return journey from May-
dena to the end of the Road is 106 miles. The Commission does not accept any responsibility for any 
person or vehicle which may become stranded. 
SERVICES 
The - following services and facilities are available to visitors in the village area: 1. General 
Store (not open at weekends); 2. Cafe: 3. Service Station - Road House; 4. Self Service Laundry; 
S. Gents Hairdresser (part time only); 6. Post Office; 7. Commonwealth Bank. 
FIRES 
Visitors are warned that they are prohibited (loin lighting fires' except in fireplaces. No 
files to be lit in the open during acute fire danger periods. 
Cigarettes and matches must not be thrown out of cars and at all times visitors must 
prevent bush fires. 
WILD LIFE AND VEGETATION 
No person havine a gun in his possession or a dog under his control will be permitted to 
enter on the Gordon Road or the surrounding areas controlled by the Commission. Guns may be left 
with the gatekeeper. 
Removal of or damage to vegaation is prohibited. 
PARKING or CARS 
Visitors wishing to park cars for any length of time must ensure that cars are parked sa fely 
tlw main surface of the read so as not to create a hazard for other motorists. 
LITTER 
Please use litter bins and keep the environment clean. 
For and on behalf of the Commission 
r; •• r 
.1 1,1 (ally on. 
Wit t ) 
   
 
4. R. R. Raward) 
Se:roure. 
I Ith Noeember 1976. 
 
  
     
DEPARTMENT OF MAIN ROADS : TASMANIA  
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT: EXTRACT  
06. CARE OF THE WORMS 
16.11 	Liability of the Contractor to Date of Paactical Completion of the Work.° 
From the commencement of the Contract to the Date of Practical Completion of the Works (BB 
defined in sub-clause 42.2) the Contractor shall be (solely liable for the care of the Works, the Temporr4 
Works and all materials, Constructional Plant and other things that are brought on to the site by or on 
behalf of the Contractor or any of his sub-contractors for the purpose of carrying out the work under the 
Contract or that are entrusted to him by the Principal for that purpose. 
The Contractor shall at his own cost make good to the satisfaction of the Superintendent any loss 
of or damage to the Works, the Temporary Works or the aforesaid materials, Constructional Plant and 
other things resulting from any cause whatsoever (save and except the Excepted Risks as defined in sub-
clause 16.2) when such making good is necessary for the satisfactory completion of the Works. When no 
ordered by the Superintendent any such loss or damage caused by any of the Excepted Risks as defined in 
sub-clause 16.2 shall be made good by the Contractor as a variation to the Contract and dealt with pursuant 
to clause 40. 
If a Certificate of Practical Completion is issued for a separable part of the Works pursuant to sub-
clause 42.2, then the Contractor's liability for the care of that separable part of the Works as defined above 
shall cease on the Date of Practical Completion of that separable part of the Works, except for his liability 
during the Defects Liability Period for that separable part of the Works, or for any Operational 
Maintenance Period specified in the Contract for that separable part of thc Works, as stated in sub-clause 
16.3. 
Nothing contained in this sub-clause shall relieve the Contractor of his responsibilities or liabilities 
under clause 18. 
--t- 
   
   
   
   
   
    
16.2 	Excepted Risks 
The Excepted Risks are — 
(a) Any negligent act or omission of the Principal, the Superintendent or the employees, 
professional consultants or agents of the Principal. 
(b) Any risk specifically excepted in the Specification. 
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be declared or not), civil war, 
rebellion, revolution, insurrection or military or usurped power, martial law or confiscation by 
order of any Go‘ crnment or public authority. 
(d) Ionising radiations or contamination by radio-activity from any nuclear fuel or from .any 
nuclear waste from the combustion of nuclear fuel not caused by the Contractor or has 
employees or agents or sub-contractors. 
16.3 	Liability of the Contractor after Date of Practical Completion 
(a) After the Date of Practical Completion of the Works or a separable part of the Works the 
Contractor shall, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) respectively in this 
sub-clause. indemnify and keep indemnified the Principal against all loss or damage to the 
Works or the separable part of the Works or to the relevant Temporary Works arising out of 
or resulting directly or indirectly from any negligent act or omission of the Contractor or any 
sub-contractor or any employee or agent of the Contractor or of any sub-contractor or out of 
•any default of the Contractor under the Contract; and for the purposes of this sub-clause the 
word "default" shall be construed, but without restricting its generality of meaning, sts 
including faulty design, workmanship or materials. 
(b) If a Certificate of Practical Completion is issued for the Works and no Certificate of Practical 
Completion has been issued for any separable part of the Works the indemnity shall extend to 
the Works and the Temporary Works during the period commencing on the Date of Practical 
Completion of the Works and ending on the day on which the Defects Liability Period for the 
Works, or the Operational Maintenance Period specified in the Contract for the Works, as the 
case may be, expires. 
(c) If a Certificate of Practical Completion is issued for a separable part of the Works the 
indemnity shall extend to that separable part of the Works during the period commencing on 
the Date of Practical Completion of that separable part of the Works and ending on the day on 
which the Defects Liability Period for that separable part of the Works, or the Opeartional 
M :tint enance Pei iod specified in the Contrac for that separable part of the Works. as the case 
may be, expires. 	 • 
Oil If a Certificate of Practical Completion is issued for the Works and a Certificate of Practical 
Compktion has been issued for a separable part of the Works the indemnity shall, without 
limiting or :Meeting the indemnity applicable in rel oion to the seam:11)1c part et the orks. 
"L: 11 L 1 to Ilic Wog ks and the Tempoiary Works other than the separable part of 111.. V..wks 
APPENDIX B 
DRAFT SUPPLY OF GOODS AND SERVICES BILL 
(No. 70) 
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3.13 DRAFT PROVISIONS FOR A SUPPLY OF GOODS AND SERVICES BILL 
A BILL FOR 
An Act to amend and repeal the Sale of Goods Act 1896 and with respect to the terms to be implied in 
contracts of supply of goods and services and in leases of goods and with respect to certain other 
matters. 
Definitions —Consumer 
Cf. Trade Practices Act 1974 section 4B 
1. (1) For the purposes of this Act unless the contrary intention appears — 
(a) a person shall be taken to have acquired particular goods as a consumer if, and only if — 
(1) the price of the goods did not exceed the prescribed amount; or 
(ii) where that price exceeded the prescribed amount — the goods were of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption, 
and the person did not acquire the goods, or hold himself out as acquiring 
the goods, for the purpose of re-supply or for the purpose of using them up 
or transforming them, in trade or commerce, in the course of a process of 
production or manufacture or of repairing or treating other goods or fixtures 
on land; and 
(b) a person shall be taken to have acquired particular services as a consumer if, and only if — 
(i) the price of the services did not exceed the prescribed amount; or 
(ii) where that price exceeded the prescribed amount — the services were of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) — 
(a) the prescribed amount is $15 000 or, if a greater amount is prescribed for the purposes of 
this paragraph, that greater amount; 
(b) subject to paragraph (c), the price of goods or services purchased by a person shall be taken 
to have been the amount paid or payable by the person for the goods or services; 
(c) where a person purchased goods or services together with other property or services, or with 
both other property and services, and a specified price was not allocated to the goods or 
services in the contract under which they were purchased, the price of the goods or 
services shall be taken to have been — 
(i) the price at which, at the time of the acquisition, the person could have 
purchased from the supplier the goods or services without the other property 
or services; 
(ii) if, at the time of the acquisition, the goods or services were not available for 
purchase from the supplier except together with the other property or 
services but, at that time, goods or services of the kind acquired were 
available for purchase from another supplier without other property or 
services — the lowest price at which the person could, at that tune, 
reasonably have purchased goods or services of that kind from another 
supplier; or 
(iii) if, at the time of the acquisition, goods or services of the kind acquired were 
not available for purchase from any supplier except together with other 
property or services — the value of the goods or services at that time; 
(d) where a person acquired goods or services otherwise than by way of purchase, the price of 
the goods or services shall be taken to have been — 
(i) the price at which, at the time of the acquisition, the person could have 
purchased the goods or services from the supplier; 
(ii) if, at the time of the acquisition, the goods or services were not available for 
purchase from the supplier or were so available only together with other 
property or services but, at that time, goods or services of the kind acquired 
were available for purchase from another supplier -- the lowest price at 
which the person could, at that time, reasonably have purchased goods or 
services of that kind from another supplier, or 
1983 
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(iii) if, at the time of the acquisition, goods or services of the kind acquired 
not available, at the time of acquisition, for purchase from any supplier 
except together with other property or services —the value of the soods or 
services at that time; and 
(e) without limiting by implication the meaning of the expression services', the obtaining of 
credit by a person in connection with the acquisition of goods or services by him luau 
be deemed to be the acquisition by him of a service and any amount by which the 
amount paid or payable by him for the goods or services is increased by reason of his 
so obtaining credit shall be deemed to be paid or payable by him for that service. 
(3) ' Services ' includes any right (including rights in relation to, and interests in, real or personal 
property), benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred in trade 
or commerce, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes the rights, benefits, privileges 
or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred under — 
(a) a contract for or in relation to — 
(i) the performance of work (including work of a professional nature), whether 
with or without the supply of goods; 
(ii) the provision of, or of the use or enjoyment of facilities for, amusement, 
entertainment, recreation or instruction; or 
(iii) the conferring of rights, benefits or privileges for which remuneration is 
payable in the form of a royalty, tribute, levy or similar exaction; 
(b) a contract of insurance; 
(c) a contract between a banker and a customer of the banker entered into in the course of 
the carrying on by the banker of the business of banking; or 
(d) any contract for or in relation to the lending of moneys, 
but does not include rights or benefits being the supply of goods or the performance of work under a 
contract of service. 
(4) Any materials supplied in connection with services shall be deemed to be a supply of goods 
within the meaning of this Act. 
Supply 
Cf. Trade Practices Act 1974 section 4e 
(5) 'Supplier' includes in relation to goods and services a person who supplies or agrees to supply 
the goods or services. 'Supply' when used as a verb, includes — 
(a) in relation to goods — supply (incuding re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or 
hire-purchase; 
(6) in relation to services — provide, grant or confer; 
and, when used as a noun, has a corresponding meaning, and 'supplied' and 'supplier' have 
corresponding meanings. 
(6) Where it is alleged in any proceeding under this Act that a person was a consumer in relation 
to the supply of particular goods or services, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is established, that 
the person was a consumer in relation to the supply of those goods or services. 
Conditions and Warranties 
2. (1) Except where otherwise provided whether a term in a contract of supply is a condition or a 
warranty depends in each case on the construction of the contract. 
(2) A term in a contract of supply may be a condition even though it is called a warranty in the 
contract and a statement in a contract of supply to the effect that a term is not a condition does not of 
itself establish that the term should not be treated as a condition. 
(No. 70) 	
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Implied Undertakings as to title, encumbrances and quiet possession 
CI Trade Practices Act section 69 
3. (1) In every contract for the supply of goods there is — 
(a) an implied condition that the supplier has a right to supply the goods; 
(b) an implied condition that the goods are free from any charge or encumbrance of which the 
person supplied is not aware when the contract is made; and 
(c) an implied warranty that the person supplied will have and enjoy quiet possession of the 
goods except so far as it may be lawfully disturbed by the supplier or by another person 
who is entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance disclosed or known to the 
consumer before the contract is made. 
(2) Where the seller is in breach of a condition under subsection (1) of this section in a contract for 
the supply of goods or an express term having a similar effect, the person supplied may not discharge the 
contract on the ground of the breach unless — 
(a) he has given notice to the supplier to the effect that he will discharge the contract unless 
the supplier, within a reasonable time, provides good title to the goods or removes the 
charge or encumbrance, as the case may be; and 
(b) the supplier has not, within a reasonable period after the notice was given, provided good 
title to the goods or removed the charge or encumbrance, as the case may be. 
(3) In a contract for the supply of goods in the case of which there appears from the contract or is 
to be inferred from the circumstances of the contract an intention that the supplier should transfer only 
such title as he or a third person may have, there is — 
(a) an implied warranty that all charges or encumbrances known to the supplier and not known 
to the person supplied have been disclosed to the person supplied before the contract is 
made; and 
(b) an implied warranty that — 
(i) the supplier, 
(ii) in a case where the parties to the contract intend that the supplier should 
transfer only such title as a third person may have — that person; and 
(iii) anyone claiming through or under the supplier or that third person otherwise 
than under a charge or encumbrance disclosed or known to the consumer 
before the contract is made, will not disturb the quiet possession of the goods 
of the person supplied. 
Supply by Description 
Cf Trade Practices Act 19 74 section 70 
4. (1) Where there is a contract for the supply by a supplier by description, there is an implied 
condition that the goods will correspond with the description, and, if the supply is by reference to a sample 
as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the 
goods do not also correspond with the description. 
(2) A supply of goods is not prevented from being a supply by description for the purposes of 
subsection (1) by reason only that, being exposed for supply they are selected by the person supplied. 
Implied Undertakings as to Quality or Fitness 
Cf Trade Practices Act section 71 
5. (1) Where a supplier supplies goods in the course of a business, there is an implied condition that 
the goods supplied under the contract for the supply of the goods are of merchantable quality, except that 
there is no such condition — 
(a) as regards defects specifically drawn to the attention of the person supplied before the 
contract is made; or 
(b) if the person supplied examines the goods before the contract is made, as regards defects 
which that examination ought to reveal. 
1111111111111111111•11•MINIMPONowAserso.." • .•••••••• ••• 
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(2) Where a supplier supplies goods to a person in the course of a business and the fnreon 
expressly or by implication, makes known to the supplier or to the person by whom any antene&art 
negotiations are conducted any particular purpose for which the goods are being acquired, there in ola 
implied condition that the goods supplied under the contract for the supply of the goods are reasonably 
fit for that purpose, whether or not that is a purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied, except 
where the circumstances show that the person supplied does not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him 
to rely, on the skill or judgment of the supplier or of that person. 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) of this section apply to a contract for the supply of goods made by a 
person who in the course of a business is acting as agent for a supplier as they apply to a contract for 
the supply of goods made by a supplier in the course of a business, except where the supplier is not 
supplying in the course of a business and either the person supplied knows that fact or reasonable steps 
are taken to bring it to the notice of the person supplied before the contract is made. 
Supply by Sample 
Cf. Trade Practices Act section 72 
6. Where in a contract for the supply of goods there is a term in the contract, express or implied, 
to the effect that the goods are supplied by reference to a sample — 
(a) there is an implied condition that the bulk will correspond with the sample in quality; 
(b) there is an implied condition that the consumer will have a reasonable opportunity of 
comparing the bulk with the sample; and 
(c) there is an implied condition that the goods will be free from any defect, rendering them 
unmerchantable, that would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the sample. 
Meaning of Merchantable Quality 
7. (I) In every contract for the supply of goods there is an implied condition that the goods are of 
merchantable quality. 
(2) Goods of any kind are of merchantable quality if the goods tendered in performance of the 
contract are of such type and quality and in such condition that having regard to all the circumstances, 
including the price and description under which the goods are sold, a buyer with full knowledge of any 
defects, would, acting reasonably, accept the goods in performance of the contract. 
(3) Without limiting the generality of subsection (2) goods of merchantable quality will• remain fit 
or perform satisfactorily, as the case may be, for a reasonable length of time having regard to all the 
circumstances. 
Supply of Services 
Cf. Trade Practices Act section 74 
8. In every contract for the supply by a supplier of service or services and materials there is an 
implied condition that the services will be rendered with due care and skill and that any materials supplied 
in connection with those services will be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are supplied. 
Implied Conditions In Supply of Services 
9. (1) In every contract for the supply by a supplier of services where the person supplied expressly 
or by implication makes known to the supplier any particular purpose for which the services are required 
or the result that he desires the services to achieve, there is an implied condition that the services supplied 
under the contract for the supply of services and any materials supplied in connection with those 
services — 
(a) will be reasonably fit for that purpose; or 
(b) are of such a nature and quality that they might be reasonably expected to achieve 
result, except where the circumstances show that the person supplied does not rely or it 




Supply of Services by Sample 
10. In a supply of services — 
(a) where the supplier shows to the buyer a demonstration of, or a result achieved by services 
and the person supplied is induced by the demonstration or by the showing of ;he result 
to buy services of that kind; or 
(b) in which there is a term express or implied to the effect that the supply is a supply of 
services of the kind that are shown to the person supplied in demonstration, or that 
achieved a particular result shown to the person supplied there is — 
(i) an implied condition that the services will correspond in nature and quality 
with the services shown in the demonstration or will correspond in quality 
with the services that achieved that result; and 
(ii) an implied condition that the services will be free from any defect rendering 
them unfit for the purposes for which services of that kind are commonly 
bought that would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the services 
shown in the demonstration or the result achieved by services of that kind 
and of which the person supplied is not aware when the sale is made. 
Reselsison of Contracts 
Cf. Trade Practices Act section 74A 
11. (1) Where — 
(a) a supplier supplies goods in the course of a business; and 
(b) there is a breach of a condition that is, by virtue of a provision of this Act, implied in the 
contract for the supply of the goods, the person supplied is, subject to this section, entitled 
to rescind the contract by — 
(c) causing to be served on the supplier a notice in writing signed by him giving particulars 
of the breach; or 
(d) causing the goods to be returned to the supplier and giving to the supplier, either orally 
or in writing, particulars of the breach. 
(2) Where a person supplied purports to rescind under this section a contract for the supply of goods 
by a supplier, the purported rescission does not have any effect if — 
(a) the notice is not served or the goods are not returned within a reasonable time after the 
person supplied has had a reasonable opportunity of inspecting the goods; 
(b) in the case of a rescission effected by service of a notice, after the delivery of the goods to 
the person supplied but before the notice is served — 
(i) the goods were disposed of by the person supplied, were lost, or were destroyed 
otherwise than by reason of a defect in the goods; 
(ii) the person supplied caused the goods to become unmerchantable or failed to 
take reasonable steps to prevent the goods from becoming unmerchantable; 
or 
(iii) the goods were damaged by abnormal use; or 
(c) in the case of a rescission effected by return of the goods, while the goods were in the 
possession of the person supplied — 
(i) the person supplied caused the goods to become unmerchantable or failed to 
take reasonable steps to prevent the goods from becoming unmerchantable; 
or 
(ii) the goods were damaged by abnormal use. 
(3) Where a contract for the supply of goods by a supplier has been rescinded in accordance with 
this section — 
(a) if the property in the goods had passed to the person supplied before the notice of rescission 
was served on, or the goods were returned to, the supplier — the property in the goods 
revests in the supplier upon the service of the notice or the return of the goods; and 
(b) the person supplied may recover from the supplier, as a debt, the amount or value of any 
consideration paid or provided by him for the goods. 
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(4) The right of rescission conferred by this section is in addition to, and not in derogation of, any 
other right or remedy under this Act or any other Act, or any rule of law. 
Implied terms and conditions not to be excluded or modified 
Cf Trade Practices Act section 68 
12. (1) Any term of a contract for the supply by a supplier of goods or services to a consumer 
(including a term that is not set out in the contract but is incorporated in the contract by another term 
of the contract) that purports to exclude, restrict or modify or has the effect of excluding, restricting or 
modifying — 
(a) the application in relation to that contract of all or any of the provisions of this Act; 
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision; or 
(c) any liability of the supplier for breach of a condition or warranty implied by such a 
provision, 
is void. 
Cf Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.) section 13 
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1) any term of a contract referred to in subsection 
(1) of this section that purports to, or has the effect of — 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions; 
(b) excluding., restricting or modifying any right or remedy in respect of the liability, or 
subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing any such right or ' 
remedy; 
(c) excluding, restricting or modifying rules of evidence or procedure; 
(d) excluding, restricting or modifying liability by reference to terms and notices which exclude, 
restrict or modify the relevant obligation or duty, 
is void. 
(3) But an agreement in writing to submit present or future differences to arbitration is not to be 
treated for the purposes of this section as excluding or restricting any liability. 
(4) A person who contravenes a provision of this section is guilty of an offence punishable on 
conviction by a fine not exceeding $10 000. 
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